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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this study is to revisit the American presidential election of 1972 via the 
interpretive lens of Richard Nixon‟s loyal inner circle. It argues that the Watergate scandal that 
forced Nixon to resign the presidency two years later has minimized the meaning of that 
watershed event. The massive landslide victory by the Nixon administration at the polls has been 
lost in the details of the break-in at the Watergate complex. The result is that the connection 
between Nixon, his loyal White House aides, and the millions of faithful supporters is minimized 
and even forgotten in the scholarship on the 37
th
 president. Nixon is too often seen as an isolated 
and disconnected leader, and consequently, the second greatest margin of victory in American 
presidential history has been largely neglected as a significant event in the literature. Supported 
and informed by archival documents, staff memoirs, newspaper accounts, and secondary sources, 
this study revisits the election through the eyes and actions of the president‟s men, concluding 
that his team developed a specific strategy to attract traditional Democratic voters, independents 
and disaffected voters, forging a post-1960s consensus. This outcome was aided by a strategy to 
portray Democratic opponent George McGovern as an extremist unpalatable to the American 
heartland. Nixon‟s image as a lonely and isolated figure inside the Oval Office has been 
misunderstood as it was also part of a specific strategy hatched by his inner circle after the 
midterm elections of 1970 to have the politician act “presidential” and remain in the White 
House, above the nasty fight for votes on the campaign trail. Nixon and his loyal aides used these 
strategies to reach the „silent majority‟ of Americans, and thereby secured an overwhelming 
victory. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
ust swirled and danced through the afternoon sky as the presidential motorcade moved 
through another in a long line of rural counties. As the miles flew past, Richard Nixon 
gazed at his fellow Americans from behind the glass of his midnight blue limousine, watching as 
they waved, clapped, and held handmade signs. One sign in particular caught the president‘s 
attention. It stated, ―No amnesty. We lost our son in Vietnam.‖ The veteran politician ordered the 
long automobile over to the side of the road and walked back to where the family stood. ―I talked 
to the mother, to the father, to the brother of the man who had been killed,‖ Nixon said, recalling 
the encounter as he had with so many others over his long political career. ―I shook hands with 
them,‖ he remembered, conscious of his appearance in his customary dark blue suit as he stood 
with the farm family on the side of the road. ―Anyone who has been in politics and who shakes 
hands a lot can tell a lot about people by how they shake hands . . . the feel of their hands. I 
shook hands with the man . . . he obviously was a working man . . . a farmer. It was a calloused 
hand . . . strong and firm.‖ The stronger impression for the president, however, came from the 
mother. ―Her hands also were somewhat rough . . . and they were red. She obviously cannot have 
a dishwasher, and she didn‘t have all those fancy things that you read about in Vogue . . . . I 
thought about my own mother and father. My father had hard hands, too, because he worked all 
of his life. My mother‘s hands were not pretty, but I always thought they were beautiful because 
I knew how much she did and how hard she worked, all day baking pies at 4:00 o‘clock in the 
morning to send four kids to college . . . .‖1   
Politics for Richard Nixon were always personal: rough hands, hard, bittersweet 
memories, a curious mixture of high expectations and curdled resentment. As with millions of 
his fellow citizens, however, Nixon‘s essential outlook on the circumstances of life was not 
unique. Indeed, his views were part of a larger American story shared by people across the 
heartland who believed in the rhetoric of hard work over patronage, national service over self-
interest, and hope over despair. While in many ways an enigmatic figure, Nixon was also a 
significant political force who never had to go it alone in his political life, and seldom did. As 
with the farm family on the side of the road, the butcher‘s son drew solid support from the 
American people for more than a generation, supporters who had opened doors for him since the 
beginning of his political career and checked the box by his name on Election Day at every step 
along the way. Through his election to both houses of Congress, as vice president of the United 
States, a bid for the presidency in 1960, a gubernatorial run in California in 1962, to his 
triumphant return to the political arena in 1968, Nixon always benefited from uncountable 
committed followers. Some had rough hands and toiled in the golden fields of Nebraska and 
Iowa and others donned shirts and ties and occupied the halls of Brown and Georgetown. 
Richard Nixon‘s well documented personal contradictions coupled with his inglorious 
political epitaph, however, has limited discussions concerning the long-standing support the 
politician enjoyed among the American electorate. Too often, the weight of Nixon‘s personal 
demons have come to define him in regards to domestic politics, where the former president‘s 
image is little more than a dark and brooding persona that was ―cut off from the rest of 
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 From Richard Nixon‘s address to his surrogates in the Cabinet Room, October 29, 1972. Please see memorandum 
from David C. Hoopes to The President‘s File, October 29, 1972, President‘s Office Files, Box 90, National 
Archives Records Administration, hereafter NARA, and memorandum from the President to H.R. Haldeman, July 
24, 1972, Contested Files, White House Special Files, Box 35, Nixon Library. 
D 
  2 
humanity‖ or ―alone in the White House.‖2  Although the historical record indicates that Nixon 
was awkward in his personal relationships, had few close friends, and ―even his dog didn‘t like 
him,‖ these characteristics do not explain his exceedingly successful public career, including his 
controversial White House years.
3
 Nixon‘s inherent contradictions did not prevent him from 
leading a fearsome squad of committed and loyal combatants, and, in many ways, from 
becoming a representational figure who dominated and reflected much of the post-war political 
terrain in America. Some influential historians, however, contend that Nixon only reflected his 
own darkness: a troubled, isolated, criminal soul revealed in enemy lists, Oval Office expletives, 
and clumsy but determined burglars with flashlights. 
As respected historian Stanley Kutler has concluded, Nixon‘s long political career must 
be filtered through the dark lens of Watergate. The man from Yorba Linda cannot be viewed 
significantly beyond this scandal and the associated abuses of power. In his view, the politician 
is the lone, responsible player, a reference not merely to Watergate but to his entire political 
career. Moreover, although Kutler maintains that the president‘s men should fade into a ―well-
deserved obscurity,‖ these ―spear carriers‖ were neither suits from central casting nor an 
infinitesimal clique of reactionary conservatism. Indeed, they were men who themselves 
represented a significant cross-section of the nation‘s populace, exhibiting many of the same 
hopes, fears, and assumptions as others in Middle America, and they were fiercely loyal to 
Richard Nixon.
4
  
As historian David Greenberg has accurately pointed out in his intelligently conceived 
Nixon’s Shadow, it is important for history to understand how people remember the president, 
and what he meant to those most close to him at the time. ―Understanding a president‘s 
importance requires reaching beyond policy to appreciate the feelings and reactions he inspired 
from the people he led.‖5 But even for scholars such as Greenberg, transcending what happened 
at the offices of the Democratic National Committee and the image of Nixon as the dark and 
lonely political persona trapped in the White House under the shadow of Watergate is 
problematic. Historian Joan Hoff (whose favorable retelling of Nixon‘s domestic achievements 
was met with harsh criticism) suggests that even sympathetic scholars such as Iwan Morgan and 
the aforementioned David Greenberg who agree that the president did indeed achieve more 
during his time in power than is acknowledged, ―conclude that Watergate will remain the 
negative scrim through which those achievements must be viewed because it so tarnished his 
image and reputation.‖6  
Indeed, Greenberg reminds us that the president‘s death in April 1994 did little to change 
the lasting image that the scandal wrought. ―Obituaries did not start with his trip to China, his 
crusades for forgotten Americans, his victimization, or his Great Society agenda. They did start 
with Watergate.‖7  Nixon scholar Melvin Small argues that there are good reasons for this. As 
the historian has pointed out, ―One can easily make the case that Watergate was emblematic of 
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 Please see Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001).  
3
 See Elizabeth Drew, Richard M. Nixon: The American Presidents Series: The 37th President, 1969-1974 (New 
York: Times Books, 2007), 45. 
4
 Stanley Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon (New York, NY: Knopf, 1990), 617. 
5
 David Greenberg, Nixon’s Shadow: The History of an Image (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 336-
337. 
6
 Joan Hoff, ―How Neo-Conservatives Helped Bring Down Richard Nixon,” February 21, 2005, George Mason 
University‘s History News Network, http://hnn.us/articles/10327.html. Please see also Iwan Morgan‘s Nixon 
(London and New York: Arnold/Oxford University Press, 2002). 
7
 Greenberg, Nixon’s Shadow, 345. 
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Nixon‘s behavior throughout his career.‖8 There is a downside to Watergate as the primary lens 
to the president‘s political soul, however, as the break-in and the associated abuses of power 
have tended to reflect back and explain too many events darkly, including the idea that the 
scandal unequivocally supports the conclusion that the president was fatefully secluded in the 
White House. Although Nixon was unquestionably a troubled, joyless, and intensely private 
individual, Watergate has served to magnify these traits inordinately, contributing to a 
misleading representation of his isolation within the White House. It is apparent in the writing of 
historians who present the Nixon presidency both favorably and unfavorably.
9
  
It should not surprise that the Watergate scandal that brought about Nixon‘s political 
demise has produced much of the scholarship concerning his administration‘s political activities, 
particularly the details of his reelection bid in 1972. The few works that deal even indirectly with 
that election year have been largely comprised of tales of dirty tricks and a White House 
enmeshed in damage control over the break-in at the headquarters of the Democratic National 
Committee. While Watergate was a significant historical event, representing an important part of 
the president‘s complex makeup, the weight of that historical episode has rendered his reelection 
landslide victory almost a footnote in the scholarship. An election year seemingly dominated by 
burglaries and political malfeasance by Nixon campaign functionaries, however, does not 
explain why a clear majority of adult Americans voted to send Richard Nixon back into the 
White House in 1972, as his administration claimed 49 out of 50 states that November.
10
 
 An investigation deep within Nixon‘s inner circle during the day-to-day efforts to build a 
winning strategy to retake the White House shows not a fixation with the execution of dirty 
tricks or even an obsession with the possible ramifications of Watergate, but a pragmatic 
political response to what they perceived was the mood of the great middle spectrum of 
American voters. By lifting the veil of Watergate and revisiting the seminal reelection campaign 
of 1972, this dissertation hopes to explain the apparent connection between the president and the 
greater American population that supported him and his administration with an overwhelming 
victory in November of that year, and how his loyal team inside the White House made it 
happen.  
 Rather than a history of an American presidential election, or an examination of an 
administration‘s foreign and domestic policies, this study is an investigation into the political 
animal that was Richard Nixon‘s inner circle during the election year of 1972. That political 
                                                 
8
  Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 310. 
9
 Please see Herbert Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 610, and Tom Wicker, 
One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream (New York, NY: Random House, 1991), 652, 653. 
Interestingly, the image of a Nixon White House shrouded in darkness remains largely unchallenged even by Small, 
Parmet, and Wicker, though certainly—and curiously—many of their observations appear to contradict this 
representation. See also Michael A. Genovese, The Nixon Legacy: Power and Politics in Turbulent Times (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1990), 241. Joan Hoff, ―How Neo-Conservatives Helped Bring Down Richard Nixon.” 
10
 Affording untoward reinforcement to Nixon as dark loner was historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who as the general 
editor for the American Presidents series, chose not a fellow historian to pen a new biography on Richard Nixon but 
Watergate-era and veteran journalist Elizabeth Drew. See Drew‘s Richard M. Nixon. The journalist‘s portrayal of 
the 37
th
 president is especially acidic, written more from the standpoint of a Nixon nemesis than biographer. Indeed, 
it is not qualitatively different than the intriguing personality and psychoanalytical inquiries (with pseudo-medical 
subtexts) on Nixon, which for all of their readability, have not explained the ascension of a young man from 
Whittier to the highest offices in the land. Please see Fawn Brodie, Richard Nixon, The Shaping of His Character 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), and Anthony Summer‘s The Arrogance of Power (New York: 
Viking, 2000). 
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entity—the president‘s White House team—was arguably as complex and contradictory as 
Nixon himself, a hardnosed but insightful partisan assemblage that reached out to the nation‘s 
heartland and secured a landslide of historical proportions. Nixon’s Loyalists tells the little 
known story of the strategy hatched by the president‘s men in the immediate aftermath of the 
disappointing mid-term elections of 1970 to keep the career politician in the White House and 
out of his own campaign. During the reelection campaign, key Nixon aides including Pat 
Buchanan, Charles Colson, H.R. Haldeman, Dwight Chapin, John Ehrlichman, Bill Safire, Jeb 
Magruder, Larry Higby, Ken Cole, Gordon Strachan, and John Mitchell kept the ―fighting 
president‖ safely sequestered inside the Oval Office acting ‗presidential‘ while carefully scripted 
surrogates, including Bob Dole, John Connally, John Tower, Barry Goldwater, and Edward 
Gurney took the Nixon epistle to the people.  Nixon‘s dedicated political team planned to 
mitigate his rougher or ―unlikable‖ qualities, while reconnecting the president with those in 
Middle America it sensed would back him at the polls. This benefaction hinged on preventing 
their boss from contributing to the public unease, fear, and fatigue following a decade of shock 
and upheaval. Nixon‘s team adjusted, repackaged, and projected a safe, bucolic image of the 
politician for nationwide consumption. While his men were opportunists, their efforts were not 
purely cynical in approach. They reflected both like-mindedness and an acute understanding of 
the nation‘s mood—a mood that appeared both weary and fearful of continued unrest on the 
streets and campuses across the nation. 
 The result was in many ways the team‘s successful, if short-lived, effort to build a post-
1960s consensus of moderate Democrats, Republicans, and independents, not unlike the big tent 
majority enjoyed by Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s or the one Lyndon Johnson brought home 
in 1964. Indeed, the landslide of 1972 revealed not so much a fractured and divided nation, as 
argued by historian Rick Perlstein but one that appeared to be quite willing to follow the lead of 
Richard Milhous Nixon and his loyal men.
11
 While deep divisions existed in the nation between 
the largely young left-leaning minority and the very real silent majority identified by Nixon, the 
appearance of a divided country was largely a facade, colored by television images of protesting 
youth and burning flags. It was a reality that the president and his men belatedly recognized and 
seized upon, making Democratic nominee George McGovern appear to be even more of a 
minority candidate than he actually was. 
 This work will also be the first to drill down deep into both the origins and the execution 
of the electoral strategy hatched by Nixon‘s team after 1970 to retake the White House. It 
provides a detailed investigation into the operation to both divide their challengers and build a 
new coalition from the remnants of the Democratic Party. It will provide a new view of the 
team‘s efforts to capture a ―Republican majority,‖ efforts that depended on portraying the 
Democrats as the party that represented a noisy, violent minority, an entity that catered to its 
friends in the ―Eastern Establishment.‖ The collaborative efforts of key strategists such as Pat 
Buchanan and Charles Colson with their engaged and passionate staffers crafted  a strategy that 
set out to portray their opponents as the ―ins,‖ and the incumbent administration as the ―outs‖—
men who represented the ―forgotten‖ citizens in Middle America. Reflecting their own 
discontent with the nation‘s trajectory, Nixon‘s men labeled Democrat George McGovern as an 
extremist unpalatable to the heartland and outside the mainstream of American political life, 
underscoring their opponent‘s self-immolation. It was a plan that drew from another massive 
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 In Rick Perlstein‘s fascinating Nixonland, the historian argues that division, not consensus, ruled the day in 1972. 
See Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of a Nation (New York: Scribner, 2008). 
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landslide, where Lyndon Johnson built a massive majority by portraying Republican challenger 
Barry Goldwater as an extremist outside the mainstream of American thought. In this fight 
between ―elites‖ and the defenders of ―real‖ Americans, the old Nixon ―enemy‖—the media—
was enlisted as an unwitting ally to deliver to voters the Nixonian message and the image of 
Democratic candidates as radicals and extremists. As such, it reveals that the behavior of the 
Washington press corps and the national media towards the Nixon administration was largely 
favorable during the campaign of 1972. What this dissertation will reveal is that the team‘s 
purposeful electoral ―front-porch‖ strategy to keep Nixon inside the White House has become 
misunderstood as presidential isolation.  
This dissertation also shows that what ostensibly were the biggest feathers in Richard 
Nixon‘s political cap in 1972—the administration‘s foreign policy initiatives—were largely 
separated from the political activities. It is clear that the president wished to avoid sparring with 
his Democratic opponents on these issues because he believed that he already held the winning 
diplomatic cards and such political skirmishes would only sully his achievements. While Nixon‘s 
historic trip to China, détente with the Soviet Union, and achieving an ―honorable‖ end to the 
war in Vietnam were crucial to the president‘s self image as a statesman, they seldom appeared 
to play a significant part of the overall or even the day-to-day campaign strategy. Whereas the 
timing of a peace treaty with Hanoi was indeed managed for political reasons, the overarching 
issues of Vietnam—amnesty, peace treaties, and POWS—played no central role in the campaign 
strategy. Nixon‘s team knew from the polls that a majority would back the president over anyone 
in the Democratic field based upon his stance against amnesty for draft resisters and for ―peace 
with honor‖ in Vietnam. It was no different with his bold diplomatic overtures with Moscow and 
China. Indeed, in the election of 1972, the strategy of keeping ‗Nixon the statesman‘ isolated 
from the political campaign was a clear winner. By raising the president above skirmishes with 
the counterculture and the antiwar movement, the team limited its opponents‘ ability to 
characterize the incumbent‘s behavior as more of the same from ―tricky Dick.‖  
 This dissertation will contribute to the scholarship on the Nixon presidency in a number 
of other ways. It will provide the first stand-alone study of the president‘s reelection campaign of 
1972 since Theodore H. White‘s The Making of the President, 1972, published in 1974, and offer 
a much-needed look at the often-volatile internal political dynamic inside the Nixon White 
House. In the process, this work will challenge charter myths, including that Nixon‘s Chief of 
Staff, H.R. Haldeman, was a gatekeeper who isolated the president inside the Oval Office and 
that dirty tricks, rather than a sophisticated multi-level form of nuanced political hardball, 
characterized the 1972 campaign.
12
  
 This work is not a defense of Richard Nixon, nor is it an attempt to minimize the 
historical importance of Watergate and the associated abuses of power, as such events represent 
an unfortunate part of his administration and a dark corner of the president‘s complex 
personality.  What the study will show, however, is how the scandal and Nixon‘s subsequent 
resignation inadvertently has kept some important insights from the historical record, among 
them that dirty tricks, including the Watergate break-in, had little to do with the landslide 
election victory of 1972. Ultimately, if Nixon did indeed reflect only the political darkness, then 
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 As will be discussed in later chapters, there is ample evidence to suggest that Haldeman mostly approved of the 
hardball tactics that came and went through the Oval Office doors courtesy of Chuck Colson and others in the inner 
circle. The image of Haldeman as gatekeeper is reinforced in Nixon scholarship over the past thirty years, from 
Stanley Kutler to Elizabeth Drew, including by staff in their memoirs. The way the Nixon White House actually 
operated belies this widely held belief.  
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historians must wrangle not just with the late president and his faithful supporters within the 
White House but also with those in the vast American heartland who demonstratively supported 
this highly recognizable politician to his great benefit for almost three decades. After all, Richard 
Nixon‘s warts had been visible long before anyone outside the beltway had heard of the 
Watergate complex in downtown Washington, D.C. 
 Nixon’s Loyalists is drawn from an immense collection of rich historical sources (most 
not available to Theodore White), numerous underutilized and seldom used (with respect to the 
1972 presidential election) archival documents, memoranda, letters, briefing notes, as well as the 
White House Tapes, scores of them recently released, as well as extensive national and regional 
polling data. This dissertation also revisits the many staff memoirs from Nixon‘s inner circle. 
Examining the president‘s closest political advisers who were themselves part of the post-war 
American story provides a pathway to understanding the complexity of the Nixon White House, 
a character that was in full expression during the reelection campaign. To understand Nixon and 
his times, it is crucial to expose the president‘s dynamic inner circle, a political animal that was 
ready to pull the meat from the bone during what was to be the final campaign for one of the 
more influential and remarkable American politicians in the last half of the 20
th
 century. 
 
**** 
 Nixon’s Loyalists is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1: Heartland Homilies outlines 
the team‘s shifting strategy for election year, away from a combative president to one that spoke 
in prosaic terms to the heartland. It details the emerging decision to divide the Democrats and 
build a new coalition from that party‘s traditional voting blocs.  Chapter 2: ―Holy‖ Warriors, 
looks at the key figures among the president‘s political team, its style of attack, and its 
preparations for waging ―holy war‖ against its opponents. Chapter 3: Unhorsing Big Ed, details 
the successful effort to destroy the assumed front-runner for the Democratic ticket, Edmund 
Muskie. It will trace the rapid-fire approach to undercutting Democratic rivals as they emerged 
and the effort to help decide for the Democrats who would lead them into the fall election. 
Chapter 4: The Making of an Extremist, outlines the manner in which the president‘s team 
portrayed George McGovern as an elitist radical, a representative of the far-left. Chapter 5: 
Above the Battle, traces the strategy to keep the president safely sequestered in the White House, 
acting presidential, while senior staff and surrogates did his bidding with the media and the 
public. It also reveals the depth of partisanship and infighting among the president‘s team as it 
drove for the total electoral destruction of George McGovern, while Nixon remained in the Oval 
office and out of the public campaign. Under the domination of Charles Colson we see that the 
process of politics often trumped the particulars of policy. Chapter 6: The Front-Porch Campaign 
investigates the inner circle‘s unorthodox approach to electioneering, as the president behaved 
like he was not in a campaign while his team descends upon McGovern and his running mate 
Sargent Shriver, painting them as radicals, and outside the American mainstream. Chapter 7: A 
Bitter Harvest examines the team‘s furious get-out-the-vote machine, where overconfidence was 
matched with a growing fear of losing, even though every poll suggested otherwise. It will trace 
the final days leading up to November and the edgy election aftermath in the White House. 
Chapter 8: ―A Mandate for Realism,‖ serves as the conclusion, summing up what I have found 
and assessing both the election and its meaning to the era. It will provide an appraisal of the 
internal character of the Nixon presidency and how it appeared to connect with the American 
heartland. 
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Nixon Historiography 
  
The scholarship on Richard Nixon covers an expansive terrain, from complete biographies to 
a myriad of monographs examining seemingly every minutia of his foreign and domestic policy. 
The immense historiography on the 37
th
 president, however, proceeds down many fascinating 
and contradictory pathways. Nixon is captured in various discordant images: he is Dwight 
Eisenhower‘s ideological pit bull, the rabid anti-Communist persecutor of Alger Hiss, the enemy 
of the American left, yet an unprofessed liberal who accomplished more for civil rights than his 
two Democratic predecessors combined did. Nixon is the villain of Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
Kent State, but the farsighted diplomat with China and the Soviet Union. He is a man quiet and 
unknowable, nonetheless revealed intimately as a prude or a closet homosexual. Nixon is both 
the president of the United States of America and the man from the wrong side of the tracks. If 
John Kennedy was a coin‘s head, Dick Nixon was certainly its tail.13  
 Through the maze of contrasting images, however, Watergate has played a 
disproportionate role in shaping both public memory and historiography on the important 
election year of 1972. Perhaps it was largely inevitable. Even though the man who rose from the 
edge of poverty in a small frame house in Yorba Linda, California, was among the most 
influential politicians in the last half of the 20
th
 century, his resignation in the face of certain 
impeachment over the break-in at the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee casts 
the longest shadow over scholarship, producing a disproportionate number of works on the 
politician after 1974.  The result is that even though scholarship on the Nixon presidency has 
moved on to cover many elements of his domestic and foreign policy achievements, it has not 
revisited and thus explained the landslide of 1972. 
 
**** 
 Significant post-reelection literature on the Nixon presidency (yet unaffected by 
Watergate) is relegated largely to veteran journalist and presidential biographer, Theodore H. 
White. White‘s The Making of the President, 1972, published in early 1974 but written before 
the fallout from the scandal had felled the Nixon administration, is a fluid narrative of the ‘72 
election, a boots-on-the-ground view, revealing a divided nation, one still facing a war in 
Vietnam and at war at home. The issues transcended mere demonstrative antiwar protesters but 
included a litany of social, economic, and racial issues, including the contentious question of 
school busing. White details a year of trials and tribulations as the incumbent president faced 
reelection, the opening to China, and promises for a resolution in Vietnam, all while revealing 
how the Nixon team set upon an error-filled campaign run by their Democratic opponent, George 
McGovern. Written before the Watergate scandal had a chance to take prisoners, White‘s 
account is not a historical assessment of the election, but one that records the drumbeat of that 
year, capturing the unsteady cadence of the political landscape.  White concludes that even had 
the McGovern camp made all the right moves instead of all the wrong ones, a Nixon victory was 
almost inevitable in 1972. While highlighting initiatives in China, the Soviet Union, and a plan 
for peace with honor in Southeast Asia, the Nixon team portrayed McGovern as a ―radical‖ at 
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 See Thomas Johnson‘s The Rehabilitation of Richard Nixon: The Media’s Effect on Collective Memory (New 
York, Garland, 1995); David Greenberg‘s well-argued Nixon’s Shadow, and Perlstein‘s Nixonland for interesting 
and informative discussions of Nixon‘s historical image.  
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home. In the wake of the massive landslide, White‘s only surprise is that Nixon did not win by 
an even wider margin.
14
 
 With the president forced from office in August of 1974, however, White had the 
opportunity to assess Nixon‘s presidency, and thus offered the first in a long list of post-
Watergate literature. In the author‘s Breach of Faith, published in 1975, White traces the final 
hours of the Nixon administration as it disintegrated into pieces with seemingly all of them under 
indictment. Gone is the more benign portrayal of the president during the ‗72 campaign, and in 
its place is Nixon the criminal who found the perfect sidekick in H.R. Haldeman, his chief of 
staff, and the one man who could turn the president‘s words into deeds. White concludes, ―The 
true crime of Richard Nixon was simple: he destroyed the myth that binds America together, and 
for this he was driven from power.‖15 
 Included in the significant first generation of works on Nixon‘s dark doings are numerous 
accounts by journalists and others close to the day-to-day political machine; the most famous of 
these are the 1974 publication of Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward‘s All the President's Men 
and The Final Days, released in 1976. Others, which struck a precarious balance between insider 
subjectivity and journalist objectivity, included William Safire‘s Before the Fall: An Inside View 
of the Pre-Watergate White House, published in 1975, and White House reporter J. Anthony 
Lukas‘s, Nightmare: The Underside of the Nixon Years, released in 1976. Woodward and 
Bernstein‘s books, although only a bit more removed (and also penned before the release of 
thousands of pages of textual files and hours of White House tapes) nonetheless represent a 
withering recounting of the fall of Richard Nixon.  
Immediately following were the memoirs from Nixon‘s closest men, former 
administration officials, and those involved in the House and Senate committees investigating 
the Watergate break-in.  The works came fast and furious. From 1976 to 1982, the pertinent 
memoirs include Charles Colson‘s Born Again; John Dean‘s Blind Ambition: The White House 
Years; Leon Jaworski‘s The Right and the Power: The Prosecution of Watergate; H R. 
Haldeman‘s The Ends of Power; John Ehrlichman‘s Witness to Power: The Nixon Years; Sam 
Ervin‘s The Whole Truth, the Watergate Conspiracy; Jeb Magruder‘s An American Life: One 
Man's Road to Watergate, and, of course, Richard M. Nixon‘s own presidential memoir, RN, The 
Memoirs of Richard Nixon. The accounts from those who actually worked within the White 
House, while generally a mixture of self-serving evasions and nuanced finger pointing, are also 
fascinating glimpses into the inner workings of the Nixon administration and reveal a colorful 
cast of characters.  
 Within a decade, historians began to assess the Nixon presidency, but the focus and tenor 
of these works did not fundamentally stray from the journalistic and insider accounts. 
Interestingly, at the hands of the historians, Nixon‘s abuses of power and the Watergate affair 
gained even more focus and dominated the scholarship for much of the following decade. The 
next substantial round of books emerged as the first archival material became available. 
Historians and other scholars began to put events of the Nixon administration into a historical 
context. Among the first major series of political biographies on the president was Stanley 
Kutler‘s The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon, and Herbert Parmet‘s 
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Richard Nixon and His America, both published in 1990, and Stephen Ambrose‘s Nixon: The 
Triumph of a Politician, 1962-1972, released in 1989.  
 In the initial historical works on the Nixon presidency, neutrality and objectivity were 
challenging propositions. Ambrose‘s second of three volumes on Nixon clarifies the difficulties 
scholars face in remaining detached from the history of the 37
th
 president. Ambrose‘s The 
Triumph of a Politician is in many ways a masterwork of scholarship, covering ten fascinating 
years in the life of this seminal politician. The historian provides a rousing recounting of Nixon 
in office, his efforts to bring to an end the war in Vietnam, his political struggle to balance the 
political sensibilities for both the left and the right, the president‘s policy of ―Vietnamization,‖ 
normalizing the nation‘s relationship with Communist China, arms limitation talks, and détente 
with the Soviet Union. Ambrose commends the president for the breakthrough with China as 
well as his diplomatic efforts with Moscow.
16
 However, after describing Nixon‘s political career, 
including his first term in the White House and the reelection campaign in 1972, Ambrose 
concludes that Nixon remains outside his comprehension: ―I confess that I do not understand this 
complex man.‖17 Ambrose admits that it is a struggle to assess Nixon given the amazing range of 
contradictions during his presidency; for example, his efforts at civil rights and progressive 
forays into foreign policy, contrasted with his vicious attempts to wipe out opponents by almost 
any means necessary. Despite his efforts, Ambrose is unable to get beyond these contradictions 
and the inevitable scandal in the Watergate hotel complex. What emerges above all in Ambrose‘s 
account is a White House riddled with corruption, and an administration that prolonged the 
Vietnam War for political reasons.
18
  
 As with other Nixon biographers, separating the good from the sin is problematic, and 
Ambrose leaves the reader questioning what history‘s judgment should be. At times, the 
historian appears as someone who admires the 37
th
 president while serving as his harshest critic; 
Nixon is both ―the ultimate realist‖ in foreign policy and ―the ultimate cynic‖ in domestic policy. 
Those looking for satisfactory insight into seminal events such as the 1972 presidential election 
were left wanting. Ambrose‘s dilemma is one shared by other historians when confronting 
Richard Nixon; the challenge is to explain the enduring presence of this unsavory individual 
within the mainstream of American political history.
19
 
 Within a year of Ambrose‘s volume came the publication of two more Nixon 
biographies, each with dramatically different conclusions. Parmet‘s Richard Nixon and His 
America, attempts to show Nixon in a favourable light (including depicting the president‘s 
commitment to ―practical liberalism‖) while Kutler‘s The Wars of Watergate, published the same 
year, takes a much harsher stance on the 37
th
 president, showing that Watergate revealed the core 
of Richard Nixon. Parmet (who like Ambrose, is also a biographer of Dwight Eisenhower) 
attempts to distance his account from those who dwell (perhaps inordinately) on Nixon‘s 
shortcomings and not enough on what made the man a highly successful politician and public 
servant. Parmet was one of the first historians able to draw upon archival and other primary 
sources, especially material unavailable to previous scholars—namely many of Nixon‘s personal 
papers. Adding to the author‘s level of access was that the former president also agreed to a 
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series of interviews while granting access to former associates, family members, and friends.
20
 
Parmet wants to take Nixon at his word. The president‘s representation of ―real Americans‖ or 
the nation‘s ―silent majority‖ stemmed not from political cynicism but from a desire to help 
those who, like him, had come from modest backgrounds. Indeed, while historians have often 
portrayed Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy as the archetypal postwar leaders, Parmet 
maintains that this applies just as much to Richard Nixon, as the nation actually looks much 
more like the man from Yorba Linda than a Dwight Eisenhower or a John Kennedy.
21
 
 Parmet‘s work is a generally persuasive reassessment of the Nixon years, especially when 
the author argues that Nixon has not received sufficient credit for keeping the Republican Party a 
relevant force in American political discourse and helping to rebuild it following Barry 
Goldwater‘s crushing defeat to Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Nixon, Parmet writes, was a 
representative figure of the new Republican Party. Furthermore, as Nixon exuded leadership in 
both foreign and domestic policy, he does not deserve the image of a psychologically impaired, 
ruthless partisan, but a centrist who considered the long-term future of the Republican Party. As 
such, this work represents more than a political biography but a study in the creation of a 
political culture that defines what the author refers to as the ―Age of Nixon.‖ The image of the 
president as an isolated and lonely administrator confined by the structure he created in the 
White House, however, remains intact.
22
 
While Parmet‘s book was a reassessment of Nixon‘s political career (with the benefit of a 
few years away from the drama of his resignation), Kutler‘s The Wars of Watergate represents 
one of the first attempts by a scholar to revisit Watergate (and challenge the president‘s memoirs 
and those of his men) from a historical perspective. While Parmet was given preferential 
treatment, including access to Nixon, his friends, and his associates, Kutler waged a long battle 
with Nixon and his estate over the release of the tapes. Kutler‘s battles with Nixon‘s lawyers 
over access to the historical record arguably contributed to his findings. Kutler makes it clear that 
Nixon, not his staff or even the plumbers, is the central figure in the Watergate scandal, as the 
break-in was ―rooted in the lifelong political personality of Richard Nixon.‖23   
Kutler provides a good overview of Nixon‘s fascinating political career to trace what he 
calls a pattern that played out during the Watergate crisis and symbolized Nixon‘s ―imperial 
presidency.‖ The tapes, Kutler argues, reveal a paranoid, petty, and vengeful man. Far from a 
―third-rate burglary,‖ it is a glimpse into severe abuses of power and obstructions of justice; we 
see a leader antagonistic with the media, contemptuous of Congress, and a micro-manager in the 
White House. What concerns the historian the most is Nixon apologists. Quoting Abraham 
Lincoln‘s reminder, ―We cannot escape history,‖ Kutler shudders at the thought that Nixon is 
worthy of rehabilitation. While he believes that the president should be remembered for his 
efforts in foreign policy, Kutler reminds us ―no ‗fair‘ history of the Nixon era can overlook the 
centrality of Watergate.‖ While many of Nixon‘s achievements will get their just due, ―they 
probably will not rival Watergate for historical attention.‖ Because scholars such as Kutler are 
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the only ones who can restore the lasting image of a fallen president, how we remember Nixon is 
largely dependent upon how historians and journalists choose to portray him in the scholarship.
24
  
 The creation of this public memory has led to a number of insightful books on the Nixon 
presidency, including Louis Liebovich‘s Richard Nixon, Watergate, and the Press; Leon 
Friedman and William F. Levantrosser‘s Watergate and Afterward: The Legacy of Richard M. 
Nixon; Thomas Johnson‘s The Rehabilitation of Richard Nixon: The Media’s Effect on Collective 
Memory, and Daniel Frick‘s Reinventing Richard Nixon: A Cultural History of an American 
Obsession. Notable among these is Michael Schudson‘s Watergate in American Memory: How 
We Remember, Forget, and Reconstruct the Past.  Schudson, a sociologist from the University of 
California, released his work on the 20th anniversary of the break-in at Democratic National 
Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex. Schudson argues that what forced Nixon 
from office and how the public assumes it learned of the scandal is mostly a myth.  The central 
fable is that it was ‗reporting in search of the truth‘ that brought down a president. Other than the 
Washington Post, the press did very little in this regard until near the end of the crisis. Moreover, 
Woodward and Bernstein did little to dispel that myth, especially that journalists brought down 
the president in isolation. Schudson argues that the contribution by the journalistic profession 
was almost tangential to the work of Judge John Sirica, the Ervin Committee, or the discovery of 
the taping system inside the White House.
25
 Another part of this myth is that the ―liberal media‖ 
brought Nixon down as the Post went after the Democrats as hard as they did the Republicans. 
Never wanting to be ―tools‖ for one party in an election campaign, Post Editor Ben Bradlee 
supported Woodward and Bernstein because he relished the chance to go after a good story. As 
Schudson suggests, that the Nixon administration‘s dark realties led to the president‘s demise, 
and not the actions of a liberal press or a right-wing conspiracy launched in reaction to Nixon‘s 
policy of détente with China and Russia and his disengagement in Vietnam, is not always 
satisfying. There is reluctance in some quarters to believe that the Watergate burglary and the 
contents of the tapes may define the Nixon presidency. Additionally, Nixon‘s administration was 
much more complex than the historical narrative allowed for in the first 20 years after his 
resignation. Indeed, Schudson accurately predicted an on-going re-imaging of Nixon. ―Will 
Richard Nixon be rehabilitated? Or, perhaps more accurately, will he be rehabilitated again? One 
of the notable features of Nixon‘s career has been his rise from defeat and his refashioning of a 
public image of himself: the ‗new Nixon‘ or the ‗new new Nixon.‘ Could there be, after 
Watergate, yet another ‗new Nixon‘‖?26 Indeed, by the early 1990s, a rigorous reassessment of 
Nixon‘s place in history was well underway.  
 One of the more significant of these efforts was the 1994 release of Joan Hoff‘s Nixon 
Reconsidered. In this model revisionist account, Nixon actually emerges as one of the worst and 
one of the best presidents in the modern era. Watergate, she argues, has obscured the former 
president‘s considerable achievements in domestic policy.  Among them was welfare reform, a 
national health insurance program, an expansion of affirmative action, a proposed guaranteed 
income, plans for national health insurance, revenue sharing, including redistributing power to 
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the local and state governments. Hoff maintains that these accomplishments actually ―exceeded 
the accomplishments of the New Deal and the Great Society,‖ especially in ―the areas of civil 
rights, social welfare spending, domestic international economic restructuring, urban parks, 
government reorganization, land-use initiatives, revenue sharing, draft reform, pension reform, 
and spending for the arts and humanities.‖27 Hoff devotes around 100 pages to Nixon‘s efforts in 
foreign policy, initiatives that she argues were much less successful than his domestic 
endeavors.
28
 While she gives Nixon and Henry Kissinger due recognition for establishing 
normalized relations with Communist China and détente with the Soviet Union, she gives the 
administration much less credit for its efforts in Vietnam and in the Third World. Ultimately, 
however, even the ―lasting and positive results of his diplomacy faded more quickly than some 
aspects of his domestic polices‖ (which is the exact opposite of Kutler‘s conclusion). Hoff‘s 
monograph, to be true, is not an investigation of Nixon‘s foreign policy, but a work that rises or 
falls on its consideration of the domestic front. In Nixon Reconsidered, the embattled and 
staunchly conservative president emerges as a closet liberal.
29
  
 Those looking for more of a ―balanced‖ approach found it five years later in Melvin 
Small‘s The Presidency of Richard Nixon. For Richard Nixon, who once suggested that by 2000 
historians would present his presidency in a more favorable light, the former president may have 
actually enjoyed some of Small‘s highly readable account of his political life, but certainly not 
all of it.  Small‘s 1999 publication is part of the American Presidency Series by the University 
Press of Kansas, and has all the earmarks of that collection, with its measured approach. His 
work provides neither rehabilitation nor vilification. Like Hoff, Small details what he believes 
were many of Nixon‘s significant domestic achievements while criticizing a great deal of his 
moves in foreign policy. Small‘s work, again like Hoff‘s, actually runs against more 
conventional wisdom, which held that Nixon‘s administration was distinguished by its efforts in 
foreign affairs instead of in domestic accomplishment.
30
 Scholars and pundits, argues Small, 
have failed to give the Nixon presidency the credit it deserves for its domestic agenda. The 
president presided over and initiated many progressive programs of lasting consequence, ones 
often overshadowed by the war in Vietnam. Among the progressive moves was the 
implementation of significant environmental legislation, including amendments to the Clean Air 
Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act. On environmental 
conservation, Small calls him the ―the most environmentally conscious president since Theodore 
Roosevelt.‖31 Other progressive social proposals included the floating of the Family Assistance 
Plan (FAP), which Small argues would have helped the nation‘s working poor by creating 
national welfare standards, welfare reform, desegregating Southern schools, furthering women‘s 
rights, as well as his expansion of federal funding for the arts and medical research. 
32
 Indeed, the 
historian argues, Nixon ushered in the social programs launched in the Sixties, and spent more in 
his last year in office on social programs than Lyndon Johnson did in election year 1968. Small 
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does not ignore the crimes of Nixon, far from it, as he writes, ―no president before or after 
ordered or participated in so many serious illegal and extralegal acts that violated constitutional 
principles,‖ a legacy that has poisoned many Americans‘ relationship with their government for 
decades.  Small does not completely emulate Hoff in her book‘s attempt at rehabilitation. As he 
writes: ―Historian Joan Hoff maintains that Watergate was the natural product of the political 
system as it existed in the seventies, ‗a disaster waiting to happen.‘ Perhaps, but one wonders 
whether it would have happened the way it did on anyone else‘s watch but Nixon‘s.‖ While 
detailing Nixon‘s accomplishments, the historian is unable to resurrect a fallen president. Small 
concludes that Nixon‘s tenure was ―among the most unusual, controversial, and tragic 
presidencies in American history. Indeed, his entire career could be described in those terms.‖33 
 Within a few years, though, more books appeared to provide a new look at this enigmatic 
historical figure, away from the immense historical weight of Watergate, and with an eye on the 
more ―liberal‖ polices of Richard Nixon. One of the more provocative of these was the 2001 
release of Dean Kotlowski‘s Nixon’s Civil Rights. While Nixon was never known as a champion 
of civil rights for African Americans and other minorities, Kotlowski (a Hoff protégé) argues 
that this is because scholars have neglected the president‘s domestic accomplishments.  Indeed, 
Kotlowski maintains that Nixon developed a credible record on civil rights.
34
 Given the 
president‘s hardwired public image as someone who had a scant record as an advocate for the 
nation‘s racial minorities, and the reality of his narrow, if privately, held racial views and 
assumptions, Kotlowski‘s book assumes a surprising position.  Given divisive issues such as 
school busing in the South, and Nixon‘s fabled ―Southern Strategy‖ (that included nominating 
conservatives George Harrold Carswell and Clement Haynsworth, Jr. to the Supreme Court), 
Kotlowski‘s work flies in the face of previous scholarship.  It also challenges the portrayal of 
Nixon as a calculating politician, one who assumed a strong ―law and order‖ stance with its 
racial undertones to help secure two election victories during a turbulent era.   
 Kotlowski maintains that Nixon deserves more credit as historians should examine what 
Nixon did instead of what he said. Nixon’s Civil Rights is not ―a means for rehabilitation,‖ 
Kotlowski writes, clearly anticipating the label of Nixon apologist—one who unduly elevates the 
president‘s successes while diminishing his shortcomings. His focus on Nixon‘s specific 
accomplishments (sans a thorough discussion of the president‘s general political record within 
the history of the civil rights struggle) leaves the historian‘s account of civil rights ripe for 
attack.
35
 Kotlowski is undaunted by such constraints, and, for example, argues that the specter of 
Watergate has made it too easy to summarily set aside Nixon‘s formidable domestic record. The 
historian outlines a list of initiatives, including providing aid for black colleges, desegregating 
public schools in the South, supporting tribal self-determination for Native Americans and 
bilingual education for Hispanics, establishing the Office of Minority Business Enterprise 
(OMBE), and expanding federal procurement from firms owned by blacks and Hispanics, while 
helping to create contract set-asides for minority-owned firms.
36
 The historian argues that those 
polices reflected the president‘s personal ideology and beliefs, and because of that, Nixon‘s 
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stance on civil rights was of his own making, helping to ensure his reelection by attracting a 
significant plurality of voters. In the end, Nixon‘s polices had profound long-term benefits.37  
 Whereas in Nixon’s Civil Rights, it is Richard Nixon, not Bill Clinton, who appears as 
America‘s ―first black president,‖ syndicated columnist Richard Reeves‘s tome, President 
Nixon: Alone in the White House, released the same year as Kotlowski‘s book, stands in stark 
contrast. Reeves‘s approach examines the Nixon White House ―as it looked from the center.‖ 
The author‘s narrative of events assumes a highly readable chronological format that spans from 
the president‘s first inaugural in 1969 to April of 1973 when the events of Watergate began to 
unravel his presidency. Reeves makes good use of archival sources including declassified 
documents, tapes and paper records, including Nixon‘s daily writings, and the Haldeman Diary. 
Noting Nixon‘s often quoted missive, ―This would be an easy job if you didn‘t have to deal with 
people,‖ the author sets the stage for much of his book. Reeves‘s Nixon is a loner, an introvert, a 
liar, a master manipulator, a man who trusted virtually no one. The author takes readers inside 
the doors of the White House, where the atmosphere was poisonous and dark. Reeves‘s thesis 
has the 37
th
 president of the United States existing in seclusion, scribbling notes on long yellow 
reams of paper, charting his thoughts and orders for the following day, and dreaming of shaping 
the times in which he lived. Nixon fired off many of these daily writings to his loyal chief of 
staff Bob Haldeman who turned them into the countless action memorandums for the White 
House staff. Reeves, though, remolds Nixon‘s entire persona around these writings, and shows 
him as a man cut off from the world and ripe for Watergate.
38
 But Reeves was not alone, as he is 
both the recipient and the promoter of this view, one borrowed from Woodward and Bernstein 
and Kutler and reinforced by Reeves and Elizabeth Drew. 
 In recent years, works on Nixon have managed to transcend not only the Watergate saga 
and the abuses of power but have managed to release Nixon from his lonely White House, 
focusing almost exclusively on the president‘s foreign policy. Notable are Margaret MacMillan‘s 
Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World, published in 2006, and Robert Dallek‘s 
Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, released in 2007.  MacMillan revisits both the optics 
and the policy of Richard‘s Nixon‘s historic trip to China and his meetings with Mao Zedong in 
Beijing, while Dallek‘s Nixon and Kissinger provides a thorough analysis of the complex 
relationship between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger during their White House years. 
MacMillan scours communiqués, cables, archival documents, and oral histories to reconstruct 
that historic week, while Dallek utilizes 20,000 pages of transcribed Kissinger telephone 
conversations and previously unused Nixon audio files, Oval Office conversations, and 
documents from the National Archives to assess this complex foreign policy team. Dallek depicts 
two men surprisingly alike, both in terms of their thirst for unbridled power and feelings of 
intense insecurity. Even though they worked in an almost co-presidency in terms of international 
affairs, after Watergate (like others on the president‘s team) Nixon and Kissinger seldom crossed 
paths again. Both MacMillan and Dallek reveal the triumphs of the Nixon administration in the 
Far East, especially in China. These works reveal Nixon in full profile: he is overly ambitious 
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and complex, but not the ultimate cynic or out of touch and walled off and alone in the White 
House.
39
  
 Other current trends in historiography have tried to stretch the interpretive canvas for 
explaining Nixon and his times. Two important works along this line are David Greenberg‘s 
Nixon’s Shadow, released in 2003, and Rick Perlstein‘s Nixonland, published in 2008. Greenberg 
provides an engaging foray into the various historical images of Richard Nixon, and quickly runs 
smack into the revisionists and what he believes is this school‘s erroneous view of Nixon as the 
last liberal president. Greenberg contends that scholars have overemphasized Nixon‘s domestic 
achievements and his breakthroughs in foreign policy, falling into the trap of comparing his 
efforts with subsequent administrations instead of within the context of his time in office. Hence, 
Greenberg agrees with Stanley Kutler‘s comment that ―Historians must judge the past by the 
standards of that past, not their own.‖ With this as a guide, Greenberg sets his sights on the 
multiple-era views of Richard Nixon delving into how each period viewed this enigmatic public 
figure. A California populist in the 1940s, an enemy and anti-communist ―Tricky Dicky‖ of the 
1950s liberal establishment, a warmonger to the counterculture of the 1960s, a hero to Middle 
America in the early 1970s, a villain and victim of Watergate, and finally, an improbable liberal. 
Throughout, Greenberg reminds us that efforts to capture the ―real‖ Nixon will remain elusive, 
especially if historians categorically deny any part of the politician‘s complex composition. As 
the scholar suggests, ―If history can help us to understand Nixon better, it will do so not by 
stripping away and discarding the many images of him that have proliferated over the years, but 
by gathering and assembling them into a strange, irregular mosaic.‖40    
 In Rick Perlstein‘s Nixonland, a wide-ranging venture into the 1960s and the political 
world of Richard Nixon, the president is not so much elusive but pervasive. Here Nixon‘s 
presidency is the natural outgrowth of a turbulent decade, a political force that was emblematic 
of the entire era.  In Perlstein‘s thesis, Nixon captured the negative energy of the 1960s and 
turned it into political victory. From the election of 1964, through to the Watts riots of 1965, to 
the fire on the streets in 1968, we see how Nixon capitalized on the cultural pressure points, and 
both presided over and contributed to a fracturing of a nation. What was born of that turbulent 
decade caused deep fault lines—divisions that remain with us to this day, between left and right, 
red states and blue states, rich and struggling. While David Greenberg‘s Nixon is enigmatic, 
Perlstein‘s Nixon is a dark knowable force representing fracture and division, an emblematic 
character who personified a chaotic decade.
41
  
In the 2008 biography of the 37
th
 president by Elizabeth Drew, however, Richard Nixon 
is put back in his ―place.‖ Drew‘s Richard M. Nixon: The 37th President, 1969-1974 (part of the 
American Presidents Series) finds little new in the man from Yorba Linda, and seemingly, little 
that his public life can teach us about the past. Unlike Greenberg‘s enigma, though, Drew‘s 
Nixon is identifiable, and thus he is thrown back into the cage where Stanley Kutler wants him; 
unloved, alone, unworthy of mourning or deeper exploration beyond the centrality of Watergate. 
Like Kutler, Drew argues that the scandal makes it impossible to view the Nixon presidency any 
other way but through the administration‘s high crimes and misdemeanors. According to the 
longtime Nixon observer, even in his early politics, ―…his tactics, while not unique or in some 
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cases even original with him, were, for his times, at the outer edges of opportunism and 
savageness.‖ In sharp contrast to Dean Kotlowski‘s thesis, the president handled civil rights 
cynically, and pandered to his southern and blue-collar constituency. Nixon is revealed as the 
ultimate pragmatist in this book, but it is certainly the thinnest and shallowest definition of the 
word. An opportunist at best in both domestic and foreign policy, Richard Nixon was ultimately 
unworthy of the presidency.
42
 
 What connects the scholarship of the last decade with the previous twenty-five years is 
that it manages to almost completely avoid the landslide election of 1972. The recent exception 
is Perlstein‘s Nixonland where the reelection campaign at least serves as a notable conclusion to 
a decade of turmoil, rather than merely a footnote of the Watergate era. In Perlstein‘s work, 
however, the election of 1972 does not smell so much like a Nixon victory as the toxic flush of a 
decade of turmoil, the result of deep divisions within the nation.  Consequently, Nixon’s 
Loyalists will delve into Perlstein‘s endgame, where the historian argues that the Nixon team 
simply and cynically capitalized on the chaos and division in the nation to win big at the polls. In 
contrast, this dissertation suggests that the Nixon majority was not an achievement based merely 
on the fruits of fear, division, and political cynicism—the beginning of a wide divide between 
―red‖ states and ―blue‖ states—but the product of a president and an inner circle that connected 
with the broad middle spectrum of the American electorate, by appearing to understand exactly 
where this majority stood. 
 As such, Nixon’s Loyalists argues that the nation only appeared divided. Indeed, this dive 
into the deep end of Nixon scholarship will reveal a president and his team more representative 
of that middling majority, which defined much of the post-war era, than few perhaps would care 
to admit. It grapples with the reality of Parmet‘s ―age of Nixon,‖ and that arguably even though 
Nixon‘s faithful and longtime supporters knew that ―distasteful‖ political malfeasance surely 
occurred throughout his career, they voted for him anyway. Watergate has made it convenient to 
forget that the majority of voting-age Americans wanted a Dick Nixon in ‘72, and put this 
politician back in the White House with the second greatest margin of victory in the history of 
American presidential elections, exceeded only by Franklin Delano Roosevelt‘s victory in 1936. 
Rather than rising from a divided and fractured nation, Nixon had captured a majority not unlike 
the one enjoyed by his former boss Dwight Eisenhower, and the one that Lyndon Johnson 
captured in 1964. While Middle Americans had split between parties in 1960, and again in 1968, 
when the Democratic Party imploded in Chicago over Vietnam, division among the majority was 
little more than skin deep, irritated by an agitated minority and magnified by the lens of 
television news: Black Power, hallucinated street theater, campus angst, and virgin idealists with 
fists. By the end of 1970, a year that saw both the Mayday student protests and a fiery and 
agitated Nixon on the midterm campaign trail, Americans wanted steadiness, not only in their 
nation but also in their president.  Nixon‘s men had finally gotten it. And long before November 
of 1972, the president and his loyal followers in the White House had reconstituted a Middle 
American consensus and a landslide of historic proportions.  
 It has been 34 years since journalist Theodore H. White published The Making of the 
President, 1972. Since then, the National Archives and Records Administration have released 
tens of thousands of documents and hundreds of hours of White House tapes, and staffers have 
penned voluminous diaries and memoirs. Revisiting this seminal election is long overdue. Along 
the way, we will see how the inscrutable Richard Nixon gains clarity in historical memory when 
he is revealed in all of his complexity: as an opportunist never without allies in periods of fear 
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and uncertainty; as a politician never disconnected from the fighters and the partisans; and as a 
leader rarely out of step with the not so silent majority. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 ―HOLY‖ WARRIORS 
 
 
issouri on a cold January morning. With the top of his Buick Wildcat convertible closed to 
the Midwestern sky, Patrick J. Buchanan left the heartland and headed east and home to 
Washington, D.C.. Packed floor to roof with personal papers, pots, pans—the accumulation of 
three and a half years of life in St. Louis—Buchanan drove his new wheels onto the interstate. 
Enjoying the speed and the feel of the open road, he headed east down Route 40 through Terre 
Haute and into the Indiana heartland, shifting south at Columbus, Ohio, down through Wheeling, 
West Virginia, and the homestretch into the capital to his parent‘s large white house on Utah 
Avenue to tell them about his rendezvous with history.  During the long trip, Buchanan‘s mind 
filled with images of past and future. Cutting his teeth with the St. Louis Globe-Democrat as one 
of the youngest political editors in the country at age twenty-three, Buchanan first met the man 
he was leaving to join during a brief conversation at a reception. He told the man that he wanted 
to work for him one day.
43
  It was 1966, and from across the nation, young ambitious men were 
beginning to answer the call to serve. A rumor no longer, their political hero had emerged from 
his ―wilderness years‖ and was about to launch himself back onto the national stage. That fine 
and promising morning, leaving his job behind him, the twenty-six year-old journalist answered 
that call to service, and drove halfway across the country to work for the political comeback of 
Richard M. Nixon. For men like Buchanan, their loyalty had begun long before inauguration day. 
 
 
**** 
 They were ―the best and the brightest,‖ celebrated journalist David Halberstam wrote of 
those called to Washington in January 1961 by newly elected John F. Kennedy. Men of 
eminence and accomplishment, the young president‘s team were Ivy Leaguers, the elite of the 
nation‘s corporate and academic establishment who brought to their lofty positions a 
combination of privilege, pedigree, and power. Then there were Richard Nixon‘s men—those 
who loathed the establishment, resented its elites, scorned those of blue-blooded derivation, yet 
were rapt by positions of power and influence. Eager and ambitious, they were bound together 
by a ―professional fascination‖ for the political game. They were also young. As veteran 
journalist Elizabeth Drew writes, the number of people under the age of 30 in the Nixon 
administration was ―more than in all previous White House staffs combined.‖44 The chaser for 
their youthful passion was a proclivity for mistakes. Politically like-minded, Nixon‘s men were 
certainly not alike. With diverse personalities, temperaments, and backgrounds, they included, 
―the visionary and the hard-knuckled, the mean and the gentle, the sweet and the bitter,‖ as 
presidential biographer Theodore White recalled. Young, independent, and new to power, they 
assumed the corridors of clout and command after Nixon‘s narrow victory over Hubert 
Humphrey in 1968, a brash and inexperienced assemblage, fresh to Washington, and—other than 
the president—new to the nation.45  
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 Although ―all the president‘s men‖ have been covered in scholarship in many ways 
following Nixon‘s resignation, this team has largely been viewed through the lens of Watergate 
or as the paranoid purveyors of dirty tricks, a retrospective that limits rather than expands on the 
administration‘s highly evolved and motivated political inner circle.46  This chapter provides a 
new look at the team in the context of the 1972 reelection bid—men still young and even more 
committed and fixated to get their boss reelected. The resulting internal tensions and rivalries 
helped shape what became one of the more fascinating and unique national election campaigns 
and reveals a volatile political animal. 
 Many of Nixon‘s young and eager group could be tracked back to those Haldeman 
brought with him from his California-based J. Walter Thompson advertising team during the 
1968 campaign. The significant step was that the president and Haldeman decided to bring those 
same individuals into the White House to govern the country. Among them were Dwight Chapin, 
Larry Higby, Ken Cole, Gordon Strachan, and Ron Ziegler, who joined with Nixon‘s longtime 
cronies, Herb Klein, Murray Chotiner, Peter Flannigan, and a later but equally staunch ally, 1968 
campaign director John Mitchell and Len Garment from his New York law firm days. They were 
an atypical assemblage picked to run an administration, and it had an effect on their approach to 
governance. Indeed, as Elizabeth Drew has pointed out, ―The dominance of former campaign 
functionaries led Nixon‘s White House to focus on politics and process rather than policy.‖ 
Moreover, some of this young staff ―felt that the people around the president were the 
government.‖ The country‘s leadership, as Theodore White fittingly suggested, ―had fallen by 
the end of 1968 to a handful of men almost uneducated in American history, with little 
background in government or the American tradition of power.‖ Emerging from the chaos of the 
1960s, they were ―embittered by defeat and thrilled by victory,‖ coagulating into a team 
―managerial and able—but very, very tough.‖47  
  Arguably, the toughest of Nixon‘s inner circle resided at the apex of the White House 
power pyramid, Harry Robbins (Bob) Haldeman. President Nixon‘s chief of staff was in many 
ways fearless; with his dour expression, piercing eyes, rigid crew cut, and his fierce manner of 
dealing with underlings, he constituted an imposing figure in the corridors outside the Oval 
Office. A longtime Nixon loyalist, Haldeman served as an advance man dating back to the 
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politician‘s 1956 campaign for vice president under Dwight Eisenhower, and again during the 
1960 presidential election, following the politician on through his failed bid for the governor‘s 
mansion in California. Haldeman joined the president‘s team for the sucessful‘68 campaign and 
then as White House chief of staff. There is little doubt in anyone‘s mind that the former 
advertising executive was Nixon‘s closest and most trusted aide. The sentiment ran both ways. 
―It was a total commitment. A clear-cut case of hero worship, almost a wedding,‖ recalled 
Franklin Murphy, then chancellor of the University of California. ―The basic loyalty was to the 
man, not to the Republican Party, perhaps not even to the traditional processes of government.‖48 
 Haldeman was a tireless worker for his boss, beginning with his arrival at the West Wing 
before 7:00 am and ending late into the night, as he jotted down an encapsulation of the day‘s 
events into his personal diary at home. Haldeman coordinated the top line of the president‘s 
activities, served as his chief adviser, and tried to protect his boss by controlling all access into 
the Oval Office. In the Nixon White House, the chief of staff‘s duties involved transforming the 
seemingly endless hand-written and typed presidential requests into daily action memorandums 
to staff throughout the administration. These in turn, generated hundreds more internal memos, 
responses and counter responses, strategies, insights, slights, rants, and drag-out arguments either 
copied widely or held administratively confidential or ―eyes only.‖ Haldeman‘s issuance of staff 
memos had become a fine bureaucratic art.  The documents also reveal his confidence in 
communicating with staffers. His scrawled rebuttals in the margins of staff memos reveal no 
hesitation marks, no cross-outs. His penned replies were verbiage set in full bold pen strikes 
across the page. As Jeb Magruder remembered, ―Haldeman had a fetish about memos.‖49  
 Nixon‘s chief aide favored communicating with his staff via memos as it was easier and 
quicker to say no on matters he did not care to debate.  Even the ubiquitous Charles Colson knew 
that it was easier to get ten minutes with the president than with Haldeman. ―He could be 
charming when time permitted—but time did not often permit,‖ recalled Magruder. Staff 
members, though, wanted good words from ―H,‖ reassurance that things were okay and their 
jobs were still safe. ―He usually scribbled comments in the margin when he returned a memo to 
you, and we all awaited his comments like kids awaiting their report card.‖ An ―excellent‖ would 
make someone‘s week while a ―No!‖ could make someone ―despair.‖  There are dozens of 
returned memos from nearly everyone on the White House staff with ―No‖ underlined three 
times. As Magruder mused, ―We rationalized that even if he cut you to pieces, at least that 
proved he was thinking about you.‖50 At times Haldeman could be especially blunt. When aide 
Dwight Chapin tried to beg off a trip that he planned for the president to Canada, his boss fired 
back in a penned scrawl across Chapin‘s memo. ―You are in charge of the trips and you damn 
well better be on them.‖51 When Pat Buchanan was unaware that the official slogan for 1972 had 
already been chosen as ―President Nixon – Now More Than Ever,‖ Haldeman shot back, ―That‘s 
what it is—check your facts first.‖52  Aide Larry Higby quickly discovered that terse responses 
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from the chief of staff were a matter of course: caught in Haldeman‘s crosshairs, the unfortunate 
staffer was verbally chewed out for two solid minutes within earshot of the Oval Office. 
Haldeman aide Gordon Strachan (another protégé from California) learned to live life tied to a 
pager given to him by the chief of staff so he could never be away from contact, day or night. 
There was often no escape for those like Strachan even in bed as the loyal but weary aide 
discovered when he was woken in the middle of the night by a phone call from the White House. 
Through the handset, Haldeman ―chewed him out royally‖ for an earlier ―minor slip.‖ The next 
morning Strachan concluded that the call had been a bad dream until the phone logs at the White 
House switchboard let him know that his boss had called his house at 3:00 am. Not 
unexpectedly, as J. Anthony Lukas pointed out, ―Strachan was terrified of Haldeman.‖ 53  
 Memos went into Haldeman‘s out basket and into the hands of Larry Higby who made 
sure the machinery of getting things done was moving forward.  Indeed, in some ways Higby 
became for Haldeman what Haldeman was for the president.  The young staffer became the 
stand-in for his boss at times because Nixon‘s chief of staff kept such a taxing schedule. It 
occurred to such an extent that some in the administration with matters to attend to were forced 
to go through Higby to see Haldeman. Even Senator Bob Dole complained that his calls to the 
president were re-routed to Haldeman‘s line only to ―wind up talking to some kid named Higby.‖ 
Staff knew, though, that if they were blocked by Higby it happened on Haldeman‘s orders. In the 
hallways of the White House, directives from ―H‖ were heeded, as everyone in the inner circle 
knew that ―An order from Haldeman was an order from the President.‖ Haldeman was the heavy. 
―Every President needs a son of a bitch and I‘m Nixon‘s . . . I get done what he wants done and I 
take the heat instead of him,‖ Haldeman was quoted as saying by most of his aides, and 
essentially confirmed by the chief of staff in his memoirs.
54
 Haldeman was always more than a 
bouncer or a buffer for the president, but a true believer perhaps without parallel in the White 
House. As Magruder suggested, ―I never saw the slightest indication that Haldeman disagreed 
with anything that Nixon said or did . . . Haldeman was just as hard-line as Nixon. He hated 
Nixon‘s political enemies as much as Nixon hated them.‖55   
An aggressive stance against ―political enemies‖ emanated from Haldeman out to his 
staff, especially men like Dwight Chapin. Born in Wichita, Kansas, Chapin moved with his 
family to California, went to USC, and another Haldeman protégé from his advertising agency 
days. While still in college, Chapin began his active political career working for Nixon‘s 1962 
campaign, gaining Haldeman‘s notice. The bright and ambitious Chapin caught Nixon‘s eye, too, 
and served as his personal aide from 1967 through to the ‗68 campaign, gaining a reputation for 
fierce loyalty especially to Haldeman and the president. This allegiance was rewarded by his 
appointment as special assistant to the president from 1968-1971, and deputy assistant, serving 
as appointments secretary from 1971-1973. Chapin assumed responsibility for scheduling all 
presidential activities and appointments, overseeing the advance men for domestic and 
international events, and scheduling the president‘s trips abroad. One of the pivotal parts of his 
role was controlling the 25 phone lines in and out of the Oval Office and attending the early 
morning staff meetings run by Haldeman, taking notes on political strategy, media relations, 
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campaigning, and opinion polls. As the appointments secretary, Chapin was not only fiercely 
loyal to the president but a ―political animal‖ with few rivals.56  
One man who could out ‗animal‘ Chapin was Charles Wendell Colson. The president‘s 
special counsel was perhaps the only one in the White House, other than the president, whom 
Haldeman was unable to intimidate or control. By 1972, the 41-year-old former U.S. Marine and 
special counsel for the president had arrived fully and completely on the scene, with a large staff 
and his fingers in all the president‘s pies. As he walked down the halls in the White House or at 
his office next to the president‘s own ―hideaway‖ burrow at the end of the coveted King‘s Row 
hallway in the Old Executive Office Building, dubbed so as only those with access to Nixon 
enjoyed such a placement, fingers pointed and heads nodded knowingly. Staffers whispered 
about the bullish Boston lawyer with his round face, stocky build, slicked black hair, and thick 
framed spectacles: there goes the  ―hatchet man,‖ that ―cold bastard,‖ ―Mr. Political Fix it,‖ the 
―chief of the dirty tricks department,‖ ―a cobra,‖ and ―an unguided missile.‖ Colson relished 
calling himself a ―flag-waving, kick-‗em-in-the-nuts, anti-press, anti-liberal Nixon fanatic.‖ In 
his den at home, the president‘s special counsel and political strategist proudly displayed the 
slogan, ―When you have them by the balls their hearts and minds will follow.‖ Colson was a 
tireless worker, slugging often through 15-hour workdays. It was not uncommon to find him in 
his office on weekends, feet up on his desk; cajoling, pressuring people on the phone, hammering 
out memos.
57
  
Colson hailed from the protestant minority enclave in Boston, where raising oneself up 
by the bootstraps was not a cliché but a way of life. His father completed his law degree at night 
school while Colson was a child; his grandfather, an orphan, worked his way up and ended up 
playing with the Boston Symphony.  The young Colson grew to embrace an early bitterness 
against the local establishment and contempt of the Beacon Hill and Harvard class who relied on 
familial connections instead of tenaciousness for success. Colson believed in self-reliance and 
thus, on principle, became the rare soul to turn down a full scholarship from Harvard. 
Nonetheless, he went to Brown, where he became involved in the Young Republicans, graduated 
with distinction, and joined the Marines. In 1959, after becoming the youngest administrative 
assistant on the Hill to Republican Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Colson attended Georgetown 
Law School at night, like his father. He practiced law in Boston, and from his wasp middle class 
background in Massachusetts, learned the nuance and importance of ―ethnic-bloc politics.‖58  
The special counsel first met Nixon when he served as vice president under Dwight 
Eisenhower, and suggested that the politician from California take another run for the White 
House in 1964. Known as someone loyal to a fault; by associates as ―intensely loyal‖; and by his 
father as ―viciously loyal,‖ Colson became smitten with the Californian politician, admitting that 
Richard Nixon was the ―brightest man I‘ve ever known in my life. And the most dedicated 
person.‖ The man who relished his own reputation as ―the chief ass kicker around the White 
House,‖ was naturally fearlessly loyal to Nixon and claimed on more than one occasion that he 
would do ―anything Richard Nixon asks me to do—period.‖59 As Nixon recalled to his assistant 
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Monica Crowley years later, Colson was ―loyal to the gut.‖60 The Boston born lawyer believed in 
getting the job done no matter what the costs. Massachusetts State Senator John Quinlan 
suggested that Colson was the type of individual who would stop just short of breaking the law, 
but if he did cross the line, someone else would take the fall:  ―He wouldn‘t get caught at 
anything,‖ Quinlan quipped. ―He‘s too bright.‖61 Watergate prosecutor Leon Jaworski noticed 
that although Colson appeared ―amiable‖ and ―charming,‖ his investigations suggested that the 
man was ―utterly ruthless,‖ much more the ―hatchet man‖ than a special counsel to the president 
of the United States. ―Colson may have been a number of unattractive things, but stupid wasn‘t 
one of them.‖62  
 Colson used his cunning and his aggressively ambitious nature to increase his influence 
around the seat of power. Coming aboard in November of 1969, the special counsel began to 
take on the ―rough chores others wouldn‘t do.‖ As Ehrlichman wrote in his memoir, ―Before 
long Colson‘s small staff was growing, and the frequency of Colson‘s visits to the President was 
increasing.‖ The catalyst for Colson‘s rise in 1971 was the president‘s well-known desire to plug 
leaks in his administration after the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Colson‘s 
rise to power in the White House had a considerable impact on the political realities inside the 
Oval Office and the reelection of 1972, beyond the well-known story of plumbers, dirty 
tricksters, and Watergate.  Colson sensed an opportunity in 1971, knowing that, as Ehrlichman 
recalled, ―Richard Nixon was frustrated.‖63 Haldeman‘s deputy, Jeb Magruder, agreed, adding 
that in meetings, Colson would listen carefully to the direction the president was heading and 
then say what Nixon wanted to hear. ―He could devastate those who disagreed with him. His 
tactic was always the same: he only wished to help the President, so if you disagreed with him, 
you must be disloyal to the President . . . . He would challenge anyone except Haldeman and 
Nixon, who were never wrong.‖  White House staffers like Magruder understood ―that from 
1970 on, [Colson] was the man whose advice the President most often followed on politics and 
on the media. He arrived in the White House with one secretary and by the time he left, he had 
dozens of people reporting to him.‖64 But while Colson smelled an opportunity to gain power 
and influence, less savory characters like E. Howard Hunt also saw the special counsel as a way 
into the White House. ―Hunt had a nose for power,‖ J. Anthony Lukas wrote, ―and he could 
smell it on Chuck Colson.‖65 Men like the inexperienced Jeb Magruder, blinded by his own 
access to power, proved to be no counterweight to the special counsel‘s growing activities, and 
in retrospect, could only shake his head. ―The rest of us would joke about Colson‘s ever-
expanding empire—the Department of Dirty Tricks, we called it—and about the fact that none of 
us knew exactly what Colson was up to. The joke would in time be on us.‖66  
Colson indeed took advantage of the young staff, feeling that he was able to bully 
inexperienced and unsure personnel, while devastating others as he did with Herb Klein. While it 
is well known that John Mitchell loathed Colson, no one was strong enough to counterbalance 
his growing influence, especially since Haldeman generally agreed with what the president‘s 
special counsel was up to. Though sometimes wary of the scope of Colson‘s activities, the chief 
                                                 
60
 See Monica Crowley, Nixon in Winter, 292. 
61
 The Washington Post, December 5, 1972, B1, B3. See also, White, Breach of Faith, 184-186. 
62
  Jaworski, The Right and The Power, 187. 
63
 Ehrlichman, Witness to Power, 21, 59, 87, 239. 
64
 Magruder, An American Life, 76-77. 
65
 Lukas, Nightmare, 78. 
66
 Magruder, An American Life, 76-77. 
 
  24 
of staff appeared to do nothing to stop his growing access to and influence on the president. In 
fact, Haldeman reserved his most positive responses in memos for Colson. Comments such as 
―Colson, you‘re right—your route is so much better. Right on!‖ became surprisingly common 
compared to their almost complete absence in other White House memorandums from Nixon‘s 
chief of staff. Over time, Colson benefited from a toxic mixture of positive reinforcement and 
not so benign neglect. It was all under the presumption that the team was helping Nixon; ethics 
were no more than an obstacle to achieving an end.
67
 
Such was the case for the thoughtful but woefully misguided Jeb Stuart Magruder who 
still in his early 30s fell into a form of hero worship that allowed him to plunge chin deep into a 
personal and professional disaster. Magruder began working for Richard Nixon as the Southern 
California coordinator for his 1968 campaign when he met Haldeman. The young man made a 
good impression on the former advertising executive who saw in him a bright, handsome, and 
articulate individual who might be able to help them in the White House. As usual, Haldeman 
knew that Nixon needed continuous help with public relations and his image ―problem.‖ For 
Magruder, the opportunity to work for Nixon in the White House was not only a dream come 
true but represented an opportunity to change the world.  Magruder entered all that was to come 
with his eyes wide open, as he recalled in his memoir, ―because I believed that his essentially 
conservative political philosophy was what American needed….I believed in Richard Nixon.‖68  
Like many other young staffers, Magruder‘s first office was in the White House basement 
across from the mess, before he moved into the Old Executive Office Building next to Herb 
Klein in the Office of Communications, and just down from Colson‘s office and the president‘s 
―hideaway‖ lair. Public relations for the president was to be Magruder‘s game, but as the young 
Haldeman aide understood well enough, Nixon ―was not a lovable man and no public relations 
program was going to make him so.‖ One of the issues for Haldeman, though, was organizing 
and finding a way to deliver the president‘s message to the American people without having the 
president over expose himself. The idea was to coordinate all of the different units in the White 
House that dealt with communications and the media, including the communications unit, 
Ziegler‘s Press Office, and the speechwriters and consultants to develop a public relations 
program to take the Nixon view of the world directly to the heart of America. It was not long, 
however, before the young Magruder was pulled down into the vortex between the White House 
and the operations at the Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP), when he was named as 
the Deputy Campaign Manager under John Mitchell.  Soon, he was over his head swimming 
with and against the various factions and the skullduggery that constituted the back-story of the 
Nixon administration from the middle of 1971 onwards.
69
 
 Those who served at the pleasure of the president and fought in his name took their path 
through the White House in different ways. Strategists and speechwriters such as Ray Price, Bill 
Safire, and Pat Buchanan, while knee-deep in partisan politics, managed to avoid the poisonous 
cup that was passed around like whiskey at an Irish wake. These theorists and wordsmiths 
themselves also differed in personality and style. Their boss was keenly aware of these 
differences. ―When he was at his most Presidential, Ray Price was the writer Nixon preferred,‖ 
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Safire recalled about his colleagues. ―When he was at his most elemental, it was Pat Buchanan, 
for whom he also had a personal affection.‖70 That personal affection was a two-way street, as 
Buchanan was always a fierce Nixon champion and defender. The linguistic pit-bull of the 
operation, who graduated with honors from Georgetown in 1961 and earned a masters from 
Columbia University‘s Graduate School of Journalism in 1962, began working for Nixon in 1966 
as executive assistant and joined the White House staff immediately after the inauguration in 
January 1969. Nixon was a proud attendee to Buchanan‘s wedding, posing for photos on the 
steps of church after the service with the bride and groom. One of Buchanan‘s prized possessions 
was the glowing personal letter sent by the president on the first anniversary of their election 
victory in November of 1969. ―On this first anniversary of our campaign victory last year, I am 
reminded once again of how much your active and very effective participation meant to our 
achievement of that victory,‖ Nixon wrote. ―The time and effort you devoted, the encouragement 
you gave, the personal commitment you made, all contributed greatly to our success in a 
difficult, exciting and closely contested campaign.‖ No one was more personally devoted to the 
president and Buchanan wore his politics on his sleeve, moving about the White House with a 
wry smile, with an abundance of energy and enthusiasm for his job to represent his political 
hero.
71
  
 Such was not the case for John Ehrlichman, the president‘s advisor for domestic affairs, 
who projected no devotion on his sleeve but a scowl on his face. Stern, dour, and humorless, 
Ehrlichman, shoulders hunched, could be seen stalking (often impatiently) the hallways outside 
the Oval Office squinting like he had bit down on a lemon. Ehrlichman never appeared to enjoy 
his job.  The lawyer, who first met Nixon in 1959, was a friend of Haldeman from their college 
days at UCLA. He began working for Nixon‘s 1960 campaign against John Kennedy as an 
advance man, and again during Nixon‘s run for the governor‘s office in California in 1962. 
Given that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and others who served with Nixon in the White House were 
denied a pardon before the president left office during the Watergate crisis, rosy references 
concerning their time with Nixon in memoirs are understandably fleeting. However, no staff 
memoir from the inner circle (other than John Dean‘s) comes close to the bitterness expressed in 
Ehrlichman‘s screed. While it was almost common knowledge in the White House that Nixon 
could not hold his liquor, Ehrlichman was the only one that has suggested that Nixon showed 
any attraction to women other than his wife, Pat, writing that the intoxicated candidate clumsily 
hit on a young woman in a campaign hotel suite during the ‘62 election. Ehrlichman also 
indicated that Nixon‘s drinking led to an ultimatum: that he would not work for him in the future 
unless he got the booze under control. According to Ehrlichman, Nixon did not let him down 
when he joined the campaign team for the successful run for the White House in 1968. However, 
during the administration‘s first term things began to change. While Ehrlichman and Haldeman 
always appeared close, the internal memoranda suggested that as time wore on, the relationship 
became strained, especially over the necessity to deal with the peculiar human dynamics within 
the White House staff. Contributing to the edgy situation was that while the president‘s domestic 
adviser was increasingly sinking into the deep end of abuses of power, he appeared strangely out 
of the loop in matters of substance after the 1970-midterm elections; this was especially apparent 
in his lack of profile in the reelection effort. The fine points of domestic policy took less and less 
                                                 
70
  Safire, Before the Fall, 100. 
71
 See letter from the President to Patrick J. Buchanan, November 7, 1969, Buchanan Papers, Box 7, NARA. See 
also Office of the White House Press Secretary, Buchanan biography of February 12, 1972; Safire, Before the Fall, 
100; and Buchanan, Right from the Beginning, 315-325. 
  26 
of the president‘s time and attention and Nixon‘s requests for Ehrlichman for help on the 
political front increasingly went to others including Chuck Colson.  After 1970, the game was 
winning and Ehrlichman appeared to be frozen out of the political game.
72
  
The person to blame was the other member of the supposed Berlin Wall, H.R. Haldeman. 
In Ehrlichman‘s mind, the White House chief of staff no longer properly distinguished himself 
from his boss. He believed that the reason was that his former college buddy no longer had a 
sense of self. As the senior domestic policy aide wrote, ―By 1968 it was hard to tell where 
Richard Nixon left off and H.R. Haldeman began.‖ What was worse was that the situation had 
led to Haldeman‘s failure to protect the president from his own worst instincts, including some of 
the more nefarious characters with access to the White House. As Ehrlichman observed, ―Later, 
Richard Nixon was to find a new complementary personality in Charles Colson.‖ And while 
similar relationships existed with Nixon and Kissinger in foreign policy, Ehrlichman insists that 
the Nixon-Colson pairing ―was the least attractive of the Nixon partnerships.‖ That partnership 
upset the hierarchical applecart, according to Nixon‘s domestic adviser. ―On paper, Colson 
reported to Haldeman; in fact, Colson reported to the President. The Colson staff grew to twenty-
three people, with Nixon‘s personal approval, while everyone else was under an injunction to 
make drastic staff cuts. As time passed, each of us—Kissinger, Shultz and I—found Colson 
operating in our substantive areas at the President‘s specific instructions.‖73   
Contributing to the tensions was John Mitchell‘s resignation as Attorney General to 
become the campaign manager at CREEP. Mitchell not only had less control over events in the 
Oval Office but appeared unable to stem a growing level of animosity between the White House 
and the campaign headquarters at 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue.  Colson was not only trying but 
succeeding in gaining control of the political operations in the White House and at CREEP as 
well. Mitchell and Colson were always at odds. As journalist J. Anthony Lukas, who covered the 
administration closely during this period recalled, ―The Colson faction and the Mitchell faction 
struggled on the brink of the chasm trying to nudge the other over the edge and scamper to 
safety.‖74 Colson, though, was winning on every front because the president liked the edge his 
―hatchet man‖ offered. Ehrlichman was clearly unimpressed. His feelings colored the way he 
saw many of his duties as time wore on, matching his general glowering disposition. Most 
communications and policy meetings about how to attack the opposition, according to 
Ehrlichman, ―were a waste of time.‖ As a rule, the chief domestic adviser for the president of the 
United States stayed away. ―Richard Nixon would ultimately decide what would and wouldn‘t be 
done…Nixon would listen to Colson and Haldeman—and less often one of us others—and then 
do what he wanted to do.‖75  
 Ehrlichman‘s disposition—more hurt than indifference—appeared to emerge from 
someone who knew that he had little control over his place. At once a man of stature and 
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importance, his access did not appear to transfer to influence with the president, an issue that was 
always at play around the edges of the Oval Office; there was no end to the sniping, infighting, 
tension, and bitterness that contributed to the character of the campaign to come. Ehrlichman, as 
the tapes clearly reveal, was willing to do the dirty work.
76
 Certainly anger, mistrust, and 
paranoia were things that Ehrlichman shared, if nothing else, with the rest of team, and it also 
helps explain why Nixon‘s inner circle remained small. Much of this paranoia was the result of 
Haldeman and the president‘s chronic concern for plugging leaks.77  
 The chief target of Nixon‘s concern about leaks was Henry Kissinger, whom the 
president believed leaked to the media as a matter of routine. Even though Kissinger was 
instrumental and indispensable to Nixon in matters of foreign policy, the president always 
resented the attention that his national security adviser and later, secretary of state received, 
demonstrated in his anger over having to share the cover of Time Magazine with him in January 
of 1973. But in domestic policy, especially in the reelection effort, the Nixon tapes from the Oval 
Office, the White House telephone, the Old Executive Office Building, and at Camp David 
reveal that Kissinger was seldom in the room on domestic political matters and not trusted when 
he was there. When Kissinger left the Oval Office, the conversations make it clear that Kissinger, 
other than on discussions concerning Vietnam, China, or the Soviet Union, was held in either 
contempt or suspicion, and thus was seldom in the inner circle‘s loop; this was especially true in 
regards to the 1972 presidential election. As historian Robert Dallek has pointed out, to recapture 
the White House, Nixon felt the need to plug the leaks stemming from the ―bureaucratic battling‖ 
over foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The upshot was that the president was not ―sure he could 
control Henry.‖ Nixon suggested to Haldeman that ―maybe we‘ve got to bite the bullet now and 
get him out. The problem is, if we don‘t, he‘ll be in the driver‘s seat during the campaign and 
we‘ve got to remember that he did leak things to us in ‘68, and we‘ve got to assume he‘s capable 
of doing the same to our opponents in ‘72.‖78  Indeed, not only did Kissinger not have the keys, 
he was nowhere near the driver‘s seat. Haldeman‘s diary indicates how little contribution was 
made to the reelection campaign by Nixon‘s would be partner in power: 
 
K [Kissinger] came in and the discussion covered some of the general thinking about Vietnam and the P‘s 
big peace plan for next year, which K later told me he does not favor. He thinks that any pullout next year 
would be a serious mistake because the adverse reaction to it could set in well before the ‘72 elections. He 
favors, instead, a continued winding down and then a pullout right at the fall of ‘72 so that if any bad 
results follow they will be too late to affect the election.
79
  
 
The nadir of this diplomatic missive nicely encapsulates Kissinger‘s gift to matters of substance 
during the president‘s campaign for reelection. It was not that the national security adviser did 
not have his uses, but as J. Anthony Lukas correctly pointed out, ―In the Nixon White House, 
Henry Kissinger was an outsider.‖80  
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 Leaks to members of media (at least those not done at the president‘s own behest) were a 
preoccupation for the White House and constitute a part of a long history of fencing with the 
press over Richard Nixon‘s storied career. The battles date back to his first political campaign 
against Gerry Voorhis for the Congressional seat in California in 1946 and continued on through 
his contentious race for the Senate in 1950. Nixon was angered with the sharp criticism he faced 
in the media for his heavy-handed tactics against Democratic rival for the Senate Helen Gahagan 
Douglas (although Douglas could hit back and did with a campaign flyer that proclaimed Nixon 
was the purveyor of the ―Big Lie—Hitler invented it, Stalin perfected it, Nixon uses it‖), linking 
his opponent to Communism. According to the Nixon campaign machine, Douglas was ―pink 
right down to her underwear,‖ and it was comments such as this that made him the national 
media‘s favorite target.81 Nixon came under fire numerous times as vice president under Dwight 
Eisenhower, including the ―Fund Crisis‖ and the farcical ―Checkers‖ affair, where Nixon 
skillfully used television to take his case directly to the people and built a faithful following in 
Middle America. This was especially true during his anti-communist crusade against civil 
servant Alger Hiss, a case that brought him more fame in the American heartland than animosity 
in the national press. Nixon became a master manipulator of the media.  However, the idea that 
Nixon had actual ―enemies‖ in the press was practically part of the vernacular by the time he 
failed in his bid to gain the governor‘s office in California in 1962. On election night, a bitter 
Nixon cemented this idea, proclaiming at an impromptu press conference that members of the 
media would not have ―Nixon to kick around anymore.‖82  
 Despite Richard Nixon‘s well-documented antipathy for individual members of the press 
and publications including the Washington Post, there is really little evidence to suggest that the 
media were ever out to get him, let alone had any significant negative effect on his political 
career or his popularity prior to the unraveling of Watergate in 1973 and 1974.  Nixon not only 
had learned to use media controversies to his advantage but he also surrounded himself with 
those who came from marketing backgrounds with honed media skills. Longtime CBS journalist 
Dan Rather took notice of Haldeman‘s media savvy, musing that Nixon‘s chief of staff ―thinks 
he knows more about my business than I do, and I‘m inclined to think he‘s correct . . . . He came 
out of an advertising agency in Los Angeles.  He‘s made a lifetime study of the techniques of 
manipulating my business.‖83 And dealing with the media was a Haldeman specialty. The former 
adverting executive believed that the best way to deal with media was to understand it, to know 
how it thought, and to tap the power it had to create images in the public‘s mind. Not using the 
press to its full advantage could be more dangerous than a few unfriendly journalists. It is a point 
of view that helps explain why Nixon and Haldeman were inseparable in the White House. For 
Nixon, the potential power of the press, combined with his thin skin for media criticism made for 
a curious and mostly false enemy. Although as speechwriter Bill Safire recalled, ―I must have 
heard Richard Nixon say ‗the press is the enemy‘ a dozen times.‖84    
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 The president‘s intention to remain behind the scenes for his reelection bid coupled with 
his peculiar antipathy for the media increased the level of pressure on the team to enhance its 
boss‘s image. Throughout the long march towards election night, Nixon‘s chief of staff was 
relentless on the issue that staffers needed to be vigilant to every detail that would come to bear 
on the president‘s image. Using the tools of the media, it was everyone‘s responsibility to make 
Nixon look good. Haldeman had no problems taking members of staff to task over this issue. 
Following a television interview with Dan Rather where the president appeared tired, with dark 
circles under his eyes, Haldeman was incredulous that his staff did not think that more could be 
done to correct his appearance. As a frustrated chief of staff wrote in a memo to staffers Bill 
Carruthers and Mark Goode, ―I‘m disappointed to find that both of you feel that camera 
direction, lighting, and general appearance was good.‖ There was, Haldeman pointed out, 
―universal reaction that the President looked bad—that he had large bags under his eyes, that he 
looked older than he usually does, and that was a poor picture.‖ Haldeman wanted fewer side 
angles and more head-on shots. ―It seems to me that with lights, makeup, and camera angle, you 
may not totally eliminate the lines, but you can certainly reduce the effect of them.‖ He insisted 
that the way to do it was to manipulate CBS‘ camera angle so it was not above eye level. ―We 
have got to exercise more control and get the camera down where it belongs.‖ Goode suggested 
that fill lighting would have destroyed the feel of the Oval Office during the interview. 
Haldeman again showed his frustration. ―…that‘s too darned bad, we should just destroy the 
overall feel of the room because the important thing is to have the President look good, not to 
have people get a pleasing and artistic tour of the Oval Office.‖85 A few months later, Haldeman 
complained about the same issue following a television spot where a shadow appeared on both 
sides of the president‘s head. Haldeman fired off another terse administratively confidential 
memo to Goode. ―I thought we had a new lighting system, and I would like to know what the 
problem was that caused the shadow, why it wasn‘t caught ahead of time, and what you are 
doing to correct it.‖86  
 Haldeman‘s concern was that the media would always prefer to make Nixon look bad, 
and thus, the staff had to do everything it could to mitigate the worst of the damage. The duels 
and battles that were to come with the press originated directly from the president‘s desk. In a 
memo to Haldeman, on April 30, 1972, Nixon wrote, ―We need the kind of attack which will get 
to their vulnerable spot—their total support of ultra-liberal causes . . . . I cannot emphasize too 
strongly my feeling that much more than any single issue that we are going to emphasize, the 
discrediting of the press must be our major objective over the next few months.‖87  As a result, 
Nixon‘s chief of staff was always cracking the whip on the press issue. Haldeman insisted that 
those on the White House staff needed to be media wary and savvy.  This was especially true in 
regards to answering criticisms through the press. The man whom Haldeman wanted on this 
issue was Chuck Colson. ―There is deep concern about the effectiveness of our program with 
regard to media bias,‖ Haldeman warned Colson in a memorandum. ―While we are doing a good 
job reacting to day-to-day attacks by the media, we need to be following a long-term strategy, 
looking toward election day.‖ Haldeman reminded the special counsel that Nixon‘s priority was 
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the media.  ―You will recall that the President spoke very strongly about the press bias at the 
beginning of the Administration. There were several former newsmen who, with all honesty, 
believed that he was overstating the case—people like Herb Klein, Ray Price, Bill Safire, et al. . . 
After three years, we know they were wrong and that he was right.‖88  
 Haldeman, much like the president, displayed an especially thin skin when faced with 
criticism in the press. This was particularly true when the delivery of those criticisms was 
skillful. As the chief of staff noted, ―What really puts the frosting on the cake as far as his theory 
is concerned is the [Robert] Novak article. Here is a press man who is strongly anti-Nixon, but 
he lays it out in such an effective way that not even the softest-headed individual in our staff 
could possibly fail to get the message.‖ Despite this baseless charge against the journalist (the 
columns with partner Roland Evans were frequently supportive of the president and harshly 
critical of Democrats), to Haldeman there was a ―media problem,‖ and it needed to be handled 
before Election Day. ―Let us be very precise as to what our target is. It is the national television 
and press media, based in Washington, not the media in the country. We should separate those 
two, and, of course, separate out those few that [press secretary Ken] Ziegler has finally 
determined may not be against us among the national press corps.‖ Haldeman told Colson to 
attack the press in its ―vulnerable spot,‖ which was their supposed complete support for ―ultra-
liberal causes‖ including what the chief of staff believed was a ―deliberate distortion‖ of the line 
between reporting and editorializing. Haldeman laid out what the campaign was all about in 
plain terms to the special counsel to the president: 
 
The purpose of our campaign should be two-fold. The primary purpose incidentally is not that of trying to 
influence the national media so that they are not as biased against us. We will have some effect on this, but 
as we get pushed to election day, they will go all out in a desperate attempt to defeat us. The primary 
purpose is to discredit the national media among their readers and viewers.
89
  
 
Haldeman suggested that the vice president could be used as a ―big gun‖ when the time was 
right, followed by ―responsible‖ members of the House and the Senate, including state 
governors. Haldeman instructed Colson to get Ziegler, Klein, [Kenneth] Moore, [John] Scali, 
and Price onboard and implement a plan, with one member of the staff doing ―nothing else but 
attain this objective.‖90 
 In his nightly diary, Haldeman noted that the president believed that tactical warfare was 
the only way to deal with unfriendly journalists, while using friendly members of the media to go 
after their opponents for them. ―The only way we can fight the whole press problem . . .  is 
through the Colson operation, the nutcutters, forcing our news and in a brutal vicious attack on 
the opposition.‖91 The ―nutcutters‖ tracked down into the sub-campaign of the 1972 election. 
Although it had no measurable benefit at the ballot boxes that November, it would end up 
characterizing the campaign in the public mind after Watergate.
92
 This darker and often more 
bizarre part of the election of 1972 was shaped in large measure by Charles Colson‘s growing 
operations at the White House and at the campaign headquarters at 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue. 
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 The Committee to Reelect the President had been raising campaign funds for the 1972 
presidential election in its office a block from the White House since March 1971. By May of 
that year, it was a ―take no prisoners‖ hive of activity that over the following six months planned 
the budgets for most of its programs; directors were appointed, staff was hired, and all activities 
became operational. The character of that organization was shaped by a motley and ultimately 
dangerous cast of characters. These included former FBI agent G. Gordon Liddy, Nixon crony 
and ex-New York City detective Jack Caulfield, and Caulfield buddy and former CIA and FBI 
agent James McCord, who oversaw a litany of spies and moles that began to dig up dirt on 
Democratic leaders and those vying for the top of the Democratic ticket in 1972. Rounding out 
this interesting assemblage was CREEP‘s campaign manager John Mitchell, deputy director Jeb 
Magruder, and deputy finance chairman Herbert Kalmbach, who was also the president‘s 
personal attorney. The goals were numerous. They included gaining intelligence on Democratic 
Party candidates (including Nixon nemesis and chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 
Larry O‘Brien), launching a series of nefarious schemes to unleash like grenades along the 
campaign trail, and to eventually disrupt and subvert possible demonstrations at the Republican 
National Convention that August.
93
  
 The collection of these unsavory characters in CREEP did not arrive together by accident 
and they tracked in and out of the White House, especially those whom Chuck Colson brought 
into the Old Executive Office Building and White House, mere feet away from the Oval Office, 
including former CIA contract officer E. Howard Hunt.
94
 Haldeman‘s California boys in the 
White House enlisted their own college cronies including University of Southern California alum 
and Chapin and Strachan friend Donald Segretti. Both the crown prince of the dirty tricks and the 
mascot of ―rat fucking,‖ Segretti got the start up money for his enterprise through Chapin in June 
1971, and cooked up a stew of crude, sophomoric efforts to disrupt the Democratic campaign 
events right through to the convention. This would include operatives canceling Democratic 
meetings and events, fabricating stories, creating fake letters on forged Democratic Party 
letterhead, and printing and distributing phony leaflets. The underbelly of the emerging 
campaign was frenetic, a litany of skullduggery hatched and run out of both 1701 and the White 
House. These included several months of 24-hour a day surveillance of Senator Edward Kennedy 
and the burglary in California of the office of Daniel Ellsberg‘s psychiatrist. The type of schemes 
that actually got a voice in the shadow of the seat of supreme power within the United States are 
staggering in their recklessness, including Liddy‘s ―Operation Gemstone,‖ and others brewed 
under the guidance of the omnipresent Colson. The plots included sabotage, blackmail with the 
use of prostitutes, wiretapping, electronic surveillance, and a plan to kidnap Jerry Rubin and 
Abbie Hoffman and hold them in a safe house in Mexico so they would not disrupt the 
Republican National Convention. Although few took Liddy‘s wild espionage schemes seriously, 
that someone of his background and character was allowed to operate at all with the knowledge 
and support of the attorney general and the president‘s own chief of staff indicates how 
poisonous the underbelly of the campaign really was.
95
 On a rainy afternoon in March 1971, as 
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Magruder and Strachan walked back to 1701 from the White House, Strachan summed up the 
situation in a succinct but frightening manner: ―Liddy‘s a Hitler, but at least he‘s our Hitler.‖96  
 Whereas presidential biographer Theodore White called Liddy a ―gun-loving psychotic,‖ 
to Ehrlichman aide Egil (Bud) Krogh Jr., Liddy was a man of strength and worthy of admiration.  
A man like Liddy fit with Krogh‘s political temperament, as he once boasted, ―Anyone who 
opposes us, we‘ll destroy. As a matter of fact, anyone who doesn‘t support us, we‘ll destroy.‖ 
Krogh, who worked most closely with Magruder, was relentless; lean and fit, he could be seen 
jogging in the mall, weightlifting in the White House exercise room, and working all night to 
finish a project.
97
 In 1971, Krogh, along with Kissinger assistant David Young, was shoulder 
tapped to plug the leaks that the president wanted plugged. Krogh enlisted Liddy and Colson got 
Hunt. The former CIA operative developed a plan to go after Ellsberg and Ehrlichman approved 
the covert operation to get his psychiatrist‘s files. But it quickly got worse, as Chuck Colson 
began pressing to use Liddy and others to get something they could use on DNC chair Lawrence 
O‘Brien and enlisted Hunt to engage in intelligence gathering for CREEP.98 The special counsel 
to the president was often directly involved in carrying out ground-level stunts, such as setting up 
a series of misleading advertising that linked Democratic senators campaigning for reelection in 
1970 with abandoning prisoners of war, calling for an immediate surrender in Vietnam, and 
legalizing heroin.
99
 All these were in step with a familiar, dark, and ruthless cadence that 
emanated from inside the Oval Office to a loyal group of subordinates. Nixon‘s hand was 
directly involved in many of these activities and it was clear that it was what he expected to see 
during the march towards election night. As Haldeman recalled in his memoirs, the president 
―has several plots he wants hatched.‖100 
 As spring turned to summer 1971, this well-known and heavily disseminated story 
concerning the cast of characters occupying the offices on both sides of Pennsylvania Avenue 
reveals the edgy and largely unnecessary (in terms of political and electoral value) backdrop to 
the actual campaign. However, the impact on the staff caught up in-between the shenanigans and 
the growing power struggle and bickering among those at CREEP and the White House was not 
only significant, but is less well known, especially in relationship to the reelection effort. It 
should not surprise that staff relations were often tense. This strain intensified over growing 
struggles between the White House election team and CREEP‘s operations at 1701, highlighting 
the upheaval during the ‗72 campaign.   
Not surprisingly, John Ehrlichman was often on both the giving and the receiving end of 
criticism and browbeating when it came to the operations at 1701. While Haldeman himself was 
at times wary of some of the sloppiness in the CREEP operation, he was concerned with the 
effect of bickering on morale. On more than one occasion, Haldeman did his best to rein in 
Ehrlichman over feuds with CREEP and John Mitchell‘s campaign staff. ―I was quite disturbed 
with the results of the meeting we had in my office awhile back with John Mitchell, Fred Malek, 
and Ken Cole,‖ Haldeman wrote in a memo to Ehrlichman. ―You will recall that at that meeting, 
you took a totally negative position and quite severely criticized Mitchell directly, as well as 
laying some strenuous objections and obstructions in the way of the development of Malek‘s 
campaign role.‖ Haldeman believed that Mitchell‘s efforts to develop a role for Malek and other 
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staffers were ―honest and sincere‖ and that everyone including the president‘s chief domestic 
adviser should deal with these internal matters in a ―constructive‖ manner and ―do everything we 
can to make it succeed, rather than simply to criticize it.‖ He was more concerned about the way 
Ehrlichman went after the Committee, especially after Magruder, which Haldeman thought was 
―disturbing.‖ Haldeman knew full well that much of the direction over at CREEP originated and 
was run increasingly out of the White House operations run by Ken Cole and Colson, and that he 
needed to understand it in that context. ―The Committee‘s material on issues may, indeed, be 
terrible. But, we ought to at least consider the possibility that that‘s a reflection of the input 
they‘ve been given from those better able to outline the issues and our positions on them.‖ 
Haldeman warned that they could easily descend into the ―old ‗we-they‘ situation.‖ The chief of 
staff wanted to impress on Ehrlichman for election year that it was ―imperative that we all 
consider ourselves part of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President and not consider it 
as a separate entity which is in some way, an enemy of the White House.‖  There were numerous 
arguments over advertisements, posters, communications, mail outs, letters, and the preparation 
of materials. While Haldeman believed that many of the problems in isolation might have 
seemed ―petty and minor‖ given Ehrlichman‘s increasing frustration, they were systematic of 
deeper problems between ―you and the Domestic Council vs. Mitchell and the Re-Election 
Committee.‖101   
Ehrlichman defended himself, insinuating that the charges emanating from CREEP that 
he unduly criticized Mitchell and ―obstructed‖ and ―undercut‖ Malek and Magruder were false. 
He denied saying that Magruder planned meetings poorly or suggested that the Committee‘s 
advertising ―stinks.‖ And charges that he cared for no one‘s opinion except his own were ―Not 
true.‖ Claims, however, that he had deliberately slowed the production of the ―Speaker‘s 
manual‖ were indeed correct, as Ehrlichman scrawled to Haldeman, ―Right—because it was a 
total disaster.‖ He vehemently denied, though, that he had ordered a review of all of Committee‘s 
campaign material. As Ehrlichman penned to Haldeman, ―Absolutely not true in any respect.‖ 
But Ehrlichman was certainly critical. In a February 23 memo to Mitchell, he not only suggested 
that White House staff and the Committee for the Re-election were ―meshing up very badly on 
matters of substantive policy‖ but that some of the work by CREEP staff, including Magruder, 
―to be very generous about it, it was very terrible.‖ Making it worse was that Ehrlichman copied 
this memo to Magruder. The young deputy campaign manager replied to the copied memo, 
writing, ―It was very thoughtful of you to give me the memorandum you had addressed to the 
Attorney General relating to some of the problems you felt had been developing.‖ Magruder, 
who undoubtedly did not feel it was thoughtful at all, tried to clarify some of the issues and 
assuage the situation somewhat. Everyone wanted Ehrlichman to back off and Haldeman heard 
about it from all sides. Five days after Haldeman‘s cautionary memo to Ehrlichman, internal staff 
memos showed worry and uncertainty about the matter. Higby fired off a memo to Strachan 
about the ramifications of this high profile row. ―When we take on Ehrlichman, we are naturally 
getting into a serious and very delicate area. John has talked to Bob about the problems that Bob 
mentioned in his memo to John, and Bob, in turn, has talked to me. Bob made the point that John 
vigorously denied several of the charges.‖ Higby suggested that they were then unsure whom to 
believe, and that Magruder may not have been completely candid about Ehrlichman‘s charge that 
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the advertising ―stinks.‖ Haldeman wanted Higby to stress upon Strachan that he needed ―the 
truth—the whole truth.‖ Higby summed up the entire episode in a way that helps to explain some 
of the internal dynamics between the White House and CREEP and the divided loyalties and 
agendas. ―I think that we were probably sucked in, to some extent, by Magruder on this thing, 
although, I am sure that there really is a problem. Ehrlichman‘s point in creating the problem is 
to draw it to a head so there are some substantial changes…The point is, I don‘t think we have 
provided with Bob, all the facts and all aspects of all the facts before proceeding.‖102  
 Young staff, strong personalities, and infighting were not uncommon, and while the 
president supposedly had his fingers in every facet of the operation—the ultimate 
micromanager—he was not micromanaging any of this White House bickering. As former Nixon 
staffer Richard J. Whalen recalled, ―Nixon did not much care what his subordinates did to each 
other as long as he was spared the sight of blood.‖103   Heading into the election year, the call for 
order, unity, and loyalty came from Haldeman‘s office. The chief of staff knew that he was 
sitting on a powder keg, and if it were to explode, he wanted it to be on enemy territory. The 
challenge was to channel the energy outward. The requirement from the chief of staff was that 
everyone needed to work as one to get the president reelected in November 1972. What the team 
needed was passion and to find a way to engage the American people emotionally. As Haldeman 
suggested to the president in 1972, ―…it‘s clear that first we are better off today than we were a 
year ago, but secondly, there is a real need to establish the President‘s identity as something 
other than just a professional President.‖  The chief of staff believed it was ―necessary to 
crystallize the support to get people willing to get out and fight—to tie people to you 
emotionally—the country needs emotional feelings regarding the President. . . before they were 
fired up for the wrong causes, now they can be stirred up for the right cause.‖104 
 Haldeman and the president both knew well enough that directing the nation‘s political 
passions was a tricky endeavor. Indeed, Richard Nixon and his loyal men had learned some hard 
lessons since assuming office in the winter of 1969. During his inaugural address, the newly 
sworn 37th President of the United States had called upon Americans to ―lower‖ their voice and 
put an end to the era‘s divisive rhetoric. ―We cannot learn from one another until we stop 
shouting at one another, until we speak quietly enough so that our words can be heard as well as 
our voices,‖ Nixon said.105 But that was then, and by the end of 1970, the president and his 
White House loyalists had strayed far from the lofty rhetoric of that promising January day in the 
nation‘s capital, when everything was still before them and everything was still possible. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HEARTLAND HOMILIES 
 
For almost 200 years, the policy of this nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in 
the Congress and the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its 
cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no future as a free society . . . . And 
so tonight -- to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans -- I ask for your support.
106
 
 
 
ichard Nixon‘s presidency was wrought from the ashes of 1968, the tenuous victory for a 
minority party that compensated for its lack of a mandate with a single-minded quest for 
survival. The crier of law and order did not staunch the violence and turmoil that plagued 
election year. For the first two years of the Nixon administration, bombs exploded like pockets 
of rage from the Pentagon to Oakland, California. From Berkeley to Columbia, students hit the 
streets instead of books, hounding the establishment, its accouterments, and even the president‘s 
daughter, who faced enmity on her own campus and jeering outside the White House gates on 
her wedding day. As the self-appointed people‘s warriors raged against the war machine, the 
political machine inside the Nixon White House raged back. By the spring of 1970, the clash had 
reached a bloody climax at Kent State University, chased by a renewed swell of student 
insurrection. Nixon entered the mid-term elections a few months later in a fighter‘s stance. It was 
not a winning strategy. Election Day was a bitter disappointment as the Republican Party failed 
to make significant gains in the House or the Senate and the administration suffered a subsequent 
drop in the polls in 1971. The setbacks, however, triggered the president‘s consummate political 
instinct.  Nixon and his men had an epiphany, a clear and quite sober understanding that the great 
majority of Middle Americans would back the president on the Vietnam War, would stand with 
him against the counterculture and the protesting students, would cheer him on the campaign 
trail and support him with their votes in the election booth. All Nixon needed to do was stop 
shouting, stop scaring an already fearful populace, and act as if he belonged where he was, 
something that was always a tricky proposition for the man from Yorba Linda.
107
  
Following recommendations from his advisers, the president changed his stance. Gone 
was the fighting armor, and in its place was a White House that spoke a language that did not 
require translation by those in the vast American heartland. Wrapped in a sheath of hearth 
qualities, Nixon and his team spoke plainly to ―real Americans,‖ or to those the president had 
earlier identified as ―. . . the forgotten Americans—the non shouters, the non demonstrators.‖108  
Those ―Middle Americans‖ were also the ones who put Dick Nixon back in the White House. 
While always a part of the Nixon mantra, this angle was dusted off and assumed a new 
importance and urgency midway through his first term in office, and it helped define the 
reelection effort in 1972.  
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This chapter delves into the origins of that political footing, an emerging strategy after 
1970 that aimed to recast the Republican Party as the one that stood for ordinary Americans 
while convincing the electorate that the Democratic Party only represented the elite, a party 
overtaken by ―radicals and the extremists.‖  This change in strategy following the mid-term 
elections by the Nixon team has not been the focus of scholarly works, although evidence for it is 
found in White House staff memoirs, including the diaries of Nixon‘s Chief of Staff H.R. 
Haldeman, and in hundreds of documents left behind by administration officials available in the 
National Archives. While the general story of Nixon‘s attempt to build a new coalition carved 
from traditional Democratic blocs is fairly well known, little scholarship connects this to the 
Nixon team‘s larger political strategy in the 1972 reelection bid.109 This includes the effort to 
both divide the Democrats by commandeering elements of their traditional coalition and 
portraying the party as elitists, out of touch with Middle Americans. This chapter also traces the 
new approach put forth by Nixon‘s political advisers, that victory in 1972 meant a departure 
from the past and that their boss needed to abandon his ―Nixon the fighter‖ stance and leave his 
team to take the battle to the other side.  The emergence of these strategies is the focus of this 
chapter.   
**** 
 It was not the first time the president did not look good on television. Those on Nixon‘s 
team who snapped off their televisions in disgust on the night of Monday, November 2, 1970, 
could shift in their chairs and hearken back to 1960 when a young John F. Kennedy appeared to 
best their boss in front of a national audience in the first televised debate of that election year. 
They all remembered what happened that November, as Kennedy slipped past Richard Nixon, 
which at that point was the narrowest presidential election victory in the history of the Republic. 
On the night before the 1970 mid-term elections, Nixon appeared on television to deliver an 
address taped two days prior in Phoenix, Arizona, penned by speechwriter Bill Safire. The 
speech came on the heels of several recent confrontations between the antiwar movement and 
police, including growing violence and protests on the road in the last days of the campaign. The 
worst episode came in San Jose, California, where demonstrators tried to force their way into the 
venue and pelted the presidential motorcade on the way out with rocks and bricks, prompting the 
city‘s chief of police, J. Raymond Blackmore, to declare that only ―an act of God‖ saved the 
president. Following the event, Haldeman recorded in his diary that protestors ―really hit the 
motorcade on the way out.‖ Nixon watched as a rock narrowly missed his head as he stepped 
into the waiting limo. The violence, however, was exactly what the president and his men wanted 
in front of the waiting media. ―We wanted some confrontation,‖ Haldeman wrote, ―and there 
were no hecklers in the hall, so we stalled departure a little bit so they could zero in outside, and 
they sure did.‖ On the way out, Nixon deliberately riled the crowd to elicit a violent response.  
―Before getting in car, P stood up and gave the V signs, which made them mad,‖ Haldeman 
recalled that evening. ―They threw rocks, flags, candles, etc., as we drove out.‖ With rocks 
smashing car and bus windows, the president‘s team had what it wanted. ―Made a huge 
incident,‖ Haldeman wrote, ―and we worked hard to crank it up, should make really major story 
and might be effective.‖110  
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 Two days later in Phoenix, an indignant president told a noontime crowd that such 
―violent thugs‖ would not prevent a president ―from going out and speaking with the American 
people wherever they want to hear me and wherever I want to go  . . . . This President is not 
going to be cooped up in the White House.‖111 Later that day, Nixon taped his speech on 
violence in America for broadcast the evening before the midterm elections, hoping to capitalize 
on the chaos captured by the media in urban areas across the nation. It was a ―fighting, arm-
waving, give-‗em-hell, law-and-order speech‖ favored both by Safire and fellow speechwriter 
Patrick J. Buchanan. Even though they were very different in style and temperament as writers, 
they personally favored a ―fighting president,‖ one who would wage the battles that some 
Americans wanted fought, and not look weak in the face of growing social and cultural crisis.
112
 
They supported Nixon as he railed against protestors, suggesting that they used the Vietnam War 
as their ―alibi for violence.‖113 Indeed, this was the approach during the mid-term elections of 
1970, as the president enthusiastically campaigned for congressional Republicans, tossing red 
meat for the faithful like some politicians lobbed baseballs at big games. While this was fine for 
the true believers at Republican rallies, few thought that Nixon‘s efforts at hard driving 
campaigning might actually keep his silent majority not only silent but at home on Election Day. 
The night before Americans went to the polls, the president‘s law and order speech ran on 
television, and quickly turned into what Haldeman deputy Jeb Magruder and other staffers 
thought was a ―disaster.‖ It was a ―disjointed, black-and-white, law-and-order tirade [that] was 
followed immediately by [Senator and Democratic rival] Ed Muskie, in living color, sitting in an 
armchair by a crackling fire, speaking in the voice of sweet reason,‖ Magruder wrote. ―The 
contrast was devastating. It was like watching Grandma Moses debate the Boston Strangler.‖114 
 Later that night, Haldeman‘s diary entry showed that he generally agreed with the 
assessment. ―TV night, and a real disaster!‖ The chief of staff tried to blame it on an ―audio 
problem,‖ suggesting they ―didn‘t know how bad it was until after the first network, NBC, went 
on the air.‖ Haldeman knew, however, that they ―had laid a bomb.‖ Among the president‘s staff, 
there was disagreement over what it all meant, an undercurrent that ran through the White House 
for the next two years. ―Considerable division of opinion within staff about net effect, I think 
most feel it was bad, some think a disaster,‖ Haldeman wrote. ―The hard-liners [such as 
Buchanan and Safire] still feel it was good. But the whole mess points up the necessity of 
checking and rechecking on all these things.‖115  In his memoirs, Nixon admitted much the same, 
revealing his concerns about a serious potential challenger in 1972. ―In contrast to the harsh tone 
of my Phoenix speech, Muskie sounded calm and measured as he spoke from the homey setting 
of his summer house in Cape Elizabeth, Maine. . . . There was no doubt that Muskie emerged the 
winner.‖ The Buchanan/Safire preference for Nixon the fighter was delivered a serious body 
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blow in the final hours of the 1970 campaign, and underscored the emerging internal struggle in 
the Nixon White House over tactics, strategy, and personalities.
116
  
 Haldeman described the following day as ―fairly rough.‖ Both he and the president were 
disappointed with not only the television fiasco but also the election results, as they had hoped 
for much more. The Republicans had gained two seats in the Senate but lost nine in the House. 
Haldeman tried to spin it as a ―major victory in the Senate,‖ as did the president; both knew that 
it was anything but a victory.
117
 All Nixon and his men needed to do for a reminder was read the 
morning papers. As Tom Wicker wrote in the New York Times, ―Richard M. Nixon is too 
realistic a politician to take much comfort from that kind of victory, whatever he says publicly.‖ 
Wicker mused about the ―ill-made and high-pitched campaign film‖ that stood in stark contrast 
to the ―quietly impressive‖ Senator Muskie.118 Wicker colleague and columnist Warren Weaver 
agreed, adding that Muskie revealed a ―convincing demonstration of personal strength,‖ 
suggesting that the two television segments ―could hardly have been more different. The 
Republican film was full of shouting crowds and Mr. Nixon‘s free-swinging oratorical thrusts. 
Senator Muskie spoke in measured tones from an armchair in a living room setting, rarely raising 
his voice.‖119 James Reston also scoffed at any administration claim of victory. ―Unfortunately, 
President Nixon apparently didn‘t get the message,‖ the columnist told his readers. ―Even after 
he had divided his party, violated all of his calls for unity, morality, and integrity, he was still 
claiming he had won a great victory and strengthened his hand at home and abroad, and 
particularly in the Senate.‖  Seeming to anticipate a shake up in the Nixon camp, Reston pointed 
out that Nixon ―tried to overwhelm the opposition in this election, but he failed. Now he will 
probably minimize his role of party leader and go back to being President.‖ The veteran 
journalist suggested that the president made the critical mistake of employing the ―old politics‖ 
that had once brought him to ―the pinnacle of American political life, but they didn‘t work in this 
election.‖ Instead, he suggested that Nixon only succeeded in dividing the nation and reviving 
the Democratic Party.  The columnist posed a question for his readers: ―What lessons will he 
draw from the campaign for the future? This is the critical question for a President who now has 
to deal with the old policy problems and the new political realities.‖120   
 Nixon was of course furious over the media coverage, blaming the poor showing as ―a 
conspiracy in the press.‖ But it was evident that both he and his team took the criticism to heart, 
acutely aware of these ―new political realities.‖121 Consequently, for the next few days, the 
president‘s loyal chief of staff was not pleased with his job. Nixon was sullen and Haldeman 
needed to handhold and try to steer his boss away from his preoccupation with the matter.  
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Haldeman admitted the president was despondent and ―just can‘t get himself away from the 
subject.‖ By November 6, with Nixon brooding ―over and over‖ about the results, they decided 
to bring all of the president‘s political team down to Key Biscayne, Florida, for a special strategy 
meeting.
122
  
 On November 7, from 11:00 am to 5:00 pm without a break, a gathering of Haldeman, 
John Ehrlichman, John Mitchell, Donald Rumsfeld, Robert Finch, Bryce Harlow, and Chuck 
Colson drank endless cups of coffee, ate sandwiches, and planned for the re-election. Noticeably 
absent were any other members of the Republican Party. They were not invited. It was a sign of 
things to come for 1972. The conversation did not call out the president‘s behavior on the 
campaign trail as much as it attempted to move the political campaign strategy in a new 
direction. The easiest and quickest target was the vice president, Spiro Agnew. Haldeman noted 
that they agreed the vice president‘s role was to be ―positive and constructive,‖ while Nixon, 
understanding all too well the changing dynamic, wrote in his diary that the vice president should 
―de-escalate the rhetoric without de-escalating the substance of his message. He should be shown 
fighting for something rather than just railing against everyone.‖123 It was an about-face for the 
president, as he had relished using Agnew as his ―cutting edge.‖ The problem, though, was that 
Agnew‘s knife cut both ways. Nixon had become agitated having his face rubbed in the issue, 
especially in the manner in which Reston suggested in the Times that both Nixon and Agnew had 
―blundered‖ with their rhetoric in the midterms, and that the president could no longer expect to 
―fight a savage election, romanticize the democratic process, proclaim the virtues of unity‖ and 
remain in power.
124
   
 Anger aside, it was clear that the team took heed. The consensus was that it was time to 
rein in Agnew who had been wielding speeches like a machete. The president also faced insider 
criticism, specifically from a voice he trusted in such matters, his old pal, John Mitchell. Nixon‘s 
long-serving ally knew that they needed to change strategy if they hoped to win. Mitchell told 
the president that the speech in Phoenix made him ―sound as if [he was] running for District 
Attorney of Phoenix rather than the President of the United States addressing the American 
People at the end of an important national campaign.‖ Haldeman aide Jeb Magruder agreed: ―In 
the longer run, the 1970 disaster persuaded the President that he must change tactics for 1972, 
that he must take the ‗high road‘ when he ran for reelection.‖125   
 Putting down the sword did not feel like the highroad for the veteran politician, who 
knew little else than politics as a blood sport. Thoughts of remaining behind the scenes and out 
of step with his usual cadence for attack constituted foreign territory. The fallout from the 
disappointing midterm elections, however, cast a long shadow over the reelection effort in 1972 
and a pall over the president. ―The first months of 1971 were the lowest point of my first term as 
President,‖ Nixon wrote in his memoirs. Even though the president certainly exaggerated, 
suggesting it ―seemed possible that I might not even be nominated for re-election in 1972,‖ it 
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illustrates his lack of confidence about the administration‘s direction emerging from the mid-
term elections.
126
 The instinctual politician knew that his recent showing at the polls had put 
everything into play. As Reston reminded his readers, ―When this election of 1970 started, the 
Democrats were in despair: they felt they had no chance in 1972 to regain the White House: but 
after the savage Nixon-Agnew campaign of the last few weeks, they are beginning to hope 
again.‖127   
 Nixon‘s stature, and indeed his direction and purpose, had taken a beating heading into 
1971, a situation that had the appearances of a leadership vacuum with less than two years before 
Americans returned to the polls to decide the president‘s fate. As David Broder and Haynes 
Johnson told their readers in the Washington Post, ―Even among [the president‘s] strongest 
supporters . . . there is now doubt about what he represents.‖ Moreover, the columnists suggested 
that the nation thirsted for a leader to emerge, as there was ―no clear national leader in sight 
today.‖128  
 Of acute concern for the president was the emergence of a politician whom he thought 
could actually best him at the polls, and that was Maine Senator Edmund Muskie. Nixon‘s men 
also feared a Muskie run, believing that the World War II veteran from a Catholic family posed 
the most difficult of all possible Democrats to run against. Muskie‘s presence contributed to 
political insecurity bordering on paranoia. As Magruder recalled in his memoir, ―the election-eve 
television shows had positioned Senator Muskie as the likely Democratic candidate in 1972, and 
in early 1971, the polls were showing him ahead of the President, a fact that led to panic, to a 
thirst for political intelligence, to new tactics and new people.‖129 The president considered a 
host of these tactics including a litany of dirty tricks behind the scenes (while his campaign 
began to paint a more presidential image of him to the masses), and then turned to his favorite 
new member of the inner circle. ―Increasingly I turned to Chuck Colson to act as my political 
point-man.‖ As Nixon admitted in his memoirs,  
 
He was positive, persuasive, smart, and aggressively partisan. His instinct for the political jugular and his 
ability to get things done made him a lightning rod for my own frustrations at the timidity of most 
Republicans in responding to attacks from the Democrats and the media. When I complained to Colson I 
felt confident that something would be done, and I was rarely disappointed.
 130
  
 
In a guarded memoir, Nixon was seldom this candid. 
 After 1970, Colson‘s fingerprints began to cover more memorandums concerning the re-
election campaign than anyone in the administration other than Nixon and Haldeman. And in the 
slow change of tactics to project a more measured public image for the president, born scrappers 
like Colson contributed to a very motivated but tense inner circle. When campaign manager John 
Mitchell enlisted Kansas Senator Bob Dole to replace the vice president as the chief 
flamethrower, allowing Agnew to assume a ―more statesmanlike role,‖ Colson continuously 
pressed for more grit. Dole once protested directly to Magruder about the tone of Colson‘s 
proposed speeches. ―Jeb, I‘ve got one of those God-dammed speeches from Colson,‖ Dole 
complained. ―What am I supposed to do? I can‘t say that stuff.‖131 At most, Mitchell would 
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mollify Dole by telling him to deliver Colson‘s attacks while trying to tone down some of the 
extreme rhetoric. Nixon‘s special counsel increasingly took every opportunity to maneuver 
events the way he wanted, actions that would also gain the attention of the president, who liked 
his toughness and his intellect. As Theodore White observed, ―Colson‘s was without a doubt the 
shrewdest political mind, after Richard Nixon‘s, in the White House.‖ In the wake of the 
midterm elections, Colson emerged as a player, distinguishing himself as the hatchet man that 
Nixon believed he needed. His smear campaign against Democrat Joseph Tydings during the 
summer campaign caught the president‘s attention, earning him an invitation to his post-election 
planning session at Key Biscayne. By early 1971, with Nixon prepared to play a reduced role in 
his own campaign, Colson became a relentless political force.
132
 
The fallout of November of 1970 caused several of Nixon‘s aides to reassess their ways 
of looking at the political terrain for the two years before the election. Even aides such as Safire, 
who wanted a ―fighting president,‖ knew that there was a way for Nixon to shift by capitalizing 
on the mood in the nation. Far from a disaster, the speechwriter sensed that there was going to be 
a turn in the momentum in their favor, one stirring in the great American heartland against the 
anti-war movement, against the college demonstrators, and against those who were criticizing 
America. Unlike others in the inner circle, who worried about the president‘s fiery mid-term 
campaign rhetoric, Safire believed things would turn in their favor, sensing that Nixon‘s basic 
verbiage matched the nation‘s mood. ―A responsive chord had been touched, its greater 
significance not in the image on TV of a divisive President in a fighting mood in Phoenix, but in 
the revulsion of a growing new majority‖ to mob violence and student unrest. The sense that 
there was a ―new majority‖ seething and yearning for representation slowly emerged and took 
form as part of the campaign strategy in the following months. While the concept of building a 
new majority was nothing new to Nixon‘s men, what was new was the specific intention to carve 
this emerging majority directly from the heart of the traditional Democratic coalition. The critical 
factor was to create the idea in the heartland that the Democrats were in bed with the protestors 
and the benefactors of the establishment, while President Nixon was the sole representative of 
Middle America. These core ideas emerged as one and constituted a viable strategy for 1972.
133
 
 The move towards breaking up the Democratic coalition and separating the Democratic 
Party from its traditional base in 1972 dated back to memos as early as October of 1971. 
Working intently on this issue, Buchanan‘s research team provided a memo to Haldeman and 
Mitchell entitled, ―Dividing the Democrats.‖ The plan was to divide the party along ideological 
lines, such as highlighting differences between ―the left and the New Left versus the moderate 
and conservative Democrats.‖ Buchanan believed that since ―militant blacks‖ and the ―radical 
chic of Eastern liberalism‖ are in conflict with ―the blue collar [and] white collar conservative 
Democrats,‖ a great deal of attention should be devoted to highlighting this division in 
surrogates‘ speeches. The political strategist suggested, ―…our great hope for 1972 lies in 
maintaining or exacerbating the deep Democratic rift between the elite, chic, New Left, 
intellectual, avant-garde, isolationist, bell-bottomed, environmentalist, new-priorities types on 
one hand—and the hard hat, Dick Daley, Holy Name Society, ethnic, blue collar, Knights of 
Columbus, NYPD, Queens Democrats on the other.‖ In December 1971, Buchanan was blunt, 
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suggesting to Haldeman, ―what we want is a deadlocked, divided convention, just as the 
Democrats wanted a knock-down drag-out between Nixon-Rockefeller-Reagan in 1968.‖ There 
was a problem, however, as Nixon‘s men were concerned that Muskie was going to emerge as 
the strongest candidate heading into 1972. As Nixon‘s loyal speechwriter warned, ―What I am 
afraid of is that the Democrats are going to wake up in March, and find the nomination closed—
accept that fact, and rally behind him.‖ The senator from Maine had begun to capture national 
attention, a reality that reverberated throughout the Democratic Party. ―One friend high up in the 
Democratic National Committee tells me that there is a possibility if Muskie rolls through 
Wisconsin, Kennedy will endorse him,‖ Buchanan wrote. ―I can‘t believe that—but if something 
like that occurred—we‘ve got problems.‖134  
 To avoid the ―problems‖ of a Democratic Party united behind a candidate such as 
Muskie, the plan was to keep their opponents off balance by moving strongly after that party‘s 
traditional wing. As staffer John C. Whitaker suggested in a memorandum to Haldeman, ―We 
have become the heir to the old FDR coalition—almost—and the South for sure—ethnic groups 
in the North (Jewish and Catholic in particular) and, to a lesser extent, Labor.‖135 Haldeman 
could also be particularly blunt about such issues in internal memorandums.  As he wrote on 
August 7, 1972, ―Catholic, ethnics, and old folks‖ are ―much more important than Jewish or 
Black.‖136 The most coherent strategy for a new coalition carved from traditional Democratic 
voters, however, came from Charles Colson. More than a mere hatchet man, the president‘s 
special counsel was the principal author of the plan for capturing these traditional Democratic 
voters. ―Colson was the first person in the White House to see that we had a chance to cut deeply 
into traditionally Democratic groups, including Catholics and blue collar workers, in the 1970 
and 1972 elections,‖ Magruder wrote in his memoir.  Despite his antipathy at best for his former 
colleague, believing that Colson was as responsible for Nixon‘s failures as his successes, 
Magruder saw Colson‘s input on this point as decisive.  ―Colson‘s efforts in 1970 and 1971 had 
paved the way for the President‘s success with unions, Catholics, ethnics, and other special-
interest groups in 1972.‖137 
 Magruder was not alone in this assessment. Several in the inner circle were aware that 
Colson spoke to Nixon on numerous occasions concerning this ―winning‖ issue in the two years 
leading up to the 1972 election. The special counsel impressed upon the president that targeting 
white ethnic, blue-collar, hardhat, and Catholic suburbs that circled around the growing cities 
was a winner. Safire, who credited Colson as the chief author of Nixon‘s proposed new majority, 
suggested that the special counsel was critical for moving it ahead. Colson ―filled a need for 
Nixon, who wanted an intermediary other than Haldeman to push John Mitchell and John 
Ehrlichman. On most of the Catholic issues, Mitchell and Ehrlichman differed with the 
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President; Colson was to be the goad.‖ For the president, catering to the Catholic constituency 
gained increasing importance and traction as the team moved into 1971.
138
  
 As a result, what emerged for the election was more of a Northern strategy, or as 
Washington Post columnist and John Mitchell protégé Kevin Phillips called it, a ―post-Southern 
strategy.‖ The White House felt that while it could not exactly take the South for granted, it was 
not concerned that Alabama Governor George Wallace would mount anything near the fight he 
had in 1968, running on the independent ticket, if he ran at all. The internal communiqués reveal 
that the inner circle did not believe that its Democratic opponents could siphon off disaffected 
Wallace supporters and his votes were theirs for the taking. The Nixon White House scoffed at 
the notion that Dixie would go for a Democrat on the top of a national ticket, no matter who the 
eventual nominee was in 1972. With the administration‘s assurance of support from the Solid 
South, Nixon‘s men increased their attention on the northern industrial states, targeting the white 
ethnic conservatives, Catholics, and industrial workers, whom they believed would be turned off 
the more ―radical‖ edge of the Democratic Party.139  
 Although Nixon‘s men had begun to hone their heartland vocabulary during the election 
of 1968, they had used it only sporadically for the first two years in the White House, and by the 
end of 1970, it had waned.  After the midterm elections, it became a staple for the next two 
years. The critical difference then was that the message needed to be managed, repackaged, and 
presented for broader national consumption.  The basic plan for building the new GOP majority 
for the reelection in 1972 was to join North, South, and West by focusing on the battleground 
states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois, and Missouri. The strategy was to ―go to the 
center,‖ and appeal to the ―broad middle of the voting spectrum.‖140   
 Much of this ―centrist strategy‖ can be traced earlier when Nixon and his team first 
planned to catch the remnants left over from what they believed was the imminent destruction of 
the New Deal coalition. Kevin Phillips, the young political strategist and his ideas for capturing 
―Middle America‖ in the voting booth were well known in the Nixon camp. Phillips, who 
worked for the campaign in the 1968 election, published his theory in a 1969 book entitled, The 
Emerging Republican Majority, that some envisioned as the future for the party. Nixon had 
earlier referred to the real possibility of this new majority forming under ―an alliance of ideas,‖ 
that would link voting and regional ―power blocs‖ together. As a result, the president was 
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swayed by Phillips‘s updated article in the Washington Post that appeared in September 1970, 
arguing for just such an approach. The president was concerned, though, that some on his 
domestic staff, namely John Ehrlichman, just didn‘t understand the importance of this ―go to the 
center‖ strategy. 141  
 Senior political strategists such as Patrick Buchanan were not only on board with the 
message, but worried continuously that the Democrats were planning to use the same strategy. 
As far back as the summer of 1970, Buchanan planned for 1972 with this thought in mind. The 
concern was the adjustments the Democrats were making towards moving out of their traditional 
voting blocs and looking to compete for the disaffected voters including the Wallaceites eyed by 
Republicans in the reelection bid. Buchanan worried about what he thought was a ―blueprint for 
our defeat in 1972,‖ a model laid out in the book, The Real Majority by Richard Scammon and 
Ben Wattenburg, where a strategy for a liberal Democratic victory in 1972 appeared plausible. 
Buchanan proposed a counter-strategy. ―Liberals,‖ he warned, ―are waking up all over America . 
. . ; they have begun talking about law and order; they have ceased apologizing for student 
militants and black radicals; they are silent on busing. We are no longer going to win the race for 
Middle America by default.‖  Buchanan laid out a counter-strategy for victory in 1972. 
Buchanan stressed that victory meant moving to the ―center‖ of American politics, stressing the 
idea that the ―the party that can hold the center will win the Presidency.‖ For Buchanan, the 
winning strategy lay in the book‘s following passage: ―You can knock the ‗liberal intellectuals‘ 
out of the Democratic coalition, and you‘ve lost the front bumper; knock out the black vote, and 
you have lost the fenders and the back seat; but knock out labor, Middle America, or the unpoor, 
unyoung, unblack, and you‘ve lost the engine, and the car won‘t run. This is an unpleasant fact to 
some, but fact it is.‖142 
While this cold political reality did not faze Buchanan, he seriously questioned his party‘s 
footing for such a ―new majority‖ leap, wondering if the incumbent Republicans could assume 
the stance of a majority party after so many years of seeing themselves only as a fighting 
minority. The myopic stance was not improved by an administration that waged war from the 
front door of the White House as the party in power, yet railed against their institutional 
―enemies‖ in the media and the Eastern Establishment. Bill Safire mused about the irony of a 
party in power acting like one out of power, but suggested that what historian Richard Hofstadter 
referred to as the ―paranoid style in American politics‖ was used for the first time by the leader 
of the majority, or at least by a leader who claimed to be supported by the great ‗silent majority.‘  
Safire was blunt in his assessment. The White House assumed this posture because ―it worked. 
Just as the NATO alliance was created by fear of the Soviet power along its border, so did the 
Silent Majority identify itself by the presence of the noisy minority.‖  This new majority that 
emerged with the failure of the Great Society programs and the tragedy in Vietnam had ―grown 
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accustomed to being the permanent minority‖ for several decades.  Conservative communist 
hunters like Nixon, who faced the anti-war movement during his first term, still felt like a 
majority ―surrounded by a minority.‖ As Safire suggested, even though the president ―was safely 
on the inside [he] remained the perennial Outsider.‖ This was a view shared by many in his 
Nixon White House.
143
 
In January 1971, Buchanan sat in his office in the Old Executive Office Building (EOB) 
adjacent to the White House surrounded by stacks of newspaper clippings and polling data and 
put his finger directly on this issue. As he pondered the 21 months before the next election, he 
thought about his adversaries in the Democratic Party. Buoyed by their showing in the mid-term 
elections, they were planning for a big get-out-the-vote strategy in 1972, gunning for the party in 
power in the Executive Branch.  Buchanan realized that even though his party had not wrestled 
away Congress from the Democrats, they were still the big dogs in the White House; they were 
the ―ins‖ and it was not a position with which Nixon‘s band of pit fighters were comfortable. For 
Buchanan, this was not a winning strategy. He needed a different idea. The speechwriter rolled 
up his sleeves, placed a fresh sheet of paper in his typewriter, and laid out his concerns to White 
House press secretary Ron Ziegler: 
 
…look back at our great victories in the last quarter century—1946 when we took over the Eightieth 
Congress, 1952, the Eisenhower Landslide which brought us to power in Congress, 1968 when we won the 
Presidency again. In each of those elections, Republicans won because we were against the ins. ―Had 
enough‖—remember that theme from 1946, Milt (Young). In 1952, it was ―the mess in Washington.‖ In 
1968 it was crime and Vietnam and campus anarchy and riots. Those are the only times in my political 
lifetime we have prevailed—and we have prevailed because, basically, we were the ―against‖ party.
144 
 
 
The conundrum, of course, was that it was difficult to secure a second term in the White House 
pretending to be ―outsiders‖ trying to kick ―the bums out.‖ Buchanan believed that one way to 
bring this magic about was to stoke their own brand of Republican populism, and thus began to 
push for a populist message in the heartland. The idea was that they would speak for real 
Americans in a world taken over by longhairs and leftists and their friends in the Democratic 
controlled Congress. Some within the inner circle believed such an idea was a winner given the 
historical realities of 1972, and Buchanan, for one, planned to push this envelope.  ―Now for the 
first time since Teddy Roosevelt, it is we who have the initiative, we who stand for sweeping 
change, we who stand for restoring power to the people—and the other side on Capitol Hill has 
suddenly become the party of the Status Quo.‖145  
Such an effort would prove to be a tall order and required a careful balancing act, as it 
appeared that the nation was not in the mood for ―sweeping change,‖ but rather longed for 
stability and security. As Theodore White observed, the domestic bombings of 1970 made 
Americans nervous, and the political high ground was up for grabs. After the shootings at Kent 
State that year and the massive student revolt against the administration‘s policies in Southeast 
Asia—the last of the massive protests of the era—Americans were wary, exhausted, and looking 
for answers and steadiness.
146
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 The internal White House memorandums reveal a subtle but perceptible awareness of this 
exhaustion, and that the nation did not want ―sweeping change.‖ Buchanan, himself, actually 
spoke to this issue directly. In a memorandum to Haldeman, the speechwriter suggested the 
complete opposite of his earlier memorandums. The president was ―elected not because he was 
Mr. Excitement, but because he was Mr. Reliable,‖ Buchanan wrote, suggesting that Nixon 
occupied the White House ―because the American people felt him the toughest, most competent, 
most able and intelligent man to hold the job in a time of crisis.‖ What the president represented 
was a ―return to basic principles that could guide America through the storms of 1968.‖ Richard 
Nixon, the speechwriter stressed, ―does not represent ‗change.‘ He represents ‗stability.‘ We did 
not get here on personality—and personality will not keep us here. We are not selling charisma. 
We are selling competence.‖147 
 Nixon then was not going to be the harbinger of massive change but of staying the course 
during a difficult time. As Buchanan enunciated, ―In boom times, people go for the convertible, 
the hard top, the tail fins…They will buy a Nixon when they need a professional. Were it not for 
the incredible mess of 1968, which we were assigned to clean up, the nation would never have 
turned to the Republicans or the quintessential Mr. Republican.‖148  Trouble and discord then 
were advantageous as long as it did not appear that the leader was likely to contribute to those 
fears. Rather, the emerging strategy suggested that the president would need to sooth and calm 
the nation by employing a steady hand, and the best way to accomplish that was to connect with 
those in the heartland.  
 The idea put forth then was that the president understood the people‘s fears because he 
was one of them, an ordinary American, despite what their ―enemies‖ in the national media 
might tell them. Buchanan knew that this slow and thoughtful change in their strategy would pay 
dividends. Indeed, by early 1972, he wrote about the connection in a memo to Colson: ―We 
should also hammer the point that though the pundits write the President off every other week, 
his personal appearances before the country on television have turned the polls around.‖ 
Buchanan stressed that despite the actions of the ―hostile liberal Eastern media,‖ the president 
had emerged strong, and does not need the ―Mandate of Heaven‖ that it gave to Lyndon Johnson. 
―President Nixon has gone for years without their endorsement, indeed, with their opposition; 
because his strength, like FDR‘s, lies with the common man.‖149 Buchanan and his assistant Ken 
Khachigian had begun to float memos and talking points to surrogate speakers showing Nixon‘s 
―empathy‖ with the nation‘s farmers, arguing that it was something that Nixon did much better 
and more naturally than a man like George McGovern, even though the latter came from a farm 
state. The speechwriter and political strategist knew they could sell Dick Nixon in rural 
America.
150
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 From the scribes on upward the idea emerged that the president understood people on the 
land, those who farmed and toiled on the soil for their livelihood. Accordingly, the team wanted 
the president to read articles that captured the ―farm ethic‖ so he could more easily communicate 
with those in the heartland and develop an ―empathy with their life-style.‖ Nixon staffers saw it 
as a natural fit for someone from the president‘s background. As Khachigian indicated in a 
memo to Buchanan, ―I think the reason farmers like RN is that his life has paralleled their own in 
many ways. He is a farmer who never farmed. Armed with the gut feeling of agricultural 
America, the President will continue to move at the top with farmers and score high politically as 
well.‖151  
 Forged in the cramped offices of the EOB was the notion that Nixon possessed something 
intrinsic—an innate and transferable connection to the hallowed endeavors of farming despite his 
life‘s non-agrarian path.  Middle Americans would support Nixon as the stable choice in 1972 
because he was safe, measured, and, like them, was rooted in the soil. This tenuous connection is 
curious, because according to some inside the beltway, Nixon‘s men were anything but grounded 
by a sense of place. As Safire mused about his many California colleagues, they were akin to 
―loners, transients, men without roots—all of this is frequently attributed to the Californians.‖ 
The speechwriter suggested that this sense of displacement led to a particular dynamic, or a 
―political relentlessness‖ that marked not only the president but also many of his team that he 
brought with him from the coast and into the White House.
152
   
 Moreover, Nixon‘s aversion to pressing the flesh in large crowds and reaching out to 
meet with ―real‖ Americans is well documented. Once the young Nixon left for Whittier College, 
he never ventured near an orange grove or any other farm for a non-political cause again. The 
president‘s men, too, were educated urbanites with no significant ties to the agrarian heartland.  
Washington-born-and-raised strategists and wordsmiths such as Pat Buchanan, however, claimed 
they represented something intangible, a connection that transcended mere immersion in Middle 
American loam. He suggested that they could speak a language that those in the heartland 
understood. The Nixon White House would win with their lexis—a collection of comforting 
idioms that would pull on the bucolic heartstrings. As Buchanan explained to Haldeman, 
―…Democrats like the Kennedys or even LBJ—who would go to Appalachia and tramp around 
in the mud. We are pre-eminently men of words—not men of gestures or symbols.‖153   
 With words, the president‘s team would express their candidate‘s character and what the 
man born in the house his father built in Yorba Linda, California, was all about. They could not, 
however, transform him into a beloved character. Richard Nixon could not become an iconic 
Hollywood celebrity. ―Who is the president?‖ Buchanan asked. ―We must recognize finally that 
Richard Nixon is not Woodrow Wilson; he is not Harry Truman; he is not Jack Kennedy—he is 
Richard M. Nixon and all of the President‘s Horses and all the President‘s men are not going to 
alter perceptibly the impression he has made upon the American people over twenty-five 
years.‖154 Speechwriters such as Bill Safire did not believe that selling Nixon to the heartland 
was much of a stretch, as Nixonian enemies were also the enemies of ―ordinary Americans.‖  
The president‘s adversaries included not only the media and the ―Eastern Establishment,‖ but 
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―elitism,‖ ―welfarism‖ and ―permissiveness,‖ or what Safire called Nixon‘s ―thematic villains.‖ 
Denunciation of these threats to the bucolic ―work ethic‖ way of life that Nixon championed 
would surely resonate with the hard hats, the white ethnics, and the Catholics they wanted to lure 
into the fold in 1972.
155
  
  Indeed, rural idioms were the staple of Nixon‘s men, including Vice President Spiro 
Agnew, who spoke with an increasing zeal about this ―old fashioned constituency.‖ Agnew 
loved to remind crowds that President Nixon respected those who ―work hard; who pay their 
taxes; save to send their children to college; obey laws; do their bit for the community; and 
believe in things like God, the Constitution and a moral as well as legal order to do right. If these 
are ‗old fashioned‘ ideas, then I am proud to be ‗old fashioned,‘ and represent an ‗old fashioned‘ 
constituency.‘‖ The idea was that old-fashioned people liked old-fashioned politicians, those 
who were also ―regular guys‖ who ―understand people‘s problems‖ and are ―as concerned as 
they are.‖156 The resurrected theme in 1972 was to appeal to Americans who felt that the nation 
had forgotten them, something that came naturally to Nixon. As acclaimed historian and 
journalist Garry Wills suggested: 
 
Nixon did not invent ―the Forgotten American‖—neither the phrase nor the concept; but he used it 
perfectly. He knew that 1968 was a time when those who had succeeded felt somehow cheated—forgotten, 
unrespected, mocked. They had worked and earned, not only for money or material things, but for a 
spiritual goal. They had believed in the morality of succeeding. And now the kids, the sophisticates, the 
―effete snobs‖ were denying them that honor. Nixon came to reassure such men, to tell them he believed in 
them, he had not forgotten, he was one of them.
157
  
 
Wills‘ cynicism implies that Nixon‘s appeal to the heartland constituted reaching out to people 
unworthy of devoted representation. The reason was that this constituency represented a ―vague 
accumulating lean westward, inward, and backward.‖ This resentful class, he argues, was easy 
pickings for a man like Nixon whose anti-establishment rants constituted learned behavior. 
―Every campaign had taught Nixon the same lesson: mobilize resentment against those in 
power.‖158 Nixon‘s inner circle, however, intended to reach out to this great and silent populace. 
While cynical, perhaps, the president‘s team of loyalists were also pragmatic, driven by keen 
political instinct and a certainty that they had their finger on the heartbeat in the heartland, and 
one they could transform into electoral cash.  
 This strategy was much more sophisticated and nuanced than it might appear.  Instead of 
merely preaching to the choir, as Agnew had done on the mid-term election trail like he was 
throwing meat scraps to pit bulls, there was a renewed understanding that the political message 
could be used for more than to play on their fears and resentments, as historians Rick Perlstein 
and Wills have suggested.  The strategy included tempering and repackaging the message to 
reassure Americans about the strength and decency of their nation and to speak the language that 
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sought to build the nation up and contrast it with language with threatened to tear it down. It was 
a mantra eagerly consumed by this constituency, and the politically astute on the Nixon team 
sensed it. As the president had recalled after the midterm elections, it was not the words but the 
approach that his vice president used that was deemed controversial.  
 The White House staff memorandums reveal awareness that the majority of non-
protesting Americans were tired of a counterculture that told them their nation was wrong and 
unworthy of respect. The plan was to encourage the basic message that the vice president had 
used to good effect in the heartland. Agnew reminded these Americans that his party loved 
America even though the antiwar movement and their friends in the Democratic Party did not. 
As Agnew told a crowd in Jackson, Mississippi, ―The Republican Party has faith in America. We 
see no gain in tearing this Country down when we have so much to build . . . . And above all we 
remember that this Country is a constitutional republic which elects its leaders to lead and not to 
placate to most vocal critics of the moment.‖  The vice president knew how to wave the flag as 
well as swing a sword. ―The Republican Party has a place for every American who believes that 
flag waving is better than flag burning.‖ As he told a crowd in Tulsa, Oklahoma, ―We are not 
ready to run up a white flag for the United States of America, and we don‘t think you are either.‖ 
To those in the heartland, he promised that Nixon would put an end to the ―glib, activist element 
who would tell us our values are lies…I call them snobs for most of them disdain to mingle with 
the masses who work for a living. They mock the common man‘s pride in his work, his family 
and his country.‖ Of course, there was no question who the ―they‖ were that he felt mocked the 
common man. They were the ―elites‖ in the Democratic Party that Nixon‘s men planned to 
connect to the chaos of the sixties in the public mind. Unlike the Democrats during that decade, 
they would remind Americans that the Republican Party under Richard Nixon would keep the 
nation ―out of the ditch.‖ From the ashes of Chicago emerged a struggle to win the war for law 
and order not only over the ―wayward few‖ but over an alliance of evil, or as Agnew suggested, 
the ―Georgetown-Manhattan-Hyannisport elitist axis,‖‘ which the White House would declare, 
did not care for those out in the middle of America.
159
 
 The president‘s men intended to play this card in 1972.  Nixon would be the president ―of 
the forgotten men,‖ as Garry Wills had enunciated. He would be the leader of the ―affluent 
displaced persons who howled at Wallace rallies, heartbroken, moneyed, without style.‖ Indeed, 
this was style that reemerged in the truest of forms for the reelection campaign.  Nixon, perhaps 
better than anyone, understood the lessons of 1968. He was acutely aware of those in the ―silent 
center.‖ As Wills rightly suggested, they were the millions of Middle Americans ―who do not 
demonstrate, who do not picket or protest loudly.‖ They were, as he adeptly pointed out, ―the 
vast middle range of the comfortable disconnected‖ who are not ―the kind who march or riot. 
They just lock their doors. And they vote.‖160 
 By the summer of 1972 as George McGovern closed in on the Democratic Party‘s 
nomination, internal White House memorandums reminded those up and down the 
communication food chain that, ―RN has not, will not, take for granted the ‗forgotten American‘ 
of his 1968 Acceptance Speech.‖161 They would remind Americans, as Agnew had in speeches 
across that nation, that ―the time has come for someone to represent the workingmen of this 
country, the forgotten man of American politics. The president and I are applying for that job.‖ 
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The problem, of course, was that by the summer before the election, the Nixon administration 
had been in power for three and a half years. With a skittish economy, rising prices, and worries 
over an energy shortage, the Nixon re-election campaign needed more ammunition—they needed 
to remind voters what might transpire under a Democratic leader like George McGovern—a 
return to the darkness of 1968 under Lyndon Johnson.      
 Junior speechwriter David Gergen was one among many who wished to remind the 
campaign that voters needed to remember the chaos of 1968 and mark how far the nation had 
come under the leadership of the Nixon administration. In a memo to speechwriter Ray Price, 
Gergen suggested what the campaign themes needed to stress: ―We‘re on the right road again; 
peace is near at home and abroad; the way is now open for stunning new breakthroughs,‖ and 
―only with Nixon and the Republican Congress can we break in the clearing.‖ Gergen stressed 
that in order to engage the public, there needed to be ―a sense of excitement about the future‖ 
because ―for the first time in a quarter century‖ the president ―has the momentum and the ability‖ 
to achieve great things. The contrasting message was to compare where the nation was with 
where it had been four years earlier. As Gergen suggested, ―These points are a shorthand for 
what I believe should be the broader argument. It runs something like this: Remember 1968? 
We‘re clearly better off today, and only because the Nixon presidency has meant a dramatic 
reversal of previous trends.‖ The issue was that the nation should fear returning to the past, as an 
―elite‖ would once again try to intervene and plunge the nation back into chaos. Gergen 
suggested that the message should be that the Democrats under someone like McGovern were 
the risky choice that would put this momentum in serious peril. He thought that the focus should 
be the ―…realization that it would now be foolhardy to go charging off in another direction on an 
untamed bucking bronco.‖162  
Going into the 1972 election, the job of Nixon‘s men was to convince Americans that the 
president was the steady hand, the leader who understood not only their alienation and 
dissatisfaction, but their fear for any return to the turmoil of the 1960s. Moreover, the team 
needed to alleviate the alarm over the bombings and student revolts that occurred over the first 
two years of Nixon‘s own watch.  Those in the White House knew very well that their 
administration was the result of a narrow election victory over Hubert Humphrey and a fractured 
Democratic Party, and that they had to fight and claw for each and every vote. As Theodore 
White pointed out, ―There was no constituent majority to which [Nixon] could point as the base 
for his mandate to govern,‖ as the president‘s 1968 victory took place in a nation ―torn by war 
and split by race hatreds.‖ From the ashes of that tumultuous year, the men who had used their 
skills to wage campaign warfare were suddenly called upon to ―shape a government . . . Nixon 
was dependant, thus, not on a majority or a mandate, but on a team.‖163  
In his mid-term election post-mortem to Haldeman, Nixon acknowledged his dependence 
on this team. The president wrote, ―I was going to take the advice of nearly all those around me 
and firmly and flatly keep out of my re-election campaign until as late as possible in 1972.‖  The 
Nixonian team was on the spot. The pressure from the president was to avoid another 1970-type 
outcome at the polls. No one was immune to the external or internal pressures that grew as the 
campaign began to take form. The character of the reelection effort was shaped by the inner 
circle‘s fierce loyalty not only to the president but the ability to project influence inside the 
White House.
164
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Speechwriter and conservative firebrand Pat Buchanan, for one, was never completely 
convinced that the president‘s fighting demeanor was a negative, as political dog fighting was in 
his blood. Buchanan liked the idea of a ―fighting president‖ because it fit with his own 
personality. The strategist relished memories from the administration‘s first year in office, and 
often reminded Nixon of his success as a fighter. As Buchanan suggested directly to Nixon, 
―One recalls that the President rated highest with the American people when he was fighting for 
survival of the presidency in November of 1969, against the media and demonstrators 
alike…This is not so much an ideological thing, as it is something within the spirit of the 
American people, who love a good fight….Better a howling press and high polls, than a 
quiescent somnolent press and low polls.‖ The speechwriter thought that it was ―not the 
President‘s campaigning itself in 1970 that cost him public support—as the media had reported. 
Rather, it was the media description of that campaign—well after it was over—that, 
subsequently, convinced the American people we had run a ‗un-presidential‘ campaign in 1970.‖ 
Using the old Nixon ―enemy,‖ Buchanan wrote that the national polls for Nixon dropped after 
the election when the media charged the administration as ―dirty campaigners.‖ Knowing that 
such an approach would win favor with the president, the political strategist suggested, ―It was 
the media construction of the President‘s campaign then, not the campaign itself, which cost us 
support.‖ So while Buchanan as an astute political operative would not insist that his boss 
assume a position that others claimed would hurt him, he decided that since the media would 
misrepresent the president‘s passion as misplaced Tricky-Dicky anger, his job was to ensure the 
campaign for re-election did not give the press anything it could use. Moreover, he would 
reinforce not only the president‘s mantra that the media was out to get him, but position himself 
as the president‘s loyal defender.165   
 Buchanan‘s view of the media, however, was not particularly unique, and it spoke to the 
team‘s frustration and almost siege mentality that at times imbued the president‘s staff. While 
one of the perennial battlegrounds was the Washington press corps, it was an entity that the team 
intended to use in the lead up to the election.
166
 Managing something as important as the media 
during the campaign had led to some internal strains and positioning for power among the White 
House staff. If Richard Nixon were to remain above the fray and present a ―presidential‖ posture, 
his men would need to compensate, and it often affected their interactions with one another. 
Indeed, the president‘s own mistrust of the press shaped not only the team‘s outlook, but helped 
shift power within the White House. Pat Buchanan, of course, was not the only loyalist who 
sought the president‘s ear and approval, but the manner of gaining it was another story for others 
connected to the Oval Office. Special Counsel to the President, Charles Colson, also believed 
that many of the problems in 1970 after the mid-terms could be laid on the press, but the 
strategist went a step further, as he blamed the manner in which some of the president‘s veteran 
staffers dealt with the media. It was not long before the man in Colson‘s crosshairs was long-
time Nixon man Herbert Klein, the director of the White House Office of Communications. 
Klein was a low-key old-style newspaperman, a trait that Colson construed as weakness and 
ineffectiveness. Viewing the mid-term debacle as an opportunity to gain power in the offices 
next to the Oval Office, Colson believed that nothing was off limits to his influence and moved 
in and tried to remove Klein and take over the Office of Communications. Among Colson‘s first 
moves was to usurp the director‘s power by overstepping him by speaking directly with the 
television networks, making Klein appear not in control of his own house. In response, Klein 
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fired off a memo to Colson in protest. ―Your continued calls have caused network heads to ask 
me privately—are you leaving?...With actions like this you make my work harder.‖ Magruder 
recalled the situation. ―It was a sad memo, really, and a sad situation. Klein had been a Nixon 
loyalist for twenty years, but knew Colson‘s star was rising and Klein‘s was falling.‖ The move, 
though, was part of a larger overhaul of the public relations apparatus that the president wanted. 
Klein, the traditional newsman, could no longer count on the strong backing of Nixon or 
Haldeman and thus became an easy target for the aggressive Colson. In the new multi-media 
news environment, Colson wanted action against what he saw as the enemy. The ―soft‖ Klein in 
charge was not up to the task.
167
  
 Special Assistant to the President Fred Malek‘s review of the communications operation 
did not help Klein any. Malek suggested that Colson should assume control of the project 
managers and the speaker‘s bureau from Klein, reducing the director to a liaison with the 
television networks. The president wanted a ―miracle worker‖ for PR, someone who would ―bull 
dog‖ all of his pet projects through to fruition. By his own admission, Magruder was never 
aggressive enough to be the man, but soon Nixon found his man in Colson. As Magruder 
recalled, ―The power struggle between the two sides of Nixon was reflected in the power 
struggle between Colson and Klein, one that, as the months went by, was obviously being won 
by Colson.‖ Indeed, Haldeman assistant Larry Higby knew that his friend Gordon Strachan 
joined the chief of staff‘s unit from Klein‘s because he saw the shift in power in the White 
House. To help control campaign manager John Mitchell‘s operations at the Committee to Re-
Elect the President (CREEP), headquartered across from the White House at 1701 Pennsylvania 
Avenue, Haldeman made his young aide Jeb Magruder the Deputy Director of Communications. 
The relatively inexperienced Magruder was thrown not only into a mess between Klein and 
Colson, but was called upon by the chief of staff to manage the apparatus and oversee the 
management of the various communications strategies, just short of throwing Klein overboard. It 
was clear that the president and Haldeman no longer believed the veteran communications man 
could get the job done on his own. Klein was reduced to a figurehead. Clumsily, Magruder tried 
to solve some of the coordination issues and manage affairs between Klein and Colson, but the 
president‘s aggressive special counsel was having none of it. Over lunch in a posh Washington 
restaurant, Colson bullied Klein unmercifully, refused to compromise, and left Magruder fearful 
of what Colson would do next.
168 
  
 Such was the emerging dynamic within the White House as it inched toward the re-
election in 1972.  In many respects, it was a team only in the sense that it was unified in the 
singular goal of victory on Election Day. Strained and bruised internal relationships were the 
collateral damage of getting things done. Throughout the fight to come, the team‘s demeanor was 
often one of ―us against the world.‖ While their boss all but abandoned his fighting stance to 
assume the role of Oval Office statesman, the team prepared for strategic warfare on multiple 
battlegrounds in his name. Their loyalty, however, did not mean conformity, but more of a 
visceral and aggressive form of hardball that either left others on board, or bloody, watching 
from the sidelines. There was no room for compromise in a world filled with ever-new political 
                                                 
167
 Magruder, An American Life, 158-159. See also White, The Making of the President, 1972, 48-49; Safire, Before 
the Fall, 291; and White, Breach of Faith, 186-187.  
168
 Magruder, An American Life, 76, 90, 108, 168. See also Ehrlichman, Witness to Power, 239; Safire, Before the 
Fall, 291; and White, Breach of Faith, 188-190. Indeed Colson had his own plans for reorganizing things and 
looked to the direction of former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt. Strachan, originally recruited by Nixon Deputy 
Assistant Dwight Chapin, became Haldeman‘s liaison to CREEP in March 1971. 
  53 
enemies. As Haldeman noted in his file, ―the White House staff has got to be like a rock and not 
allow anybody to succeed in the constant attempt to divide us.‖169 With conflicting agendas, 
temperaments, and egos, the team struggled to keep its eye on the ultimate prize—their reputed 
constituency in the vast American heartland—the silent loyalists. Their only guide through the 
months to come was a combination of self-righteousness bullishness and an unrelenting drive to 
crush any obstacles to victory.  
 Driving much of the passion for the fight ahead were Pat Buchanan and Chuck Colson. 
Adding and stirring two large helpings of hard headed pragmatism to their partisanship, they 
targeted their potential opponents with a strategic view to a kill.  Buchanan had been setting 
small fires under the president chair in the Oval Office since the spring of 1971 concerning the 
political reality of Ed Muskie. As time wore on and Muskie inched up in the national polls, 
Buchanan was hammering the keys on his typewriter as if their political lives depended on it. 
―For some months now, PJB has been inundating the West Wing and elsewhere with a blizzard 
of memoranda, warning about the possibility of a Muskie sweep in the primaries and promenade 
to the nomination,‖ Buchanan wrote in a memo to the president. ―What was possible before 
seems probable to me now—and only the Florida Primary stands in the way of the unpleasant 
scenario outlined below.‖ The worry was that Muskie was running neck-and-neck with the 
president in the polls. According to Buchanan, that meant danger.  
 
Should Muskie roll up the primaries, defeat left, center and right opposition, remove all doubt that he is the 
party choice, roll into a Democratic convention, win on the first ballot, stick [New York Senator and 
Democratic nominee hopeful] John Lindsay on the ticket to excite young, poor and black—he could march 
out of that convention into a hailstorm of TV and press publicity that could give him a five-point lead over 
the President by mid-July 1972. That to me is not out of the question.
170
  
 
Even the old Nixon nemesis Ted Kennedy paled in comparison to the growing fear that 
Muskie wrought inside the hallways of the Nixon White House. By the middle of 1971, the team 
worried much less about Kennedy as polling suggested that the senator from Massachusetts‘s 
reputation as a playboy, combined with his baggage from Chappaquiddick, made a successful 
run in 1972 unlikely. A Harris Poll conducted in June 1971 showed that Kennedy would lose in a 
divisive campaign. Pollster Lou Harris suggested that Kennedy ―arouses bitter hostility or ardent 
support but rarely any lukewarm reactions.‖ What made Colson nervous about the poll was that 
in Harris‘ opinion, ―Muskie is a more viable opponent than Kennedy.‖171 It confirmed what 
many had already thought.  The reaction to Kennedy‘s candidacy was almost more of a Nixonian 
conditioned, emotional response, but Muskie engendered hard-core, practical political concerns. 
In a March 24, 1971, memo to Richard Nixon, Buchanan suggested, ―We ought to go down to 
the kennels and turn all the dogs loose on Ecology Ed. The President is the only one who should 
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stand clear, while everybody else gets chewed up. The rest of us are expendable commodities; 
but if the President goes, we all go, and maybe the country with us. My view.‖172  
The dogs were ready. Buchanan knew it—everyone did. The animals were stretching 
their chains across the street at the Committee to Re-Elect the President, salivating, teeth bared, 
biting everything in sight, even each other, and it was indeed time to set them loose. But once set 
in motion, no one really had control over the extent of their ravages. Nonetheless, the political 
strategist understood that if Muskie was going to go down, the voters would need a strong 
helping hand. Buchanan thought that there were a few in the Democratic Party who also did not 
want to see Big Ed Muskie steal the show before the race had a chance to begin. It was crystal 
clear that the senator from Maine needed to be grabbed by the collar and dragged down into the 
dirt. ―I cannot believe they view with any enthusiasm eight years of President Ed Muskie telling 
them what is good for America. No, I think some of these fellows would not be disappointed to 
see Big Ed unhorsed and lying in a ditch by the side of the road.‖173 
  
Less than two months later on May 17, 1971, Nixon and aides, Kissinger, Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, and Colson, set sail for an evening cruise on the presidential yacht the Sequoia.  
After the craft passed by Washington‘s Tomb at Mount Vernon, Nixon and his men gathered in 
the wood paneled dining room, drank wine and scotch, dined on New York strip steak and corn 
on the cob, and plotted their political futures. While the yacht inched quietly down the darkening 
waters of the Potomac, Nixon looked ahead to 1972 and the battles that were to come against 
Congress and others over Vietnam and his domestic agenda. As the president nursed his wine, 
stroking the rim of the glass with a finger, he turned to his trusted political strategist Chuck 
Colson and said, ―One day we will get them—we‘ll get them on the ground where we want 
them. And we‘ll stick our heels in, step on them hard and twist—right, Chuck, right?‖ Colson 
watched the president closely and listened intently to every word. Nixon told his men that they 
would get their enemies ―on the floor and step on them, crush them, show no mercy.‖ Colson 
understood instinctively what his boss meant. Henry Kissinger ―smiled and nodded,‖ and while 
Haldeman said nothing, ―the look on his face was one of hand-rubbing expectation.‖ Colson was 
the only one who said a word. ―I spoke for all three of us: ‗You‘re right sir, we‘ll get them.‘‖ The 
obvious dissenter was John Ehrlichman, who ―often a lonely voice of moderation, jerked his 
head back and stared at the ceiling.‖  Colson recognized it as a seminal moment and that the die 
had been struck for all that was to come. ―And so on the Sequoia this balmy spring night, a Holy 
War was declared against the enemy,‖ Colson declared. The Nixonian enemies who had the 
temerity to oppose their ―noble goals‖ would be dealt with ruthlessly. ―They who differed with 
us, whatever their motives, must be vanquished. The seeds of destruction were by now already 
sown—not in them but in us.‖174 
 That was true of course. However, well before the long knives of the Ervin Committee 
cut into the soft—and surprisingly vulnerable—underbelly of the Nixon team in the darker days 
of 1974, the president‘s men set upon those ―enemies‖ to make haste with their political 
destruction, much like Colson had so grimly and succinctly put into words. In what was about to 
be unleashed upon the mild mannered Ed Muskie and, soon after, the hapless George McGovern 
was certainly war but none of it was anything near holy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 UNHORSING BIG ED 
 
He sure fooled me. I very much expected him to give a ―flaming liberal speech,‖ but instead he chastised 
the liberals, essentially, for being too ideological . . . . In short, Muskie has probably made a central 
strategic decision to quit playing footsies with the far left…and that he would rather be the nominee 
without having to kiss up to the party leftists. . . . If Muskie wins the nomination, and if he keeps up the 
current line, he cannot be campaigned against as easily as some dewy-eyed radical.
175
 
 
 
t was Christmas and they were cutting down trees. December 26, 1971, North Vietnam, and 
the skies opened and the bombs fell like belated gifts. Some packages bore nametags etched in 
chalk: ―It‘s for you, Gook,‖ and ―Merry Christmas, Charlie,‖ while the others were reserved for 
no one in particular.
176
 In that season of giving, the United States launched the largest bombing 
raid on North Vietnam since November 1968. More than two hundred planes and jets were 
involved in the onslaught that lasted for several days. The timing of the air raids caught the 
special counsel to the president by surprise and screwed up the results of a national poll that 
Charles Colson wanted to use to show Richard Nixon in a favorable light on the eve of election 
year. Colson was gearing up for a good ride in the polls following what he believed was ―a lot of 
good year-end stuff.‖ The carpet-bombing of another country proved to be inconvenient for the 
Massachusetts attorney. It ―turned out to be a very bad call time-wise,‖ he wrote in a memo to 
H.R. Haldeman. ―I obviously did not know that the bombing was going to be resumed during the 
week after Christmas.‖ The problem for Colson was that he believed the Harris Poll conducted 
from December 28 to January 4 was compromised by the news from Southeast Asia.
177
  
By the end of 1971, the vocal portion of the antiwar movement had lost much of its punch 
and public opinion was generally supportive of the Nixon administration‘s handling of the war in 
Southeast Asia.
178
 In some important ways, the war was no longer the defining national issue, at 
least not one that reached anything near the crippling level as it had with Nixon‘s predecessor by 
early 1968.  However, on the eve of election year, while ordinance rained down from the sky 
over Hanoi, the support of the ―silent majority‖ that the president had asked for in 1969 was still 
silent and the national polls were making Nixon and his team more than nervous. The numbers 
were not encouraging: in a three-way race, Ed Muskie and Nixon were tied at 42 percent and 
George Wallace came in a distant third at 11 percent. More troubling was a two-man race, where 
Muskie bested Nixon 48 percent to 45 percent. The poll showed that the president would defeat 
Kennedy by 6 points with Wallace in the race, and 9 points with a head-to-head contest against 
Ted Kennedy. Muskie indeed was turning out to be a problem. This was especially evident in the 
gains in middle-income voters, white professionals and upper-middle class suburbanites. 
―Muskie,‖ warned Colson, ―is the only Democrat who can make inroads with this group and 
whenever he does he surges ahead in the polls.‖ Humphrey and Kennedy, maintained Nixon‘s 
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special counsel, were unable ―to make a dent‖ among those coveted set of voters.179  Going into 
election year, Nixon did not like what he read about his challenger in the media, especially in the 
pages of the Washington Post. The Post‘s Tom Braden, for example, told his readers that 
heading into election year, Nixon was ―a very beatable candidate,‖ as he had the highest 
―hostility rating,‖ while Muskie had the lowest. 180 
Dealing with the specifics of President Nixon‘s ―Muskie problem‖ as a key element of 
the 1972 presidential election has not been given full treatment in Nixon historiography. While 
elements of the full frontal political assault are better known through works by J. Anthony 
Lukas, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, Rick Perlstein, and Theodore White, the behind the 
scenes panic and hand wringing over Muskie and his comparison to the president has been 
largely neglected, sidelined by discussions of the department of dirty tricks that came to light as 
investigations into Watergate widened.
181
 Many of the Nixon administration‘s election year 
efforts became a footnote to the skullduggery. The overall strategy to divide the Democrats and 
deliberately set up a radical to roast, thereby avoiding a ―centrist‖ like Ed Muskie as part of the 
designed re-election effort, is largely absent in scholarship. The depth of fear concerning Muskie 
in the Nixon camp is also less known, a fear that was heightened by the team‘s belief that its own 
boss did not compare well in terms of likeability and lacked the image of one with a ‗steady hand 
at the tiller.‘182   
 Fear was palatable in the White House as election year began. Chuck Colson was 
particularly troubled by Muskie as he saw the senator from Maine as the greatest threat to his 
coalition. Colson was widely seen as the architect of a ―labor-ethnic-Catholic-Wallaceite‖ group 
of voters—a ―new coalition‖ that had never really been a core part of the Republican Party. 
Colson pushed the president for aid for parochial schools, to voice support for the anti-abortion 
and anti-busing lobby, and to claim Wallace territory by appealing to conservatives and voting 
blocs in the south. Colson held that there was a new middle class, people who were ―not fighting 
against the establishment but to protect it.‖ These ―have-nots of the ‗30s‖ were ―the haves of the 
‗70s. They have their boats and suburban homes.‖183 In the election of 1972, Colson and others 
feared that Muskie was going to give them much more trouble with these voting blocs than 
Humphrey, Kennedy, and especially George McGovern.  Indeed, there was much to support this 
trepidation, not the least of which was the senator from Maine‘s background. 
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  Edmund Muskie was the product of a large Catholic family, a proud and hard-working 
Polish-American clan that raised six children and believed in the ethos of hard work and getting 
ahead. Muskie had the grades and became a scholarship student attending Bates College where 
he joined the debating team, played sports, and served on student council. The young Muskie 
worked throughout school serving as a waiter, toiling in a kitchen, and paying his dues as a 
dormitory assistant at the college to supplement his scholarship. Graduating in 1936, Muskie was 
accepted into Cornell University Law School. His law career was interrupted by the Second 
World War, and in 1942, he enlisted in the U.S. Navy, served in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, 
and was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant. Muskie‘s political career was equally impressive, as 
he served as the Governor of Maine, and in Washington as a U.S. Senator and, later, in 1980, as 
Secretary of State. In 1968, he ran alongside Hubert Humphrey as the nominee for vice president 
of the United States. In government, Muskie chaired the Legislative Review Committee of the 
Democratic Policy Committee and co-chaired the National Study Commission on Water 
Pollution, sponsoring significant federal environmental protection laws, including the Clean Air 
Act of 1970 and the Clean Water Act of 1972. The steady, calm, Catholic war veteran who put 
himself through college by waiting tables was no Ted Kennedy, and he was certainly not, as Ken 
Khachigian suggested, ―some dewy-eyed radical.‖184 And so while the Air Force leveled villages 
and destroyed rice paddies half a world away, Nixon‘s team launched a multidimensional ―bomb 
Muskie‖ operation to rub him out politically and make way for someone for whom the radical 
term could stick.   
  Before the smoke cleared from the flares Buchanan shot over the White House 
concerning the Muskie threat, Nixon and Haldeman had themselves become impatient to get 
things rolling. ―We need some action on the bomb Muskie crew,‖ Haldeman wrote in his nightly 
diary, ―especially Agnew, he‘s got nothing to gain in fighting the press anymore, but he should 
brutally attack Muskie, leaving Hubert [Humphrey] and Teddy [Kennedy] alone for now, since 
Muskie‘s way out in front.‖185  The next day, Haldeman fired off a memo to Buchanan, pushing 
him for progress with exactly the same line. ―The President raised the question yesterday as to 
what‘s happening on the ‗Bomb Muskie Crew.‘ He feels that all our speakers, including [Barry] 
Goldwater and especially the Vice President, should be steadily attacking Muskie now, hitting 
him on every point that he scores . . . . We should leave Humphrey and Kennedy alone for 
now.‖186 Buchanan and Colson got moving. ―We are activating the bomb-Muskie squad,‖ the 
special counsel wrote in a memo to Haldeman soon after his directive. ―In fact, we have had 
pretty good results with it this week.‖ The positive results came from Republican warhorses—
surrogates, including Goldwater, John Tower, Edward Gurney, and Bob Dole. The plan included 
the use of Vice President Spiro Agnew, believing his pursuit of Muskie would gain attention in 
the press highlighting the line that a Muskie presidency would be a disaster. Colson complained 
bitterly that even though Agnew had ―hit Muskie very hard in a speech‖ (and there were plans 
for numerous appearances with the senator in the crosshairs in the coming days), journalists were 
shielding the senator from Maine by not covering the substance of their team‘s attacks. ―I suspect 
because the media is protecting Muskie, some of the Vice President‘s good rhetoric has not 
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gotten into print.‖ Despite this disappointment, Colson knew that the best course of action was to 
stay after Muskie and make it the ―number one priority here.‖187  
 According to Buchanan, Muskie‘s growing profile was alarming, especially since the 
early campaign was based on some basic assumptions (many of which later proved to be 
correct). With Alabama Governor George Wallace‘s specific intent still unclear, the political 
team believed that there would only be a 4 percent separation between parties, especially given 
the historical concerns from the ―very close‖ elections of ‘60 and ‘68. The disappointing mid-
term campaign had made Nixon appear as ―a partisan leader of a minority party‖ with little room 
to break out into the open for new voters. At issue was another operating assumption, that there 
was a ―fundamental shift‖ among the electorate, chiefly a fracturing among the ―New Deal 
Coalition‖ with declining support for the Democratic Party. It was not only Catholic voters, but, 
―in particular, southern whites, blue-collar urban ethnics and Jews,‖ who they believed would 
cross over to the president in 1972. Given the president‘s experiences in the midterm elections, 
the plan was to avoid ―over-exposure to the public as a candidate in a long campaign.‖ The 
immediate problem was not just the president‘s image, his incumbency, nor was it a battle in the 
primaries; the problem was that Edmund Muskie could best take these voters away.
188
  There 
was little doubt that the Nixon campaign team would have preferred to tangle with Humphrey 
and his baggage from the 1960s. As Buchanan enunciated, ―were Humphrey the candidate . . . 
we could run the horror clippings of 1968, war, riots, coffins, urban violence, crime and say, this 
is the result of what Hubert Humphrey called the ‗politics of joy‘ in 1968. Let‘s not go back to 
the horrible year, 1968—let‘s move forward with President Nixon.‖189  
Muskie was a more elusive target to hit with the Vietnam War. Haldeman‘s diary shows 
how the inner circle came out swinging in the dark, as he mused about how the World War II 
veteran could be tarred with the Democratic Party‘s history with the 1960s and the Southeast 
Asian war. As Nixon‘s chief of staff wrote, the issue was to show voters that Muskie belonged to 
the bunch that ―stood silently by while we were getting into the war and the deaths were going 
up . . . . Who are you going to trust, the one who stood silently while we were getting in, and 
now criticizes the peace, or the one who said he would get us out and is doing so?‖  The upshot 
in Haldeman‘s comparison was that ―we‘ve got to get over that we‘re more for peace than they 
are.‖190 
 Notwithstanding this absurdity, the team struggled over exactly what to do with Muskie. 
The senator represented both the largest threat to their proposed coalition and the most difficult 
to paint into a radical corner. Getting distance between the president and the calm, rational, and 
steady looking Muskie had those in the White House scrambling for answers. The alarm was 
apparent in White House memorandums, many of which were striking in their candor. This was 
especially so in internal research done by staffer Doug Hallett. After reading Hallett‘s results, 
Haldeman suggested to aide Larry Higby that polling was necessary on the issues he raised, 
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including the not so flattering way their boss compared with Muskie:  
 
In his analysis, Hallett makes the point that Muskie‘s public image is everything the President‘s is not: 
strong, reflective, prudent, even wise. The President on the other hand, is viewed as a man on the make, 
ashamed of and constantly running away from his past, manipulator, unsure of his convictions, tactician 
instead of strategist, grand vizier of all Rotarians, substituting pomposity for eloquence. Further, the 
American people do not think he has any broad conceptional [sic] framework or any sense of direction or 
purpose. These are arguable points and they should be pursued by some valid polling as soon as possible. 
In other words, we need to test the Nixon image versus the Muskie image against the hypothesis laid out by 
Hallett.
191
 
 
While concern over the president‘s image was always chronic, Muskie‘s candidacy 
exacerbated this anxiety. The team understood that although a majority of Americans agreed 
with Nixon‘s polices, they were not always as confident in the way these messages were 
packaged and delivered, especially if they arrived via a ―fist-waving‖ politician. Nixon‘s aides 
believed that their best move was to dress Nixon up with the brightest ribbon they could find, 
and that decoration came from the aura of the presidency. Buchanan, for example, was positive 
the team could best Muskie on the presidential role. ―Whether or not they do, my guess is that 
the American public wants to trust their President,‖ Nixon‘s strategist wrote.  ―Thus, we must 
once again make use of—the Nixon presence—the commodity which we monopolize in the 
campaign—the Presidency.‖ Buchanan maintained that Muskie was no match for Nixon in 
appearing ―presidential,‖ and therefore, ―every effort must be made to identify the White House 
with Richard Nixon—pressing the dignity and even the majesty of a political ambience that 
Edmund Muskie couldn‘t match in a million campaigns.‖192 Perhaps that was true, but 
Buchanan‘s bluster notwithstanding, Nixon‘s men feared that marshalling the president‘s 
uncertain charisma might not be enough to derail Muskie. The team was well aware of the 
emerging support of the establishment for the Maine senator. Chicago mayor Richard Daley 
compared Muskie to Nixon‘s old rival, suggesting the senator was ―a man who is sincere and 
dedicated to moving the country ahead like the late John Kennedy was.‖193 In the primaries to 
come, Muskie appeared ready to match Nixon not only in charisma but in generating the perfect 
storm, uniting the Democratic Party under a single banner. Staffer Steve Embry agreed. Writing 
to Ken Khachigian that same day, he suggested that Muskie was ―the candidate with the greatest 
chance of uniting the Democratic Party and thus the toughest of the President‘s potential 
opponents.‖194  
Nixon‘s loyal inner circle needed an issue that would not only distract from the 
president‘s image problem but also take its opponent out at the knees. The point the team 
believed would hit home with Muskie concerned the Vietnam War. When the Democratic 
senator came out swinging against the administration‘s negotiations with Hanoi, Haldeman 
pounced. ―Muskie‘s attack on our peace proposal is an opportunity for us to nail him hard on a 
number of fronts.‖ The number one issue was to connect the senator to the former Democratic 
administration‘s policies and the Paris Peace Accords in November of 1968. Haldeman used the 
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old argument that it was unbelievable that ―those who got us into this war are sabotaging the 
President‘s efforts to get us out.‖ Haldeman suggested that Muskie secured a place on the ticket 
with Humphrey by supporting Johnson‘s policy in Southeast Asia, a ―policy [that] did not 
accomplish anything at the bargaining table in Paris except to agree on the shape of the table.‖195  
Of course, Haldeman is completely disingenuous on this point, as he knew, or should 
have known, as well as anyone in the administration, that in 1968 Nixon campaign manager John 
Mitchell, and opportunist perhaps without par Henry Kissinger, helped to sabotage the Paris 
Peace Accords by promising at Nixon‘s behest that Saigon would get a better deal with a 
Republican administration.
196
 Swallowing this irony without missing a step, Nixon‘s loyal chief 
of staff took the absurdity even further, suggesting to Colson and Scali that Muskie ―attacks the 
plan and in effect tells the enemy not to negotiate with the obvious bait that if they don‘t 
negotiate to end the war with Nixon they will get a better deal by waiting for Muskie.‖197  
Perhaps it was obvious to Nixon‘s chief of staff because that is akin to what his boss did to 
Hubert Humphrey in 1968, thereby destroying his party‘s peace plank. Despite this, Haldeman 
baldly claimed that the ―longer we wait the more people will be killed in Vietnam.‖198 
Nevertheless, Haldeman suggested, ―Muskie is muddled. He obviously has not done his 
homework.‖ But for the purposes of the attack team, it was really about politics not policy, and 
accuracy took a back seat to getting the right message out through Colson‘s operation. The 
points were that Muskie rejected the president‘s proposal ―before the enemy rejects it‖; he will 
give the enemy ―aid and comfort‖ and ―encouragement‖ and ―surrender rather than settlement.‖ 
The main thrust and one that the team put forward quite effectively was that ―Muskie is out of 
step with the majority of the American people.‖199 
 All of this was music to the ears of political strategists like Pat Buchanan who looked for 
any opportunity to attack. He was also the man who could put the case into words for the 
surrogates. Nixon was well aware of his speechwriter‘s talents. On the same day that Haldeman 
sent his marching orders to Colson, the president sent a memo to Buchanan and his chief of staff 
on this subject: ―I believe that Muskie‘s attack on our peace proposal is an opportunity for us to 
nail him hard on a number of fronts. Buchanan is probably the only one who can write the 
talking points or speech to deal with this problem.‖200 Nixon‘s allusions to peacemaking aside, 
the team underneath him knew that Muskie was no ordinary political opponent. Memos that 
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included the president‘s desire to ―nail‖ Muskie were the type of communications that were 
copied widely and appeared in numerous staff files. There is little doubt that such edicts trickled 
down through the entire reelection campaign and into the operational hands of small units, all 
working on their own angles and strategies, and looking for ways to derail Muskie with hard 
hitting speeches through growing surrogate operations, and the tricksters that were targeting him 
at the knee level out on the campaign trail.
201
 But for all of the attack plans and the dirty tricks to 
come, Edmund Muskie played a significant role in crippling his own campaign. 
  The cracks began early for the Democratic contender when rival George McGovern made 
a surprisingly strong second-place showing in the Iowa caucuses. Even though Muskie won, his 
opponent gained national attention. While the Nixon team was delighted that McGovern left the 
rural state with momentum, what engendered broader smiles in the corridors outside the Oval 
Office took place in the New Hampshire snow. Although Muskie captured the state‘s primary, 
the victory came at a tremendous cost, when the Nixon team got a helping hand from a 
Manchester newspaper. Although it is arguable the degree to which dirty tricks affected 
Muskie‘s primary hopes, one ―trick‖ in particular became notorious, even though its effect on the 
campaign is questionable. On Thursday February 24, two weeks before the state‘s primary, a 
letter to William Loeb, the fiery conservative publisher of the Manchester Union-Leader 
appeared in the right wing newspaper. Loeb presented the letter as part of a scathing editorial, 
which expounded on text suggesting that the senator disparaged French-Canadians and their 
descendants populating the northern part of the state while on a campaign stop in Florida. Loeb 
suggested that if it were not for the letter writer, ―no one in New Hampshire would know of the 
derogatory remarks emanating from the Muskie camp about the Franco-Americans in New 
Hampshire and Maine—remarks which the senator found amusing.‖ Loeb said that the 
communication from a Paul Morrison from Deerfield Beach, Florida, which came to be known 
as the ―Canuck letter,‖ confirmed to him and others that the senator was ―a hypocrite.‖202 Muskie 
countered that the contents of the letter were complete lies. It was not the letter, however, that set 
Muskie ablaze; rather, what drew Muskie into a fight was a story in the publication‘s Friday 
edition. That day, Loeb ran an attack on the senator‘s wife, Jane, impugning her character, 
suggesting that on the campaign trail she was a foul-mouthed drunk. Muskie could have let it go, 
winning the state and then moving on, forgetting about the letter that would have mattered little 
anywhere else in the nation, leaving Loeb‘s body blows behind him. But instead the candidate 
decided to defend his wife.
203
      
  While Richard Nixon was half-way around the world playing international statesman for 
a historic meeting with Chinese leader Mao Zedong, Ed Muskie climbed aboard a flatbed truck 
outside the offices of the Manchester Union-Leader. That Saturday morning with a heavy snow 
pounding the streets, the Democratic hopeful, microphone in hand, made a passionate 
denunciation of Loeb and a stirring defense of his wife. With a few hundred souls in winter coats 
packed up against the edge of the makeshift stage, Muskie called Loeb a ―gutless coward‖ who 
had insulted his wife. ―This man doesn‘t walk, he crawls. It‘s fortunate for him he‘s not on this 
platform beside me.‖ Commentators in the media, though, concluded that it was a bit too 
emotional, and reported widely that Muskie had broken down and sobbed during his speech. 
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David Broder‘s first line in his column in the Washington Post the following morning told 
readers all they needed to know about what the speech meant. Broder wrote that Muskie‘s 
defense was delivered ―With tears streaming down his face and his voice choked with emotion . . 
. . In defending his wife, Muskie broke down three times in as many minutes—uttering a few 
words and then standing silent in the near blizzard, rubbing at his face, his shoulders heaving, 
while he attempted to regain his composure sufficiently to speak.‖ Loeb, unfazed by Muskie‘s 
outburst, saw the ―weeping‖ for the political blunder it was. The publisher said that the senator 
had made ―a very serious tactical error. I think that Sen. Muskie‘s excited and near-hysterical 
performance this morning again indicates he‘s not the man that many of us want to have his 
finger on the nuclear button.‖204 The senator and World War II veteran from Maine countered 
that his voice only cracked from anger and that snowflakes were in his eyes, not tears.
205
  
The cracks, however, began to appear in the Muskie campaign‘s internal polls. Even 
though he beat McGovern 46 to 37 percent, his handlers had earlier predicted that they would 
capture 50 percent of the New Hampshire Democratic vote, and it appeared to some that 
McGovern looked strong while Muskie appeared weak. This reality did not escape McGovern‘s 
notice. ―Even if he claims victory, as he will,‖ the senator from South Dakota told the media 
following the primary, ―it‘s not the sort of victory he imagined.‖206 The media loved this weepy 
political story. As historian Rick Perlstein observed, journalists ―had begun circling Muskie like 
buzzards.‖207 Voters were turned off as much by ―senatorial tears shed in a snowstorm on a 
flatbed truck‖ as they were by the Canuck letter, which  received much more attention and blame 
for why Muskie‘s ship started to go down.208 Muskie appeared undaunted by McGovern‘s 
showing, maintaining that ―Senator McGovern says I won by a razor-thin margin. If I were 
Senator McGovern I wouldn‘t try to shave with that razor.‖209  As Muskie‘s strength came from 
his image as a calm and rational politician in contrast to the often-bellicose Nixon, the media 
attention left his candidacy bloodied early on in the race.
210
  
  Although Nixon‘s reelection campaign machinery operating out of CREEP headquarters 
at 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue carried out a litany of activities trying to disrupt Muskie along the 
election trail, the effect has been over-emphasized in accounting for Muskie‘s fall.211 The 
legendary Canuck letter was no different. What helps explain this development was that its 
origins tracked back to the larger story of Watergate. The connection to the campaign first 
emerged in October 1972 when Washington Post writer Marilyn Berger told colleague David 
Broder that White House staffer (and former Post writer) Ken Clawson was the letter‘s author. 
Broder urged Berger to bring her story to Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward. The two reporters, 
then hard on the heels of the Watergate break-in, revealed the ―Canuck letter‖ as part of a 
sweeping campaign of Nixon campaign sabotage.
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 Muskie believed that ―somebody was out to 
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ambush us,‖ especially as along the campaign trail letters and facsimiles purporting to be from 
Muskie‘s senate office were sent out attacking fellow Democrats. Polling data disappeared, fake 
phone calls from those claiming to represent the Muskie campaign bothered voters in their 
homes, and phony campaign flyers appeared in their mailboxes bearing the senator‘s name. From 
the fall of 1971 to the spring of 1972, Donald Segretti traveled through 20 states with political 
sabotage as his main goal. One young woman was paid $20 to strip and run outside Muskie‘s 
hotel room yelling, ―I love Ed Muskie‖; posters that read, ―Help Muskie in busing more children 
now‖ went up in Southern states; and invitations to non-existent events claiming free food and 
alcohol were distributed to black neighborhoods in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Segretti was also 
responsible for fabricating a letter on Muskie‘s letterhead indicating that Humphrey and Henry 
Jackson were involved in sexual misconduct.
213
   
  The efforts were part of a program called ―ratfucking,‖ a slang for political sabotage, and 
one that Chapin‘s buddy Segretti and others turned into a crude art during the early days of the 
campaign. The plan was to disrupt and divide the Democrats by having them bicker over the 
others‘ political tactics. Phone lines were jammed, speeches were pilfered, meetings were 
cancelled, campaigns were spied upon, food was ordered and delivered to puzzled campaign 
workers and fake rioters turned up at political events. In early 1972, such activities constituted a 
bizarre contrast: while Nixon was undertaking historical diplomatic trips to the Soviet Union and 
China, his men were burglarizing offices in the Watergate complex and ―sending unordered 
pizzas to Muskie.‖  It was also a classic case where the right hand did not always know where 
the left hand had been. As J. Anthony Lukas pointed out, ―Every faction in the White House and 
CREEP seemed determined to have its own undercover network. There were at least four other 
parallel operations.‖  One of these was run by Segretti out of CREEP; the second by E. Howard 
Hunt; a third by Murray Chotiner; and a fourth by Jeb Magruder.
214
 There can be little doubt that 
Berger‘s contention that Clawson told her he authored the infamous Canuck letter was true, even 
though he later denied it. Such an act was consistent not only with all of the other activities the 
team did admit to, but the letter‘s purported writer, Paul Morrison of Deerfield Beach, Florida, 
was never located.
215
 
  Despite these high and low-level shenanigans, there is little evidence that the fabricated 
letters or any of the other activities had any beneficial effect at the ballot box for the Nixon 
administration. What they did accomplish was to embolden Muskie‘s political enemies, 
including William Loeb, to go fishing after the candidate and get him to bite on a bit of New 
Hampshire bait. The immediate winner leaving the state then was not Edmund Muskie or 
Richard Nixon but George McGovern. Even though Muskie topped the senator from South 
Dakota 46 percent to 37 percent, his campaign had certainly hoped for a wider margin and 
momentum heading out. ―It‘s heartbreaking,‖ admitted one of Muskie‘s campaign coordinators. 
The strong second-place finish provided McGovern with a boost of new energy heading down 
into Florida. As he told reporters, Muskie was a ―frontrunner with a very shaky base.‖216  This 
base was increasingly torn between the underdog McGovern and a vulnerable Muskie who was 
attempting to clarify his position on the Vietnam War and prevent defections to the McGovern 
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insurgency, while not alienating those in the center of the political spectrum. As the Washington 
Post‘s David Broder suggested, ―What these liberals have perceived about Muskie is that his 
style may be low-keyed and noninflamatory, but his positions are now very much in line with 
their own. He has begun to condemn the war, not just as a political mistake, but as a moral 
wrong; his rhetoric on domestic issues has shifted from the standard Democratic call for bigger 
government and higher benefits to the ‗redistribution of wealth and power.‘‖217 
 For the Nixon team, the primary showed that Muskie may not have been the dangerous 
opponent it had made him out to be.  However, by mid March, there was a growing concern that 
the ―several quasi-independent attack operations‖ needed to be coordinated under a central 
authority to direct the effort against Muskie in a more professional and consistent manner. The 
goal was to mitigate sloppiness and ―avoid the problem of the right hand not knowing what the 
left is doing.‖218  Buchanan and Khachigian were to try to take control over tactic development 
as well as oversee general strategic aims, while the staff at CREEP would assist by checking on 
the effectiveness of their operations in the media, aid in negative advertising, help in the drafting 
of  speeches for major events, and contributing to the production of covert materials. The 
consensus was to get a member from the White House staff over to CREEP headquarters at 1701 
Pennsylvania Avenue to coordinate all the attack mechanisms, including ―Gordon Liddy on his 
special projects.‖ With a White House man at 1701, the plan was that they would have the ability 
to ―turn lines on and off almost instantaneously.‖ The member would also coordinate all the 
attack mechanisms outside 1701, including information from the Republican National 
Committee‘s (RNC) answer desk and ―Colson‘s own White House operation.‖219 
 Because Muskie appeared to be wounded early, Nixon‘s men believed the senator could 
be lumped in with Ted Kennedy, as someone especially ‗feeble‘ on national defense. ―Muskie‘s 
and Kennedy‘s records [on approving weapons systems] are atrocious,‖ Buchanan and 
Khachigian wrote in an Attack Organization and Strategy memorandum to John Mitchell. 
―Senator Muskie voted to strip America‘s defenses below the danger point.‖220 The sight of 
Muskie‘s blood also emboldened others in attacking the senator, as even long-shot candidate 
Eugene McCarthy was encouraged by the attacks and began to take a run at his fellow Democrat, 
looking to eke out a win in Illinois. As the presumed frontrunner, Muskie had become a moving 
and wounded target.
221
 The senator was also not the only party ―centrist‖ heading into Florida, as 
his apparent vulnerability allowed him to become squeezed by the moderate Hubert Humphrey 
on one side and energized McGovern on the other. Humphrey, who was attempting his third run 
at the presidency, believed that if he fell short of second place in the Sunshine State his chances 
at the Oval Office would be over. ―This is it for me,‖ Humphrey said heading into the primary. 
―It‘s now or never. I don‘t want to be some rerun on the late show.‖222  
 Lacking momentum, any support Muskie did have in the South waned, and the senator‘s 
attacks on George Wallace increased in their shrillness. The result was that Nixon‘s team was 
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given an opportunity to sick its attack dog Spiro Agnew on the Democratic frontrunner. The 
message was that unlike Richard Nixon, Muskie did not understand the South. The issue came to 
a head when Muskie finished fourth in the Florida primary, capturing only 9 percent of the vote 
compared to Wallace‘s 42 percent. Muskie referred to Wallace as ―a demagogue of the worst 
kind,‖ someone who ―threatened the nobility of our country.‖ Using the agreed upon strategy of 
taking the side of the American people against these sorts of ―elitist‖ attacks, Agnew was taken 
off his leash and he promptly pounced. In regard to Wallace‘s victory, the vice president 
suggested, ―It seems to me that in our system of politics, when a man wins an election in such an 
overpowering fashion, he should at least be acknowledged as someone who has struck a chord 
among the people and not be referred to as a demagogue.‖ Agnew stated that Muskie missed the 
point and did not understand the issues the people cared about. ―Now, if this is true, something 
that Mr. Wallace was saying must have struck a responsive chord,‖ which was not only code for 
contentious issues such as school busing, but as the Nixon team had thought, general fear and 
frustration in the heartland over the nation‘s direction. The president‘s inner circle had begun to 
understand that disaffected voters were not merely ―Wallace voters‖ but were indeed up for 
grabs. The task was to appear to be an administration that spoke the language this alienated 
constituency wanted to hear. It was something that Tom Wicker had put his finger upon in the 
New York Times. ―But beyond busing, the point the Wallace vote has most clearly made is that a 
large and heterogeneous group of Americans are simply fed up with the ways things are going in 
their country,‖ Wicker wrote. The more salient point was that ―no one has found a way to focus 
its energies constructively and progressively‖ to capture this alienated constituency and ―Wallace 
will ride high‖ until someone does.223   
The internal White House memorandums make it clear that the Nixon team both 
recognized this reality and intended to go after these disaffected voters during the 1972 
presidential election.  They also believed that Wallace would eventually lose his footing nation-
wide and their party would be best positioned to swoop in and collect the disaffected, especially 
with a fractured Democratic Party led by a ‗radical‘ like McGovern. Nixon‘s men had kept tabs 
on the inside of the Wallace camp, and the word was ―don‘t worry about Wallace.‖ As Buchanan 
had suggested to Haldeman, ―From an excellent source in Alabama comes word that Governor 
Wallace is ‗getting psychotic,‘ that he has serious marital problems and that he is ‗not what he 
used to be.‘‖224  
 As the primaries moved from the balmy southern sunshine into the Midwest, the strain on 
Muskie amplified, and increasingly he looked incapable of capturing that disaffected 
constituency. A new Gallup Poll showed that Humphrey had passed Muskie 35 percent to 28 
percent after the second week in March. While Humphrey decided to bypass Illinois and focus 
on Wisconsin, a possible McGovern insurgency loomed. McGovern set the bar low in Illinois, 
claiming in the days before the primary that 30 percent support was his target, as he joined with 
Humphrey in focusing on Wisconsin. With Eugene McCarthy left to battle with Muskie,
225
 the 
senator from Maine captured Illinois, 63 percent to 37 percent. Humphrey led both Muskie and 
McGovern in the polls heading into Wisconsin, further splitting the middle vote. The veteran 
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Minnesota politician had actually gained a slight lead in the Badger State less than two weeks 
before the primary. Meanwhile, the vice president kept up the attacks on the leaders, suggesting 
that they were ―as wrong as it is possible for a human being to get without attracting the attention 
of the medical profession.‖226   
With Muskie on the ropes, anticipation grew within the Nixon camp. State polling 
indicated the prospect of a win for McGovern in Wisconsin, with Muskie possibly coming in 
fourth or fifth.‖ According to Buchanan, such an occurrence would ―be a climatic disaster for 
Big Ed.‖ In a memorandum to the president, the speechwriter wrote that if this were the case, 
―Muskie would sustain a near fatal blow.‖ Buchanan as usual wanted a clearer picture of 
McGovern‘s chances in the state, and if they proved good, the team should devote material 
efforts to the cause. The plan included getting Republicans out to cast ballots for McGovern. As 
the political strategist noted for the president, ―if we have some hard poll information, and this is 
a possibility, then we should have Republicans cross over and vote for George McGovern. Word 
should go forth today.‖227  
By April, however, the president had become anxious that his men were not going hard 
enough after Muskie, and he was on his chief of staff‘s back over the issue. ―Got into political 
discussions, the P‘s concerned that we‘ve got to get moving on the attack, that we should have 
someone attacking Muskie as a defeatist, because he‘s saying that we shouldn‘t react to the 
Vietnam attack by the enemy,‖ Haldeman wrote in his diary. ―We shouldn‘t let him build that 
line about just getting out of Vietnam.‖228 And there were reasons for this concern inside the 
Oval Office, as the internal memorandums spoke to a sense of fear rather than confidence. Those 
the team brought in from the outside for help in understanding the political mood only reinforced 
this trepidation. In a memorandum prepared for the administration, public opinion analyst Lloyd 
Free commented quite bluntly on the president‘s prospects for the fall. ―You have asked for my 
views about the President‘s prospects; I shall give them to you with complete frankness. Despite 
the current Harris poll which shows Nixon comfortably ahead of Muskie, I would estimate the 
President‘s chances of reelection in November as being no better than 50-50.‖ Free‘s advice for 
the team was ―to talk consistently like an ideological conservative; to act consistently and 
vigorously, with constant follow through, as an operational liberal.‖229  
Colson and Buchanan claimed never to trust the polls anyway, especially when they 
shifted suddenly. The president‘s special counsel and his hardnosed speechwriter were seldom 
mollified and this reality contributed to the chronic belief in imminent political doom. When 
pollster Lou Harris warned in conversation with Colson that the president and his team should 
avoid ―stridency‖ and crass partisanship, Buchanan suggested to Colson that he ―would not trust 
                                                 
226
 Agnew is quoted in the New York Times, March 26, 1972, 103. Please also see the campaign coverage and 
polling data in the New York Times, March 6, 1972, 24; March 22, 1972, 1, 32; and March 23, 1972, 32.  
227
 Memorandum from Pat Buchanan to the President, March 29, 1972, and relevant state polling data from March, 
Box 30, Nixon Library. 
228
 Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 435. 
229
 See memorandum and attached file from Jeb Magruder to H.R. Haldeman, April 3, 1972, WHSF, Contested 
Files, Box 32, Nixon Library. Additionally, the team was worried about playing the Vietnam card too heavily with 
Muskie. As the Washington Post‘s David Broder told his readers, ―[Nixon] has elevated Muskie into major national 
prominence on an issue on which Muskie can hardly lose: The desire to bring a quick end to the American 
involvement in Vietnam.‖ See the Post, February 15, 1972, A19. 
  67 
Harris so far as one could throw him. He has long been, in Teddy White‘s phrase, a ‗Kennedy 
fanatic.‘‖230  
In the Wisconsin primary on April 4, Muskie matched his fourth place in Florida. 
Finishing behind winner George McGovern, Humphrey and Wallace were in a virtual dead heat 
in second place. Wallace was the biggest surprise, gaining more votes in the northern state, 
besting Muskie by ten percentage points. Long shot candidates, New York Mayor John Lindsay 
and Senator Henry Jackson, trailed in the basement.
231
 After the vote, Lindsay withdrew from the 
race. Becoming aware of the growing numbers of the politically disaffected in the nation, 
McGovern and Wallace both played to that constituency or as Tom Wicker pointed out, to those 
who ―believe instinctively that loopholes and favoritism are a prime reason why the rich get 
richer and the poor get audited.‖232 The big change after the two disastrous fourth-place finishes 
was that Muskie‘s one time lead over Richard Nixon had evaporated. Indeed, even before the 
Wisconsin vote, polls on March 24 and March 27 showed Muskie trailing the president by 10 
points, compared with the spring of 1971, where a Harris poll showed Nixon behind with a 
projection that the president would lose 47 to 39 in 1972. A weary Muskie delivered a pep talk to 
approximately one hundred of his campaign workers and volunteers, claiming he was going to 
―work like hell‖ and focus on the states where he could capture the most delegates, namely 
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts on April 25, Ohio on May 2, California on June 6, and New 
York on June 20.
233
 
  As Muskie continued to bleed out on the campaign trail, Nixon‘s men quietly applauded 
the gains made by George McGovern.  The South Dakotan was knocking off his Democratic 
rivals one-by-one in the primaries, and no one was more pleased than those inside the walls of 
the White House.  This was especially the case following McGovern‘s win in Wisconsin. ―The 
Democratic presidential candidates discombobulated themselves further in Wisconsin,‖ Harry 
Dent wrote to the president. According to the communications man, the ―big news‖ included ―the 
McGovern and Wallace scores, HHH‘s failure to win, Muskie‘s fourth place disaster, and 
Lindsay‘s withdrawal.‖ What really rallied the troops, though, was Muskie‘s poor showing, with 
both glee and derision to be found in abundance in the corridors outside the Oval Office. As Dent 
suggested to the president, ―In the last four days Muskie virtually gave up, spending too much 
time watching pro basketball.‖234 Late that night, Haldeman summed up the momentous occasion 
inside the Nixon camp. ―Everybody was highly pleased with the Wisconsin primary results,‖ 
wrote the White House chief of staff. McGovern‘s wide margin of victory according to 
Haldeman, ―thoroughly screws up the Democrats one more time.‖235 
 Each Muskie fall was seen not merely as a victory for McGovern but a win for Nixon. 
The next to fall for the politician from Maine was Massachusetts. McGovern won the state 
primary by 30 points over Muskie, with Humphrey coming in third, and Wallace dropping back 
to fourth. In Pennsylvania, Muskie lost again, this time to Humphrey; there were those in his 
campaign who wondered if there was any point going on to Ohio, especially as Muskie appeared 
―increasingly doleful with each campaign appearance.‖  As R.W. Apple wrote in the New York 
Times, for Muskie, the former front-runner, April was not ―the cruelest month,‖ it was a 
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―wasteland.‖236  
 Although Nixon‘s historic trip to China did not help Muskie‘s numbers against the 
president, it did not make an appreciable difference to the outcome. Before the president‘s trip, a 
Harris Poll found that Nixon led Muskie by four points, 44 to 40 with Wallace at 11 percent.
237
 
What really hurt Muskie was not the statesman in China but a crowded Democratic field that 
smelled blood on the leader. While the president was away, the battle had intensified between 
Democratic candidates and Hubert Humphrey assumed the lead over Muskie, 35-28 percent.
238
  
A Wisconsin poll less than two weeks later showed an even more fractured Democratic group 
with McGovern at 24 percent, Humphrey at 19 percent, Muskie at 15 percent, and Wallace at 12 
percent.
239
 A Gallup Poll taken from March 24-27 following the China trip showed that head to 
head, Nixon held a 46-36 percent lead over Muskie, and in a match up with Humphrey and 
Wallace, Nixon would capture 46 to Humphrey‘s 35 percent, with Wallace at 15 percent.240  The 
boost from the diplomatic venture was not all that impressive as while Nixon had opened up a 10 
point lead from 4 points before the trip to China on Muskie, he had only moved up by 2 
percentage points from 44 to 46 overall. What had occurred was that Muskie lost ground against 
the Democratic field due to his own failings in New Hampshire and in the states in the South and 
the Midwest following that episode, not to Nixon directly.  Muskie had lost 4 points after a bad 
two week showing. And while the president‘s approval rating had jumped to 56 percent, his 
highest in 14 months following his foreign policy successes, in actuality, Nixon‘s rating had 
steadily climbed before his trip to China, from 49 percent in January to 53 percent in early 
February (before China) and then three more percentage points by early March to 56 percent.
241
  
 By May, a Harris poll indicated the peace efforts had brought Nixon public acclaim. The 
president‘s plan to visit Moscow and the trip to China had helped, as 55 percent of Americans 
thought it would bring substantial long-term agreements with the Russians, and 62 percent 
believed that it would lead to real agreements with China. Back in April, Americans had 
approved of the president making the trip to Moscow by a percentage point difference of 74-13, 
while 73 percent agreed with him going to China.
242
 These results, though, had little to do with 
what happened to Muskie on the campaign trail. On April 27, Big Ed Muskie abandoned his 
active pursuit of his party‘s nomination when he officially suspended his campaign. The senator 
admitted ―I do not have the money to continue.‖ While suggesting that he was not dropping out 
completely, the decision effectively ended his run for the presidency, much to the delight of 
those in the Nixon White House. In many ways, Muskie was a paper tiger, never really finding 
his footing on the campaign trail. He generated little passion; looking weak and indecisive, he 
failed to gain traction once the primaries began. Even when he looked for a fight in the snow in 
New Hampshire, the senator never looked less presidential, a far cry from the man who bested 
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Nixon on television on the eve of the 1970 midterm elections when everything looked bright for 
Muskie and dark for Richard Nixon.
243
 While the president‘s men certainly played their share of 
dirty tricks against the senator, it appears that Ed Muskie unhorsed himself.  
 What the Muskie episode did expose was the level of concern inside the Nixon camp that 
a ―centrist‖ politician could steal the constituency that the president and his team had planned to 
capture. They were the votes they largely did not get in 1968: moderate Democrats, Wallace 
supporters, Catholics, labor, Jews, and the growing suburban neighborhoods populated by the so 
called white ethnic voters. With the Muskie threat neutralized, the president‘s immediate concern 
had turned to Ted Kennedy. Rumors abounded that Kennedy would endorse McGovern, and the 
pressure on the senator from Massachusetts to make a decision began to build with each passing 
day. As a Kennedy spokesperson indicated, ―He‘s said all along he did not expect to make any 
endorsement before the convention and that has not changed.‖244  
Meanwhile George McGovern progressively built a lead over Humphrey in delegates and 
money raised through the month of May.
245
  By then, McGovern looked unbeatable. ―I don‘t see 
how anybody can stop him,‖ one national party leader said. An early effort to block the rising 
McGovern tide, ostensibly led by Governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia and other Southern 
governors, fell flat.
246
 Even though by the end of May it looked to many inside the Nixon 
political camp that McGovern was taking a stranglehold on the nomination, the underbelly of 
that peculiar campaign continued unabated, as on the 28
th 
of that month, electronic surveillance 
equipment was installed inside Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate. 
While a ―stop McGovern‖ movement began in vain, President Nixon remained concerned about 
Kennedy coming out of the blue to grab the nomination and threaten the continuation of his 
presidency. As Nixon suggested to John Mitchell, ―…from a number of sources it is becoming 
apparent that a last-ditch effort may be made by Kennedy to try to have a deadlock so that 
Kennedy could still get the nomination.‖ The fact that Kennedy had already given up his Secret 
Service protection did not relieve the president‘s anxiety, suggesting that the senator might be up 
to some political posturing tricks. As Nixon suggested, ―…that might just be a ploy for the 
purpose of playing that game.‖247  
Nixon was not alone in his belief that Kennedy had serious designs on the presidency in 
‘72. ―It‘s a funny thing,‖ Nixon nemesis and Democratic Party Chairman, Larry O‘Brien, said. 
―Here in Washington we all assume Kennedy is not going to run; we don‘t even talk about it 
anymore. But every time I get out into the country, the first question I get asked is, ‗What about 
Teddy?‘‖248 Watergate prosecutor Leon Jaworski believed that much of Nixon‘s paranoia about 
Kennedy and other political foes that could potentially come out of the dark to take him under, 
stemmed from his political career. In the election of 1968, despite earlier polls showing Nixon 
considerably out in front in the campaign‘s final days, challenger Hubert Humphrey suddenly 
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gained ground and almost eked out a victory. This experience and the narrow loss to John 
Kennedy in 1960 led ―Nixon and his aides…to do almost anything to crush the opposition in 
1972.‖249 
 The reality was that Muskie‘s fall had signaled McGovern‘s rise. And there was no doubt 
that Nixon‘s team wanted to ensure that nothing would stop this. They wanted to control who 
was on the top of the Democratic ticket for the fall election.  As a result, the edict from Nixon‘s 
White House strategists was to stay out of McGovern‘s way. ―With the great success of 
McGovern and subsequent pullout of Muskie, the chances of a McGovern nomination are 
immensely improved,‖ Buchanan wrote in a memo to Haldeman and Mitchell. ―Thus, we must 
do as little as possible, at this time, to impede McGovern‘s rise.‖ The word was that no matter 
how ―irresponsibly‖ McGovern should act, he should be left alone for the moment, other than on 
Vietnam, as they wanted to run against the antiwar crowd and tie McGovern to it. ―He can be hit 
hard on this subject—a point which not only elevates his candidacy but also gets the President‘s 
position restated while reinforcing the strong anti-war sentiment behind McGovern.‖ To which 
Haldeman wrote with a flourish, ―Right.‖ Buchanan cautioned, though, that the team had to 
remain strategic: ―On the other hand, the ammunition which will be our stock in the campaign—
the extremist, radical labels; the pro-amnesty and pro-abortion positions; the radical chic; the 
gut-the-military attitude; etc.—should he held in abeyance until we are reasonably sure 
McGovern has the nomination.‖ Haldeman penned ―Right‖ again. ―The temptations will be high 
in many quarters to go after McGovern,‖ but Buchanan warned that the ―word ought to go out to 
lay off with but a few exceptions. We have plenty of time to attach labels later, and the same 
labels which will defeat McGovern for the Presidency are the same labels which could prevent 
him from getting the nomination. Let‘s not do Hubert‘s work for him.‖ Haldeman responded 
again, ―Absolutely!‖  In what was no doubt a clear reminder to bring the president‘s chief 
hatchet man into the loop on these points, Haldeman wrote in the top corner of the memo in large 
bold letters a single name: ―COLSON.‖250  
 McGovern was the dream candidate for Nixon and his men as they were well aware that 
he would be the least likely candidate to appeal to the supporters (and the potential supporters) of 
Alabama Governor George Wallace. Indeed, Wallace‘s decision to run as a Democrat in January 
helped Nixon as it further split the Democrats and ensured that a repeat of 1968 would not take 
place. The team was confident that while Wallace would do well in the field with alienated 
voters he would not do well enough to hurt them as the southern governor would not be able to 
sustain a national campaign and thus would not remain on the ballot in 1972.
251
   
Wallace had naturally done extremely well not only in the South but had also captured 
dissatisfied northern voters. It was both of those constituencies that Nixon‘s team strongly 
believed they could capture, especially with McGovern at the top of the ticket. Fate took Wallace 
out of the race sooner than even they could have predicted. On May 15, while on the campaign 
trail in Laurel, Maryland, the Alabama governor and Democratic candidate was shot four times 
by Arthur Bremer in a failed assassination attempt. It was not long until the president and 
                                                 
249
 Please see Jaworski, The Right and the Power, 333, 336. 
250
 Memorandum from Pat Buchanan to H. R. Haldeman and John Mitchell, April 27, 1972, WHSF, Contested Files, 
Box 7, Nixon Library.   
251
 Historian Rick Perlstein maintains that while Nixon wanted the presence of Wallace to help divide the Democrats 
in the primaries, he could not have predicted that he would help by deciding to run on the Democratic ticket. While 
hinting that there may have been a secret deal between the president and the former Alabama governor to run as a 
Democrat, he maintains that Nixon had hoped that ―Wallace would screw the Democrats,‖ but he would not ―be in 
the race long enough to screw him.‖ Please see Perlstein, Nixonland, 631-632. 
  71 
Haldeman thought of the value their hatchet man Charles Colson would bring to this event.  In 
fact, Nixon wanted Colson‘s operation to pin the attempt on their political opponents—namely 
George McGovern and Ted Kennedy. The president ordered Haldeman to have Colson get in on 
the action, by having Ken Clawson enlist friendly media assets. The goal was to make it appear 
that initial reports on the interrogation of accused assassin Arthur Bremer revealed a connection 
to ―a McGovern/Kennedy person.‖ As Nixon hinted, ―Know what I mean? Rumors are going to 
flow all over the place. Put it on the left right away.‖ The president thought the word to the press 
should be that Bremer ―was a supporter of McGovern and Kennedy. Now just put that out. Just 
say you have it on ‗unmistakable evidence.‘‖ Naturally, both Nixon and Colson knew that such a 
trick was right up the alley for the author of the Canuck letter. As Colson later told the president, 
―You don‘t have to sell it to [Clawson].‖ The aide had told Colson with a wink, ―of course, of 
course he‘s a student radical, naturally.‖ Colson had replied in kind, suggesting that Bremer was 
from Wisconsin and had actually ―worked in McGovern‘s campaign‖ to hearty laughter in the 
president‘s office in the Old Executive Office Building.252 
 Everyone in the Democratic Party leadership had a target pinned to their lapels. Aiding 
the Nixon team was a growing split within the Democratic Party, a division between those who 
supported McGovern heading into the convention and those who believed the senator 
represented a narrow far left edge of the party, one that was spilling over into the national news 
media. Even though Muskie had suspended his campaign, he refused to endorse McGovern. 
―Party unity is not achieved with the magic wand of a kingmaker. No man can hand George 
McGovern a united party,‖ Muskie said.253 Nixon and Haldeman loved Muskie‘s refusal and the 
emerging party turmoil. In his diary that evening, Haldeman welcomed Colson‘s report 
concerning the Muskie news conference, which was ―good news for us.‖254 But just a week later, 
there was to be some bad news, as five individuals connected to Nixon‘s men in the White House 
were arrested in the early morning hours of June 17 as they tried to bug the offices of the 
Democratic National Committee at the Watergate. The consequences of those actions, however, 
would not be felt until after the November election had come and gone. The matters of concern 
for the coming weeks were ensuring a divided Democratic Party with a McGovern victory. 
Indeed the prospect of McGovern‘s rise worried some Democrats in Middle America. Governor 
Warren Hearnes of Missouri said that he could not support a McGovern nomination, and former 
governor Sam Goddard of Arizona joined others who believed that the senator ―would be 
absolutely murdered by Nixon.‖ As Goddard declared, ―I‘ll tell you flat out, McGovern would be 
a disaster for us here.‖255 Even though the ―stop McGovern‖ movement would ultimately fail, the 
fight between moderates and the party establishment on one side and the ―McGovernites‖ on the 
other would help the man from Yorba Linda. It was a battle for which the president‘s loyal team 
had hoped. Heading into the summer, Nixon‘s men intended to paint McGovern into a radical 
corner from which there was no escape. He would be seen by all as an extremist politician and a 
man out of touch with those in the great American heartland.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE MAKING OF AN EXTREMIST 
 
 
McGovern‘s victory is not a popular victory; it is more a coup d‘état of the Democratic Party, where a 
youthful leftist and suburban leftist elite has deposed and ousted the traditional Catholic and Jewish 
leadership of the Democratic Party. The fellow is not the people‘s choice.
256
 
 
or a solid week in early June, 1972, speechwriters Pat Buchanan and Ken Khachigian were 
squirreled away in the Old Executive Office Building, drinking coffee, eating sandwiches, 
and assembling the ―assault book‖ on George McGovern. Haldeman had requested this dark, 
furtive file to be ready before he and President Nixon traveled to the Soviet Union. Buchanan 
created only two copies, one for Haldeman, which he delivered to Camp David and the other for 
John Mitchell. The assault strategy was to be kept on a need-to-know basis in order to have time 
to fact check, but more importantly, to prevent leaks to the media about the direction for the 
campaign.
257
 The opening passage of the assault book, however, left little doubt on the nature of 
the strategy. It stated boldly, ―Within are enough McGovern statements, positions, votes, not 
only to defeat the South Dakota Radical—but to have him indicted by a Grand Jury.‖ The team 
understood early that McGovern could be portrayed as being so outside the mainstream that 
―only with enormous effort could we boot this election away.‖ In the document, the 
speechwriters focused not only on issues but also on the ―perceptions‖ of McGovern by the 
electorate. The text shares earlier predictions that despite the preference for the South Dakota 
senator as the opponent in the fall, there was a real danger that this skilled campaigner might 
move to the center and eke out a victory. As it stood going in, according to Buchanan, McGovern 
―could conceivably beat us by four to six points, on the basis of his get-out-the-vote machinery.‖ 
This effort would be driven by ―tens of thousands of ‗True Believers,‘ working night and day for 
him.‖ While Buchanan felt that his quarry was on the far left side of the political spectrum, he 
worried that he might not choose to run that way. The speechwriter understood that ―while 
McGovern‘s positions are wooly-headed, he is an ambitious and pragmatic politician—who will 
not hesitate to move crab-wise to the center to win the election.‖ The job during the campaign, 
then, was to ―nail‖ McGovern on the left side of the political road if he wanted to be there or not, 
and thereby portray him as a ―pet radical of Eastern Liberalism, the darling of the New York 
Times, the hero of the Berkeley Hill Jet Set; Mr. Radical Chic.‖258 
 By putting McGovern in bed with the radical left, political strategists like Buchanan 
planned to separate him from the base of the Democratic Party, while allowing the president to 
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claim its traditional territory. As Buchanan wrote, ―The better we portray McGovern as an elitist 
radical, the smaller his political base. By November, he should be postured as the 
Establishment‘s fair-haired boy, and RN postured as the Candidate of the Common Man, the 
working man.‖ The best way to make the ―extremist‖ label stick would be to ensure that the 
public did not forget that McGovern was ―part and parcel of the Democratic liberal 
establishment‖ dating back to the 1930s, which created big government programs that both 
―bankrupted the workingman‖ and taxed ―to death the middle class.‖  Moreover, before the end 
of the summer, the campaign tactics were designed to reveal the senator as a close friend of 
―Harvard, elitist left-wing professors, snot-nosed demonstrators, black radicals, and the whole 
elitist gang.‖259 The attack strategy on McGovern and the Democrats was both gleeful and 
vicious. Buchanan and the other speechwriters began to detail the method of assault that was to 
depict McGovern as a dangerous radical more in touch with the fringe of the anti-war movement 
than with ―hard working regular Americans.‖ The team planned to ―skewer McGovern on 
national television‖ over his temperamental connection with radicals, stressing the belief that 
―America is tired of rock throwing, rioting demonstrators who threaten the public safety and 
make rational discourse impossible.‖260 
 Despite this ―nut-cutter‖ language, Nixon‘s men actually planned a much more nuanced 
and careful delivery of these messages throughout the summer and the fall. The method for 
getting the word out to the public was to employ a focused, local—almost diffuse—approach, 
targeting Middle American voters where they lived, including Catholics, the white ―ethnic‖ vote, 
blue collar and working class ―hardhats,‖ utilizing many voices and medias, and avoiding the 
―shotgun‖ approach. It was admittedly a delicate balancing act, employing a strategy of painting 
the Democratic challenger into a corner. However, with five months remaining before the 
election, not shooting off all their volleys on the Democrats too quickly became a priority. The 
plan for the attacks was to ―hang these one at a time around McGovern for the rest of the year.‖  
The cautionary note in the assault book was that they would have to guard against appearing ―too 
harsh or strident‖ with their strikes. As they held that ―the hostile out there…will pounce on the 
first allegation of ‗Tricky Dick,‘ or ‗smear‘ campaign,‖ the approach was to take the knees out of 
the McGovern campaign while avoiding the perception of the old fighting president.
261
   
The historiography on the Nixon presidency plays heavily on a combination of ―dirty 
tricks‖ and McGovern blunders to explain the trajectory of the 1972 election, but the team‘s 
efforts at sophisticated, nuanced, and highly effective political hardball as a specific strategy has 
received insufficient scholarly attention. This is largely true because discussions on the internal 
politics of the 1972 election outside the parameters of Watergate are minimal in Nixon research. 
Stanley Kutler, Stephen Ambrose, Herbert Parmet, Melvin Small, and Richard Reeves, for 
example, devote little space to the mechanics of electioneering, choosing to focus primarily on 
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CREEP and the operations at 1701 and the connections to the larger events surrounding the 
administration‘s abuse of power. Recent books on Nixon including Conrad Black‘s The 
Invincible Quest, Elizabeth Drew‘s President Nixon, and Robert Dallek‘s Partners in Power, 
devote little time to the internal political strategy to win in a landslide election and retake the 
White House. The limited exception is Rick Perlstein‘s Nixonland, which positions Nixon‘s 
landslide victory at the polls as the natural outcome of a decade of intense national turmoil and 
upheaval that the politician from California had capitalized upon in one form or another over his 
entire career. This chapter provides, however, a much more detailed investigation into the 
electoral strategy of election year. While larger historical trends certainly were at work, this 
section focuses on those who had their boots on the ground during that seminal year. By 
shedding light inside the political machine as it set out against McGovern, it unpacks the making 
of an extremist.
262
 
**** 
  In the months before the South Dakotan actually secured the top spot on the Democratic 
ticket, it was clear which candidate Nixon‘s men preferred to attack. Surveying the reelection 
terrain and the mood of the country, men like Haldeman knew how easy it would be to sink their 
knives into political prey like George McGovern. The senator‘s candidacy presented an excellent 
opportunity to expose the clear distinctions between the Nixon brand and the self-styled ―Prairie 
Populist.‖ Indeed, long before McGovern bested his inner-party rivals, Richard Nixon‘s loyal 
staffers already had a huge attack file on McGovern, including his stance on abortion, women‘s 
rights, drugs, amnesty for draft resisters, and of course, his anti-war stance concerning Vietnam.  
As Khachigian suggested to Buchanan, ―McGovern knows damn good and well that we have 
enough material on him to sink a battleship. He knows that we won‘t be afraid to use this 
information.‖263 But Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman wanted more than just to attack in reaction to 
the issues McGovern raised. After reading many of Buchanan‘s memos, he wanted the 
president‘s strong points featured as much as the attacks on McGovern‘s weaknesses. He too 
feared the old ―tricky Dickey‖ charges.  ―The Buchanan memorandum fails to recognize the 
necessity to keep our strength up front and center,‖ Haldeman wrote. ―In other words, all of our 
attack lines on the opposition should end up emphasizing our strengths. We must not get trapped 
into McGovern‘s bog of peddling himself a new face. If people want new ideas, this 
Administration has the boldest initiatives in history.‖264  
 The chief of staff‘s pressure on Buchanan stemmed from a meeting he had with the 
president one day after the release of the assault book, and Nixon was growing anxious over the 
details of the attack on McGovern. Following his meeting with the president, Haldeman 
documented in his diary what he was going to kick down the food chain for the political 
strategists was that the contrast between the two men was paramount. ―We need savage attack 
lines against the McGovern positions. Get McGovern tied as an extremist. Don‘t give any ground 
regarding the fact that he‘s changed his position.‖ McGovern, Nixon believed, was ―guilty by 
association‖ with radicals including Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, and Angela Davis. ―We should 
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get a maximum number of pictures of rowdy people around McGovern, while we go for the all-
out-square America.‖265 
 However, while Haldeman expected his staff to speak about the president‘s achievements 
in foreign policy and the dangers of a McGovern presidency, he could not help seeing the 
president‘s accomplishments in contrast to his opponent‘s obvious deficiencies. And while 
Haldeman wanted the messages tightly controlled, his memorandums could not hide his obvious 
relish for the rough stuff against his opponents. So while the president‘s chief of staff reminded 
staffers that ―President Nixon has launched some very major, far-reaching, foreign policy 
initiatives,‖ he made it clear that the nation ―can‘t afford to let an inexperienced novice come in 
and pick up the reins at this point. We cannot afford to have McGovern in the White House in 
terms of foreign policy. His inexperience and naivety in the foreign policy field would be 
disastrous. Do we really want ‗White Flag McGovern‘ in the White House?‖266 Haldeman‘s 
words are a perfect example of how members of the inner circle fueled each other‘s fire and 
pushed the intricate election machine forward. Two days later, in reaction to the Haldeman 
request, Khachigian fired off a memo to Buchanan indicating the strong public support for the 
president‘s handling of Vietnam. Helping matters was the latest Harris Poll showing that 75 
percent of Americans believed that a quick pullout of Vietnam would not be appropriate without 
an agreement over POWs. According to Khachigian, the one issue that was ―never too early to 
start on McGovern is Vietnam, and we should be discrediting him night and day.‖ While 
venerating the president‘s policies, the attack strategy was to refer to McGovern as ―Hanoi 
George,‖ a candidate that is ―quite popular with the politburo.‖ As Khachigian suggested to 
Buchanan, ―Umbrella sales ought to perk up when he gets the nomination.‖267 
 The Republican attack team had been all over the Democratic candidate for his comments 
over the progress of the peace negotiations with Hanoi, trying to paint McGovern as not only 
naive and weak but unpatriotic. The candidate‘s comment in the Washington Post that, ―Begging 
is better than bombing,‖ was jumped upon by Buchanan‘s staff before the paper hit the street. ―I 
would go to Hanoi and beg if I thought it would release the boys one day earlier,‖ McGovern 
said in reference to the North Vietnam peace proposal: ―If I was President, I would grab that 
offer with both hands.‖268  
 On the same day that Buchanan issued the assault book to Haldeman, aide Ken Rietz laid 
out the issues with McGovern as the presumed candidate, and reiterated the dangers of attacking 
their potential opponent too hard too soon. ―McGovern should be an easier candidate to run 
against than [Hubert] Humphrey…; there is a danger in the McGovern candidacy, however, that 
may not be immediately apparent. That danger lies in the immediate temptation to go for the 
jugular. In my opinion, this would be a real danger.‖ Since McGovern does not ―appear to be an 
evil man,‖ he falls into the unfortunate category, at least for the attack team, of looking like the 
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―man next door.‖ According to Rietz, the candidate ―appears to be straightforward, honest, and 
sincere.‖ Given McGovern‘s sudden rise in popularity, the staffer was worried that a ―broadside‖ 
attack would look like a ―cheap Republican trick,‖ causing the Democrats to rally behind 
McGovern. As Rietz wrote, ―We cannot make a martyr out of McGovern or we will have real 
problems.‖  Rather, the word was to let his sudden rise in popularity run its course, and not 
exhaust all of their ―material‖ too soon. For the final six weeks of the campaign, the idea was to 
keep McGovern on the defensive with a new plan of attack on the issue each week, from busing 
to abortion to prayer in schools. As the memorandum made clear, ―The key is not to destroy him 
but to keep him always on the defensive, explaining his position.‖ Nixon‘s aide mused about the 
difficulty of holding back, as they felt that not dropping the bricks on McGovern early ―will be a 
very difficult thing to accomplish because the natural tendency is to hit him now and hit him 
often.‖ The internal memorandum, however, enunciated exactly the type of strategy that 
eventually won the day, and that, as Rietz suggested, was to paint ‗McGovern as someone out of 
touch with reality and the American people, insincere, and a politician of the first order.‖269 
  Based upon a presidential memorandum of June 10, Charles Colson was planning to set 
up McGovern for attack by also connecting him in the public‘s mind with the establishment, 
―liberal‖ media. Journalists, Colson, believed, were temperamentally predisposed to the 
Democrats and the senator‘s left wing polices, which he labeled ―the McGovern Protective 
Society.‖ The special counsel maintained that ―what we have here is a situation where the 
working press, because they really believe in their hearts exactly what McGovern believes in, are 
frantically doing everything they can to clean him up and make him a respectable candidate for 
the nomination.‖ Colson wanted his aide Doug Hallett to draft columns that would deal with his 
belief that 90 percent of the working press agreed with McGovern‘s ―stand on amnesty, abortion, 
pot, surrender in Vietnam, confiscation of wealth, [and] the $1,000 baby bonus for welfare 
recipients.‖ The political strategist stressed that since the ―realists‖ in the media knew that these 
positions would ―sink‖ McGovern in the election it was their aim to conceal his ―real views 
during the period of the campaign so that he can win the election‖ before revealing its true 
nature. Colson‘s line was that the left wing were ―willing to use any means whatever to get their 
man nominated, even if it means covering up [McGovern‘s] real views during the period of the 
campaign.‖270  
 The guts of Colson‘s memo came right from the heart of Richard Nixon. The word was 
that the difference between left wing and right wing extremists is that those on the right would 
not forfeit their principles to get elected while the left would do anything to ―get power.‖ These 
‗power hungry leftists‘ were part of the same ‗evil‘ Eastern Establishment, one that Nixon went 
on numerous rants about on the White House tapes. Colson‘s agreement and animation on these 
subjects colored the way the Nixon administration communicated through its writers and helped 
shape the nature and tenor of the campaign. His views almost mirrored that of the president. 
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Nixon believed that the press was ideologically pitted against him, and shared the values of 
McGovern completely. ―If you consider the real ideological bent of the New York Times, The 
Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, and the three television networks, you will find 
overwhelmingly that their editorial bias comes down to the side of amnesty, pot, abortion, 
confiscation of wealth (unless it is theirs), massive increases in welfare, unilateral disarmament, 
reduction of their defenses, and surrender in Vietnam. Now they have a candidate within sight of 
the nomination who shares all these views.‖  But more than that, ―they [the media] will clean up 
their candidate, they will lie, distort and do anything that is necessary to get into power. They 
never allow their piously held principles to get in the way of their overriding drive to gain and 
wield power.‖ The president naturally had wanted Buchanan and Colson on it right away.271 
 But the campaign mostly cherry picked articles to prove the veracity of their views on the 
media. They were even upset with the more conservative Washington Evening Star, which 
pointed out that McGovern‘s ―radical‖ positions on a number of issues were not actually radical 
at all but in fact were in the best traditions of American history. Buchanan wrote to Strachan in 
frustration, decrying what he saw as effective counterweights to their attack posture. ―This tactic 
to portray McGovern as remarkably reasonable because of his ‗association‘ with other great 
leaders of the country strikes me as remarkably effective for McGovern to use throughout the 
campaign.‖272 Fearing that the media would try to clean up McGovern‘s image to win the 
election, Nixon himself instructed Mitchell to ―get Democrats and Independents, not 
Republicans, to nail McGovern on the left side of the road which his record so clearly identifies 
him with.‖ The president, Colson, and Buchanan understood that dividing McGovern from his 
own party would have real benefits.
273
  However, the idea that the media was predisposed to 
attacking Nixon and acting ―soft‖ on McGovern in reality was pure fiction. 
 Though Nixon‘s inner circle appeared to loathe the media, they were not above using it at 
every opportunity, especially when journalists were pointing out with greater frequency how 
McGovern appeared to be increasingly out of step with the core of his party or unable to bring its 
factions together for a common cause. In fact, the Nixon team used media outlets as a matter of 
routine, sending information to friendly columnists with pet campaign themes whenever 
possible, turning any utterance in their favor against McGovern from the media to their 
advantage.
274
 Buchanan, for example, seized upon Walter Cronkite‘s suggestion in a 
commentary on the CBS Evening News that there was a growing rift between centrists and the 
left wing of the party, and it was one among many that they wished to use for political spin for 
the party conventions.  As Buchanan stressed in a memorandum to the president, ―Cronkite is 
right. The McGovern camp is divided between True Believers and Pragmatists.‖ Fired up by the 
press reports, Buchanan set out to attack the McGovern camp and his brand of ―undiluted Prairie 
Populism‖ through the media. Indeed, the growing perception in the press was that McGovern 
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did not have control of his delegates, was in bed with the far left over abortion and drugs, and 
was at odds with the Democrat-controlled House over the president‘s Vietnam policy concerning 
Vietnamization and a negotiated settlement. Nixon‘s attack team exploited every opportunity.275  
 The Nixon administration‘s reelection campaign found a valuable resource in the national 
media, an institution that largely matched Republican pronouncements of doom and gloom 
regarding the Democrats‘ chances as they headed into their convention. Columnists such as 
Stewart Alsop believed the Democrats had neither the unity nor the ideas to beat Nixon in the 
fall. ―The Democratic Party, in short, has never in its turbulent history been more rancid with 
small dislikes and big hatreds. . . In this situation, who could conceivably defeat Richard Nixon 
in November? The answer seems obvious: only Richard Nixon.‖ Alsop described Nixon‘s first 
term in office as a ―shrewdly orchestrated setup for the election and the second term in office,‖ 
when the changes would really come about. Even Vietnam, seemingly the biggest foreign policy 
conundrum of the day, was not a winner for McGovern. As Alsop pointed out to his millions of 
readers across the nation, ―Hanoi, of course, would very much like to see George McGovern 
President—the official paper has said as much.‖276  
 As far back as May, columnist Crosby S. Noyes warned of McGovern‘s extreme 
positions. ―What we are talking about essentially is McGovern‘s concept of what this nation is, 
where it stands and what it is prepared to do in a world which is not yet governed by the laws of 
the International Boy Scout Association.‖277 A survey done by the New York Times in early June 
suggested massive defections from party ranks should McGovern get the nod. Forty percent of 
Humphrey supporters said that they would defect to the Republicans in a Nixon-McGovern 
showdown.
278
 Newsweek was no different. As the magazine dryly observed, ―Many [party] 
regulars look forward to a Democratic convention dominated by McGovern delegates chosen 
under McGovern reform rules with all the enthusiasm Rome felt for the onslaught of the 
barbarian hordes.‖ The terms ―radical‖ and ―extremist‖ also became common in press accounts 
concerning McGovern, much like the labels pinned to Republican Barry Goldwater during the 
1964 presidential election. Newsweek told its readers, ―Most critical of all, [some in the 
Democratic Party] consider McGovern a loser on the grand, Goldwater scale—the kind who will 
not only concede to the opposition in the White House but will doom whole tickets to defeat. 
Down to the state legislative levels.‖ Naturally, Republican leaders smelled Democrat blood. ―If 
McGovern gets the nomination,‖ Minority Leader Gerald Ford said, ―we‘re going to carry the 
House.‖ McGovern‘s candidacy was also engendering little confidence in the South. According 
to some political observers in Dixie, ―McGovern couldn‘t win the South if he had Robert E. Lee 
on his ticket.‖279    
 Senator and Nixon loyalist, Bob Dole, however, was wary of a backlash from the attacks, 
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and warned of ―overkill‖ on the McGovern assaults. The fear was that since they were enjoying 
the good fortune of facing the weakest Democratic candidate possible in McGovern, they did not 
want to knock him out of the race. ―We don‘t want that. We don‘t want to lose him,‖ Dole said, 
who thought little about McGovern‘s chances of winning any states in November. Dole 
remarked dryly that McGovern would carry ―South Dakota, maybe.‖ Veteran politicians like 
Dole understood that party unity was in a fragile state and not all in the Democratic Party 
appreciated the dimensions of the McGovern candidacy.  ―It‘s too late for the Democrats to call 
off their convention,‖ Dole told reporters mockingly. ―The programs have already been printed. 
They have to go through with it.‖280  Buchanan too warned once again of going too far or being 
clumsy in the delivery of the attacks, especially as it would likely bring a counterattack in the 
press of ―smear tactics‖ from ―Tricky Dick.‖ As Buchanan outlined, it‘s ―the old ‗Low Road‘ so 
familiar to Nixon and his hatchet men. This is, it appears, the McGovern strategy for answering 
all of the material we have piled up on Georgie; and it is a strategy which McGovern will be 
counting upon the press to assist in its implementation.‖ Never truly believing that the press 
would keep up the pressure on the senator, Buchanan cautioned that his team must ―be 
scrupulously accurate‖ in its attacks, while forcing McGovern to stay on the defensive, including 
seeking an apology over his comparison of Nixon to Adolph Hitler. Although Buchanan wanted 
to keep the image of the campaign ―out of the smear stage‖ from the start, it did not mean that 
they were not going fight back. ―Each time McGovern raises this charge of ‗smear,‘‖ Buchanan 
wrote, ―we ought to have those quotes to stuff right down his throat.‖281  
 Overconfidence, though, was not the forte of Nixon loyalists during the 1972 reelection 
campaign. Plagued by fears and insecurities following three years in uneasy power in the White 
House, there was constant concern that the reelection team would be felled by the growing 
predictions of an easy victory against the McGovern-led Democrats in the fall. So much so that 
when Clark MacGregor replaced John Mitchell as Nixon‘s campaign manager, he immediately 
warned against impudence. ―There is a feeling that the President is a shoo-in for reelection,‖ 
MacGregor said during his first press conference in his new post in early July. ―It is a very 
dangerous feeling to have.‖ Harkening back to Nixon‘s drop in the polls in the last weeks of the 
1968 federal election, the new campaign manager warned the same thing might occur once again 
in November. MacGregor wanted a sense of ―urgency‖ to rule the grassroots drive for Nixon.282 
Believing that this effort would be motivated by the prospect of a radical in the White House, the 
campaign zeroed in on McGovern even before it was clear the senator was the candidate. By the 
time McGovern had finally placed a stranglehold on the nomination, the team was in full attack 
mode to place the South Dakotan on the outside of his own party. Charles Colson, following 
Nixon‘s lead, instructed MacGregor ―to get the point out that we have heard from thousands of 
Democrats across the country and that this will not be a Republican vs. Democrat campaign this 
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year but rather a campaign of Republicans, Democrats and Independents behind the President 
against the McGovern elite that has taken over the Democratic Party machinery.‖283   
 The team pushed out the message to the hard hats in the heartland, putting out numerous 
stories about McGovern‘s ―elitism.‖ These included the story concerning the Democratic 
nominee‘s move from Maryland to the District of Columbia and his refusal to enroll his daughter 
in a public school. McGovern‘s decision to send her to a largely white school in exclusive 
Bethesda, Maryland, was seized upon as a move by someone who was out of touch with the 
challenges faced by ordinary American families. As Khachigian pointed out to Southerners and 
others worrying about the controversial issue of inner city schools and busing, ―McGovern can 
afford to avoid poor schools, can the average working man?‖ The emerging issue in the strategy 
session among speechwriters and strategists like Buchanan and Khachigian was the need to 
stress to working class voters that they needed to fear not just the man but the extreme nature of 
his ideas. The label with the most mileage to tag the presumptive candidate with was McGovern 
the ―extremist.‖ This, they believed, would be a sure winner for Nixon in the fall. Khachigian 
felt, though, that the word was not getting out and that he needed to hammer the point home 
again and again: ―At the risk of being repetitive, let me be a bit more explicit concerning my 
thinking that the word to tar McGovern with is ‗extremist‘ and not radical.‖ Since Khachigian 
thought it had become somewhat ―fashionable‖ to be a radical, the term was losing its effect. 
Additionally, the senator from South Dakota did not appear to match the label. ―McGovern 
doesn‘t look like a radical—with his $200 suits, his modish styling, his Gucci ties, sideburns no 
longer than most, relatively short hair.‖  Khachigian stressed ―extremist‖ takes the appearance 
problem away as ―…one doesn‘t have to look like an extremist to be one. [Barry] Goldwater was 
the most solid-looking guy you could think of—a square-jawed all-American—yet it stuck with 
him; the same for George.‖ In a memo to Buchanan he suggested the need for surrogates on the 
trail in the summer and autumn to understand that ―‗radical is thru in ‘72.‘‖284 
 McGovern the elitist with extreme ideas actually proved to be smack in the middle of Pat 
Buchanan‘s wheelhouse. The former newspaperman and fierce Nixon loyalist wholeheartedly 
agreed with the characterization not only politically but personally. He contended that those who 
were rallying to support McGovern were just the sort of people who would hurt the candidate the 
most in Middle America because the senator was on the wrong side of history. 
… We should be certain that when the voters enter the booth, they know who represents the common man and 
who the elite, who speaks for American strength and for national weakness, who would be permissive on 
social issues and who would be tough, who is interested in more government ―programs‖ and who wants 
tax cuts, who is the darling of the purple sunglasses set, and who represents middle America, who is a 
moderate centrist and who is an exotic extremist, who is a man of the middle and who is a man of the far 
left, who would disgrace us in Vietnam and who would bring the prisoners home in honor…
285
 
 
Painting McGovern as an extremist was even more mandatory when McGovern stopped 
acting like one. Buchanan‘s memo to the president through Haldeman on July 12 pointed out the 
unpleasant facts. ―Despite the ideological liberalism of Mr. McGovern, there is a clear 
conservative thrust to many of his issues ads.‖ Buchanan was not pleased with the Democratic 
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nominee talking about ―cleaning up the welfare mess,‖ and that he ―could find nothing in the 
way of elitist, new left themes‖ in his primary campaigns. There were no ―Amnesty, abortion, 
pot, soak-the-rich, slash defense‖ issues. Instead, there was an alliance on older liberal 
approaches that the administration feared including lowering the age of social security and 
universal medical coverage to appeal to older voters. That McGovern was moving away from 
social liberalism and towards economic liberalism, which political analysts Scammon and 
Wattenburg had warned about, created a sense of foreboding in the attack team. ―There‘s hardly 
a trace of what one might call social liberalism, or ‗radical chic‘ politics in the McGovern 
advertising campaign.‖ The best approach Buchanan advised was to drive home that he is an 
―extremist,‖ in his polices and positions, without ―raging.‖ The idea was that instead of using the 
―meat ax‖ the ―scalpel is preferred.‖286  
Dozens of internal memorandums make it clear that the language the team wanted to use 
out on the campaign trail was not merely created for surrogates to fire up the base on the stump, 
but reflected the members‘ own prejudices and personal politics. White House memos are rife 
with comments referring to those in the McGovern camp as ―egg-heads‖ ―eastern elites,‖ and 
McGovern as the ―so-called populist‖ who has ―surrounded himself with a bunch of white-collar 
intellectuals who don‘t know anything about the working man.‖287  McGovern is continuously 
portrayed as the kind of man who instead provides tax breaks for artists and his ―radical chic 
friends at the expense of the American taxpayer.‖288 It was clear, however, that the members of 
the team knew their attitudes, if properly packaged and presented, would certainly resonate in the 
heartland, and therefore represented a winning strategy. 
 Buchanan and the other writers and political strategists pushed as much about McGovern 
as a big government elitist as they could into every media orifice, underscoring all of the 
resentment they could muster from blue collar voters over polices they believed would increase 
the tax burden on working Americans. As Buchanan told the Washington Evening Star, 
―Everybody is fed up with giving their money to other people.‖ He understood that they could 
turn worker frustration and anger ―into votes for Richard Nixon.‖289 Buchanan, a former 
newspaperman himself, scoured media sources for ammunition for proof of McGovern‘s elitism 
to provide to the surrogates. What Buchanan often found was journalists who shared his team‘s 
specific views on McGovern, and he found them in increasing numbers. As Robin Wright noted 
in the Christian Science Monitor, ―The programs Sen. George S. McGovern will be enunciating 
in his flat Midwestern accent for the next two months bear a strong New England imprint.‖  To 
his great delight, Buchanan underlined the article‘s contention that McGovern‘s brain trust came 
from the familiar ―elite, Eastern intellectual establishment‖ of Harvard, MIT, and Tufts 
University.
290
  
One topic that was not a winner for November was the economy. While the Nixon 
administration was certainly concerned over what McGovern would do with the economy, as 
Buchanan pointed out to the president, after a request by Haldeman, ―By most everyone‘s 
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judgment, our record is not considered as that good; this is our ‗weakest‘ point—and a national 
debate over whether we managed the economy well is perhaps the one debate with McGovern 
we can lose.‖ Therefore, Buchanan‘s recommendation to the president was not to defend their 
record on the economy, but to focus on McGovern‘s ―disastrous‖ polices. ―In short, let‘s not so 
much defend our record, which is subject to criticism, as to attack McGovern with being a clear 
and present danger to the prosperity we now have.‖ The speechwriter laid out the position for 
sidestepping the economy. Buchanan maintained that the voters‘ decision in the fall must not rest 
on the Democrats‘ ―rhetoric,‖ or any of their ―issues—i.e., ‗unemployment‘ and the unequal 
economic record of the last four years—it must focus upon our issues—i.e., the extremism, 
elitism, radicalism, kookism, of McGovern‘s person, campaign, and programs, against the solid, 
strong, effective leadership of the President.‖ But much of this was completely disingenuous. 
Buchanan harkened back to how John Kennedy‘s use of the mythical ―missile gap‖ in 1960 and 
charges of ―extremism‖ with Barry Goldwater in 1964 helped to create issues ―on which 
elections turn, sometimes legitimate issues, sometimes illegitimate.‖ As the speechwriter put it, 
―When we portray McGovern‘s ideas as preposterous, foolish, and even dangerous to U.S. 
security and the nation‘s economy, we are right now pushing against an open door—with the 
media at large, as well as the country.‖ Nixon‘s strategist knew that the campaign needed to be 
waged on the ―manifest unqualification‖ of McGovern‘s ―character and his ilk to even be in the 
Presidential contest,‖ rather than a ―damn referendum‖ over the administration‘s ―spotty 
economic performance.‖291  Of course, George McGovern was about to offer a gift that made 
Americans forget all about that ―spotty‖ economic record, and he did it before a national 
television audience. 
 The team of Nixon loyalists looked forward to the Democratic National Convention in 
Miami Beach in July like wolves at the bottom of a buffalo jump. They knew that the event 
would provide a treasure trove of material to seize upon for the fall campaign, but even they 
could not have imagined how rich that treasure would be. While the internal communiqués 
reveal strong confidence that what Americans saw on their television screens would frighten 
them enough that they would vote for Richard Nixon, they intended to maximize the damage 
throughout the fall. It is clear that while Nixon‘s men planned to cut no corners in their march to 
victory, they never had much respect for their opponent from South Dakota or what would come 
out of the impending DNC in Miami. When an enterprising White House staffer brought 
something called the ―McGovern Eclipse,‖ to the attention of speechwriter Ray Price, he could 
not wait to fire it off in a memo to the president. ―On the day the Democratic convention opens 
in Miami, July 10, there will be a total eclipse of the sun. The eclipse will be full in Alaska and 
Northern Canada and partial in the rest of North America and Western Europe. At 4:42 p.m. 
EDT, the sun will be 80 percent covered in New York City.‖ Predicting the gloom and the 
dissention to come at the DNC, Price wrote with some glee, ―They even made the sun not to 
shine . . . !‖292 
 Weary delegates assembled in the Convention Center in Miami Beach, Florida, on July 
10, 1972 to decide upon the candidate to face Richard Nixon in the fall. The president‘s team 
watched the events with some disgust, noting that when it was their turn later, they would make a 
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point of doing almost everything differently, especially in displaying party unity.
293
  From the 
beginning, the convention was a floor fight for the heart and soul of the Democratic Party. 
Radicals, political activists, conservative Democrats, labor, and remnants of the Old Left 
struggled in the humid convention center in sessions that lasted well into the night when much of 
the prime-time television audience had retired for the evening.  As the Nixon team watched with 
more than a little pleasure, McGovern chaired a new rules committee that mandated that a 
percentage of party delegates come from minority groups, including women. That party‘s lively 
debate over contentious issues, such as rights for gay Americans, and abortion rights, was 
welcomed by the Nixon political strategists who used this later as ammunition to portray 
McGovern as outside the mainstream of American voters and the core of his own party. 
Challenges to the new rules, disputes over credentials, and fencing over the choosing and seating 
of delegates created a tense atmosphere. That McGovern himself championed the new groups 
and delegates angered traditional labor leadership and the big city political operations like Mayor 
Richard Daley‘s Chicago machine.  The McGovern-led grassroots insurgency, that appeared as a 
threat to the more conservative wing of the Democratic Party, fueled by an anti-war platform, 
quickly captured delegates. A ―Stop McGovern‖ effort tried unsuccessfully to change the rules 
after the game was over, pressing for a state-by-state proportional distribution of delegates to 
derail the South Dakotan senator. In the end, McGovern captured the day, winning on a platform 
of diversity with minorities and women, despite a battle with the credentials committee to toss 
the entire elected delegation.
294
  
 McGovern appeared unfazed by the controversy, believing his inclusive coalition would 
outshine anything that the Republicans could muster. ―Well, I frankly welcome the contrast with 
the smug, dull and empty event which will take place here in Miami next month,‖  McGovern 
said in his acceptance speech, in a direct swipe at the upcoming Republican convention.
295
 The 
senator made it clear that he intended to be a political reformer ―We choose this struggle,‖ 
McGovern told his party delegates. ―We reformed our party and let the people in.‖296 The South 
Dakotan believed that the nation was ready for drastic change, or as Democratic pollster Pat 
Caddell put it, a ―political revolution,‖ one that would throw over the old guard and party 
chieftains. McGovern‘s staff also promised that it would embark on a post-convention sweep to 
the conservative south and capitalize on its discontent with Washington and appeal to the 
Wallace voters who were restless and eager for change.
297
  
 However, the perception of the candidate as someone ―soft on abortion and indifferent to 
the American prisoners of war,‖ especially in the South with the precarious state of race 
relations, meant dangers to local Democrats. Some local party members were worried about what 
McGovern meant to them. David Herring, chair of the Jefferson County Democratic Committee, 
began to inform all of his candidates running for local office to stay away from McGovern and 
the national party in order to survive. ―Maybe people here understand if McGovern were just a 
‗nigger-lover‘ for political reasons—using the blacks and making it known that he needed their 
votes. But he comes across as a man who really likes blacks—a ‗nigger-liker‘—you know.‖298 
                                                 
293
 Please see Chapter 5 for a discussion concerning the preparation for the RNC, and the comparisons with the 
Democratic event. 
294
 See Perlstein, Nixonland, 686-698, and White, The Making of the President, 1972, 162-166, 170-175.  
295
 Please see the New York Times, July 14, 1972, 11. 
296
 See the Wall Street Journal, July 13, 1972, 1. 
297
 Caddell‘s comments are found in the Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1972, 1. 
298
 Herring is quoted in the New York Times, July 24, 1972, 14. 
  84 
 Many Democrats feared emerging from Miami Beach the divided party they were coming 
out of Chicago in 1968, a convention that contributed to their loss in the November election. As 
New Jersey Democratic Party boss Richard Leone said, ―We don‘t have the luxury this year of 
playing those kinds of games anymore. There‘s too much at stake.‖ However, many believed that 
the strongest issue was the divisive incumbent president. As Leone suggested, ―Nobody is going 
to unite Democrats like Richard Nixon.‖ McGovern‘s campaign manager Frank Mankiewicz 
agreed, adding that the party would unite despite the division at the convention as ―there is still 
the great unifier—Richard Nixon.‖299  McGovern himself told his convention that Nixon was 
their ―unwitting unifier.‖ However, confidence that Nixon would throw red meat as he had in the 
midterm elections did not mask the reality that no one divided Democrats like an insurgent 
McGovern candidacy, or his ―new constituency for change.‖ While the nominee and the party 
believed they could emerge from the convention and create an amalgamation of blue-collar, 
black, and suburbanites voters, the American Federation of Labor and other traditional 
Democratic backers were wary at best and openly hostile at worst about McGovern and his 
supporters. While the South Dakotan senator hoped to bring together a coalition of the 
disconnected, Richard Nixon‘s men were planning to build their own coalition, one that would 
venture into traditional Democratic territory, no matter who the DNC nominee was. But 
McGovern had made this strategy all the more realistic.
300
 
 The idea had gained traction since 1970, as political analyst Richard Scammon had then 
articulated, ―It‘s very true that malaise and discontent exist‖ among Catholic voters concerning 
busing and crime, but the assumption that ―it has to go to the left [is] not necessarily true.‖ As 
Scammon found, Nixon was ―much closer to this voter‘s type of dissent.‖301 While dividing the 
Democrats and pursuing the old Democratic coalition was the plan for any eventual nominee, the 
choice of McGovern made it that much easier for Nixon‘s men to exploit. McGovern‘s base had 
been tested by the primaries and was bruised by a divisive and less than satisfying convention. 
As George McGovern accepted his party‘s nomination, he paid tribute to all of his vanquished 
opponents, including George Wallace and some of the AFL-CIO bosses who had run the failed 
stop-McGovern movement. But the damage had been done, and little he did in the months ahead 
appeared to slow his decline. McGovern came out of the blocks in slow motion as his address to 
accept his party‘s nomination was carried to a drastically reduced audience, as the nominee 
finally delivered his speech in the middle of the night.
302
 President Nixon apparently thought 
little of McGovern‘s acceptance speech or the time of its delivery at the Democratic National 
Convention. As Nixon recalled in his memoirs concerning the early morning address, it was, 
―2:48 A.M. in Miami—prime time on Guam.‖303  
 Later that morning in the White House, some of Nixon‘s men met to decide on the 
official response to the McGovern nomination. Dick Moore and Chuck Colson came out against 
the president calling to congratulate McGovern on his victory. They also did not want the 
president to provide the customary national security briefing to the Democratic nominee, as 
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Dwight Eisenhower had given Adlai Stevenson and Lyndon Johnson had given Richard Nixon. 
Colson and Moore had discussed a way to ―preempt‖ this formality by having the president 
deliver a letter to McGovern on the morning after the nomination, offering congratulations, and 
indicating that either the Secretary of State or Defense would be made available later to brief the 
candidate on national security matters, rather than the president.
304
 Meanwhile in the Old 
Executive Office Building, the speechwriters, ties loosened, hammered away on their 
typewriters. In a memo entitled ―The Making of an Extremist,‖ Pat Buchanan summed up the 
DNC in the agreed upon tone: ―Miami Beach was not the victory for the common man; it was the 
triumph of the Porsche and Pucci Populists, the Park Avenue revolutionaries, the radical rich, the 
Marxists from the Philadelphia Main Line.‖305  
 With McGovern as the quarry, Buchanan was working unrestrained on the talking points 
for the administration ahead of the fall campaign. The results of the Democratic convention had 
provided new energy to the backroom campaign team. In his brief for the White House and the 
surrogates, Buchanan wrote, ―How did a Methodist preacher‘s son from Middle America wind 
up as the national candidate and champion of the exotics, the extremists, and the radicals? How 
was the great Democratic Party of Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy hijacked by what 
Hubert Humphrey denounced as an ‗ideological elite,‘ and a ‗haven for kooks and nuts?‘‖ In his 
brief, Buchanan questioned how the Midwestern senator became ―the hero of the purple 
sunglasses set and candidate of the Radical Chic?‖ The speechwriter and political strategist 
wanted it known that the senator has begun to live like a ―Japanese feudal lord,‖ who ―sports 
mod clothes and mod hair, lollygagging about his exotic mansion in sandals, $15 Pucci ties, and 
Saville Row suits.‖ It was the line Buchanan was to continuously feed material on McGovern for 
Colson to use in the field as he saw fit.
306
 The message from the White House was that the 
Democratic Party‘s ―leadership consists of a so-called Prairie Populist who makes $100,000-a-
year, from Senate salary and ‗speaking engagements‘ and is the only populist in America with a 
19
th
 century Japanese shrine in his living room.‖ Such was the tenor that imbued much of the 
campaign to come.
307
  
  Whereas the Nixon team had little trouble articulating the desired public perception of 
George McGovern, they were not always certain which image of the president to reveal for the 
campaign. What was certain was that Nixon certainly was not part of Buchanan‘s purple 
sunglasses set, or a friend of the radical chic. Rather, as speechwriter Bill Safire elucidated, the 
―Nixon style‖ was ―identification with ―heartland qualities.‖ In a June 1971 memorandum to 
Haldeman, as per his request, Safire laid out the president‘s image.  ―The country is not divided 
up between elitists and squares, but taking a scale with those as extremes, the Nixon style 
unabashedly leans toward the square side,‖ Safire wrote. The writer maintained being a square 
was essentially a feather in the president‘s cap. ―He doesn‘t wear funny hats,‖ and the only 
photograph of Nixon ever dancing was ―at his daughter‘s wedding.‖  In an obvious reference to a 
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famous shot of President Kennedy surrounded by adoring bathers, the speechwriter suggested the 
difference between his boss and the late president was that, ―You won‘t see a ‗beefcake‘ photo of 
him on a beach in a swarm of admirers.‖ At issue for Safire was that Richard Nixon could not 
pull it off even if he tried.  
When an essentially undignified man strikes a dignified pose, the pretension shows through like 
potmetal through cheap silverplate. If Nixon were putting on an act, he would be ridiculed out of 
public life; the fact that not even his severest critics dispute the reality of his sense of dignity says 
something about the Nixon style and about the desire of most Americans for a genuine decorum in 
Presidential conduct.  We capitalize the ‗p‘ in President for good reason.
308
  
 In a memorandum written for the president in the days immediately following the 1970 
midterm elections, Safire made it clear that he was not trying to create a persona for Nixon but 
that this was his analysis of the man in a political context. The speechwriter suggested that they 
should ―dismiss the straw man of stridency and examine how best to portray the President as 
what he is.‖ Safire was clear that Nixon would never become ―a beloved figure of benignity, and 
it would be a mistake to attempt to strike such a pose.‖ The president, he suggested, was ―not a 
man who believes that national unity is a prerequisite to progress . . .; his posture should be that 
of a man willing to fight for the kind of progress for which the time is ripe.‖ Safire warned that 
Nixon as the peoples‘ representative, ―must not play it so cool as to refuse to do battle for their 
interests, and those interests are controversial.‖ However, the speechwriter‘s view on this 
important point was in the minority, as this was the Nixon of 1968 and 1970, as the consensus in 
the White House was that these days were over.  The goal was to make Nixon less a fighter and 
more a dignified statesman in the White House, a departure from the raucous political behavior 
that the president was involved in during the midterm elections of 1970. The goal was to have 
the president appear presidential by allowing him to rise above his street fighting past. Safire 
didn‘t like the move, believing that the nation wanted a fighting president. ―All that can be heard 
among friends and foes alike is how the President must soften his image, return to being 
President and not candidate, lower his voice, stop shaking his fist. . . .‖ 309 Going into 1972, 
however, Richard Nixon was to stay behind the scenes, he would throw no red meat, he would 
not shake his fist, and he would remain in the Oval Office ―acting‖ like a president, as that was 
exactly what the clear majority of his loyal aides wanted him to do. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ABOVE THE BATTLE 
 
The best tribute to what we have done, I think, came from McGovern I believe just after the convention 
when he said—―They‘ve got fifteen guys shooting at me from all sides while the President‘s acting like 
he‘s not even in the campaign.‖ If we can continue that we‘re golden.
310
 
 
t would have been easy to sympathize with George McGovern who emerged from his party‘s 
convention victorious and eager to strap on a helmet for a clash with Richard Nixon only to 
discover that the president had curiously left the field before the game began. In the election of 
1972, Richard Nixon was indeed behaving as a man disconnected from his own campaign, 
squirreled away in the Oval Office while the machinery of electioneering ran on without him. 
Nixon‘s low profile—seemingly sequestered within the White House—was not due to an 
aversion to campaigning, an inability to talk to the American people, nor was it the result of the 
―Berlin Wall‖ Haldeman had allegedly constructed around the Oval Office.  Instead, it was part 
of a concerted strategy that utilized a loyal staff and surrogates to mitigate the president‘s 
―unlikable qualities‖ while maximizing the reach of his political message among the heartland 
majority, taking his words directly to the voters. By early 1971, Nixon understood that while his 
politics might resonate in Middle America, the appeal of his old fighting persona had waned 
during his tumultuous first term in office and his profile in terms of national bedside manner was 
flatter than Kansas. The president‘s image, especially his perceived lack of charisma, was a long-
standing issue, but before the mid-term elections of 1970, it had never been an issue considered 
serious enough to cripple his political cache and jeopardize his chances at the second term in the 
Oval Office. The conundrum, however, could be cured by a sophisticated political strategy. ―We 
cannot and should not try to make the President something he isn‘t,‖ personal aide Dwight 
Chapin wrote in a memorandum to Haldeman. ―A President doesn‘t have to be likable, have a 
sense of humor or even like children. It is important only that his personal qualities engender 
confidence.‖311  
 Creating this sense of confidence in Richard Nixon heading into the reelection of 1972 by 
strategically restricting his public appearances has received scant attention in scholarly works. 
Even though it is known that the president rarely left the White House, this reality has not been 
connected to the election in any significant way or given (seemingly any) consideration as a 
strategy to win. The picture of the president‘s public separation from the campaign and the 
intensive and orchestrated use of surrogates to take the message to the people as part of a 
concerted plan in Richard Nixon‘s historic landslide election have failed to comprise a 
significant part in the historical record.
312
 Indeed, as this chapter will show, the inner circle‘s 
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plan to mitigate the president‘s more unlikable qualities by sequestering the politician in the 
White House was not only quite pervasive but crucial to the history of that watershed political 
event. Indeed, President Nixon‘s demeanor during this period prior to Watergate has resulted in 
the opposite effect—one that views such behavior as further evidence of his isolation behind a 
―German wall‖ inside the Oval Office. 
**** 
 No one in the inner circle danced around the image issue with the president; Nixon was 
not sexy, charismatic, even warm, and although the talented White House staff writers could 
lather honey on a turnip it would remain a turnip. ―As you know we have tried hard for 3 years to 
project ‗color‘ about you, to portray the human side of the President, the personal warmth, the 
compassionate, considerate qualities you have,‖ Colson suggested in a memo to the president of 
the United States. While Colson was loyal to the bone, he wasn‘t stupid. Like others, he knew 
the team needed to try something else.
313
  
Few within earshot of the Oval Office were slow on their feet, and the more intense their 
loyalty to the president the greater was their likelihood to engage in these types of conversations. 
Chapin, the handsome, discreet, and trusted personal aide, sat down with the president in the 
Oval Office to deal with just this issue in January 1972.  Following the conversation, Chapin 
drafted a memorandum for Haldeman with a message intended for maximum dissemination.  
―The President expects to keep the lowest of political profiles through the Convention,‖ Chapin 
wrote to Nixon‘s chief of staff. The plan was for a ―low-key‖ approach, a ―tone‖ that ―should be 
expected from everyone at the White House.‖ Additionally, Chapin explained that since it was 
the president‘s understanding that their political opponents would bring the fight to ―the Oval 
Office door,‖ the immediate response from the White House needed to ―underplay‖ the 
counterattack. ―We must fight but we must fight in a way which is most conducive to keeping 
the President on the highest plane possible. We do not have to get into a bunch of gun fighting 
and we should not.‖ Of importance in the meeting for what was to come was the question Nixon 
put forth for his staff.  Nixon asked Chapin to solicit the feedback from staff concerning ―the 
White House posture during the coming year.‖  While complimenting the talent of his 
―outstanding team,‖ Nixon stressed to Chapin that his plan to keep out of the political fight was a 
ploy that needed to be kept secret. ―The President can attempt to keep his nonpolitical profile but 
if stories generate from the White House about our political orientation and our deep 
involvement in the campaign it can only serve to undermine that which the President is trying to 
accomplish.‖ This was not a request, but marching orders for his loyal team. ―The President is 
keeping the political profile at the White House at the lowest possible point. He has demanded 
from the staff that the business of government be paramount, and that is the policy which we are 
all following.‖314 Nixon had on his mind historic trips to China, the Soviet Union, and 
shepherding through a peace deal in Southeast Asia. During the election year, he would play his 
coveted role as ―statesman,‖ and let his troops fight the political wars.  
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 Inside his large wood-paneled office, the president‘s loyal chief of staff put pen to paper, 
the young women in the White House secretarial pool turned these orders into typed 
memorandums, and the presidential directives went out to dozens of offices. On June 12 and 
June 27, 1972, Haldeman sent out high priority communications to all those in the 
administration, including the cabinet and the White House staff. The purpose of the orders was to 
comply with Nixon‘s query to have everyone involved in the reelection effort offer their opinion 
on what the president‘s position should be between conventions and then during the fall 
campaign. Within days, Haldeman‘s inbox overflowed with responses, all containing one clear 
and consistent message: the president must stay above the political battles to come in the election 
of 1972. ―The President should keep being ‗President‘ just as long as he possibly can,‖ staffer 
Ken Cole wrote. ―I think that it is important to convey the image of the President being in 
Washington ‗running the country‘ while others are out campaigning….The President should not 
attack anyone for anything during the campaign. This should be left to the surrogates. He should 
at all times be the statesman who has brought peace to the world and economic stability to our 
country.‖ As far as the political fight was concerned, ―the President should stay above all of 
this.‖315  Several respondents suggested that Nixon should assume a position not possible for 
McGovern. John C. Whitaker believed that between July and November, Nixon should just be 
the president, and ―meet with international leaders‖ and do the things that ―McGovern can‘t.‖ 
The role of statesman did not gibe with hard knuckled electioneering. The message was that 
campaigning in any traditional manner was out. On the part of the president, there needed to be a 
―low-risk campaign.‖  As Whitaker cautioned, ―Don‘t do any large political rallies—not one‖ 
and ―don‘t engage in any debates.‖316 John Scali suggested that Nixon should be ―High-level, 
statesmanlike, tending to the business of running the government.‖317 Peter Flannigan echoed the 
dangers of campaigning. ―The President‘s posture between the conventions should be that of 
‗President.‘ In my view he would be doing his candidacy a great disservice by engaging in 
political activity during that period.‖318   
 Several others suggested there be a seamless blending of the suggested posture between 
the campaigns and the campaign trail. Bryce Harlow was one among many that thought that 
Nixon should remain out of the political arena even after the conventions. ―I would greatly regret 
any move so to elevate politicking between now and, say, October 1 as [it] would reawaken the 
notion that the President would rather be a domestic party leader than a world statesman.‖ But 
even after the convention, the aide stressed his hope that when the campaign began, ―the 
shrillness and ad hominem stuff‖ would be left to vice president Spiro Agnew and ―John 
Mitchell‘s minions, leaving the President as free as possible to be Presidential far more than 
political.‖ This was all based on Harlow‘s ―premise that a Presidential stance will prove to be the 
best politics.‖ Fascinating was the idea that Nixon‘s public aversion to politics was chiefly and 
strategically political. Any pretense to a courteous democratic process by the president was 
purely for public consumption. As the White House staff knew, the ―campaign will be very dirty 
before it is over,‖ and because of this, having Nixon maintain ―a Presidential stance throughout‖ 
while personally practicing ―a dignified and thoughtful campaign‖ would ―confirm the public 
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judgment that the President is determined above all else to do only the right things for America.‖  
Harlow, like others, concluded that such a strategy would mean not only a ―victory in November, 
but also the road to a landslide.‖319  
  As Harlow had so clearly indicated, staffers aware of Nixon‘s long political career were 
concerned that a fist-waving Dick Nixon would not be the image that the White House would 
want to project if it intended to recapture the Oval Office. Presidential speechwriter Ray Price 
agreed on the question of image. Nixon would need to ―be President first and candidate second. 
Remember at all times that he comes across to the public more sympathetically and more 
positively as President than as a campaigner. Keep campaign travel limited, and do as few rallies 
as possible…; remain Presidential; resist the temptation to respond in kind to the attacks that will 
be made.‖320 Fears abounded that this effort would be interpreted as another false image of 
Nixon. As Bill Carruthers suggested to Haldeman, although Nixon ―should maintain his 
Presidential posture,‖ he warned that this has been ―misconstrued as being abstract, private and 
secretive.‖321 Press secretary Ronald Ziegler did not feel that such a stance was insincere, as 
―The posture exists because it is his posture. It is present because of his accomplishments as a 
statesman both in his widely approved foreign initiatives and in the less appreciated domestic 
initiatives.‖322  
 The partisan grinders were all lock-in-step with this view, especially in what they thought 
was the sure miss-match between the President of the United States and upstart George 
McGovern. The director of the Economic Stabilization Program and cabinet member, Donald 
Rumsfeld, believed that given the situation, Nixon did not have to ―engage in partisan activities.‖ 
Faced with this Democratic nominee, the president could simply ―use the platform and power of 
the office to show a President governing—let the distinction be drawn between a partisan 
Democratic office seeker versus an incumbent President governing.‖323 Al Haig agreed, 
suggesting to Haldeman that ―the President‘s posture should be one of a statesman who is above 
the frantic gut-fighting and politicking of the campaign.‖ Rather than engaging McGovern, 
Nixon should ―pursue a strategy totally consistent with that of a self-confident, competent 
statesman who is above frantic political campaigning. This means that his travel and public 
appearances should be carefully contrived.‖324 Foreign trips, like the one he took to China, had 
been in the works for years and were not among the appearances that brought concern.
325
 It was 
the political appearances that were to be sharply managed and curtailed. Such a strategy also 
meant that the team never really trusted their boss‘s ability to stay on message in public for any 
length of time.  
 His loyalists also wanted to quash any discussion of the president‘s image in the media 
by keeping the level of discussion as surrogates versus McGovern.  The goal was to take away 
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attention from the discussions of the president‘s character by focusing all of their energies on 
surrogates attacking the image of their Democratic opponent.  While Henry Dent agreed that 
Nixon should present the image of the ―professional President working to solve national and 
international problems‖ between the conventions, and during the fall, ―humility and dignity‖ 
must hold sway ―with the President ignoring the enemy.‖ Dent, as with fellow staffers, 
maintained McGovern should be attacked below the presidential level. Indeed, not only should 
any ―campaigning by the President‖ avoid being ―very partisan‖ and ―local ticket 
entanglements,‖ but ―all the attacking should be done by the surrogates and others.‖ This would 
be part of a ―strategy . . . to lay the McGovern statements, polices and record on the line through 
speakers and advertising.‖ Thus the senator from South Dakota would appear as ―the advocate of 
surrender, weakness, gross welfarism, and appeaser of lawless elements.‖326 
 What it meant was a well-planned and concerted surrogate program from all levels of the 
administration aimed at McGovern from the convention floor until the November election. As 
Ken Clawson pointed out, while a ―high level Presidential posture is still the most valid,‖ it 
would only matter if ―all 100 plus surrogates and, for that matter, the whole government 
apparatus is campaigning like hell from this moment until election day.‖ The aide suggested that, 
―Every effort should be made to isolate McGovern‘s more vocal backers from the mainstream of 
the Democratic Party and the nation as a whole.‖327 Veteran press man Herbert Klein believed 
that the best way to isolate their foe was to make the American public afraid of the Democratic 
leader, much like Lyndon Johnson‘s men had made Americans fear Barry Goldwater in 1964. 
―We should make the public fear a McGovern Presidency in much the same way that they feared 
a Goldwater Presidency,‖ namely by pointing out the challenger‘s ―extreme‖ views. ―We should 
try to nail him as soon as possible on his radical positions. . . to cement the identification of him 
with positions that are perceived as radical, scary or hairbrained….to plant the impression that he 
too readily embraces schemes that have been only half-thought through; that he‘s not only 
radical, but imprudent, and therefore not to be trusted with the power of the Presidency.‖328  
This, of course, was already well underway on Buchanan‘s typewriter and disseminated 
to those close to the president inside the White House. The goal of this emerging plan remained 
that none of the attacks would come from Nixon, but through the surrogate speakers across the 
country. Klein believed this strategy was a winner. With the president spending ―most of his time 
emphasizing the positive‖ and meeting ―the attack by staying above it, I think we gain.‖329  
When there was a differing opinion, it was clear that it was not particularly welcome anywhere 
near the Oval Office. ―What is the lesson for 1972? It is not that the President should blitz the 
country as he did in 1960 to avoid the complacency which almost led to Humphrey‘s victory in 
1968,‖ Doug Hallett wrote. ―On the other hand, it is not that he should remain above and beyond 
the battle—remain Presidential is the way Ray Price would put it.‖ To which Haldeman scrawled 
in the margin: ―No‖ and then in a hard scrawl, ―Above battle.‖330   
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 Others also were not so sure about this prevailing wisdom. Although firebrand-loyalist 
Pat Buchanan saw the benefit of protecting the president from the fight, his personality certainly 
contributed to his desire for more ―flexibility‖ in the team‘s approach, one that would depend on 
Nixon‘s position in the polls. However, even the political strategist agreed the president should 
―hold off vigorous campaigning for as late as possible.‖ The conservative wordsmith always 
thought that the media would force the team to swing its sword. Although Buchanan believed it 
was important to ―avoid stridency and nastiness and partisanship,‖ he was realistic enough to 
know that ―some of this is certain to creep in late in the campaign‖ because members of the 
media in Washington are ―intolerant of our attacks where it is indulgent of the opposition‘s.‖ 
Buchanan suggested to Haldeman that the best he thought they could do was to ―keep our cool as 
long as possible.‖331  Nixon loyalist Dwight Chapin also did not feel it was natural to keep the 
president completely under wraps: While it was fine to continue a ―non-political approach‖ and 
―remain every bit the President,‖ after October 1, they should allow Nixon to ―break loose. The 
President will want to campaign hard and should. The obvious which everyone will say is, the 
President should maintain his Presidential posture—but that does not mean he can‘t swing hard 
and be his toughest self.‖ 332 
 Speechwriter Bill Safire was well aware of the flurry of memorandums within the White 
House, and did not particularly like where it was all heading. ―You will be receiving all sorts of 
memos revealing the wisdom the President acting like a President…and I will not belabor the 
point.‖ Rather Safire warned that Nixon ran the risk of acting ―so Presidential as to be out of 
touch….Nixon‘s greatest danger is to disappear into the high clouds.‖333  But the scribe did not 
represent the consensus. As Nixon loyalist Robert Finch stated, ―In my mind, there is no question 
but that the President should remain ‗the president‘ not only between conventions but during the 
campaign.‖ The presidential surrogates could go after the disaffected voters, which included, 
―tax conscious, elderly, Jews, labor, and the South.‖ It was important that ―the ‗non-political‘ 
non-credible, cross country jaunts that President Johnson took in 1964 and 1966 should be 
avoided.‖ Instead, he, like others, believed it was preferable for the Administration to attack 
McGovern head-on by driving ―home the cost and froth of his proposals and push him 
categorically into far left field.‖ Finch argued that they could then ―turn the onslaught in the 
‗McGovern crusade‘ into a landslide for the President.‖334 
 But not all of this felt right to the man sitting behind the finely carved desk in the Oval 
Office. Even though it was Nixon who suggested to Chapin the strategy of staying above the 
political fight as the best way to win, the thought ran against his innate instinct for battle, one 
that he had honed for the previous quarter century. ―The 1972 presidential election, with its 
landslide result, should have been the most gratifying and fulfilling of all my campaigns,‖ Nixon 
wrote in his memoirs. ―Instead it was one of the most frustrating and, in many ways, the least 
satisfying of all.‖ Nixon complained that he would have preferred waging political war against 
opponents that he believed were more worthy, including Humphrey, Muskie, and Teddy 
Kennedy, all of whom he believed would have made ―formidable‖ opponents.  Nixon admitted 
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disbelief that the Democrats chose the senator from South Dakota, thinking to the last minute 
that they would change their minds and draft Kennedy. ―Only after McGovern was nominated 
did I accept the fact that I was virtually assured of re-election without having to wage much of a 
campaign. . . .Against McGovern, however, it was clear that the less I did, the better I would do.‖ 
Here Nixon admitted that his perception as eager candidate in the public would have risked his 
edge as an incumbent over a long shot candidate. This passage also reveals Nixon‘s internal 
struggle over the strategy to rein himself in from the political fight during the reelection 
campaign. The president recalled that keeping out of the action was contrary to his nature: ―This 
was a totally unaccustomed situation for me, and it was not one in which I felt particularly 
comfortable or even knew instinctively what was best to do.‖335  
 Instinct or not, the practical matters had been explained to the president in no uncertain 
terms in Key Biscayne, Florida, following the 1970 mid-term debacle. It was also important that 
Nixon had heard much of this from trusted political ally, John Mitchell. The Attorney General 
had advised the president to run a ―front-porch‖ campaign from the White House, which, as 
columnist Stewart Alsop pointed out, was the ―best of all front porches.‖ Others had recognized 
that the strategy of keeping the president above the fray did not sit comfortably for the career 
politician. ―For an old war-horse, it is not easy to stay in the stable,‖ Alsop noted in his column. 
―The party faithful always want to be thrown red meat, and red meat used to be a Nixon 
specialty.‖336 
 There were, however, other Nixon strengths beyond fist shaking and yelling at anti-war 
protestors on which to hang his political hat. As early as July 1971, Haldeman sent out a ―high 
priority‖ memorandum for the entire staff entitled ―Key Issues of 1972.‖ Colson responded that 
the public should have ―three perceptions of the President by the fall of 1972.‖ These would be 
that Nixon was a ―man of peace,‖ one who was getting the nation out of a war while ―building a 
generation of peace.‖ Nixon was a ―strong president‖ both ―courageous‖ and ―tough,‖ combined 
with one who is ―dignified‖ and displaying ―high moral purpose.‖ Of course, the high moral 
purpose was the ongoing framing of ending the Vietnam War with ―peace with honor,‖ bringing 
home all POWS, and refusing to consider amnesty for draft violators. They knew that these 
issues would also play well with their target groups: farmers, senior citizens, conservative labor 
―hard hats, Teamsters and Longshoremen,‖ and veterans.337 Speechwriter Ray Price maintained 
that Nixon should be viewed as a ―professional president‖ meaning that he be seen as a 
―statesman,‖ ―hardworking‖ and ―respected.‖ Above all he will make Americans proud of their 
domestic achievements and of his position as a ―peacemaker‖ to the world.338  
 Naturally, the team knew as well as any that Americans had reacted favorably to his trip 
to China and a thawing of relations with the Soviet Union. Donald Rumsfeld, clearly thinking of 
the president‘s tricky Dickey history, wrote that the president must take strides to appear sincere 
and credible. ―RN must come across as believable—honest with the people. If he is seen as 
deceitful, misleading or less than candid in his dealings with the public, the Congress or the 
media, nothing the Administration says or does will be credible or have impact.‖ Rumsfeld 
cautioned that the president and his team should ―avoid being uptight and secretive.‖ Like others, 
Nixon‘s perceptions of strength must reside in his successes in foreign affairs and dealing with 
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social unrest and law and order at home.
339
 Bill Safire reaffirmed that presidential courage was 
important, that Nixon ―cannot be pushed around by Russians or Congress,‖ as he proved he 
could be tough and fair in foreign policy dealings not only in Vietnam but in Moscow and 
Beijing.  Thus, according to Safire, he was much more like a ―Theodore Roosevelt and Harry 
Truman than Eisenhower or Kennedy.‖ To identify with working people in the heartland, the 
president needed to be portrayed as ―hardworking.‖ Nixon‘s weakest point, Safire wrote, was his 
inability to generate idol-like excitement, but his image as a family man was his ―big 
strength.‖340 Herbert Klein agreed, adding that Nixon‘s strength would come from someone who 
is a ―decisive leader,‖ a man who ―makes big decisions‖ and one who understands problems both 
foreign and domestic that are ―best for the country.‖ Like Safire, Nixon as a ―family man‖ was a 
winner with many Americans including women. As Klein wrote, Nixon‘s ―regular guy‖ image 
was like Harry Truman‘s, in that he was also ―tough-minded.‖ 341  
 In order to get that ―regular guy‖ out into the heartland, the president and his team relied 
inordinately on thirty-five special surrogates or ―surrogate candidates‖ to speak on his behalf at 
campaign appearances throughout the nation. The material for these speakers came up through 
Pat Buchanan‘s attack organizations and through the campaign machinery before delivery to the 
surrogates in an operation coordinated by the omnipresent Charles Colson. The ultimate goal was 
to attack George McGovern.
342
 As early as November 1971, the planning for taking the president 
out of the day-to-day electioneering was well under way with Haldeman‘s staff. Memos sent by 
the chief of staff indicated the need to prepare material and have it available early for staff, 
surrogates, and Cabinet members; including everything from speeches to ―thoughtful by-liners.‖ 
This would need to occur throughout the administration. As Ray Price suggested to Haldeman, 
the belief was that since the president felt ―he shouldn‘t deliver speeches with substantial or 
sophisticated thought content, it‘s doubly important that the rest of us do more of this,‖ to which 
Haldeman responded, ―good idea.‖ The plan was sent down early to the writers including Pat 
Buchanan that they were to take the president‘s case to the people. ―Since . . . [the president] 
feels he can‘t do it himself . . . it would be good for the writers—giving them a chance to flex 
their intellectual muscles . . . and thus to keep the juices of thought—and of thoughtful 
analysis—running.‖343  
 These ―juices of thought‖ did not appear with the wave of a magic wand, but from hours 
of work with sleeves rolled up past the elbows in the often sweltering conditions of the Old 
Executive Building across the street from the White House. There, Mort Alin, with a small staff 
of four aided by a core of eight female volunteers or ―clipping ladies‖ poured over hundreds of 
newspapers, magazines, television shows, films, and news ticker sheets gathered from across the 
nation. Each day the staff prepared a brief for Buchanan, and the speechwriter along with his two 
aides disseminated all the relevant material, created files, and prepared reports for his daily 
White House briefings for the senior staff. Buchanan‘s files were full of clips from news articles, 
many underlined, which subsequently ran through the political machine, up to the president, and 
back out as talking points for the surrogates and Buchanan‘s own media leaks to the press. The 
strategist also provided oversight, assistance, and ―checks‖ on various attack operations and their 
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effectiveness in the media; helped to create television and radio spots, pamphlets and flyers; 
monitored their distribution points and the news summary operations; recommended general 
shifts in strategy; helped draft speeches and covert materials; and oversaw updates for the 
briefing books. The summary for all of this was fuel for the campaign fire. The most important 
part of Buchanan‘s efforts was managing the surrogate strategy and, as he put it, ―avoid at all 
costs the kind of ‗attack‘ by individuals or media or ad that opens us to the ‗Tricky Dick‘ charge 
or the ‗Old Gunfighter‘ allegation.‖ The strategist knew that both the media and the Democrats 
would be looking for an opportunity. ―And if caught at it, we will have ourselves a problem.‖344  
 During the campaign, ―problems‖ were plentiful, and the team‘s efforts to handle the 
surrogates constituted a constant tussle within the inner group. As far back as April, Colson was 
at odds with several of the White House staffers, including Jeb Magruder, over the operation‘s 
progress and this continued through the summer and fall. In typical fashion, Colson‘s strong-arm 
tactics reverberated throughout the ranks. Dick Howard was concerned that these issues could 
easily get out of control resulting in the team taking its eye off the ball. ―As you probably 
determined there is some thrashing going on between Colson and Magruder over surrogate 
scheduling,‖ Howard wrote in a memo to David Parker. ―[Dick] Chapin and I sat in on a meeting 
between the two and all I could get out of it was that there was no agreement.‖ When Colson was 
involved, it usually meant trouble. Howard wanted something done ―since this mole hill is 
growing into a mountain rapidly.‖345  
 The aide knew how the lay of the land in 1972 had changed and how Colson, perhaps 
next to Haldeman himself, was the power on the White House staff. Howard‘s memorandum 
spoke to a changing tide in the hallways outside the Oval Office. ―In ‘70 when you and I were 
involved we had an entirely different situation. We had the clout of the White House and I know 
this made the difference in many, if not most cases.‖ Howard explained that given the 
circumstances, Magruder‘s positions on surrogate scheduling would probably not have a chance 
of gaining a voice, but he tried to play the role of diplomat with the deputy campaign manager 
and the touchy political issue over who was really in control over campaign details: The CREEP 
operations at 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue or the Colson operation at the White House. ―I would 
appreciate your comments on my recommendations, as well as whether I have represented your 
position correctly and fully. If not, I am willing to add your additional arguments, but I don‘t 
think I can change my recommendations,‖ Howard wrote. He did promise Magruder, however, 
that he would ―try to hold back the horses‖ at the White House until he heard back from him. 
―And if you want to talk about it, I am even willing to respect your territorial rights and come to 
your office.‖346 
 Charles Colson, however, did not respect anyone‘s territorial rights. Nixon‘s special 
counsel rapidly became the bullwhip for the reelection campaign within the White House, and he 
was not going to let any of the department staffers forget it. By the beginning of June, Colson 
was in full attack mode. When Bruce Kehrli suggested that staffers could take some time off in 
the summer to recharge for the fall, Colson as usual pounced. ―I am staggered…It is inapplicable 
to anyone on the Colson operation in any way, shape or form and I would hope that it would be 
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equally inapplicable to other parts of the White House. I can‘t believe that you are really 
encouraging any vacations this summer. There are 148 days between now and [the] election.‖347  
 Colson‘s ever-increasing involvement in operations in both the White House and at 
CREEP not only made many uneasy, but complicated divisions and tensions already ingrained in 
the various operations. Passionate turf wars and personality conflicts made for a tense internal 
dynamic inside the campaign machinery. There were numerous clashes between the White 
House and the CREEP operations at 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, where the former continuously 
found fault with the operations across the street. For those in the White House operation, the 
notion of any interference from 1701 was a constant irritant, especially when CREEP tried to 
repackage its message. This was especially the case when the White House complained that the 
letter operations that it ran through 1701 had to be halted because they were deemed ―too 
negative.‖ These letters, some ending up as ―letters to the editor‖ in selected cities, had 
strategists like Buchanan displeased with the manner in which CREEP had repackaged the 
message and was mixing the positive White House image with the negative aspect of the 
campaign. ―The letters don‘t go out on 1701 stationary. . .the tendency to fold the letters 
operation into the overall strategy is not wise, because of the nature of the letters, and because 
this should be a negative function.‖348  
 There were many layers to the friction between camps. Haldeman was often intensely 
critical of his own deputy that he placed over in CREEP to keep tabs and report to him on the 
daily operations. The chief of staff did not like many of Magruder‘s ideas, especially when he 
learned that the deputy campaign manager had asked for permission to send out direct mail over 
the president‘s signature. Gordon Strachan had written to Haldeman stressing that he believed 
such letters were ―a mistake. It raises the President‘s campaign profile too high. It demeans the 
Presidency.‖ When Haldeman saw Magruder‘s forwarded request, he circled it in a wide arch, 
writing in large bold letters, ―NO!‖349 As far back as January, Haldeman was wary of Magruder‘s 
work, especially in his abilities as a spokesperson for the campaign. In a terse memo to 
Magruder‘s boss John Mitchell (which he also ccd to Magruder), the chief of staff laid out his 
feelings. ―In spite of the outstanding job that Jeb is obviously doing in many phases of the 
organization of the campaign structure, it seems to me that he is exactly the wrong guy to be 
used as a spokesperson for the campaign. My personal view would be that Jeb should 
discontinue his present practice of holding press interviews, TV interviews, etc., and should 
become totally the man behind the scenes. Otherwise he‘s going to destroy his usefulness.‖350 
 These internal divisions and rivalries were exacerbated by the campaign strategy to 
separate the positive Nixon from the negative Nixon.  Marshalling and organizing the troops for 
battle required a careful balancing act between preparing for an assault on McGovern and the 
Democrats while keeping the guns pointed outside their tent. The plan was to avoid soiling their 
boss during the political carnage to come. As Ken Clawson pointed out to Haldeman, ―There 
also has to be a counterattack mechanism throughout the campaign, which I presume would be 
handled by Colson in collaboration with John Mitchell.‖ While Clawson could ―see great value‖ 
in this operation, he warned the president‘s chief of staff ―this is obviously one of the more 
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ticklish areas—where the President could beat himself—and should be most carefully 
controlled.‖351 While there was hope that all political activities would be ―handled entirely at 
1701,‖ no one (perhaps not even the president) could completely control the extent of Colson‘s 
growing operations; there was no escaping the dangers of political subterfuge.
352
 While Nixon 
planned (at least publicly) to wage a ―limited campaign‖ from the White House, even he could 
not manage all the unleashed energy that he needed from those whom he trusted most in his 
inner circle.
353
 
 One of the most difficult challenges of the surrogate program was determining the role of 
the vice president. Agnew occupied the slippery slope between the surrogate attack agenda and 
the White House that wished to stay on the high road and out of the mud.  Referred to as ―our 
gun,‖ the reelection team wanted to use Agnew, but worried about his reputation as something 
akin to an old and unstable ordinance that could explode without warning.
354
 Indeed, there had 
been serious talk that the vice president might not even make it on the ticket in the summer of 
1972.   That Nixon might have dumped his controversial vice president complicated a coherent 
plan for his campaign role. In a Buchanan/Khachigian memo to John Mitchell, they suggested 
that based on the ―assumption Vice President Agnew is our man‖ there would have to be ―two 
top speechwriters‖ on his plane with direct communication capability to 1701 and the attack 
briefing book. As they believed, the ―election of 1970 demonstrated that V.P. Agnew can get 
more coverage than any Vice President in history; that makes tremendous copy; he will be the 
bayonet of the Administration in 1972.‖ The problem, though, was at times that bayonet cut both 
ways, and the White House was becoming nervous of Spiro Agnew turned loose.
355
 Everyone in 
the inner circle knew that the vice president liked to fire up the base of the Republican Party, and 
that George McGovern proved to be an easy way to achieve his ends. Agnew maintained that if 
the Democrats chose the senator from South Dakota, it would lead to the ―downfall of our great 
republic.‖ On more than one occasion, the vice president had referred to McGovern as an 
outright ―fraud.‖356 
 Haldeman had warned Buchanan that the vice president had to be handled carefully. ―We 
need some heavy thinking regarding the Vice President‘s role and how he should play it if he is 
the nominee for reelection. We should determine first how he can help, and second, how he can 
avoid hurting the prospects for the ticket.‖ Haldeman believed with good reason that Buchanan‘s 
political temperament made him the one person who could communicate with Agnew. ―We need 
your strategy views on this, but we also need you to talk with the Vice President, try to get him 
to stop the swipes at the New York Times, and so forth, and also to avoid the personal attacks on 
McGovern as you suggest in your latest memorandum.‖357   
 Ten days later on July 23, Buchanan sent a memorandum to the president regarding his 
original request on how to handle Agnew during the campaign. Following Haldeman‘s lead, 
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Buchanan asked to be the one to brief the VP on this. He realized that Agnew did not have many 
friends inside the White House. ―Recognizing that there are many within the White House and 
the Hill who are not exactly enthusiasts of the Vice President, word should go forth that this is a 
‗team‘ effort, there should be no ‗background‘ knocking of the Number Two man, who will be 
shouldering as RN did, much of the nasty workload of the party and the campaign.‖ Buchanan 
pointed out that it was bad for morale as there was nothing more ―embittering than to pull off the 
wire some holier-than-thou statement from a fellow Republican.‖358  
This inside sniping at Agnew was a long-standing issue, and one that Bill Safire had 
previously complained about to the president, stressing that it had to stop for strategic reasons.  
―The VP doesn‘t need selling to his supporters, for he can do no wrong in their eyes; nor can he 
be forgiven by committed partisan Democrats he tagged with ‗radical liberal.‘‖ But to use the VP 
effectively, there was a need to stop treating him as the butt of jokes. ―We must overcome the 
sloughing-off of him as a joke by some. The attack on him that would sway many people is not 
so much that he is a divider (the other side of that coin is that he is a scrapper and a fighter for 
his beliefs, which will gain him affection) but that he is ludicrous. So…no more jokes about him 
by other members of the Administration, even about golf.‖  Rather, Safire believed that the vice 
president should be used to probe in a sober fashion ―social concerns‖ such as the counterculture, 
apathy, elitism, intellectualism, and the role of the federal government.  The plan was to make 
use of him while not embarrassing the campaign. ―It may get a little boring, and it will not make 
the front pages . . . but it will fit philosophically and it will let some wounds heal…By 1972, he 
will be stronger than ever for a political campaign.‖359  
 Strong but manageable was the plan for Agnew in the fall. Buchanan‘s idea was to use 
the vice president in a practical manner and have him go after the Colson-driven coalition of 
middle class, white ethnic, hardhats, and Catholics. ―The Vice President should be scheduled 
into those areas and among those groups that are the battleground in 1972. And that is not 
Republicans,‖ Buchanan wrote. The chief political strategist laid it all out for the president. ―We, 
by and large, have the South now. In the North, it is Catholic, ethnic, urban, Jewish, middle-
income, working class Democrats who are the swing votes, the ones who will decide by how 
large a margin we will win this one, if we do win it.‖360 Haldeman remained concerned about the 
vice president, explaining the risk they ran with Agnew turning the media against them, and 
Nixon concurred. Haldeman noted in an Oval Office meeting with the president that they ―must 
not make [the] VP the issue. Don‘t give [the press] ammunition.‖ The idea stressed was that 
Agnew should not attack the press either but should ―stay positive and on the issues.‖361 The 
inner circle understood, though, that it was going to be tough to control, as when it came to ―the 
dirty work‖ and the vice president, both Haldeman and Nixon knew that it was ―his forte.‖362 
Buchanan had also realized that Agnew‘s combat with the press was an ongoing problem. As he 
wrote to the president, ―Frankly, we need better press relations between the Vice President and 
the national and the local press. This might require a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the 
Veep‘s staff toward the traveling press.‖363 
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 For all of their efforts, Agnew still got Buchanan and the president into trouble with the 
media with an inflammatory speech in front of the National Newspaper Association on July 22. 
In damage control mode, Buchanan spoke to reporters off the record, indicating that the president 
had ordered his men to play nice with the national press. However, Robert Semple‘s article in the 
New York Times indicated that on Nixon‘s orders the White House was doing damage control by 
ordering a stop to attacks on the media. The internal backlash was predictable as the tight control 
over the message was compromised. Buchanan backpedaled on his comments to Semple in a 
carefully worded memo to Haldeman. He suggested to the chief of staff that he should let the 
president know personally that ―Buchanan was not the source of that Times story about RN 
directing a halt to press attacks,‖ and that others had essentially leaked the quotes and 
information attributed directly to him in the article. In a memo to Haldeman, Buchanan tried to 
do the White House two-step, arguing on one hand that his position remained that they ―ought 
consciously to hold back on sweeping attacks on the media‖ while covering his backside, 
indicating that he was on board in not giving the impression to the press and the public that 
Nixon had ordered a halt, as ―it makes it appear that the President is master of the house who 
calls dogs on and off.‖364     
 Haldeman had warned his staff repeatedly about the media, that playing games with 
journalists would get their fingers burned. ―Let‘s face a few facts—most of the media people are 
(1) against us and (2) suspicious of us. In the main, they are hard to fool although they often fool 
themselves . . . It is difficult for us to put anything over on them [and] it is practically impossible 
for us to subvert them.‖ Haldeman‘s talking paper to staffers was blunt: ―When we try a 
gimmick they usually are waiting at the entrance of the alley and they wind up making us look 
more devious [than] we are. This gives us a credibility problem . . . The media wind up being 
more suspicious of us than ever.‖365 
 Complementing decisions on Agnew‘s use were rumors that Nixon would replace him 
with veteran Texas politician John Connally. As a former Democrat, Connally‘s role as a 
campaign surrogate was enhanced by including his leadership with Democrats for Nixon.  The 
chatter concerning the Texan as a possible replacement for Agnew on the ticket grew and is 
reflected in memos in early July where the talk was all about the vice president and speculation 
over Connally‘s role in the campaign. Because of the contacts and rumors that the former Texas 
governor was interested in the number two spot on the ticket, Colson and Haldeman were busy 
trying to feel out where the Texan stood concerning the vice presidency. Senior staff felt in 
―limbo,‖ and as Colson wrote to Haldeman, they were not exactly sure ―where Connally stands.‖ 
What they did know was that he was ―interested in his own future.‖ According to Colson, he was 
―very anxious to know what the President wants from him in the way of future assignments, and 
in my opinion would jump at the prospect of being on the ticket this year.‖   On the other hand, 
―If he assumes the chairmanship for Democrats for Nixon, he wants it to be a real campaign, 
well financed; he wants to play a major role and wants to be damn sure he has complete control 
in the areas for which he is responsible.‖ In a private meeting with Colson, Connally tried to feel 
Colson out about the VP position but Nixon‘s special counsel said that he did not really know 
other than the president always kept his options open, ―especially this President.‖366 Mere days 
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later a Belden Texas poll failed to give a Nixon-Connally ticket much of a bump over Nixon-
Agnew.
367
  
Ten days later the administration announced that Agnew was staying on. In a press release, 
the Campaign Director for CREEP, Clark MacGregor, chalked it up to what the people wanted. 
―There is no doubt in my mind that if the need arose, Vice President Agnew would make an 
outstanding President. That a great many Americans share my view was demonstrated in the 
New Hampshire primary when more people chose to write in the Vice President‘s name than 
voted for any other candidate except President Nixon himself.‖368 The vice president, then, 
would be used, but it would be in a ―controlled manner‖ for special projects. It was not long 
before the team had its first opportunity to rein in Agnew as George McGovern stumbled over 
his own choice for a running mate.  
**** 
 There were many mistakes and miscalculations that helped torpedo George McGovern‘s 
campaign, but perhaps one of the most significant was his choice for vice president. The 
candidate‘s selection from available Democrats was narrowed when Humphrey, Kennedy, 
Muskie, Gaylord Nelson, and Walter Mondale all turned McGovern down. Finally, the 
Democratic nominee looked to Missouri Senator, Tom Eagleton, who agreed to run on the ticket. 
Eagleton unfortunately failed to divulge his medical past to anyone in the McGovern camp, 
although it wasn‘t long before McGovern had the senator‘s medical records, documents that 
contained references to ―suicidal tendencies‖ and ―manic depression,‖ including the discovery 
that he was taking an anti-psychotic medication called Thorazine. Eagleton revealed that he was 
hospitalized three times between 1960 and 1966, and with the story set to break in the media, 
McGovern and the senator held a press conference to deal with the revelations that concerned 
electric-shock therapy treatments for depression. Such information was political dynamite and 
McGovern‘s pronouncement that Eagleton was ready to ―take on the presidency at a moment‘s 
notice‖ sounded hollow. The night before the exposé on Eagleton broke, Nixon crony Murray 
Chotiner, who had been working to see what he could dig up, told Haldeman that Eagleton 
refused to release medical records and had denied charges of alcoholism. As Chotiner wrote, ―It 
is great to know that he has ‗recovered‘ from his ‗depressions‘ and ‗fatigue.‘‖ But as the long-
time Nixon ally suggested, ―the public is entitled to know all of the facts since he will be one 
heartbeat away from the Presidency if, by a mistake, McGovern is elected.‖ In a P.S. to 
Haldeman, Chotiner pointed out that he understood that ―the Air Force will not accept a man for 
intelligence who has ever had psychiatric treatment.‖369  
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 McGovern‘s choice was savaged in the media, and despite the proclamation of his ―1000 
percent‖ support for Eagleton, the damage was done. On August 1, at McGovern‘s urging, the 
damaged senator withdrew from contention. Throughout the episode, Nixon was adamant that 
Vice President Agnew needed to tread carefully. Haldeman‘s word to Agnew and Mitchell was 
that the vice president ―should take on McGovern and totally ignore Eagleton. It‘s important not 
to make the Vice President the issue. We should not give them ammunition. He should be hard-
hitting on the issues, but should avoid becoming a subject of controversy.‖ The approach was 
that the vice president needed to ―contrast himself with Eagleton, who is a smart aleck. He 
should show dignity, stability, responsibility, avoid any clownish appearance, use a little humor 
to kid himself, but let the Democrats cut them up personally. The Vice President should stay on 
what McGovern has said and why it is dangerous.‖370 This in many ways defined the above 
ground legitimate campaign that was disciplined and made very few mistakes.  
 In some ways, all the Nixon team had to do was watch as McGovern looked weak and 
indecisive especially over questions of why he did not fully vet his choice for vice president. 
With his judgment questioned, McGovern began to slip in the polls.  The immediate outcome for 
Nixon‘s men was that it made their plans for using Agnew that much easier. ―As long as we 
maintain our lead and in light of the Eagleton fiasco, we should keep [Agnew] on positive issues 
and use him to attack the Democratic ticket only if it‘s absolutely necessary,‖ Bob Teeter noted 
in a memorandum to Haldeman. ―As long as the McGovern campaign continues to have 
problems and the press produces negative comment, we ought to seize the opportunity to make 
the Vice President a statesman.‖ The view was that as long as the administration maintained a 
significant lead, Agnew ―should be used primarily to reinforce our voters and to say 
complimentary things about the President that he cannot say himself.‖371 In the end, George 
McGovern had inadvertently freed up another surrogate for Richard Nixon.  
 Indeed, the Eagleton affair provided a bonanza for the Nixon attack team and a feeding 
frenzy for members of the media. It also underscored how the press seldom laid a glove on the 
Nixon administration during the campaign while McGovern was taken to the shed on numerous 
occasions. The Baltimore Sun‘s Nick Thimmesch was quite typical of the media‘s reaction to the 
Democratic Party‘s nominee. ―He just does not seem to do things right,‖ Thimmesch wrote. 
―Much of the public regards Senator McGovern as an unreliable fellow.‖ Polling on the matter 
had one respondent suggest that it was McGovern that needed ―the shock treatment,‖ while 
another suggested, ―one‘s crazy and the other talks crazy.‖ According to Thimmesch, ―Senator 
McGovern‘s problem . . . is that he talks big and righteous, and then takes it back by word and 
deed. He seems to eschew thoughtful reflection and planning.‖ The columnist was fond of 
recalling how McGovern was so unsure of his selection of Eagleton that he wore unmatched 
shoes and ―twitched‖ when the telephone rang. Washington Post columnist Joseph Kraft was 
even more withering on the Eagleton Affair. ―The effort to dump Sen. Eagleton has been even 
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more remarkable for ineptitude. Sen. McGovern has been exposed to the whole world in the 
process of changing his mind.‖ Kraft pointed out the long-term political problem for the nominee 
from South Dakota. ―At the outset Sen. McGovern said he was ‗one thousand per cent behind‘ 
Sen. Eagleton. One can hear that comment echoing ironically down through the months of the 
campaign as Sen. McGovern tries to demonstrate that he is for blue collar workers and blacks 
and Israel and others who doubt his support.‖ Kraft pointed out that McGovern‘s fumbling 
underscored the ―underlying doubt about the capacity of the left wing to run things.‖  But as 
Thimmesch suggested, the Eagleton affair by itself would not alone write off the candidate. 
Rather it was that the episode was reflective of ―a whole list of Senator McGovern‘s gaffes,‖ 
including his stand on abortion, national defense, marijuana use, amnesty, and Israel, and 
comparing Nixon to Hitler for his polices in Vietnam. And as the columnist rightly pointed out, 
―Senator McGovern‘s credibility problem should be a joy to Mr. Nixon and his campaign 
staff.‖372  
 Veteran journalist Stewart Alsop readily reprinted slams against McGovern in his 
column, seemingly amused by the manner in which Republicans went after the senator from 
South Dakota. This included reprinting the suggestion from the Republican National 
Committee‘s publication First Monday, that if McGovern became president, it would ―open the 
White House to riotous street mobs.‖373  
 Despite the blather against the media from Haldeman and Colson, they understood the 
value of maintaining friendly contacts in the press, especially maintaining ―good relations with 
those reporters and columnists‖ critical of the Democratic nominee, so they could continue to 
write stories that ―needle‖ McGovern at  every opportunity. According to Colson these included 
McGovern critics Evans and Novak and Nick Thimmesch.
374
 Nixon, though, prodded his staff to 
keep their shields up when dealing with journalists of any stripe. ―Even when our most 
intelligent people are meeting with [the press] they are confronting the political enemy and that 
everything they say will, therefore, be used against us,‖ Nixon wrote. ―I have to emphasize this 
over and over again because we never seem to get it across to our people no matter how many 
times they get burned.‖ Additionally, the president maintained that the staff should never 
comment on polls showing them ahead ―in any of the major states without my specific 
approval.‖ With a growing fear over voter complacency, Nixon stressed that he didn‘t wish to 
give the ―impression . . . that we are conducting our campaign on the basis of polls rather than on 
the basis of principles.‖375  
 Some observers of the media coverage that emerged in the campaign argue that 
journalists had either succumbed to or were overwhelmed by Republican tactics in the way they 
began to cover the 1972 elections. As media critic Joseph Spear has argued, the ―Nixon 
campaign was a virtually flawless case study of media manipulation . . . Who perfected the 
techniques for taking the show on the road? Who demonstrated for them the importance of 
image, the necessity for a good public relations program, and PR experts to implement it? . . . 
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Who invented the office of communications?‖376  
 Those in the media and the public expecting to see or hear much more of Richard Nixon 
during the upcoming Republican National Convention were going to be disappointed. Control 
would be the operative term both outside and inside the convention hall. As Haldeman‘s pre-
convention briefing note indicated, ―Every delegation should have a ‗policeman.‘ He should 
make sure that the delegation is behaving properly, that people aren‘t making fools of 
themselves.‖ The chief of staff had a hand in many details of the convention in Miami, as memos 
concerning almost every small item crossed his desk for comment. Haldeman commented on 
how they should make the color of the president‘s eyes lighter on photo layouts in the convention 
hall. The position of the flags, placards, and other signs were to be carefully placed. There were 
to be no black backgrounds behind the president.  Even the balloons and the ―blue part of the‖ 
ribbons for party delegates were too dark, according to the White House chief of staff, and never 
anywhere should anything ―be done on pink paper.‖ But there were more serious political issues 
than blue eyes and pink streamers. Haldeman ordered that there should be no pictures of Chou 
and Nixon or Nixon and Mao that are smiling. As Haldeman had indicated, playing on the 
president‘s image as tough but practical statesman following his groundbreaking trip to China, 
―You can use the picture of the President and Mao where Mao looks dull and the President 
serious.‖ The strategy papers overseen by the chief of staff on the tone of the convention were all 
business: ―The tone of the Convention should be crisp, not emotional, confident without being 
smug or complacent, lively and factual without being grandiloquent and self-serving…; it 
mustn‘t look slick or over staged. [The] Convention can‘t appear to be a vacation for the 
delegates.‖377   
Much of the grist for this mill came from the boys at the White House who were 
watching the Democratic convention with both interest and disgust, from McGovern‘s ―slicked 
down‖ hair style to using a meatier gavel than the Democrats had used. As the pre-convention 
notes suggested, ―To lend a sense of heritage, perhaps a different gavel should be used at each 
session and a fact sheet about each one given to the networks. The Democrats‘ gavel sounded 
tinny. Ours should be solid.‖378  Speeches by the Democrats suggested that the party‘s leaders 
were ripe for a comedy roasting. As Dick Moore noted, ―The speeches from the party were 
totally devoid of humor, and [Larry] O‘Brien is something of an undertaker to begin with. We 
must plan some good cracks and laughs at the expense of the Democrats from the beginning.‖ 
Indeed, within a day, a planning memo suggested the Republican convention‘s keynote speaker 
―should poke fun at McGovern with one-liners prepared by a comedy writer.‖ The thrust was 
that since McGovern would try to ―play down his extreme position from now on, so we should 
be consistently keeping him on the defensive and trying to frustrate and irritate him.‖379 
 Indeed, the team‘s plan was to do everything different than the Democrats had done at 
their convention. Even Bill Safire was spending time thinking of songs for the event.  Safire 
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thought that using ―God Bless America‖ might make a good contrast with McGovern‘s apparent 
choice of ―Bridge Over Troubled Waters.‖ As Safire indicated to Haldeman, using a Paul Simon 
song might not be the best idea for a Republican convention. ―The writer …is Paul Simon of 
Simon & Garfunkel, who also wrote ‗Mrs. Robinson‘ and ‗Feelin‘ Groovy,‘ neither of which 
would be quite suitable for us.‖380   
 The intent was that the Republican convention would avoid many of the gaffs they found 
in viewing their opponents‘ event. There was much concern over the little things, from imputing 
―a little dignity‖ by having the delegates stand and cross their hearts during the Pledge of 
Allegiance, trying ―to get everyone to sing,‖ and to try to look better than the Democrats at their 
convention. ―Let‘s see if we can‘t find some friends at the Musician‘s Union. The musicians at 
the Democratic National Convention all looked dog tired.‖ For the Republican convention, as 
Dick Moore reminded Chapin, image was everything. ―Obviously delegates still don‘t realize 
that if they read a newspaper or fall asleep they are likely to be put on camera.‖ The team 
believed that they needed to manage every minutia that the networks might pick up and the TV 
audience might notice. This included getting ―a few minority accents among the delegates‖ to 
speak from the convention floor and ―at least one foreign accent doing the pledge of allegiance.‖ 
There were concerns over the start of each night‘s events and ensuring that all delegates arrived 
15 minutes early, the need for ―order,‖ and ―podium traffic must be controlled!‖ Those on the 
podium were to wear only ―neutral‖ clothing so as not to detract from the speakers, and there 
were to be neither empty seats nor ―people reading, sleeping, drinking, or otherwise not paying 
attention to the business of the convention.‖ What they were going to do was avoid long 
speeches like those given by the Democrats and control the convention floor from the White 
House. As Moore indicated in his memo to Chapin, things needed to snap and click along. ―In 
closing I would emphasize again that speeches are an archaic form of communication. Almost 
everything last night was too long, and therefore, dull. We plan short speeches and short 
everything, but it is plain that human nature will get in the way unless we monitor this item 
constantly and ruthlessly.‖381  
 The internal memorandums show that a great onus was placed on having an upbeat 
positive convention, where participants were in tune and in the moment, but not mean or mean-
spirited. While it may be surprising why any of this was important to winning an election, it was 
all seen as part of the strategy to nail George McGovern. As Buchanan explained in a 
memorandum to the president, ―A campaign which continually raises specters about McGovern‘s 
extremism, and the crazyness [sic] of his ideas, is the only kind of campaign I can think that can 
win us a major landslide.‖ However, the speechwriter cautioned, ―we have to be wary of making 
George a martyr. Mean-spiritedness has no place in this campaign; thus, it is important that the 
campaign staff not be tired and bitchy as the campaign heats up.‖ 382 
 To keep the ―mean-spiritedness‖ in check, the political team wanted to limit the 
president‘s appearances to a minimum prior to the convention, even suggesting that he not leave 
the White House at all until the final night. As internal memorandums suggested, ―The President 
should stay in Washington and run the country until the evening of August 23
rd
. At that time, he 
should leave Washington, fly to Miami…, helicopter to the Convention Center, proceed to 
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holding room, and make his first appearance, for his acceptance speech, after the Vice 
President‘s speech.‖ The idea was that it would ―completely take the President out of the 
political arena. We continue to keep him in a position of President and from the Office of the 
Presidency he leaves his desk, flies to Miami, thanks the delegates and alternatives and the 
American people, makes his Acceptance speech, receives his ovations, moves to his helicopter 
en route Miami Airport and return to Washington.‖383  
 Indeed, this was indicative of the tightly managed public campaign, with Nixon 
purposely sequestered in the White House by a deliberate strategy cooked up by him and his 
staff. This view, of course, contrasts with the journalistic and historic image of a president 
isolated, out of touch, and alone in the Oval Office, descending into greater and greater 
darkness.
384
 But in fact, any images of Nixon as president beyond Pennsylvania Avenue were 
carefully contrived, right down to the utterances from the First Family. 
 To keep the image of Nixon as an elder statesman who could hold his own with 
communist leaders in China and the Soviet Union who would not stoop to the level of political 
warrior, the president needed not just the aide of his loyal staffers, but his wife and daughters. 
Nixon knew that he lacked some of the ‗softer‘ qualities required to tug at the heartstrings in the 
heartland. He believed that his family might help bridge the gap. ―As far as getting across the 
idea of warmth, interest in people, etc., our biggest assets here are PN, Tricia, and Julie,‖ Nixon 
wrote in a memorandum to Haldeman. The president stressed the importance of using ―people 
very close to RN‖ in ―certain situations.‖385 It was clear that his staff also understood the 
difficulty that he had in projecting this ―warmth‖ and ―interest in people.‖ After all, all they had 
to do was read the morning papers. As loathed columnist Jack Anderson wrote, ―despite a 
quarter of a century of public life and a massive effort by his staff or public relations experts to 
humanize him, Richard Nixon‘s public image remains oddly shallow.‖386  
Ray Price sent a memo to Haldeman indicating that the plan to use the First Family in the 
campaign was necessary to show the president‘s ―concern for people.‖ As the speechwriter 
pointed out, ―This sense of caring is what we are weak on.‖  Price thought that Pat Nixon would 
appeal to those in the heartland and stand in stark contrast to someone like Jackie Kennedy. ―I 
suspect that a lot of people today, comparing the two, might suddenly come to realize how 
refreshing it is to have a working, gracious, involved, concerned and mature First Lady, rather 
than a frivolous pleasure-seeker from Camelot.‖387 The president wrote on the importance of this 
issue back in January, suggesting that he considered it a ―top priority‖ to find a way to use his 
family.
388
 As the campaign heated up heading into summer, the president had Haldeman enlist 
Buchanan to help coach his daughters on how to steer around political questions. Nixon 
understood that even though ―this is not generally Buchanan‘s approach,‖ they would need help 
with ―the more off-hand, subtle kind of answer.‖389  
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 While Buchanan would handle the political questions, the president prepared to coach his 
own daughters on how to portray him as a warm family man for public consumption. He needed 
his daughters to indicate which memories for them would be ―heartwarming.‖ Nixon crafted a 
memorandum indicating that ―On the personal side, you might mention some of our Christmas 
parties where I played the piano for group singing, etc., always by ear.‖ Nixon told his daughters 
that they could say these recollections were ―part of the Nixon story that is to you most 
heartwarming. And also point out that when you had your own birthday parties, etc., that I from 
time to time played a happy birthday song for you.‖ Another point the girls could make was to 
recall their father making phone calls just before dinner at the White House. ―I call people who 
may be sick, who have had hard luck like losing an election or not getting a promotion in 
business that they expected, or sometimes the mother of someone who has been killed in 
action.‖390  The president not only knew that such images would resonate in the heartland, but 
that he needed help in projecting his ―warmth,‖ especially after a first term in office marked by 
war, violent protests, and presidential fist-waving. 
 
**** 
 The images that the president and his team did not want out in the nation heading in to 
the fall campaign were the scenes of violence and chaos that plagued the national conventions of 
both the Democratic and Republican Parties in 1968, or the increase in campus violence during 
1970. Few, however, expected such disruptions in the election year of 1972. The Nixon 
administration showed little of the foreboding that they experienced heading to Miami four years 
earlier, where the mayhem had actually eclipsed the street violence if not the media coverage in 
Chicago.
391
 Internal memorandums between John Dean and Haldeman in August reveal that 
although quite a bit of investigation went into the various groups and individuals that might show 
up in Miami at the party‘s big show, the communications do not reveal deep concern with the 
prospect of large disruptions at their convention. Writing from presidential campaign 
headquarters in Miami Beach, Dean sensed that things were going to be different this time 
around, even though some demonstrators had arrived early. As the legal counsel noted, ―Camped 
at Flamingo Park are approximately 2,000 protestors from all groups.‖ It was clear that from 
what he saw, that number was not expected to swell above 3,500. ―This small number 
significantly limits the capability of the demonstrators to disrupt the Convention,‖ Dean wrote, 
describing a fragmented set of protestors with no single group in command. While there was no 
concern about large crowds, Dean believed that ―the real potential for violence rests with 
approximately 400-500 hard core radicals. Showing ―no fear of the police,‖ Dean believed there 
would be some ―thrashing . . . from these militants, most of whom will probably be arrested 
before the Convention adjourns.‖ The target, Dean believed, would be Washington Avenue in 
front of the convention hall on the night of Wednesday, August 23, in order to ―receive 
maximum media coverage. Their main goal is to be able to embarrass the Republicans during 
prime time by forcing the calling of the National Guard.‖392  
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 At the party‘s convention, as heavy clouds of teargas tried to keep protestors from 
blocking the entry and exit of delegates, the president asked the youth and disaffected Democrats 
to join his ―new majority,‖ promising a ―dynamite program for progress in America and peace in 
the world.‖ As hundreds of anti-war protestors were hauled away by police, pelted all the way by 
demonstrators with rocks and bottles, Nixon pledged to delegates and the television audience that 
he would end the Cold War with the Chinese and the Soviets. While the president played 
diplomat, Vice President Agnew‘s speech gave the faithful the meat. Agnew asked delegates, 
―Do we turn our country over to the piecemeal, inconsistent polices of George McGovern, or do 
we entrust the future of this nation to the sound, tested leadership of Richard Nixon?‖ Agnew 
also spoke to the constituency they had wanted to attract since November of 1970: disaffected 
Democrats and other alienated voters. ―To those millions who have been driven out of their 
home in the Democratic Party,‖ the VP said, ―I ask you to join us...as members of a new 
American majority bound together by our common ideals.‖393 
 Chief of Staff Haldeman had wanted a drastically different convention from the ―mess‖ 
he and his staff saw from the Democrats, and ―different‖ was exactly what they got. As the 
Post‘s Marquis Childes suggested, ―The Republican convention differs from the Democrats 
convention of a month ago as night from day, black from white. The difference lies in one 
word—control.‖ As the journalist recalled, ―The Democrats shambled along in what often 
seemed planned chaos, wasting their precious prime television with frivolities.‖394 The other 
major issue did not go unnoticed, and that was taking bread and butter votes away from the 
Democrats. As the Wall Street Journal noted as the convention began, it was obvious that there 
was ―a carefully calculated wooing of blue-collar unionists, Jews, Catholics and other 
traditionally Democratic groups of voters who this year appear deeply disenchanted with the 
Democratic ticket. From platform praise of organized labor to presidential promises of parochial-
school aid, the campaign pitch will invite converts from such usually non-Republican blocs.‖ As 
John Ehrlichman told the paper, McGovern was not going to be able to reach those voters. ―This 
is going to be a unique campaign in that the challenger has assumed an enormous burden of 
defending his own far-out proposals.‖395 
 From the convention floor columnist Joseph Alsop believed that the other real difference 
was that voters were going to make a choice based upon some good old fashioned practical 
matters.  ―This year, seemingly, the voters are going to choose their President the way any 
sensible man chooses a plumbing fixture. You do not expect to love, or even like a plumbing 
fixture. The test is not whether a plumbing fixture is charming. The main test of a plumbing 
fixture is whether it flushes.‖  That result, the journalist said, had a lot to do with the type of 
candidate at the head of the Democratic ticket. As Alsop wrote, the voters who ―appear to be 
defecting from the Democratic Party in droves—have taken a good, hard, skeptical look at 
George McGovern, his backers, and what they stand for. So far, they have heartily disliked what 
they have seen.‖396 A Gallup poll following the Republican National Convention revealed the 
mountain that McGovern had to climb to get back into the race against Richard Nixon. It showed 
the president leading his Democratic challenger 64 percent to 30 percent, which was virtually the 
same margin that Lyndon Johnson had over Republican Barry Goldwater in 1964.
397
 Not all the 
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press commentary was rosy, however. As he had often been, columnist Jack Anderson both 
agitated and worried Nixon‘s inner circle. Part of the reason was that he had a knack for placing 
his finger directly on a sensitive issue for the president. As Anderson wrote during the 
convention, ―GOP strategists confide, indeed, that only one major obstacle lies in the way of a 
Nixon landslide in November. Not the economy. Not the war. It‘s Nixon‘s robot-like 
personality.‖398 
 That summer, Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman had been worried about many issues, and 
the president‘s ―unlikable‖ personality was just one of several. As he jotted down his concerns 
on a legal pad in his large comfortable office near the Oval Office in the White House one 
afternoon in late July, his attention turned to reports suggesting that Nixon‘s victory would hinge 
on a large voter turnout on Election Day. In a political strategy memo, Haldeman stressed that ―a 
fundamental shift in our thinking‖ was needed. ―Up until now we‘ve been convinced that a small 
vote helps a conservative and a large vote helps the left wing.‖ Polls indicated that decided 
Democratic voters planned to turn out for their candidate in November were more motivated to 
speak their minds and more galvanized to come out to show their support. Haldeman worried 
about a ―small‖ turnout with Republican supporters too complacent to bother to vote.  ―This year 
for the first time since 1952, a big vote helps us, a small vote helps the opposition. McGovern 
has won all the primaries on a small vote.‖ Back in July, the team knew it needed to have an 
aggressive get out the vote drive throughout the country, especially in battleground states in the 
Midwest, including ―down-state Illinois, small town Ohio, and so forth.‖ The massive voter drive 
was necessary, Haldeman suggested, as ―McGovernites are sure to vote, ours aren‘t.‖399  
 With the strategy to have the president stay out of the public campaign, getting the 
faithful out to vote for him had become a unique challenge for the political team.  Indeed, the 
campaign Nixon‘s men ran to retain the White House in 1972 bore little resemblance to what can 
be considered traditional American electioneering. Rather, reelection year from a view outside 
the White House appeared rather unorthodox in modern American electoral politics, where the 
invisibility of the incumbent president along the campaign trail, in retrospect, almost made 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt seem extroverted. In terms that bore great similarity to what he 
actually did during the election, Nixon indicated that in the first six critical weeks following his 
party‘s convention, he would not be campaigning but ―in the White House doing my job.‖ The 
president suggested that since the policy differences on the economy, on Vietnam, military 
spending, aid to parochial schools, and busing between he and McGovern were so vast, there was 
no need for him ―to hammer them home.‖ The hammer would need to come from party leaders 
that included Kansas Senator Bob Dole and former Texas Governor John Connally.  The 
president‘s strategy was to build the ―most efficient and effective campaign committee 
organization humanly possible.‖ Nixon, like Haldeman, though, worried about low voter turnout, 
as he indicated that his greatest fear was the possibility that ―complacency‖ might cost his team 
during the election. As a result, he reminded Haldeman that the team must ―develop a sense of 
mission and not back into victory by default.‖400  
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Nixon‘s loyal chief of staff also worried about his party‘s electoral complacency, a 
disengagement of their base from the process, and that McGovern might find a way to capture 
the voters that Chuck Colson wanted to form into a new coalition. Staff memorandums echoed 
Haldeman‘s internal concerns. ―McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democrat 
Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time campaigning in the Northeast 
and Mid-west and Far-west,‖ Doug Hallett wrote. ―By doing so, it is possible that he could lose 
the popular vote and still win the electoral vote count. And since it is possible—and since it‘s the 
only possible way he could win—we should worry about countering McGovern‘s potential.‖401  
Haldeman noted that to win they needed to appeal to the anti-McGovern vote and others 
out in Middle America who would respond to stories and speeches that painted McGovern as 
someone separate from the middle of the voting spectrum. ―We have to fire up the Democrats for 
Nixon,‖ Haldeman warned. ―We have to activate the silent majority versus the activist minority.‖  
Knowing that they had launched a dangerous gamble with their strategy with Nixon out of the 
visible campaign, Haldeman knew what had to be done. ―The theory of the President above the 
battle thus becomes very dangerous, unless our people are stirred up.‖402  
His boss inside the Oval Office also understood this very well. As Nixon later wrote, 
―Politics is battle, and the best way to fire up your troops is to rally them against a visible 
opponent on the other side of the field. If a loyal supporter will fight hard for you, he will fight 
twice as hard against your enemies.‖403  There was a problem, however. Haldeman knew, much 
to his own peril, the one man who was more than willing to stir up the loyalists inside and 
outside the White House, and that was none other than the president‘s special counsel, Charles 
Colson. 
**** 
  
While the strategy for the president to remain above the fray and let staff and surrogates 
do the heavy lifting originated with Richard Nixon‘s experiences in the 1970 mid-term elections, 
much of the campaign‘s bite came from Charles Colson. The former Marine and corporate 
lawyer plotted, prodded, cajoled, bullied, and threatened staffers and members of the media as a 
means to a single end: victory on Election Day. There could have been no doubt about the 
position of power and influence that Colson had gained in the White House; that he had the ear 
of the president was not a well-kept secret. As summer turned to fall, the president met with 
Colson almost every day and called for his political operative through the White House operator 
more than any other member of staff, rivaling even Bob Haldeman, the White House chief of 
staff.
404
 The political strategist and special counsel to the president ran his own show, often 
delivering memos to personnel without going through Haldeman, his superior. Near the end of 
August, Colson fired off one such declaration to the staff, leaving no doubt about the power he 
believed he had in the corridors of the White House. 
 
There are 71 days left between now and the election. Every single one of these is a campaign day and for 
those of you who have not been reminded of this lately, every day has 24 hours . . . There should be no 
necessity for this kind of memo and in the case of most of you there is not. Just so there is no 
misunderstanding, however, I want to make it perfectly clear what the policy will be for the next 71 days. 
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No one should plan any trips anywhere without my express approval. No one should ever be out of the 
reach of the telephone. The White House Switchboard must know at all times where everyone is; each 
individual member of staff should insure that he or she can be reached at any time of the day or night . . . 
No speaking engagements should be accepted, no trips should be planned without my knowing and 
approving in advance. 
405
 
 
Colson appeared unconcerned with crossing lines in the pursuit of the ultimate goal. He warned 
staffers that he expected ―maximum output from every member of the staff for whom I have any 
responsibility. I will be very intolerant of less than maximum output.‖ Nixon‘s personal aide 
cared little for stepping on toes or ruffling feathers. As Colson boldly claimed, ―I am totally 
unconcerned with anything other than getting the job done. If I bruise feelings or injure anyone‘s 
morale, I will be happy to make amends on the morning of November 8 assuming we have done 
our job and the results are evident.‖406  
 To make winning ―evident‖ in the fall reelection bid, the campaign assumed two almost 
separate tracks after August.  One was a full-fledged assault on the Democratic Party and its 
nominee, and the other was almost a ―non-campaign‖ with the president keeping such a distance 
from public electioneering that some members of the media openly wondered if the president 
was still breathing.
407
 The conduit between the political attack squads and Nixon‘s statesman-
like posture of ―indifference‖ to the nastiness of political wars was Colson.    
 The political operative waged war against not only Democrats but also against those 
within his own campaign deemed not to be on board with him all the way. This included 
muscling in on the political operations of CREEP, the organization which later became infamous 
for its involvement with a litany of dirty tricks on political rivals across the country during the 
1972 campaign. However, the real election headquarters were not located at 1701 Pennsylvania 
Avenue, but a block away in the White House, and Colson never let anyone forget it. The blood 
between the two operations was bad as CREEP staffers increasingly found themselves forced to 
produce amid a climate of fear and immense pressure from Colson and aide Dick Howard. As 
Magruder recalls, the daily word was, ―What the hell are you guys doing over there? What are 
we getting for all that money?‖408  The stridency with which Colson operated was not merely due 
to his impervious and authoritarian nature but because everyone in the bubble knew that he had 
the president‘s ear. As columnists Roland Evans and Bob Novak noted, ―Colson has grown so 
close to the President so quickly because he exudes qualities Mr. Nixon admires: toughness, 
quickness, intelligence—and a lust for personal combat.‖ Moreover, as a Nixon campaign aide 
added, ―Chuck says the things the President likes to hear.‖409 Colson also liked what the 
president had to say, including some of his comments when blowing off steam in the Oval Office 
that others in the White House might have chosen to ignore.
410
  
 To Colson, the president‘s words were marching orders, and he had no difficulty letting 
the staff know that they would fall in line or face the consequences. As Haldeman recalled, ―By 
the spring of 1972 Colson had angered nearly everyone inside the White House—and out.‖ The 
chief of staff knew that even Mitchell and Ehrlichman felt they had come under his thumb, 
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becoming ―powerful enemies.‖ As Haldeman recounted in his memoir, ―their anger at Colson 
had always landed on my shoulders. I was the one who had to carry their complaints to Colson.‖ 
Haldeman, though, did not have time to deal with bruised feelings and tolerated Colson even 
though he knew that the actions of the special counsel hurt morale. ―Dealing with Colson was no 
fun for White House staffers at any level. If he was superior in rank, he would bully them. If he 
was inferior, he would smile—remind them he had ‗the ear of the President.‘ Which he had.‖411   
Clearing the path for Colson‘s open-door policy in the Oval Office and in the reelection 
effort was aided by the resignation of John Mitchell as campaign manager. While Mitchell had 
tried to curb Colson‘s worst instincts, new manager Clark MacGregor proved to be no match for 
the Massachusetts attorney.  Mitchell had tried to keep Colson from taking over everything.  As 
deputy campaign manager Jeb Magruder recalled, ―Mitchell hated Colson. He often said that 
Colson had only joined the Administration because he wanted to build up his law practice.‖412 
Nixon‘s chief domestic policy adviser, John Ehrlichman, thought that Colson‘s game could be 
boiled down to a thirst for power. For Colson, that was to do whatever was necessary to secure 
the president‘s approval. As a result, according to Ehrlichman, Colson ―was to be the man who 
would do whatever Richard Nixon wanted done.‖413  
 With his growing power in the corridors of the White House, Colson‘s staff had swelled 
to twenty-three. The special counsel to the president attempted to dominate not only the 
operations at CREEP but to stack the numbers in his favor in the morning attack-group planning 
meetings. There, Colson helped hatch plans and develop attack speeches that he said were 
approved inside the Oval Office. The special counsel knew how to play the game. When some 
Republican leaders complained about ―obnoxious‖ overkill, such as the relentless attacks over 
McGovern‘s plan to name Ramsey Clark as FBI director (sometimes even the president 
complained), Colson blamed the origin of the attack plan on the operation at 1701.
414
 Although 
Haldeman is often depicted as the sturdy chief of staff who guarded all access to the president, he 
not only did not control Colson‘s access but was in a competition for the president‘s time by 
1972.
415
  Through Colson, the president was able to have his hand (if he always knew the extent 
of it or not) in the middle of a litany of political malfeasance.
416
 Those in the media covering the 
White House understood that a star had risen and Haldeman‘s Berlin Wall appeared breached. 
As columnists Evans and Novak observed in early September, ―Colson is now the dominant 
tone-setter of that campaign. The only possible check against him is the all-powerful Haldeman, 
who now seems to totally approve of Colson.‖417 While the chief of staff certainly agreed with 
his positions and gave assent tacitly or otherwise, it is apparent that he was also wary of Colson‘s 
influence on the president. As Bill Safire noted, ―Haldeman‘s only real rival—for Nixon‘s time, 
and in the decision-making process—was Charles Colson.‖ Indeed, Haldeman wanted to know 
whenever Colson and the president had something cooking, and when the special counsel left his 
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office in the Old Executive Building, charging off to do the president‘s bidding, Haldeman took 
notice, ―determined not to let Colson end-run him with the Old Man.‖418  
 As a man who rubbed many staffers the wrong way, the change in the White House 
dynamic did not sit well with everyone. When Staff Secretary Bruce Kehrli sent out a request to 
the president‘s can-do man to follow up on a Nick Thimmesch article slamming McGovern, 
Colson‘s failure to respond in a timely fashion, and the ―quality‖ of the response sent the 
secretary through the roof. Dick Howard was the unfortunate emissary of the substance of 
Colson‘s work, the origin of which was a Presidential Action Memorandum, and thus bore the 
brunt of Kehrli‘s blunt response.  
 
The attached is a marvelous example of what we should never ever do for the rest of the campaign. We 
have received a Presidential action request. We have, of course, taken seven days to figure out a reason 
why not to comply with it. That in and of itself is unforgivable from here on out. Nothing that can be done 
in a day should take more than a day. There is no reason that this answer could not have been prepared a 
week ago. Moreover it is high time that we stopped figuring out reason[s] why we can‘t do things and 
decide ways in which we can do them. If I were the President I would fire Colson for sending this reply in . 
. . Let‘s get whoever wrote this and reorient his thinking entirely—think positive about how we can get the 
job done and not all of the reasons why we can‘t and let‘s think positively in hours not days.
419
 
 
According to Jeb Magruder, speechwriter Pat Buchanan, who had been with the president since 
the ‘68 campaign, ―felt some resentment‖ against some of those who came in after him and had 
gained more of the president‘s ear. Buchanan, a chief political strategist in 1972, was also a 
loner. He not only preferred to avoid staff meetings to work on speeches and supervise the daily 
news summaries for the president, but was wary of Colson‘s actions, referring to him as a 
―Massachusetts Liberal.‖420  The speed with which Colson‘s star had risen was alarming to those 
who had been around the president for much of his career in Washington. As Magruder recalled, 
―Colson became the only newcomer to gain the direct access to Nixon that Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, Kissinger, Mitchell, Shultz and Connally among others enjoyed.‖ While Colson‘s 
value as a political force of nature was in some ways indispensable to the team‘s efforts to retain 
the White House, the notable fault lines in his character had spread under everyone‘s feet.  ―I 
came to regard Colson as an evil genius,‖ Magruder wrote in his memoir. ―His brilliance was 
undeniable, but it was too often applied to encouraging Nixon‘s darker side, his desire to lash out 
at his enemies, his instinct for the jugular. I would have to say that—granting always Nixon‘s 
central responsibility for what happened in his administration—Colson was one of the men 
among his advisers most responsible for creating the climate that made Watergate possible, 
perhaps inevitable.‖421   
 It was from this ―climate‖ that the war for reelection inside the White House was waged. 
From the president who put people in position, from fiery take-no-prisoners strategists like 
Buchanan, misguided idealists like Magruder, to trend setters with a bullwhip like Colson, the 
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team went into the meat of the ‘72 reelection with a self-righteous stridency chased by a nasty 
bitter undercurrent. The singular goal was winning. The pressure was on the entire staff to push 
Democrat George McGovern into a corner from which there was no escape. In the execution of 
these tasks, Colson was relentless for results and he wanted them both perfect and ―yesterday.‖ 
Those within his earshot, even if they answered more directly to Haldeman, received an earful 
concerning the nature of their duties.  ―I am now convinced that we are not doing an adequate 
job of forcing Congressmen and Senators and/or challengers running against incumbents, to 
force their opponents to either support or disavow McGovern,‖ Colson insisted in a memo to 
Dick Howard. The special counsel wanted more than action, but measurable results. ―Until 
somebody can show me a complete breakdown, updated with names, I am not going to be 
satisfied that this job is well handled.‖ Colson was not at all concerned with browbeating to get 
his point across. As he made plain to Howard, he was not about to ―accept Jeb Magruder‘s glib 
assurances‖ that the job was going to get done to his satisfaction. Nixon‘s political man ordered 
Howard to get himself, Magruder, Joanne Gordon, Caukins, and Berentson into a meeting where 
he could lay down the law. ―Let‘s find out what in Christ has been done and who is going to do 
what from here on out.‖422 
 Part of running a tight ship was managing the message and killing embarrassing stories 
before they appeared. Plugging leaks was a constant preoccupation and Colson, for one, wanted 
those he believed responsible for leaks put down fast.  The special counsel was not the only one 
who believed the problems originated in the campaign‘s official headquarters at 1701 
Pennsylvania Avenue. In late August, both he and Haldeman were on the warpath to silence 
staffers talking to the press, especially when columnists Evans and Novak ended up with too 
much information about what went on in their early morning attack meetings. ―All signs very 
much point to 1701 on this one,‖ Colson suggested to Haldeman. ―Evans and Novak have a piece 
coming out on Sunday which details the whole 9:15 attack meeting and attack strategy here. 
Novak told me today that Evans had gotten the story, although Evans never called me. Novak 
implied that they had gotten their information from 1701.‖ Colson was soon on the phone to 
everyone in the regular morning meeting to find out who spoke to the columnists. As he wrote in 
a memo to Dick Howard, ―what all of this adds up to in my mind is that we have a serious leak 
somewhere and we damn well better find out or roll a few heads . . .‖423 
 Effective attacks meant an effective military-style run campaign organization, a 
relentless, regimented, and highly planned organizational structure that was a way of life for the 
former Marine, Chuck Colson. And if they liked it or not, it became a way of life for White 
House staff charged with attacking George McGovern. The typical day began early for those on 
the political strategy team as they pushed the attack on their Democratic rival. The main vehicle 
for this assault on George McGovern was a war of words through the use and manipulation of 
the media.  To carry their message to the people by way of their surrogates and the press, the 
Nixon administration established a counterattack group to strike out at the Democrats through 
the media and their surrogates in the field. The daily activities often began before 6:00 am with 
staffers undertaking a thorough scan of the morning papers, scissors in hand, including pulling 
stories hot off the morning wire services. The operation‘s foundation was a series of high-level 
meetings coupled with the dissemination and implementation of material brought forth from 
Mort Alin and Pat Buchanan‘s media operations.  Each morning at 8:00 am, there was a brief 
―great thoughts‖ for the day meeting with Haldeman and Colson, followed by a strategy meeting 
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at 8:15 am in Ehrlichman‘s office with Colson, Haldeman, and Clark MacGregor. Colson then 
related the guts of that high-level scrum to his aide Dick Howard, who briefed the counterattack 
group consisting of chair Ed Failor, some of Colson‘s men, including Dick Howard, and a writer 
(usually from the Buchanan operation) for their daily 15 minute meeting at 9:15 sharp, while 
Haldeman later briefed the president during their regular morning meeting.  On the heels of these 
White House meetings, writers put together the material for the surrogates in the field, while the 
RNC distributed all releases by congressmen and senators to all media outlets.
424
 Colson 
expected the attack material on the Democratic opposition from the speechwriters and strategists 
to be pushed directly onto the streets and appear in newspapers and on television by those 
directly in the counterattack operations. ―I would like each of them (Failor, Clawson, Buchanan, 
Koch, and Scali) to try to take the quotes and points out of here and get them into the hands of 
the press people who can push McGovern on these points.‖425 
 The ―press people‖ felt the daily pressure from above build as they headed into the dog 
days of summer. The chief political writers and strategists pushed their staff, who in turn 
pressured John Ziegler and his communication staffers, while Colson breathed down everyone‘s 
neck for more. Nixon‘s special counsel wanted information on the hour, and nothing less. His 
zealousness to go after the stories emanating in the press ruffled the feathers of the 
administration‘s press secretary more than once.  Colson was not pleased with the speed that he 
learned of information emanating out of White House briefing room, and wanted to install a 
phone line from the briefing room to Ken Clawson‘s office for immediate reports.  When Ziegler 
complained, Colson fired back. ―I think the attached [memo] is getting ridiculous. We are in no 
way trying to do anything with this request for a line but be able to be aware of events as they 
build up and get hot.‖ Colson complained that it was unacceptable for his men to wait ―until four 
or five hours,‖ as given the pace of the attack team, the special counsel insisted that it was too 
late as ―we may have already stuck our foot in our mouths.‖ Colson was adamant that they did 
not have the resources to send someone over to monitor each press briefing and needed timely 
information. Nixon‘s can-do man was adamant: ―Personally I don‘t quite understand your 
hangup with this request.‖426 
 Colson claimed that the president had made it perfectly clear to him early on that he was 
to do anything that was necessary to protect his interests.  ―I don‘t give a damn how it is done,‖ 
Colson recalled the president‘s angry words. ―I don‘t want to be told why it can‘t be done…I 
don‘t want excuses. I want results. I want it done, whatever the cost.‖ And while the president‘s 
outburst concerned plugging leaks, it appears that Colson used this to justify all acts on ―behalf‖ 
of the president.
427
 Special consultant to Richard Nixon, Leonard Garment, understood the 
dangerous dynamic created for the president with someone like Colson in his inner circle. 
Garment believed that there were those around Nixon ―who brought out in him and each other 
what I can only call a negative synergism—a set of negative qualities which, instead of canceling 
each other out, multiplied each other.‖428  Indeed, as Theodore White noted, ―the President‘s men 
saw no distinction between ends and means, and they were making war not just in Vietnam but 
all across the home front, too. All the disputes over home issues, as well as foreign issues, were 
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sucked into the vortex of ideological war; as in war, victory became the only goal and the means 
savage.‖ What helps explain this need was the undercurrent of culture wars, led by a new 
subculture that was undermining traditional values and threatened to destroy the nation, as they 
knew it.
429
  However, as Bill Safire pointed out, while there was not a classic ―groupthink‖ 
mentality in the White House about issues concerning foreign and domestic policy, ―where the 
inner circle‘s groupthink and paranoid style did reinforce each other disastrously was on 
attitudes, but nobody thought to guard against that.‖430 At the beginning of August, Bob 
Woodward and Carl Bernstein wrote in the Washington Post that $25,000 from the president‘s 
campaign ended up in bank account of one of the five Watergate burglars. On August 30, 
President Nixon told the nation that White House counsel John Dean‘s investigation into the 
Watergate burglaries revealed that no one from the administration or the White House was 
involved in that ―bizarre incident.‖431 
For the remainder of that peculiar campaign year, what the team did best was to manage 
(at least most of the time) to aim their guns outside their own tent, and focus its energies on the 
Democratic challenger, and that included the ubiquitous Charles Colson. As usual, it was Pat 
Buchanan who tried as best he could to remind everyone that the senator from South Dakota was 
the quarry. ―Again, the critical point is that just as McGovern ought to make ‗Nixon‘ the issue—
so the issue this fall is McGovern.‖ In a memo to Haldeman, Colson, and Ehrlichman, the 
speechwriter and strategist pointed out that the ―bottom line‖ was simple:  ―Will he and the hard-
core left-winger radicals who took over the party take over America . . . If the country goes to the 
polls in November, scared to death of McGovern, thinking him vaguely anti-American and 
radical and pro the left-wingers and militants, then they will vote against him—which means for 
us.‖  Going negative against an opponent was about to take on a whole new meaning. As 
Buchanan stressed, ―What we have done thus far, and fairly well, is not put the President thirty-
four points ahead—but McGovern thirty-four points behind.‖432 As Nixon‘s loyal fighters in the 
White House understood, the key to victory for the remaining weeks before Americans went to 
the polls was to stay on McGovern‘s back and keep the president of the United States out of his 
own campaign. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE ―FRONT-PORCH‖ CAMPAIGN 
 
In my view, intense campaigning will rejuvenate the McGovern camp, will bring us head to head with them 
on the networks every night, will energize partisan Democratic loyalties, will remind millions of people of 
the Candidate Nixon and will turn a landslide into a horserace.
433
  
 
ose Mary Woods sat at her desk in the West Wing of the White House in the third week of 
September 1972 with a growing unease. The discreet and dedicated Woods had been with 
the politician from California longer than anyone in the administration. Since 1951, she had 
ridden the buses, endured the long car rides from one end of California to the other, and gazed 
out the window at America during the lengthy train trips across the country. Woods dealt with 
smoky rooms, cramped campaign offices, and the predictable collection of hotels and motels 
through the boom and bust of Richard Nixon‘s long political career. For her years of ―savage 
support‖ Woods had expected her just reward, a valued seat at his side as the most loyal and 
closest political confident when he claimed the ultimate political prize back in 1968. Indeed, 
Woods was the new president‘s first staff appointment, but as personal secretary. It was Nixon‘s 
second appointment of Bob Haldeman as White House chief of staff in 1969 that changed things 
for the long-time Nixon loyalist. There was little question as to who was in charge of those 
around the president as the new administration settled into 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue in early 
1969. With Haldeman‘s growing influence, people no longer went through Woods to see the 
president as they were then filtered through Nixon‘s new number one. By 1972, Woods found 
herself moved away from her cherished seat just outside the doors of the Oval Office, and down 
the West Wing Hall. In the Nixon White House, where proximity often translated to influence, 
Woods may as well have been back in her hometown of Sebring, Ohio, for the level of insight 
she was afforded into the reelection effort in 1972. One day frustration welling, the secretary 
informed the Secret Service agent blocking her way into the Oval Office that he would need to 
use his sidearm to keep her from the president. In the shadow of the seat of power, Woods, who 
Nixon once described as ―virtually a part of the family‖; as ―Aunt Rose‖ to his daughters, Tricia 
and Julie, or ―the fifth Nixon,‖ was not only out of the inner circle but out of the loop as she 
stared with incredulity at the mounting pile of correspondence from across the nation. Woods did 
not like what she read.
434
 
 Had Nixon‘s faithful personal secretary been made aware of the political strategy hatched 
inside the Oval Office, she may have known what to make of the early complaints and concerns 
from the volunteers, organizers, and party members out in the field.  They were all waiting 
anxiously for the campaign to start and wondered what the ―hold up‖ was in the White House. 
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Woods‘ office was flooded with unsolicited advice and questions that she was at a loss to 
explain.  ―I am enclosing just three of many notes, calls, etc. I have been getting about the local 
campaign activity in various states,‖ Woods wrote in a memo to Haldeman. ―It seems it is 
impossible for people to get bumper stickers, pins, buttons, or any campaign literature.‖ Woods 
indicated to Haldeman that it was one thing that campaign paraphernalia was not getting out to 
the grassroots, but that there was a palpable fear that the sluggish or almost nonexistent 
campaign was going to cost them the reelection. ―Some of our friends in California are really 
becoming disturbed that we seem to be standing still.‖ One of the examples from Woods 
revealed a fear that the administration would lose important ground unless the White House 
came out swinging. ―Dear Mr. President: We‘ve been wondering when the Campaign will begin! 
McGovern is working, seemingly, day and night and crawling into every college, factory, club 
and neighborhood to peddle his trash—and seemingly his audiences are beginning to grow. 
Some of those seeds are taking root!‖ Letter writers worried that the public was less in love with 
the president than ―scared of McGovern.‖ The prospect that the president was losing his profile 
worried those writing to Nixon in the White House. ―Now, then we mustn‘t let McGovern get the 
advantage by sitting on our hands!‖ one disturbed supporter from Chicago wrote. ―Seemingly the 
Campaign (Republican) Committee has not awakened as yet! It‘s said the Campaign will start 
after Labor Day. What‘s holding it up?‖435 
 The ―hold up‖ can be tracked back through much of the spring and summer as Nixon‘s 
inner circle grappled with its new political footing for rolling out the effort to reclaim the 
presidency. Launching a campaign that was not supposed to look like a campaign had some staff 
unsure of how to proceed. In August, memos from junior staff on this issue were cut down 
sharply. Staffer Bob Teeter discovered this when he suggested that New York City would be ―an 
ideal place to kick off the campaign.‖ Chief of staff H.R. Haldeman circled the section in a 
flourish, replying in a bold black scrawl: ―We are not going to kick off the campaign.‖436 Indeed 
the operation initially struggled with the challenges of this non-traditional plan, between wanting 
to hold the reins of their attack dogs from going after their opponent too hard and too soon and 
actually allowing the campaign machinery in the field to bring Nixon‘s message to the voters. 
The delicate balancing act was keeping the president‘s ―record before the American public 
without over-exposing the candidate.‖437 
 Contributing to the slow start was a combination of internal bickering, disorganization, 
and a fear that aggressive overt measures might play into the hands of their enemies. The 
attitudes and personal relationships were often poisonous, tense associations were exacerbated by 
the logistical challenges surrounding the numerous attack operations, including the hiring of 
seven new political coordinators to handle specific regional headquarters, and to restructure 
training budgets and internal organization.
438
  In early August, aide Larry Higby was upset over 
the lack of coordination and leadership concerning election activities, especially the attack-
counterattack operations. Higby laid out his concerns to Haldeman in a lengthy memorandum 
that revealed a deep level of frustration. The main issue for the aide was that there was no central 
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point for coordination or guidance for the operations. The issue that most concerned Higby was 
that Colson had busied himself with so many other projects (including Democrats for Nixon) that 
he was not keeping his eye on what mattered. The reality, Higby wrote, was that Colson had 
abandoned his responsibilities to underlings. Even though the special counsel was supposedly 
one of the ―great thinkers‖ and ―grand strategists,‖ there was not near enough actual 
implementation. Higby believed that the White House attack operations should be run by Colson. 
―Essentially, like with any other operation, there needs to be someone in charge,‖ Higby stressed 
to the White House chief of staff. ―Ehrlichman is apparently pushing you for this position, but I 
would recommend that Colson is the person to use here and the person who should have been 
doing this all along. We need Colson‘s total involvement in implementation.‖ This included 
overseeing the surrogate scheduling and meeting with the attack group each morning to make 
sure the proper line of attack went out. ―Someone needs to make it clear to Colson that this is his 
job—not Dick Howard‘s, and that he had better start doing it.‖  
 In fact, Higby was challenging the White House chief of staff to channel Colson‘s 
awesome energy and amassed power in the ―right‖ direction. Higby recommended that 
Haldeman continue the ―great thoughts‖ 8:00 am meetings with Colson, but that they needed to 
reassess the terrain. Higby argued that Colson had been given all of the power but was failing to 
use it correctly, as he left it to subordinates while he went off doing other things. ―You may 
argue that in effect you are investing Colson with the power to set our line. This isn‘t really true. 
In fact, the contrary is true. You‘ve currently abdicated to him the power to totally set our line by 
default.‖ Colson, argued Higby, needed some direction on how to use this power to move the 
operation forward, believing that Haldeman was the only one with the authority to get Colson on 
track. The aide was blunt. ―You need to make it clear to [Colson] that he is in charge of the 
counterattack…‖ The internal politics on this was complicated, however, and Higby‘s attempt to 
steer Colson away from his project with John Connally and the Democrats for Nixon, would not 
be easy. Everyone knew that the reason that Colson was involved with a litany of projects was 
that the president of the United States wanted it that way. ―As you indicated, the most difficult 
part of this may be explaining it to the President,‖ Higby wrote. ―He‘s the one that gets Colson 
started—and once he is started there is no turning him off.‖439 
 The efforts to control the unwieldy power placed in Colson‘s hands by Haldeman and the 
president were obviously a difficult challenge. And the lines of communication over this issue 
were seldom clear as were the contradictions inherent when dealing with a potent weapon like 
Colson. As on July 20, 1972, just a few weeks prior to Higby‘s memorandum, Doug Hallet had 
written to Haldeman (as per Higby‘s request of July 19) asking for Colson to do the impossible 
by taking over most of the CREEP operations at 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue while still running 
his own White House operations. ―Combining the Colson interest-group operation with 1701‘s—
1701 would get lead responsibility—and it would also get Colson….Colson could take as many 
people from here as he needs, reorganize the operation, fire and hire people, etc. Malek would 
retain his administrative role, but Colson would have the lead in idea development and kicking 
ass. That is not all Colson would have. He‘d be Macgregor‘s deputy with authority to run all 
over the place.‖ Based on Higby‘s urging, Hallet suggested that the Democrats for Nixon 
operation report to Colson. It was important for a heavy-weight like the president‘s special 
counsel to be in charge of this important operation. ―I fear we are spending at lot of time talking 
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to, stroking, dining, and salivating over groups we know are going to support us anyway while 
ignoring the opportunity to expand our constituency.‖440 
 Colson was indeed off in numerous directions and his power led to sometimes chaotic 
organizational structures. There were, however, many layers of fur on this political animal that 
helped explain some of the concerns over Colson‘s influence. As far back as June, Gordon 
Strachan and Fred Malek were worried about the lack of leadership at the 1701 office because of 
the need for consistent and managerial authority. As Strachan explained, ―The real problem, 
which Malek discusses at length in the Overall Direction and Priorities sections, is for a tough, 
hard-driving, ass-kicking manager. Colson is filling this void in some way on particular projects, 
but this is a structurally unsound arrangement.‖ Strachan suggested that Malek wanted the job. 
The chief of staff was unimpressed, scratching on the document, ―how do you know?‖ and then 
circling Strachan‘s first paragraph, writing, ―Useless.‖441  
 Attacks on CREEP and the takeover of its operations from any leadership in the 
campaign were taking their toll before the end of the summer. When copies of one of 
McGovern‘s speeches did not come down the pike quick enough, Gordon Strachan was 
preparing for another body blow from the heavy hitters in the White House. The ―effectives of 
the 1701 organization‖ in the eyes of some was always under attack. As Strachan complained to 
Magruder, ―Jeb, I‘m not writing this to bitch and moan, but this is just the type of incident that 
sets up an Ehrlichman and Colson attack on 1701 to their increasing success.‖442 The White 
House was seldom happy with CREEP‘s handling of most of the field operations, including the 
storefronts organized or run by 1701. There were numerous internal documents lamenting 
CREEP‘s lack of structure, leadership, effectiveness, and professionalism, much of it blamed on 
John Mitchell‘s tenure, where there was no ―sense of urgency‖ but a ―great complacency.‖  A 
―confidential eyes only‖ memorandum indicated that Mitchell was not the ―charismatic, fast-
moving ass-kicking, general manager who first gives firm direction and then pushes people 
relentlessly in that direction.‖443 
 But Colson was an ass-kicker, and by September with Nixon‘s special counsel pulled 
(mostly willingly) back and forth between attack and strategy groups, and his fingers in every 
political pie, there was sometimes a lack of leadership and focus, especially for Democrats for 
Nixon. As Strachan then complained to Larry Higby, ―…there is no central focus for Connally 
and the Democrats for Nixon. No staff man who can report directly and exactly to Bob is in 
charge.‖ What Strachan wanted was for Higby to take over the Connally and Democrats for 
Nixon operation as he could ―control Colson [and] keep up to date on Bob‘s conversations with 
                                                 
440
 As per Larry Higby‘s request of July 19, Doug Hallett wrote to Haldeman on July 20, 1972, WHSF, Contested 
Files, Box 53, Nixon Library. 
441
 Memorandum from Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman, June 10, 1972, WHSF, Contested Files, Box 33, Nixon 
Library. 
442
 Memorandum from Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder, August 29, 1972, WHSF, Contested Files, Box 14, Nixon 
Library. 
443
 See undated Confidential Eyes Only, ―Campaign Organizational Problems,‖ WHSF, Contested Files, Box 35, 
Nixon Library. New campaign manager Clark MacGregor it seemed fared little better in controlling events beneath 
him, including speaking to unauthorized members of the media. As he indicated in a memo to his staff, ―From now 
on, no one but I will talk to any hostile reporter or any reporter from a historically hostile newspaper or magazine. 
This means no backgrounders by anyone at 1701 (except me) to anyone in the ‗hostile‘ categories.‖ Please see the 
memorandum from Clark MacGregor to Fred Malek, Jeb Magruder, Van Shumway, and Al Abrams, August 1, 
1972, Contested Files, WHSF, Box 35, Nixon Library.     
  120 
Connally.‖444 No one, however, was controlling Colson other than the president for more than a 
year, and the cracks were appearing around the edges and underneath the feet of the Nixon 
administration.  
Also contributing to the slow roll out for the beginning of the campaign was internal 
polling that showed the president building what looked like an insurmountable lead on George 
McGovern. On August 30, Haldeman walked into the Oval Office with ―a morose look‖ on his 
face. ―Bad news,‖ the White House chief of staff stated. ―I really mean it—it‘s really bad.‖ But 
Haldeman was teasing his boss, as in his hands where the latest Gallup Poll showing Nixon with 
a commanding 34 point lead over his Democratic challenger.
445
 As it turned out, though, the 
growing lead over McGovern was not good news as it detracted from the campaign‘s early 
momentum. After Labor Day with the president well ahead in the polls, the campaign 
organization discovered to its surprise that it had difficulty in recruiting volunteers to work the 
telephones as the lead had ―created considerable apathy‖ among the president‘s supporters. 
Apathy translated into alarm in the White House, and the new driving term became ―turnout,‖ 
one driven by voter identification and canvassing for the remainder of September and throughout 
October, especially in the battleground states.
446
 For the field campaign, the team decided to 
concentrate on the ―fundamental premise‖ that while Richard Nixon ―had sufficient support to 
win the election,‖ their efforts would have to identify and target ―favorable voters rather than 
persuading undecided voters and guaranteeing that the support was translated into votes on 
election day.‖ Turnout indeed became the operative term.447 In order to get people out to vote for 
Richard Nixon in November, the word went out directly from the Oval Office through Haldeman 
that there would be absolutely no talk of ―landslides or mandates,‖ rather, the message was that 
they were ―seeking a decisive majority.‖ There would be no ―reliance on polls‖ but a fight for 
every vote, taking their ―case to every state.‖ Above all, no one in the White House or at CREEP 
would be ―predicting any win.‖448  
 Even Charles Colson, who was so troubled by public opinion polls in the opening days of 
1972, knew by summer‘s end that they were going to win big in the fall. He also cautioned his 
men not to use the terms ―mandate‖ and ―landslide‖ in reference to Nixon‘s reelection. Colson 
wanted to hit this home in the talking points for the surrogates heading out on the campaign trail. 
―These are phrases that will merely frighten Democrats and worry a lot of people who think it‘s a 
bad thing for there to be a landslide,‖ Colson wrote. The special counsel was very aware of the 
impression some in the middle had about the nature of the Republican Party under Nixon‘s 
leadership, and thus was concerned that they would alienate those who wanted to reject 
McGovern as a possible president but were wary of a ―mandate‖ for the Nixon administration. 
―As we talk about mandate, landslide and Republican Congress, we tend to frighten these people 
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into not voting for us.‖ The message to the surrogates was that any boasting about what would 
happen on Election Day would be ―counterproductive.‖449  
 Despite these worries and delays, the immense campaign machine, which had initially 
sputtered, finally had begun to roll and roared to life with nationwide canvassing and surrogates 
out in fifty local headquarters in the country, helping to drive a massive grassroots campaign. 
The local storefront operations were charged with voter identification, registration, and 
turnout.
450
 The campaign in the field was actually among the most well organized in modern 
electoral history. Using a comprehensive system of voter contact, the team hoped to capitalize on 
the president‘s high visibility and familiarity to voters. The decision from the morning strategy 
meetings was to maximize individual voter contact through door-to-door canvassing, telephone 
canvassing, and targeted mailing in all large and key battleground states. The efforts were 
coordinated through the use of a list of registered voters in a computerized data bank. The team 
cross-referenced household information and other demographics to target specific mail outs, and 
also the use of telephones and door-to-door operations. All information gathered was analyzed 
and dumped back into the computer. The team was especially interested in targeting potential 
Democratic voters who would vote for Nixon. At the local level, door-to-door canvassing and 
informal telephone centers targeted favorable supporters rather than scores of undecided voters. 
The main assumption going in from Buchanan and his team was that the surrogate program 
would be highly effective. The surrogates‘ job was to reach voters ―while controlling the 
exposure to the candidate.‖ The group of about three-dozen, including cabinet ministers, 
senators, congressmen, and selected members of the White House staff, were scheduled 
throughout the states for the duration of the campaign. The plan was simple: attack the 
Democratic leader and present the president‘s record in a positive light and get both into the 
media‘s hands.  All of this, as Buchanan recalled, allowed the president ―to remain above the 
day-to-day campaign.‖ One of the aims was to goad McGovern into taking on the surrogates, 
which would reinforce ―his image as a second-level political figure.‖451 
 The surrogate operation targeted older citizens, African-Americans, farmers, youth, as 
well as Spanish-speaking and Jewish Americans. The main get-out-the-vote targets were 
California, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, New Jersey, Maryland, 
and Connecticut.  Local advertising was geared toward emphasizing Nixon‘s ―competence and 
incumbency,‖ while raising doubts about McGovern‘s competency and his polices. The plan was 
to ―legitimize‖ for Democrats ―the idea of voting for a Republican President‖ through the 
Democrats for Nixon program. From September 25 to October 30 telephone polling allowed the 
team to identify target states, while large-capacity computers looked for concentrations of blue 
collar workers by income, race, age, and occupation. The combined polling and demographic 
techniques were designed to find the ―Peripheral Urban Ethnics.‖  According to Buchanan‘s 
strategy, their team‘s computer mapping revealed rings around every metropolitan area. The first 
ring was the black underclass, followed by their target: the ring that included the ―blue collar, 
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middle income, Democratic voters, of European ethnic background.‖ According to Buchanan‘s 
research team, previous voting trends revealed that George Wallace had gained much of his 
support in 1968 from this ring. In 1972, their polling showed that these voters were close to the 
president because of his stand on social issues including crime, drugs, and busing in the south, 
that Haldeman, Colson and Nixon had been playing on for nearly two years. These results helped 
firm up the strategy to give ―high priority to the ethnic precincts and to target them for the voter 
contact program.‖452 
 The central campaign, though, was run out of the White House, controlled by Nixon‘s 
savvy media men with Haldeman ―at the top of the pyramid,‖ and Buchanan as the chief 
wordsmith and the one most responsible for placing the words in the mouths of the surrogates on 
the trail. He analyzed McGovern‘s positions and prepared the ―assault books‖ on the 
opposition‘s top dog. Colson was the operation‘s goad, and the president‘s eyes and ears in all 
meetings, especially the morning ones as the attack and counter-attack groups searched media 
stories, creating material that appeared in the daily action memorandums and White House 
talking points and attack lines against their opponents. With McGovern‘s national poll numbers 
starting to slip badly, the president‘s men remained cognizant of inadvertently helping the 
senator out of his hole. They planned to avoid all direct attacks on the media and avoid behaving 
in a manner that could alienate potential Democratic voters. McGovern and his ―radical‖ polices 
and ―extremist‖ pals were the target. As Buchanan had stressed in a memo for the president file, 
the term ―McGovernite‖ served to separate ―the McGovern types from the regular Democrats.‖ 
The word from Nixon was to capture more ―Democrats for Nixon‖; the team needed to ―isolate 
McGovern from the Party regulars.‖453  
To keep McGovern on the defensive, and ―to coordinate public relations efforts against 
him,‖ the Attack Group continued to meet each morning to plan tactics for the day. This group 
orchestrated the attack plans of the Communications Division, the surrogate speakers, the White 
House staff, the vice president and the Republican National Committee. The Communications 
Division prepared press releases, speeches, audio feeds for radio, television film, and aided in 
implementing the attack plans, as well as publicizing the ―positive side of the President‘s 
record.‖454 As planned in the early summer when the South Dakotan began to take the lead in the 
Democratic field, Nixon‘s men seized upon every utterance that McGovern had made in order to 
dog him with charges of ―amnesty, abortion, and acid.‖ Buchanan‘s research men flooded media 
outlets with McGovern‘s comments. ―Well, if I were President, there wouldn‘t be demonstrators 
like that,‖ McGovern said in regards to protestors outside the gates of the White House objecting 
to a widening of the war in Indochina. ―Those people would be having dinner at the White House 
instead of protesting outside.‖455  Or as he told the Associated Press in June, 1972, ―I‘ve said 
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many times that the Nixon policy on Indochina is the most barbaric action that any country has 
committed since Hitler‘s effort to exterminate Jews in Germany in the 1930s.‖456  
In September 1971, McGovern told an audience in Los Angeles that he was ―going to end 
this war and I‘m going to declare a general amnesty for everyone who has resisted it.‖457  For 
Nixon‘s men, such utterances were pure campaign gold. They knew that they owned the Vietnam 
issue, and that their target voters would trust the president to make an ―honorable peace‖ with 
North Vietnam rather than a ―radical‖ whom those on Hanoi radio already stated they preferred 
to be in the White House. 
458
 
As Buchanan had noted for the president‘s file, the plan was to wage ―the most intensive 
campaign in history . . .; we are going to carry the fight to them. Don‘t let him off the hook on 
his positions—make him say he has changed his mind.‖ The key to a decisive victory was to 
lower ―McGovern around the necks of the Democratic candidates‖ at each opportunity. They 
would play on the senator‘s ―idiotic statements and force the Democrats to repudiate them. Get 
them to run away from him. We are ‗campaigning on issues‘ not personalities.‖459 And the 
strategy had worked, as Buchanan later wrote. ―Throughout the campaign, one consistent game-
plan was followed. That was to keep McGovern identified with his earlier statements and never 
let him get off the defensive.‖ As a result the senator ―was never able to position himself firmly 
on the right side of a policy issue.‖460  
 One of the reasons that McGovern always appeared to be on the defensive was that since 
the summer, he had suffered from a constant assault from the nation‘s press.  Throughout the 
campaign, the target of the media‘s wrath was clearly the Democratic nominee. By July, 
McGovern had taken such a beating in the media that a headline in the Chicago Journalism 
Review suggested that McGovern could not win the election ―because Evans and Novak won‘t 
let him.‖ The popular column, written by Roland Evans and Bob Novak (syndicated in 300 
papers across the nation), routinely eviscerated McGovern. In numerous articles from as early as 
March 1972, the columnists painted the politician as part of a ―fringe‖ movement. Even the hated 
New York Times hit McGovern hard just prior to his party‘s convention. McGovern‘s positions, 
warned the Times, ―Alarm Big Donors on Wall Street. Democratic Supporters May Withhold 
Their Backing or Switch to Nixon.‖461 New York Times columnist Tom Wicker, along with 
Stewart Alsop of Newsweek, rarely ran anything positive on McGovern. Wicker railed against 
McGovern on his flip-flopping and lack of any credibility on the economy.
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Washington Post wrote that McGovern lacked the ―capacity to govern,‖ was incapable of 
handling staff, showed no ability to ―manage big affairs,‖ and appeared to ―have no way of doing 
things independent of his staff.‖463 And the polls largely bore this out. This was especially true 
with the American public‘s confidence in McGovern‘s ability to bring about a satisfactory end to 
the war. A Harris Poll of 1648 likely voters nationwide between October 24 and 26 (at a time 
when the administration had a lot of favorable press over Kissinger‘s negotiations on a peace 
accord in Vietnam), showed that the administration had increased its lead to 60-32, the highest it 
had been since March, when it was only one percentage point lower.
464
  
 Despite this, Haldeman and Nixon always claimed to be upset with the press coverage 
their side received. In his notes taken in the Oval Office beside the president, the chief of staff 
scrawled instructions to Alexander Haig and Henry Kissinger, ―Do nothing for CBS this week. 
Return no calls—period. An order.‖ And to John Ziegler, ―No CBS or [Washington] Post.‖465 
Colson too was often incensed at the media, and often it was not necessarily the actual material 
relevance of the case, but just that he felt that many members of the press corps were out to ―get‖ 
the president.  ―Since our conversation this morning of UPI, my temper has not cooled in the 
slightest. I really think on this one UPI owes an apology to the President. Whatever you do, don‘t 
drop this one. UPI has been zinging us almost daily and it might be well if someone made an 
issue of this.‖466 As Colson noted, the New York Times was ―appalling‖ in its coverage of the 
president. The special counsel often railed about the Times to anyone who would listen, 
especially members of his staff. ―It is obvious the Times just isn‘t going to give us a fair break,‖ 
Colson wrote to Clawson. ―I think you ought to make damn sure they know that we are watching 
and are bothered by it—bothered, hell! We are incensed! . . . Maybe we should make this ‗Dump 
on the New York Times Week.‘‖ The Washington Post seldom fared any better. ―The attached is 
bullshit!‖ Colson roared in reaction to a column by George Lardner criticizing the president for 
his lack of aid for parochial schools while giving McGovern a pass on his stance on the same 
issues. ―Once again let‘s raise hell with the Post.‖467  Indeed, Nixon‘s staff had a long history of 
teeing off on reporters. On a train ride during the 1960 presidential election campaign, Rose 
Mary Woods dumped a drink on the head of a journalist who wrote articles she didn‘t like.468  
Surprisingly, however, Colson actually appeared to relish the notoriety the press had 
given him in the corridors outside the Oval Office. The special counsel even went as far as to 
confirm the worst stories attributed to him in the press. ―I can well understand that many of you 
may have gotten the wrong impression of me since so many erroneous things have found their 
way into print lately,‖ Colson wrote to members of the White House staff. ―Just so you 
understand me, let me point out that the statement in last week‘s UPI story that I was once 
reported to have said that ‗I would walk over my grandmother if necessary‘ is absolutely true.‖469 
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 For all of the criticism against the media, the team used the friendly journalists as a 
matter of routine to get their message out.   Buchanan‘s files contain several memos to various 
members of the press corps indicating how to shape Republican arguments against McGovern. 
As Buchanan suggested to Paul Martin from U.S. News & World Report (at his request), that 
since Catholics and white ethnic voters (Irish, Italian, Polish, Slavic, etc,) ―are very family 
oriented and neighborhood oriented,‖ they would see ―the McGovern emphasis on forced 
integration of housing and schools…as threats to their way of life.‖  As the strategist 
emphasized, these Americans are very patriotic, and ―view McGovern as associated with flag-
burners and Viet Cong sympathizers.‖  What Buchanan always liked to drive home was that 
these citizens resented being ―the butt of jokes of the radical chic, the Polish jokes, the Italian 
jokes, the scorn of the Park Avenue revolutionaries—and McGovern is surrounded by their 
cultural adversaries.‖470 
 Indeed, media attacks became good for business. Colson believed that any attack against 
the Nixon administration—no matter the source—should be used as an ―opportunity‖ to attack 
the Democratic nominee on the campaign trail. ―Use it as an excuse to create a news forum to 
make a charge against McGovern,‖ Colson wrote in a note on September 8. ―Don‘t be concerned 
whether the charge is relevant to his attack which promotes our counterattack.‖471  The 
McGovern campaign also provided a lot of grist for the mill for Nixon‘s team and members of 
the media. Planting story ideas with friendly journalists and editors and then using the results for 
fuel for talking points on the campaign trail became as common as breakfast.  While the charge 
was often that the media was against the Nixon administration, it had plenty of allies in the 
national and regional press. Colson and Buchanan‘s operation spent fruitful time gathering 
articles that aided in their portrayal of McGovern as a dangerous radical at odds with the nation‘s 
morals and values. McGovern‘s campaign white paper sent to the media on October 7 attacking 
Nixon‘s record on individual rights while supporting polices to end the harassment and 
discrimination against groups including homosexuals brought about a great deal of attention, and 
little of it positive.  
 McGovern‘s position on ending discrimination in obtaining insurance, housing, and 
dishonorable discharges from the military for gays, to some observers, placed the senator on the 
far left of the political spectrum. On this point, the campaign always had a willing friend in 
William Loeb, the publisher of the Manchester Union Leader. ―Not only is George McGovern 
supported by all the revolutionary scum in the United States—those who have attempted 
revolutionary violence not only in our streets but also in our courts and to our laws are almost 
100 per cent behind McGovern—but note also that the homosexuals are there too,‖ Loeb wrote 
in an editorial. ―This newspaper has never heard George McGovern repudiate the support for the 
revolutionaries or the homosexuals, so he can‘t blame the voters if they judge him accordingly.‖ 
The Democratic nominee‘s support for ―male and female homosexuals, revolutionaries, and draft 
dodgers,‖ needed to be repudiated. Three weeks before the general election, the paper made it 
clear that the American people should not support George McGovern. Loeb doubted why any 
American would support the Democrat now that ―everyone else knows what Senator McGovern 
really stands for.‖472 While Loeb and his publication were not exactly indicative of the national 
media, the substance of his message was actually penned by several members of the more 
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mainstream press, including Joseph Kraft, Nick Thimmesch, Robert Novak, Roland Evans, 
Clayton Fritchey, Crosby S. Noyes, Jack Rosenthal, and Stewart Alsop.
473
 McGovern could not 
have been happy with the press coverage during the campaign. As columnist Mary McGrory 
wrote, ―the feeling grows that McGovern against Richard Nixon is Boris Spassky against Bobby 
Fischer.‖ McGovern, she pointed out, ―drones along in a reedy monotone‖ while stepping ―on 
his good lines and wanders off into marshy subordinate clauses.‖ The New York Times‘ Anthony 
Lewis told his readers that McGovern is ―turning off his own supporters‖ with an ―aura of 
bumbling,‖ including the senator‘s ―on-again-off-again welfare and tax proposals, the Eagleton 
fiasco and his current desperate flailings about everything under the sun.‖ 474  
By the middle of summer, the Wall Street Journal was referring to Nixon‘s opposition as 
the ―McGovernites,‖ instead of the Democrats.475 As historian Stanley Kutler pointed out, ―The 
media remained useful to Nixon as an instrument for manipulation as well as an object of public 
scorn.‖476 Even the Washington Post ―muted its editorial attacks‖ on Nixon in November.477 
McGovern never complained so much about his own press coverage but rather about how it 
differed fundamentally from the president‘s. ―I was subjected to the close, critical reporting that 
is a tradition in American politics…Yet Mr. Nixon escaped a similar scrutiny. The press never 
really laid a glove on him.‖478  
 Throughout the fall campaign, Nixon and his men kept swinging their gloves at the 
senator from South Dakota. The attacks were relentless.  The team worked intently on 
connecting McGovern to ―radicals‖ and those they believed were out of touch with the 
mainstream of American political thought. When McGovern floated the name of former 
Attorney General Ramsey Clark to replace the late J. Edgar Hoover as director of the FBI, the 
word from the White House to the surrogates was that electing McGovern would ―run the risk of 
placing the F.B.I. in the hands of a milquetoast like Ramsey Clark whom Mr. Hoover himself 
called a ‗jellyfish‘ and a ‗softie‘ before he died.‖ McGovern‘s interest in the controversial Clark 
was not only ―naïve‖ but ―dangerous.‖479 Smelling blood, Colson eagerly jumped all over the 
Clark issue. The political operative wanted a sustained series of attacks on the Democratic 
nominee over Clark as the Bureau‘s director. ―Let‘s keep kicking hell out of McGovern on this,‖ 
blasted Colson in a memo to Dick Howard. ―We need to constantly remind people . . . Let‘s be 
sure in our discussions during our 9:15 meetings, that we are constantly seeking opportunities to 
exploit this point.‖480  
 One of the opportunities was to dig up dirt on the McGovern family. Among the targets 
was McGovern‘s daughter Susan, whose marriage to James Rowan, described as ―a bearded, 
self-proclaimed Socialist revolutionary,‖ provided even more ammunition. Staffers were 
especially interested when the White House Social Office could find no mention of Susan by the 
family nor was she photographed with any members of the nominee‘s family. ―Apparently,‖ Ed 
Harper wrote, it was ―because she has chosen to become a part of what is sometimes termed ‗the 
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counter culture.‘‖481 The team‘s guns were aimed in all directions, including at George 
McGovern‘s replacement for the disgraced Senator Eagleton on the vice presidential ticket. 
Kennedy cousin and the first director of the Peace Corps, Robert Sargent Shriver, soon learned 
what it was like to be a marked man. Whereas the original plan was to largely ignore both the 
arrival and significance of Shriver, and focus on McGovern, things changed after a long 
conversation Chuck Colson had with the president on the morning of September 12.  Following 
that, Nixon suggested to Haldeman that they could make use of the ―liability‖ that the 
Democratic running mate presented and ―start cracking him.‖ Within a few days, Haldeman 
scrawled onto his yellow legal pad, ―Shriver—destroy him—his credibility on VN [Vietnam] 
peace issue.‖ The thrust in the Oval Office conversation with the president was that attacking 
Shriver‘s lack of knowledge about Southeast Asia was a winning tactic, one that they needed to 
keep ―alive long enough to kill him.‖ The goal was to ―tie [Ramsay Clark] to McGovern then tie 
Clark and Shriver together as [a] double-edged hoax turning VN for political purposes.‖482 
 However, despite these musings about actual policy differences, the attack on Sargent 
Shriver took on a life of its own, as the team used some more sensational material that they had 
mined just a few weeks earlier. An operative was sent to Shriver‘s Alma mater, Yale, to sift 
through anything that the candidate may have written. The team was especially interested in 
anything Shriver may have penned for the America First Movement in 1940-41. The plan was to 
turn anything they found directly over to the ―hated‖ media.483 This included a whole host of 
slips and misstatements. When Shriver used a poor choice of words concerning Civil War 
veterans, the attack team made sure his utterances hit southern papers. Speaking before labor 
leaders in Rock Island, Illinois, on October 2, Shriver was making the case for amnesty for 
deserters, and used Abraham Lincoln‘s amnesty for Confederate soldiers after the war as an 
example. His idea was that if the nation could forgive those who killed ―Yankees with guns, you 
know—killing—not deserters or conscientious objectors, but traitors—fighting on the other 
side,‖ then how could it not forgive American citizens who did not take up arms against anyone. 
The attack team portrayed Shriver‘s unfortunate choice of words as a slight against all those who 
fought on the side of the Confederacy, by belittling them as ―traitors.‖ It was a way to turn the 
argument on amnesty on its head while driving a wedge between Southern voters and the 
Democratic Party.  
 The reaction was predictable. Georgia Congressman Fletcher Thompson blasted Shriver. 
―I bitterly resent Shriver putting the people in the South who fought to defend their homeland in 
the same category with those who deserted this country and fled rather than do their duty.‖ 
Shriver was not only painted as an enemy of the South but as someone unpatriotic to the core, 
not even knowing the words to the National Anthem. When speaking on the stump in early 
October, Shriver ended his speech with ―the home of the free and the land of the brave.‖ As the 
press release indicated, ―Any school child can tell you that the final words of the Star Spangled 
Banner are ‗the land of the free and the home of the brave.‘ . . . This isn‘t too alarming, however, 
because the ticket which wants to fly the American flag upside down in South Vietnam should be 
expected to get the words of the National Anthem backwards.‖ 484 
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 Among the smears was to point out that Shriver came from a slave-holding family in 
Maryland, and that their lives of luxury were earned off the backs of indentured servants. The 
releases included sound bites on the mementoes in the Shriver family home in Maryland, such as 
the kitchen bells ―used to summon the slaves and indentured servants,‖ and handbills printed by 
David Shriver in 1809 offering $30 for a runaway slave. Nixon‘s men were all over Shriver‘s 
comment that none of his ancestors fought on the side of the Union when traveling in the Deep 
South. The line for speeches was that ―Mr. Shriver boasted that of eight of his forebears of 
military age during the Civil War, six had served on Dixie‘s side and two stayed home, but ‗none 
of them fought on the other side.‘‖ The August 31 release to the media tried to paint Shriver as 
the worst kind of bigot to black voters. As the surrogate and media brief indicated, ―One must 
wonder if Mr. Shriver also approves so highly of the slaveholdings of his ancestors which today 
makes his aristocratic life so comfortable and continues to make the lives of millions of blacks of 
bare subsistence.‖485   
 Internal memorandums, however, revealed the cynicism over any sensitivity in the black 
community. The team knew there was much more electoral cash in racial fear and loathing in the 
south than in the black vote. As Dick McCormack wrote to Pat Buchanan,  
 
Passed the Watergate McGovern headquarters the other day and noticed a striking new poster—Hands that 
Pick Cotton Can Now Pick Our Leaders—Vote McGovern. Depicted is a long black arm reaching out 
toward a cotton ball. This may be a dandy at the Watergate and at the corner of 14
th
 and R St. But can you 
imagine the impact of the poster at every Southern court house, every Union Hall, every ethnic club, in 
every Cicero, Ill? Why don‘t we have some of the boys duplicate that poster and give it wider circulation 
than the Democrats intended. Both our ‗heritage‘ organizations and Demos for Nixon would be ideal for 
vehicles for distribution.
486
  
 
There were several levels of political attacks underway against the Democrats, though, setting up 
ways of separating the Democrats from each other and from their base, and some of these had 
been underway since the spring.  Among the strategies was to have staff assistant to the president 
on Ehrlichman‘s Domestic Council staff, Sallyanne Payton, do research on the black vote as part 
of the team‘s re-election strategy. As Payton‘s memorandum suggested, ―Make the democrats 
look bad. Our objective here is to get the black vote to stay at home in November. The principal 
Democratic candidates—Muskie, Humphrey, McGovern—have no particular image in the black 
community and inspire no particular enthusiasm. Their strength will come from an anti-Nixon 
vote. It is therefore critical to avoid having a large black turnout. The strategy must be to make 
the Republican and Democratic parties look like Tweedledum and Tweedledee.‖ On April 17, 
1972, Ehrlichman forwarded the document to Haldeman for a look.  Ehrlichman suggested that 
the chief of staff ―give it to Fred Malek or whoever has the operational responsibility for this sort 
of thing.‖487 Not surprisingly, the Washington Post‘s William Raspberry believed that Nixon 
cared little about civil rights or any other issues faced by black Americans. The president, he 
argued, ―isn‘t about the business of eliminating black people. He‘s about the business of ignoring 
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them, leaving them to their natural enemies.‖ Raspberry noted that Nixon appealed to ―the baser 
instincts of people who see black progress as inimical to their own interests.‖488   
 The daily attack group meetings at 9:15 am had made it clear that there was to be nothing 
hysterical or ―emotional‖ in tenor in response to attacks. Any ―whining‖ would make them 
appear like their Democratic rival. The goal was to keep McGovern looking like the one 
engaging in ―shrill‖ attacks. The vice president breaking ranks would be counterproductive and 
would send the wrong message, one that could be used against them in the media. Therefore, 
when McGovern blasted the Nixon administration before the United Press International editors‘ 
meeting in early October, suggesting that it was the most corrupt administration in American 
history, the word was to ―turn the other cheek,‖ and not respond. But as Rowland Evans and 
Robert Novak indicated, ―Agnew didn‘t get the word.‖ Colson bristled when the vice president 
blasted back while on the stump in Rapid City, South Dakota, letting loose with what members 
of the media called an ―emotional‖ attack on the Democratic leader. Colson was livid and sent 
word down the internal wire that decisions in the 9:15 am mornings were the law and surrogates, 
no matter who they were, were ―to fall in line.‖489 
 A memo from Buchanan to the president the next day, however, suggested that the ranks 
were not too upset about Agnew‘s comments and their ultimate meaning for the election. As 
Buchanan wrote, ―With four weeks to go the political situation seems to have stabilized.‖ The 
speechwriter knew that McGovern was bleeding; indeed, according to the polls, the Democratic 
candidate was ―hardly moving at all, according to [Lou] Harris.‖490 Interestingly, just days 
earlier, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein ran a story in the Washington Post alleging that John 
Mitchell had controlled a secret campaign fund, with implications that it may have been 
somehow connected to the break-in at the Watergate, even though the piece admitted that a grand 
jury ―did not establish that the intelligence-gathering fund directly financed the illegal 
eavesdropping.‖ Despite the sensationalism of this story mere weeks before Americans went to 
the polls, media scrutinizers within the White House, like Pat Buchanan, knew that it meant little 
to their reelection efforts.
491
 What concerned Buchanan at that point was that many of those who 
told Lou Harris they supported Nixon might stay home on Election Day. He, like others, worried 
about an ―apathetic electorate and the low turnout.‖  The political strategist thought that there 
was a kind of irony in the electoral salad they faced, as where once the ―liberal press‖ had 
suggested that the ―aroused and alienated electorate‖ would go for ―McGovern‘s kind in 
politics,‖ the reality now was that it looked like Nixon was going to capture the disaffected and 
their own traditional voting bloc might stay home. Despite this prospect, it did not lend itself to a 
change in strategy for the president‘s team. As Buchanan noted, ―There seems to be some truth 
in the possibility of a low turnout [and] over-confident Republicans. . .We ought to be giving this 
problem serious consideration—although I do not believe it at all calls for RN to hit the stump at 
this point in time.‖  The watchful strategist worried, though, that the entire strategy might 
backfire, as they would not be able to fight back against ―smears‖ in the press on the president. 
Buchanan always lamented about the media. It was in his nature. At issue was that he believed 
that an angry press would charge that Nixon had used the White House to his unfair advantage, 
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and worse, that the president would be criticized for ―ignoring the issues, playing above-the-
battle, refusing to ‗engage‘ in campaign debate … and appears headed for a landslide.‖ While all 
of this was quite true, Buchanan was concerned that members of the media would do what they 
could ―to see the gap closed‖ between the candidates. In his office in the Old Executive Office 
Building, Buchanan and his men held their breath and concluded that the focus of the last few 
weeks of the campaign of 1972 would remain on ―McGovern‘s screw-ups and incompetence and 
his radicalism.‖ Despite his instincts, and those of his boss, the loyal strategist and speechwriter 
stressed that ―the President should stay out of the attack business altogether.‖492  
 
**** 
 Less than a week later, Buchanan was worried about the past coming back to haunt them, 
and fired off an administratively confidential political memorandum to Haldeman, Colson, and 
Ehrlichman. His concern was that the team not ―freeze the ball‖ just because they enjoyed a 
―twenty-odd point lead, and three and half weeks to go—as we did in 1968.‖ Seemingly 
forgetting about earlier memos concerning developing better relations with the press, Buchanan 
suggested that one way to keep the fires going without burning the president was to attack the 
Washington Post ―head-on‖ over its investigations into Watergate, which Buchanan called 
―desperate‖ and ―last-ditch‖ efforts to ―smear‖ the president before the election. Knowing that 
Nixon would stay out of the fight, the speechwriter was on a charge. As he reminded Haldeman, 
Colson, and Ehrlichman, ―The next ten days are crucial to breaking the back of the McGovern 
campaign; we ought not to be holding back material now.‖493 Three days later, Buchanan sent 
yet another memo to Haldeman and Colson looking to attack McGovern by taking ―out ads in all 
major black publications attacking McGovern for taking blacks for granted.‖ He also wanted the 
president photographed at religious services to counteract charges of corruption in the 
Washington Post. Haldeman was not impressed with either idea. Trying to keep the lid on his 
more emotional men, the White House chief of staff simply scrawled on the memo in reply, ―I 
disagree on both. H.‖494 
 With less than a month left to go before Americans went to the polls, however, Chuck 
Colson was still charging around the White House and down the hallways of the Old Executive 
Office Building, cracking the whip. As he reminded Henry Cashen, ―There are still 28 days left 
and plenty of time for a lot more exploiting.‖ The president‘s very special counsel wanted to 
impress upon all staff that doing for the president was the only thing that mattered, and that they 
were to think of ―ways in which you can wake up in the morning and say to yourself, ‗What will 
I do today to help re-elect the President.‘‖495  As the remaining opportunities to close the gap 
disappeared between him and the president, it was becoming apparent that there was little 
George McGovern could do to make up ground. Even sports prognosticator ―Jimmy the Greek‖ 
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gave Herb Klein 15 to 1 odds that the president would prevail over McGovern on election day. 
The reason was that Americans considered him not a Democrat but a ―McGovernite.‖ Klein 
prepared a memo on the subject for the president. Nixon liked it and scribbled in the margin for 
Klein to show it to Colson, a request with which the communications man promptly complied.
496
  
 Inside the war for the White House, it had become clear that there were tremendous 
strains that resulted from leaving the president out of the fight. There was a great deal of tension 
regarding the policy of the president remaining above the fray, especially with only a few weeks 
left before Americans cast their ballots. Colson was feeling the pressure from the troops at the 
regular morning meetings in the White House, as there was growing disagreement over their 
chosen course of action. As Colson pointed out to Haldeman, ―There were 11 people at the 8:15 
meeting and 11 different opinions.‖ Colson, however, did not mind telling everyone that there 
was only one way, and that was not subject to debate. ―MacGregor is absolutely furious that I 
raised the subject and was as angry as I have ever seen him.‖ The special counsel to the president 
informed the White House chief of staff that MacGregor, Klein, Weinberger, and Ehrlichman 
were adamant that Nixon get out of the White House and do more ―presidential events.‖ Not 
surprisingly, Colson found himself fencing with Ehrlichman again, suggesting to Haldeman that 
the president‘s chief domestic adviser ―continued to make the point that there are innumerable 
opportunities for ‗Presidential‘ campaign appearances but when pressed couldn‘t name a specific 
single one.‖ Colson cared even less for Clark MacGregor‘s input. ―The big argument comes from 
MacGregor that our 1 million volunteers need to be charged up and need to know that the 
President is working and campaigning.‖ What angered Colson the most was the idea that having 
the president out on the stump would counter stories on Watergate. As the special counsel 
fumed, ―That is absolute bullcrap.‖  Colson knew that little was to be gained by a late campaign 
run when they were so far ahead in the polls. ―In my view, intense campaigning will rejuvenate 
the McGovern camp, will bring us head to head with them on the networks every night, will 
energize partisan Democratic loyalties, will remind millions of people of the Candidate Nixon 
and will turn a landslide into a horserace.‖ Colson, though, understood the pressure that 
MacGregor was under, and knew that John Mitchell had his ear to the ground on partisan 
discontent, yet he remained at a loss to explain the attitude of the person who was supposedly the 
president‘s key domestic adviser. ―Ehrlichman I can‘t explain,‖ Colson wrote. In the end, the 
special counsel was letting Haldeman know that he was looking out for the president and that 
appearances be damned. ―In short, there was no consensus on anything except that I was the 
skunk at this morning‘s lawn party….Let the media bitch like hell that we are hiding in the 
White House.‖497  
 The president of course was neither hiding nor alone on Pennsylvania Ave. The plan that 
was hatched in the dark days following the 1970 midterm elections was working, and those in 
Nixon‘s inner circle did not want to have a disaster at the 11th hour. The internal tension 
increased over concerns that a few well positioned mistakes could sink their political ship. When 
Haldeman got wind that staffers Gordon Price and Henry Dent had sent letters of best wishes to 
state Republican candidates over the president‘s signature and sought permission to do more 
through Gordon Strachan, the chief of staff was furious. Higby had tipped Haldeman off with a 
note in pen: ―Apparently Harry Dent has the power to decide who the President endorses.‖ 
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Unfortunately, some of the campaign letters of best wishes had already gone out. Haldeman 
naturally was furious, and scrawled back to Strachan, ―Dent or Price has no authority to issue 
endorsements.‖498 Haldeman had been hearing it from numerous sources inside the White House 
that they needed to keep the lid on errors in the last few weeks of the campaign. Even Buchanan 
assistant Ken Khachigian was warning the chief of staff of the dangers. ―For God‘s sake, let the 
word go out to all staff that the smallest mistake of judgment could foul everything.‖499   
 But things never turned around for McGovern and the attacks from the Nixon camp never 
let up. That fall, there was no question around the White House concerning how to handle their 
Democratic opponent.  As Nixon had pointed out quite clearly, ―When you‘ve got a fellow . . . 
who is under attack like this, who has fallen on his ass a few times, what you do is to kick him 
again. I mean, you have to keep whacking, whacking, and whacking.‖500  However, while 
―whacking‖ the opposition was good, the blood was not to soil Nixon‘s image as a statesman. 
While hammering on their opponent‘s weak points, they had to refrain from mixing attacks 
against their opponent with presidential accomplishments.  Speechwriter Pat Buchanan had 
lobbied for this course of action and it is a strategy that won the day in the Oval Office. Nixon 
and Haldeman knew that the best way to counter any criticism against the administration that 
might appear in the press was to deflect this attention back on their Democratic challengers. 
What they wanted was to ―stay on the negative side.  Do not try to weave in . . . the positive,‖ as 
―there should be an attack program that is purely attack.‖  Haldeman believed that the attack 
should remain ―pure‖ of discussions on foreign policy because they did not want to mar the 
president‘s perceived strength as a diplomat. The president agreed with Haldeman and Buchanan 
that he could play his foreign policy strength while his campaign machine went after McGovern. 
They knew that the president‘s image as a ―peacemaker‖ and elder statesman because of his trips 
to Moscow and China was a card he could continue to play. In the Oval Office, Nixon and his 
chief of staff boiled it down to its most basic element: 
 
Haldeman: Except foreign—you, you hammer your strong point. 
Nixon: I just think you‘ve got to hit that over and over again ‗cause, goddamn it, we gotta win our election. 
Haldeman: … and that attack [should] not have anything on Nixon strong points. 
Nixon: Right. 
Haldeman: It should only make McGovern negative points. 
Nixon: Yeah.
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 The various efforts of Nixon‘s loyal reelection team were achieving results. The president 
was able to remain holed up in the White House out of the public eye. As Colson pointed out, by 
the last two weeks of the election, most Americans who intended to vote for the president based 
upon his record had already made up their minds. As a result, there were those on Nixon‘s staff 
who thought there was little to be gained by having the president speak for the merits of his own 
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record. Nor did Colson believe it was in the interests of anyone else in the White House to spend 
time, money, or effort exalting the president‘s list of accomplishments. Two weeks before the 
election, Colson made this point perfectly clear in a memo to Haldeman. Colson‘s ―seat of the 
pants political instincts‖ and his analysis of polling data convinced him that those Americans still 
unsure about the president would not be swayed by ―China, Russia, SALT, or any other positive 
Nixon accomplishment.‖ Colson understood the reality that some would choose his boss simply 
because he was ―the lesser of evils,‖ or that many voters were simply ―turned off by McGovern.‖ 
As a result, instead of building up the president, the political team wanted to target the anti-
McGovern voters and those wary of supporting the senator from South Dakota. ―The key 
objective in my mind in the next two weeks is to keep the undecided voter and the lukewarm 
Nixon support turned off on McGovern . . . I, therefore, believe that positive advertising will 
accomplish little if anything in the last two weeks of the campaign.‖ A series of ―classy 
commercials‖ would only detract from efforts to keep the public ―unsold on McGovern.‖ 
Therefore, what emerged was what Colson called the ―negative negative strategy‖ to prevent 
McGovern from persuading Democrats who believe that while McGovern is a ―horse‘s ass,‖ they 
would hold their noses and cast their votes for him instead of the president. ―We have to continue 
to make him so unattractive that no matter how bad a picture he paints of us, they still will come 
to us instead of him.‖  Negative campaign ads were a strategy that the Nixon team used well 
down the stretch and one that the McGovern side failed to utilize until the end, and with 
Watergate failing to gain much traction as an issue in the national press, this reality came much 
to the relief of the Nixon attack team. According to Colson, ―thank God [McGovern] didn‘t think 
of [negative attack ads] sooner.‖ The team, though, had no plans to relent on the attack, which 
they would wage with surrogates throughout the country, and heavy use of anti-McGovern 
newspaper ads and television commercials. ―Only the attack and the ads will keep those who are 
against McGovern against McGovern.‖502 
 Political attacks became increasingly easy as Election Day neared, especially on the 
Vietnam issue. The president appeared to be making serious progress towards peace in Southeast 
Asia (which he was) while showing how McGovern was wrong on the issues, and unaware 
(which he was) of what was really going on in negotiations with the North Vietnamese. 
Buchanan and his crew had been churning out the speeches for the surrogates with good effect 
for weeks, especially those delivered by former Democrat and Texas governor John Connally.
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A good illustration of this was the ―agreement to agree‖ on a nine-point cease-fire draft treaty for 
peace with the North on October 26 brokered by Henry Kissinger in secret talks held in Paris. 
The announcement was part of an agreement reached in secret back on May 8. At a White House 
press conference, Kissinger told the nation that ―We believe that we have an agreement in 
sight.‖504 The event held less than two weeks before the election not only sandbagged McGovern 
but represented the first public comments about the secret talks in the French capital.* The 
signing of the agreement was to take place within a few days, but it was clear that Nixon and 
Kissinger were not going to let that take place, citing two outstanding points, the release of 
POWS and post-cease-fire arms shipments. On November 2, Nixon announced that there would 
be no signing until those outstanding issues had been settled. 
505
 
 The promise of imminent peace with honor was political gold, and the day of the 
Kissinger announcement, Colson and the president were jubilant not only for what it meant to the 
election but that Watergate would continue to be a non-issue. ―This is heaven sent the way it 
happened,‖ exclaimed the president‘s special counsel. ―No one can say politics,‖ replied Nixon. 
But it was, of course, as Colson explained. ―We look tough and hard line and North Vietnam 
looks like they‘re coming to us. And old George McGovern looks like he has swallowed his 
lunch and has a very bad case of indigestion. He looks pretty feeble.‖ Colson went on to make 
the point that even if Watergate were having any effect, the announcement nicely took care of 
that. The timing was perfect for Colson as he wanted a final slam on McGovern. ―We should not 
let up on this fellow for one minute,‖ the special counsel exclaimed. Nixon agreed, naturally, 
adding ―Don‘t let him off the ground.‖ Colson had spoken to pollster Lou Harris who suggested 
that the announcement would result in ―a tremendous landslide.‖506 That day Buchanan sent 
memos to Haldeman and Ehrlichman, adamant that they create new television attack ads against 
McGovern concerning Vietnam.
507
  
 Buchanan aide Ken Khachigian was also arguing for throwing down the gloves and going 
after McGovern hard.  ―We have suffered in silence long enough,‖ the staffer wrote in some 
frustration. ―It‘s time to come out fighting.‖ Khachigian complained that there was a ―distinct 
appearance‖ that the reelection team was ―acquiescing by our denials and no comments‖ to 
McGovern‘s attacks over Vietnam. As he suggested to Haldeman, the administration needed to 
―go on the attack and to do it hard.‖ The main reason, he believed, was to squash the trilateral 
conspiracy between ―McGovern and the left, aided and abetted by the Post et al,‖ that intended 
to ―destroy the President.‖ Since the Democrats under McGovern knew that they would lose in 
November, they ―are going out as irresponsibly as they can.‖ Khachigian added that his team 
was sitting on a ―laundry list of McGovern immorality and corruption [and] all of the issues that 
McGovern is trying to cover-up—the welfare, defense, and high budget stuff, plus his total 
surrender to North Vietnam.‖508  
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 But Nixon‘s chief of staff worried about the attacks getting carried away. While 
Haldeman sent a memorandum to Colson that very day about unleashing the dogs on McGovern 
with a ―massive attack‖ on ―all the Vietnam related issues‖ in reaction to the senator‘s criticisms 
that he agreed were ―the most vicious attacks on the President in history,‖ he did not want sloppy 
attacks such as those that might be made by Vice President Agnew messing up the electoral bed 
at the last minute. As Haldeman ordered, ―The Vice President should be kept completely off this 
subject.‖ Nixon‘s chief of staff did not want White House press secretary Ron Ziegler on it 
either; he wanted his trench warriors, he wanted Colson‘s operation. As Haldeman ordered, 
―This is at the political level and should be [dealt] with at the political level.‖509 
 The text of a Connally speech penned by Buchanan on the subject the next day showed 
how they used the issue to maximum effect.  The speech indicated that McGovern had promised 
that if elected he would ―carry out an American surrender on Communist terms in Southeast 
Asia…; in short, two days after Hanoi had secretly accepted the essentials of the honorable 
United States compromise proposal of May 8 for a cease-fire and an honorable settlement—
Senator McGovern was still publicly calling for a dishonorable American surrender and on terms 
even harsher and more humiliating for his own country than Hanoi had demanded.‖510 Of course 
McGovern was not privy to the secret May 8 agreement, but that meant little to how they 
planned to use it as proof that their opponent had been wrong on Vietnam all along.   
 The dark cloud that had followed McGovern around since the Eagleton affair had not 
gone away. Falling in the polls, painted into a corner as a radical and an ―extremist,‖ and 
seemingly on the wrong side of foreign policy issues, partisan fighters such as Colson and 
Buchanan began to relish their opponent‘s demise. They especially enjoyed newspaper columns 
that suggested that the election campaign was in a large sense a ―referendum on the major issues 
of the day.‖ Indeed, the very day that the Washington Post reported that the FBI had found 
evidence linking the Watergate burglaries to a massive campaign of political espionage by the 
Nixon reelection effort, Colson and Buchanan were gloating about the campaign and the 
coverage of the Democrats‘ demise in the media. As the president‘s special counsel suggested to 
Buchanan, nothing could stand in their way to victory as Nixon represented the ―views of the 
vast majority of the American people and that McGovern has simply . . . misjudged the mood of 
the country.‖511  By late October, McGovern pollster Pat Caddell knew it was over. Looking at 
the polling data, he recalled dryly, ―I felt like the recreation director on the Titanic.‖512 
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CHAPTER 7 
A BITTER HARVEST 
 
This is terrible! This is awful shit. I just want to take a look at him! Is he alive? How do I know he‘s 
alive?
513
 
 
n King‘s Row in the Old Executive Office Building—the spot where the big boys 
swaggered—sat Richard Nixon and his special side-kick, Charles Colson. In the final days of 
the election campaign of 1972, holed up in the president‘s hideaway office, the pair planned in 
bitter prose post-election retribution. Although mere months away from political disaster, these 
self-styled sovereigns operated as if they ultimately wielded the sword. Sitting in easy chairs 
with their feet up, they plotted the slaying of enemies in the media following the election. ―We‘re 
going to screw them another way,‖ Nixon told Colson in reference to the Washington Post. 
―They don‘t really realize how rough I can play. I‘ve been such a nice guy around here a lot of 
times . . . But when I start, I will kill them. There‘s no question about it.‖514 That, of course, was 
the ―inside‖ Nixon. To his own cabinet and the rest of the world, the president preferred to play 
the ‗statesman,‘ a man worthy of the Oval Office. Like coveted French wine, Nixon kept his 
more bitter thoughts on special reserve for his inner circle.  
 On October 29, in sharp contrast to his acidity with Colson, the president struck a 
thoughtful pose just a short walk away at the EOB‘s Conference Room. That Sunday morning, 
just over a week before his last election, Nixon met with the surrogates who had served him so 
loyally along the campaign trail in his stead. At 11:00 am, the president buttoned his jacket and 
strolled in to offer a special ‗thank you‘ and to rally the troops for the last week before Election 
Day. ―I want to say…that I am very appreciative of what you have done,‖ Nixon said, standing 
and looking around the room. ―I am very proud of what you have done. I know that to go out and 
be heckled from time to time, or wondering why you aren‘t getting the play [in the press], must 
bother a few of you. I must say that I have had so much of it through the years it just goes off my 
back; it doesn‘t bother me anymore.‖ While this comment was patently false, Nixon‘s job that 
morning was to squeeze the last few drops from the political lemon and rally the troops. The 
president told them they had ―done a splendid job,‖ and that the work by the surrogates in the 
campaign ―when it is all written in the future, will be one of the very, very positive points that 
will be emphasized by those political scientists who will try to find out how it all happened.‖515  
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 The president of course could not imagine that Watergate would narrow the lens on these 
―positive points‖ to a place where they rate little more than a footnote in the scholarship on his 
presidency. But Nixon had more immediate concerns, not the work of future political scientists 
and historians who would see his actions not as part of a strategy to remain in the White House, 
but as proof of his growing isolation.
516
 That bright and promising morning the president stressed 
to all in the room that they must remain steadfast and positive, that ―above everything else, as 
you go out, be confident; not cocky.‖ While the president assured them he believed they would 
behave this way, he maintained that it was ―particularly‖ important to do all they could in the last 
week of the campaign. His team remained concerned that a small turnout would help the 
Democrats and Nixon pressed his surrogates to ―hit hard‖ on the word vote. ―The most important 
thing to get across to all of our people is ‗Get out the vote‘ . . . If you can, hit that very, very 
hard…this is the greatest service you can render in this last week of the campaign.‖517  While 
Nixon stayed behind in the White House, his loyal team launched its final pre-election day 
organizational activities for its national campaign.  On October 28, the reelection effort fired up 
its ―Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) Kick-Off.‖  The operation took place in 44 separate areas in 22 
battleground states. Nixon‘s dozens of surrogates visited storefront operations and telephone 
centers in these key areas for the final push toward Election Day.
518
  
 
**** 
 On the Saturday before the election, Colson sat in his office in the Old Executive Office 
Building and thought about his fellow citizens heading to the polls on Tuesday. Never ready to 
call the game until the last whistle, the attorney pulled himself up to his typewriter, loosened his 
tie and fired off a letter to Secretary of State William P. Rogers.  His thoughts were on the long 
postponed peace agreement with Hanoi. The chief ―political‖ attack from the opposition Nixon‘s 
team had always worried about concerned the war. Even though the White House knew that it 
owned the Vietnam issue, characterized so well in Henry Kissinger‘s much publicized 
announcement of a pending 9-point peace treaty with the North, staff members bristled each time 
McGovern attacked the president in the press over Southeast Asia. Much of this was due to the 
Nixon and Buchanan belief that the press too often ignored the administration‘s foreign policy‘s 
successes or labeled them as politically motivated. While there is little evidence to substantiate 
their belief, this reactionary stance ran through the administration like blood, but like bile, it 
usually coagulated in the offices of Charles Colson.  
 That Saturday, President Nixon‘s special counsel was not in a good mood, as he bristled 
at McGovern‘s suggestion the previous evening that his boss had used the announcement of a 
treaty with Hanoi on October 26 for political purposes. Of course, even though the 
Massachusetts attorney understood that was largely true, he nonetheless worried about the charge 
of politicking on the Vietnam issue. Although Colson understood that his opponent was going to 
face ―massive repudiation‖ at the polls in 72 hours, he wanted everyone on board for a strong 
11
th
 hour response to McGovern‘s charge. As he indicated to Rogers, ―As we sum it all up, 
looking at Tuesday, the issue to present to the American people is do we want to stand with the 
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President for an honorable end to this bloody and divisive conflict…or do we want to take the 
McGovern approach of surrender and begging.‖519  
 As hard as the senator from South Dakota tried to come out swinging against the 
president‘s record, though, his stance had failed to resonate with any length or depth in the 
heartland. This was certainly the case with the Vietnam War. As a campaign issue, it never really 
gained any traction. For most Americans, including many of the nation‘s journalists, Nixon‘s 
policy on Vietnam, while not perfect, was the best that could be made out of a bad situation, and 
Nixon managed to finesse the touchy issues of amnesty and the return of POWS as a question of 
honor in the heartland. The polls showed that a clear majority of the American people trusted 
that Nixon was going to end the war while achieving some measure of ‗honor.‘ By 1971 and 
1972, the Vietnam War was no longer the one Nixon had inherited when he assumed office in 
January of 1969. In the final days before the election of 1972, Newsweek columnist Stewart 
Alsop summed up the feckless McGovern campaign and his insistence that the war had made the 
election a contest between good and evil. The veteran journalist had taken the Democratic 
nominee to task on numerous occasions, including McGovern‘s comparison of Nixon to Adolph 
Hitler for extending the Asian conflict beyond Vietnam. ―Here we come back to that mystery—
why Senator McGovern has been such a disastrous candidate . . .When he orates about the war, 
McGovern often talks as though he were running against Lyndon Johnson, when Johnson had 
more than half a million men in Vietnam, and draft calls and casualties were high. In fact, the 
central political fact about the war today is that no more young men are being drafted and sent to 
Vietnam.‖520  
 Nixon had managed to have his way with Middle Americans on the Vietnam issue since 
his major speech to the nation on the war in Southeast Asia in November 3, 1969, when tens of 
thousands of pieces of positive mail flooded into the White House in response. In April and May 
1972, Nixon addressed the nation on Vietnam by radio and television and garnered a similar 
response, engendering many thousands of telegrams in the days and weeks following.
521
 The 
comments were three to one strongly supporting the president‘s position on the war. ―Thank God 
for your courage and leadership,‖ read some letters, while others suggested, ―Your logic on 
Vietnam policy is unassailable‖; ―You‘re really talking like a President‖; ―Your speech was great 
as you are‖; ―Applaud your strong stand and speech‖; ―Your speech made us proud to be 
Americans,‖ and ―We are behind you 100 percent.‖ To Nixon‘s advantage, McGovern was 
increasingly portrayed during the campaign as being out of touch with the mood in the nation. As 
Stewart Alsop pointed out to his readers, ―McGovern often talks as though we were in the 
middle of a Hoover-style depression. In fact, we are in the middle of a boom, and most of the 
voters have never had it so good.‖522 That same afternoon, Haldeman was in a rare good mood as 
he understood that journalists such as Alsop were right. As he jotted in his note pad in his 
spacious White House office, ―Think we‘re in great shape.‖ Indeed, Haldeman believed that the 
popular vote would play out at about 58 percent to 42 percent for his boss, as it was ―hard to 
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believe [it] can be bigger.‖ In the end, according to the chief of staff, there was ―no concern‖ 
about McGovern winning a war of words over Vietnam, as ―no one believes McGovern on 
this.‖523 The strategy had all worked well for Nixon and his loyal men, as voters over 50 
described Nixon as ―strong, statesmanlike,‖ ―competent‖ and ―trustworthy.‖ 524 
 
**** 
 On the evening of November 3, Colson and the president spoke by phone in the Oval 
Office about McGovern and the Democrats, and the pain that was about to be inflicted on their 
political opponents. Both men mused about the good word from Wall Street, as stocks had risen 
on the news that the president would remain in the White House. ―I‘ll say they‘ve finally decided 
on Wall Street that you were going to be reelected,‖ Colson said. Nixon retorted, ―Ha! Well, at 
least this is a good thing in a sense, you know. In that arena, a lot of those jackasses just vote on 
the basis of how their stocks are.‖ But the real matter was their opponent. The pair relished the 
hurt they had caused McGovern, a defeat which was evident on the senator‘s face on television 
that night. ―He‘s doing very badly,‖ Colson said with some satisfaction. ―On TV tonight he 
looked whipped.‖ With facetious concern, Nixon responded, ―Hell, he‘s tired. The poor devil is 
running around, of course he‘s only 50 years of age. Christ, when I was 50, I could go like hell.‖ 
Colson added that McGovern just ―doesn‘t have the stuff.‖ The president‘s faithful assistant 
suggested that the Democratic challenger ―realizes he‘s on the verge of an impending… .‖ Nixon 
finished the sentence for him with one word, ―Disaster.‖ Colson naturally sounded amused, as he 
put it, ―everything he has done has gone wrong.‖ To their pleasure, the pair recounted how the 
life had also gone out of the Democratic faithful in the field. The word from California was that 
―the Democrats out here are absolutely demoralized,‖ Colson said, repeating the news from his 
men in the trenches. The special counsel gloated that ―there‘s no sign of activity on their side.‖525 
To illustrate that point, Colson informed Nixon that the latest Harris poll predicted the 
president‘s reelection by a margin of 61 percent to 33 percent. Nixon, seeming surprised by the 
notion of a landslide victory, asked, ―Does [pollster Harris] think this figure‘s right, Chuck?‖ 
Colson responded, ―Yes, sir.‖ The president, though, disagreed, indicating, ―I don‘t really 
believe that. . .‖ Colson reassured his boss it was true before the conversation returned to musing 
over their opponent‘s collapse.  Colson suggested with some glee that McGovern was ―coming 
apart at the seams,‖ and that he looked ―pretty pitiful.‖ The special counsel informed the 
president that the candidate needed to cancel some engagements earlier in the day to tape the 
evening‘s television spot. Moreover, according to Colson, even McGovern‘s handlers looked 
drained and done. ―They had an interview with [campaign manager Frank] Mankiewicz who 
really looked whipped on the evening news tonight.‖ Nixon understood what his team had 
wrought on its opponents since summer. As the president expressed with obvious candor, 
―they‘ve got to be coming apart. Good God, they‘ve got to be.‖ The special counsel made it clear 
to his boss that even at the 11
th
 hour, they would not take their foot off McGovern‘s neck. ―We‘ll 
keep right on ‗em,‖ Colson said. ―Yes, sir!‖526 
A look at the discussions between Nixon and his top advisers in the days immediately 
prior to the election reveals not only the petty personal politics but the low level of concern they 
had over what would appear to have been one of the major issues of election year: Watergate. 
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Given the number of works on Watergate compared to the few that deal with the landslide 
election, it might appear that the scandal was the biggest story of 1972. The tapes reveal that this 
issue was not a major concern in the last weeks before Americans went to the polls. One of the 
main reasons for this was another issue that the president and his team believed they owned that 
year, and that was Vietnam. As Colson told Nixon, ―Mr. President, [the promise of a peace 
accord in] Vietnam just knocked [Watergate] right off of people‘s minds. [The Harris Poll 
indicates] that people are only thinking about one thing at a time. Right now they‘re thinking 
about the end of the war. That‘s helped the confidence in your leadership, and that‘s stopped the 
erosion and that stopped people thinking about saboteurs.‖ As Nixon was well aware that the 
strategy to destroy George McGovern as a viable candidate had made a significant difference in 
this respect, he offered, ―And even though they know it isn‘t over, they have more confidence in 
me than McGovern?‖ Colson responded, ―That‘s right.‖ The strategist understood that the 
reelection team was ―going into the weekend just about as strong as [they] could be.‖ In fact, the 
lack of concern about Vietnam and Watergate had been present in their reelection deliberations 
all along. Throughout the summer and fall, Nixon and his men were seldom worried about losing 
the election over these issues, but rather, losing by default to the Democrats by overexposing the 
president‘s more ―unlikable‖ qualities or suffering the apathy of their supporters who believed 
the president would win easily over an ―extremist‖ candidate like George McGovern.527  
The strategy hatched by the president‘s loyalists had worked. And when Richard Nixon 
finally decided to leave the White House to meet voters before they headed to the polls on a 
―two-day final campaign swing‖ through five states, prior to landing in his home state of 
California, he planned on sticking to the script. ―It‘s rather good that I‘m out tomorrow, really, 
because it‘ll be…a way to just take the high road,‖ Nixon told Colson. His special counsel 
believed that it was good that the president was finally getting out to see the voters, telling his 
boss that they we‘re bringing the campaign to an end ―with you on the upswing.‖528  
In the closing days of the election with Nixon‘s men firing up the troops for a huge get-
out-the-vote push, the Democrats were singing the same tune. Indeed, some desperate Democrats 
hoped for a miracle.  As one of McGovern‘s staffers suggested, ―The polls have never measured 
motivation and commitment. Our people will wait four hours in a blizzard to vote for George 
McGovern.‖ As Steven Roberts dryly observed in the New York Times, ―The Democrats are 
praying for a blizzard.‖529 The blizzard never came.  
 On the day before the election, columnists Rowland Evans and Bob Novak shook their 
collective heads in amazement over how Nixon and his men had managed to pull it off, how they 
had stuck to a script that the scribes knew was hatched almost two years earlier. The plans ―for 
Mr. Nixon to stay in the White House all year and campaign hardly at all...astonishes even the 
White House  inner circle‖ in that the president had ―followed the plans to the letter.‖ Moreover, 
that the president refused to lose his cool with hecklers at his final campaign stops was 
remarkable for the old political warrior. ―Nobody knows whether such self-control would have 
been possible if a Democratic candidate more viable than McGovern had made a real race. But 
the fact remains that the last of Richard Nixon‘s five campaigns for national office has ended up 
as his quietest, his dullest, and, undoubtedly, his best.‖530 For the feckless campaign of his 
opponent, George McGovern, the end of the trail came on a sour note. While shaking hands 
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along the fence line at the airport in Battle Creek, Michigan, in the campaign‘s final days, a 
Nixon supporter dogged him, chatting ―Four more years, four more years.‖ As McGovern 
worked his way closer, pressing the flesh, the heckler shouted, ―We‘ll beat you so bad you‘ll 
wish you never left South Dakota.‖ The Democratic candidate for president replied, ―I‘ve got a 
secret for you—kiss my ass.‖531 
The night before the president left Washington, Tricia Nixon walked into the Lincoln 
Sitting Room to talk to her father. The small Victorian-styled sitting room located on the second 
floor of the White House was also the president‘s favorite, a place he sat most nights in his 
preferred chocolate brown easy chair and matching footstool, writing and listening to music. The 
chair was so well-loved, the president often had the piece of furniture packed up and flown with 
him so he could enjoy it on trips around the country. Looking up from his long yellow legal pad 
covered with his hand-written scrawl, Nixon welcomed the visit from his youngest daughter. 
Tricia sat down beside her father and said, ―I want this week to be the real last hurrah.‖532  The 
next morning, the president of the United States finally left the White House to meet his fellow 
Americans on the campaign trail—one last time. 
 
**** 
Richard Nixon attended the final rally as a candidate in his long political career the night 
before the election in Ontario, California, just a few short miles from where he ran his very first 
campaign rally twenty six years earlier. Looking out over the crowd in Ontario, Nixon told the 
assemblage that where once the nation was divided by regions, including urban and rural, that 
had all changed, as ―wherever you go across America, this nation is getting together.‖533  On 
November 7, Nixon cast his own vote for the presidency at a polling station in San Clemente, 
California. While a frustrated press secretary Ron Ziegler yelled, ―Stop that! Stop that! No 
pictures!‖, photographers rapidly snapped their shutters capturing both the vote and the 
commander-in-chief dropping the ballot to the floor before awkwardly fishing it out from under 
the voting machine.
534
 The president later flew back across the country to Washington to await 
the night‘s returns. Following an enthusiastic greeting by his staff on the White House steps, 
Nixon joined his family for dinner in the residence before heading to his favorite chair in the 
Lincoln Sitting Room to wait and think while he listened to Richard Rodgers‘ ―Victory at Sea.‖ 
The president was adamant that he ―would not insult anyone‘s intelligence by rehashing the 
issues and making a last-minute plea for votes.‖ As he indicated in his memoirs, the election was 
―probably the clearest choice between the candidates for President ever presented to the 
American people in the twentieth century.‖535 With the music‘s volume turned loud, Nixon 
reached for the phone at his side, wanting to speak to his loyal chief of staff about the historic 
night to come. Haldeman ―could hear his ‗Victory at Sea‘ record playing loudly in the 
background.‖536  
As the returns began coming in from across the country, it was apparent that the night 
would bring an overwhelming victory to Richard Nixon. Not surprisingly, the president was soon 
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on the phone to his favorite aide, Chuck Colson. ―Well, congratulations, Mr. President,‖ the 
elated special counsel gushed. ―It looks to me like a very big landslide. Just about. I think we‘re 
going to make honest men out of the pollsters . . . They‘ve called us winning it. In fact, NBC has 
called us winning it.‖ Colson was pleased when the network not only called the election at 7:05 
pm, but with an overwhelming victory with 60 percent going to the president.  ―They [the 
pollsters] think it‘s going to be right around 60. It could go over 60 [percent] . . . One hell of a 
landslide, Mr. President.‖ The only blemish at that point for Nixon and Colson was the possible 
loss of Massachusetts and the prospect of again losing Congress to the Democrats. Nixon 
appeared to care little about Colson‘s home state, but not winning the Hill had Nixon feeling 
sour on election night, especially concerning the way the media would characterize his landslide. 
As the president suggested to Colson, ―I suppose that‘s the way that they‘ll piss on the damn 
thing.‖537  
 Ridicule of the nightly television coverage replaced the president‘s bitterness minutes 
later when he got on the phone once again with Haldeman. The pair was incredulous about CBS 
predicting an even larger ―total landslide‖ of 67 percent to 32 percent, with only two percent of 
the returns in. Nixon laughed and his chief of staff called it ―most ridiculous.‖ But when ABC 
had the president at 55 percent, Nixon knew that it was ―too far‖ off the mark.  The problem with 
the coverage, according to Haldeman, was that they were ―projecting too early.‖  Nixon was not 
impressed and his chief of staff called the televised events a ―shameful operation.‖538  At 11:30 
pm, a gracious in defeat George McGovern sent a telegram to the president. ―Congratulations on 
your victory,‖ it stated. ―I hope that in the next four years you will lead us to a time of peace 
abroad and justice at home. You have my full support in such efforts with the best wishes from 
Eleanor and me to you and your gracious wife Pat.
539
  The president‘s daughters were not 
impressed. They thought that McGovern‘s comments were ―cold and arch.‖540 
 While Nixon‘s memoirs are silent about McGovern‘s statement, other than that it was 
―carefully worded,‖ the president revealed his true feelings to his national security adviser in the 
early hours of November 8.
541
 After Nixon arranged to meet Colson and Haldeman over in his 
office in EOB for an early morning rendezvous, he took a 1:15 am phone call at the White House 
from Henry Kissinger. ―It‘s an extraordinary tribute,‖ a gloating national security adviser said. 
For Nixon it was an opportunity to dump on his vanquished opponent. ―You know this, this 
fellow [George McGovern] to the last was a prick. Did you see his concession statement?‖ While 
Nixon admitted that the senator ―was very gracious at the beginning,‖ he could not stomach 
speechwriter Ray Price‘s suggestion for a suitable genial response. Nixon scoffed, mocking 
Price‘s words: ―‗I look forward to working with you and your supporters for peace in the years 
ahead,‘ and I just said, ‗hell, no, I‘m not going to send him that sort of a wire.‘‖ Kissinger 
agreed: ―Absolutely.‖ Nixon had even argued with Haldeman about his proposal to be gracious. 
―But I said, ‗Ray just doesn‘t have the right sense of this sort of thing.‘‖  Kissinger, naturally, 
agreed with everything the president uttered during the short phone call.  ―No, [McGovern] was 
ungenerous, he was petulant, he was unworthy,‖ he told Nixon who agreed with a strong ―Right‖ 
on each point. In the end, Nixon informed Kissinger that he just pretended to be gracious: 
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―Because you probably know, I responded in a [laughs] very decent way to him.‖ Kissinger, ever 
unctuous, replied, ―Well, I thought you were a great statesman.‖ Nixon admitted that he was 
incapable of any other words of kindness for McGovern, as his thoughts were on his 
disappointment over the tallies in Congress. ―That‘s as far as I could go . . . I‘m not going to say 
much to him . . . Anyway, it was a good day. We had a terrible time in the damn Senate. We‘re 
going to end up with probably 44, but, it isn‘t worth a damn anyway.‖ Kissinger, however, 
soothed: ―It‘s a tremendous personal triumph, Mr. President.‖ Nixon thought about what it 
meant, his bitterness showing over how he failed to capture Congress, a sullenness that was 
mixed with a sour pleasure for destroying McGovern at the voting booth. Nixon pouted that ―all 
these left-wing columnists can do now is to piss on [his victory by] not winning the Senate and 
the House.‖  But the president believed he had achieved a revenge of sorts on the media, 
believing without evidence that journalists had supported McGovern. Nixon suggested that 
members of the media knew that his loyal men ―came up to bat against their candidate and beat 
the hell out of him.‖542 
 One issue that the national security adviser was accurate about was his suggestion that 
Vietnam never was a negative for the president as Nixon had made the war his ―issue without 
fear or weakness.‖ Namely, that they had managed the announcement, the progress, and the 
timing of a peace deal with North Vietnam, navigating around the touchy issues of POWs and 
post-withdrawal conditions for the South. Kissinger also pressed the button that he knew the 
president would respond to. ―Year after year the media were harassing you, all the intellectuals 
were against you, and you‘ve come out and have the greatest victory, I‘m sure in terms of margin 
that anyone has had.‖ Nixon responded quickly, ―That‘s right. That‘s right.‖ The national 
security adviser reminded his boss again that it was ―a tremendous triumph.‖ Eager to get over to 
the EOB to carouse with Colson and Haldeman, however, the president ended the phone call 
with an utterance that inadvertently foreshadowed what was to be a bizarre day after the election. 
―Well, anyway, Henry; have a good night‘s sleep,‖ Nixon said. ―Give ‗em hell tomorrow.‖543 
Give them ―hell‖ was exactly what they did. But this time, Nixon‘s guns were pointed inward in 
the direction of his own staff and cabinet. 
 Following his call with Kissinger, Nixon left the White House for the short stroll over to 
the EOB, arriving there around 1:30 am to meet with his real partners in power, Colson and 
Haldeman. About 2:30 in the morning, about 15 minutes after Sargent Shriver sent in a teletype 
message offering ―sincere congratulations‖ to the administration on its victory, Nixon and his 
favorite boys ordered up some bacon and eggs from the White House Mess and took in the 
victory in style. Feeling no more gracious than his boss in victory, Colson fired off a memo to 
Bruce Kehrli suggesting that the president should not speak to Canadian Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau.
544
 Colson‘s only annoyance that morning was that the president did not carry his home 
state of Massachusetts. He chalked it up, however, to the state having ―a disproportionate share 
of kooks.‖545  
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 For once, even Richard Nixon would have enjoyed reading the morning edition of the 
Washington Post. As David Broder wrote, the president‘s opponent George McGovern was 
―destined to go into the history books as one of the all-time losers—ranking with Barry 
Goldwater, Alf Landon, Herbert Hoover and Horace Greeley.‖ The president, Broder wrote, had 
received from the voters the goal he had most coveted, and that was ―‗a new majority.‘ He 
toppled traditional Democratic strongholds in the North and made the Solid South solidly 
Republican.‖ Nixon‘s last campaign victory had come twenty-six years after his first election 
night victory over Democrat Jerry Voorhis, twenty years after becoming vice president to 
Dwight Eisenhower, and ten years to the day from his infamous post-election defeat in the 
California gubnatorial race, where he told journalists that they would ―not have Richard Nixon to 
kick around anymore.‖546  
     Indeed Richard Nixon had achieved a massive electoral victory, beating McGovern 60.7 
to 37.5 percent. The margin of victory was a whopping 23.2 percentage points, second only to 
FDR‘s 24.3 percentage points over Alf Landon in 1936. Lyndon Johnson‘s 1964 win over 
Republican Barry Goldwater sits at third with a 22.6 percent margin of victory. Nixon‘s 60.7 
percent of the popular vote was also the third highest in American history, narrowly trailing 
Johnson‘s 61.1 percent in 1964 and FDR‘s 60.8 percent in 1936. The Nixon landslide, though, 
did something that his Democratic predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, was unable to do, and that was 
to carry 49 out of 50 states. George McGovern had even failed to carry his home state of South 
Dakota.
547
 
     At 10:59 am on November 8 with the morning sun almost directly over the White House, 
Nixon had finally responded to McGovern‘s congratulatory message, one penned by Pat 
Buchanan. It read: ―Mrs. Nixon and I deeply appreciated your election night wire. You and Mrs. 
McGovern have our very best wishes for a well-deserved reast [sic] after what I know must have 
been a very strenuous and tiring campaign.‖548 That morning as the president‘s men slapped each 
other on the back and wrote each other congratulatory memos on White House letterhead, things 
were brewing inside the Oval Office. While Dwight Chapin wrote to Strachan, thanking him ―for 
helping with one of the most magnificent outcomes in political history,‖ celebrations were to be 
short-lived as a new post-election political reality was settling in.
 549
   
 As the events of that day transpired, staffers, and those in the Cabinet whom the president 
had just days earlier beseeched to bring him over the top, were in for a rude surprise. In the 
White House, the president and Haldeman met to make the final arrangements for the immediate 
resignation of staff and cabinet members. Sitting by the president‘s side, his yellow legal pad 
perched on the edge of the desk in the Oval Office, Haldeman took notes as he and the president 
spoke of an immediate transition.  Those closest to the president would be given a chance to ―say 
goodbye and start all over.‖  After submitting their resignations, the ―members of the first team‖ 
would be asked if they wanted to return as they were the ones that ―made possible what 
happened.‖550  
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 As Haldeman suggested, it was all a part of some ―very sweeping plans,‖ a house 
cleaning of sorts. Everyone on staff would submit their resignations with the caveat that they 
could be asked to return, but on entirely different terms. As Haldeman enunciated to the 
president, ―Anybody who stays there‘s got to be a very tough discussion with, first, about the 
terms under which he stays, which have to be radically different from the terms under which he 
came.‖ As the White House tapes reveal, Haldeman was blunt: ―If he buys that and wants to stay 
that‘s fine.‖ For anyone else, it would be a bit different. The president wanted to know how it 
would physically play out. ―Christ . . . what are you—what do you want me to say to the staff? 
Do I say I‘d like their resignations?‖ Nixon asked, deciding on how they were going to deliver 
the news to those who had just brought in the second widest margin of victory in the history of 
the Republic.  ―No, sir,‖ replied Haldeman.  The president suggested that he could ―just thank 
them for their work and so forth and so on and make it very brief and then get the hell out.‖ 
Haldeman agreed: ―Absolutely, and say you know I’m covering that…‖  Nixon continued on 
firming up the script: ―‗I want Bob to talk to you a bit about it‘ . . . then you‘ll take them. Now, 
and then you‘ll make that meeting and be in to the Cabinet meeting by 11:00 [am]?‖ Haldeman 
responded that the talk with his loyal staff would not take long: ―Yeah. It‘s just going to take a 
couple of minutes.‖ Nixon knew what he wanted to do, but did not have the stomach to do the 
dirty work. ―We really need that Cabinet meeting, right?‖ he asked Haldeman. ―Well, whatever 
you want. I don‘t know whether you want me there or not,‖ replied the chief of staff. Nixon 
wondered who they would get to ask the cabinet for their resignations, clearly not wanting to be 
in the room when that took place. Haldeman originally suggested that Secretary of State William 
P. Rogers would be the lucky one, while personally performing the ―wrap-up set.‖  Haldeman 
stressed that he did not wish to be in the room when the president was thanking them. ―I kind of 
think I should not be there when you‘re in.‖ Nixon agreed with a, ―Yeah, that‘s fine.‖ Haldeman 
suggested that the president ―should talk to them alone and then let me go in when you come 
out.‖ Nixon believed that would work but he did not want his chief domestic adviser to be there.  
―But . . . nobody else. I wouldn‘t take Ehrlichman in, for example.‖ Haldeman agreed, and 
indicated that the message would be quite simple. The chief of staff thought the best would be to 
―just say, ‗You‘ve done a great job,‘‖ before lowering the boom.  ―Right. Right,‖ Nixon 
responded.  Haldeman then explained the rationale to use for the cabinet. ―I know some of you 
will be leaving, some of you will be moving to different kinds of jobs, and some of you will be 
staying where you are. Whatever it is you‘re doing it‘s been great.‖ Nixon suggested that the line 
should sound like they were ―appreciated,‖ or as he put it, ―We want to work it out in a way that 
will be in the best interests of everybody concerned.‖551  
 
**** 
 That morning the White House staff gathered in the opulent Roosevelt Room for what 
should have been a well-deserved celebration following a hard-fought election victory. With 
McGovern vanquished, it was a moment to thank those who had put their lives on hold to ensure 
the president‘s return to the Oval Office. Before the ink was dry on their ―certificate of 
achievements,‖ however, the 37th president of the United States appeared and told them there 
were ―no sacred cows. . . After the Eisenhower midterm victory we didn‘t change things 
enough.‖ Nixon informed his staff that there would be significant changes. ―We can‘t climb to 
the top and look down into the embers, we‘ve got to still shoot some sparks, vitality, and 
strength, and that we get some of that from new people both in the Cabinet and here in the 
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staff.‖552  Nixon then thanked them and slipped out, on his way to talk to the Cabinet. He left 
Haldeman to take care of the dirty details. ―He then left the room and turned the floor over to 
me,‖ Haldeman wrote in his memoir. ―I stood up, and in chilling tones that actor Robert Vaughn 
might envy told the numbstruck staff members that each and every one of them must have his 
resignation on my desk by nightfall. Period.‖553   
 The president then met with his cabinet. When he left, Haldeman, as he had done with the 
White House staff, went in and asked them all to submit their resignations.
554
  Among those who 
submitted resignation letters to the president that day was the very loyal Patrick J. Buchanan. His 
letter read simply, ―Please accept my resignation from the White House staff to be made 
effective at your convenience and pleasure.‖555 There was nothing for which to apologize. As 
Haldeman rationally and coolly pointed out in his memoirs, ―We did it in a ruthless fashion,‖ 
knowing that it would anger ―many of our own people who had served us loyally and 
honorably.‖ Haldeman believed that ―ruthlessness was the only attitude that would work‖ in their 
efforts to create a situation where they could control the entire government from the Oval 
Office.
556
 
 Much of this post-election house cleaning can be easily traced back to earlier in the year. 
In his memoir, Haldeman recalled that the president‘s intention was that the turnover extend 
down from the executive branch all the way through to the ―lower levels were the government is 
really run.‖ The president told Haldeman that they had to ―do it fast because‖ after the election as 
―after the first of the year it‘s too late. You have got to do it right after the election. You‘ve got 
one week, and that‘s the time to get all those resignations in and say, ‗look, you‘re out, you‘re 
out, you‘re finished, you‘re done, done, finished.‘ Knock them the hell out of there.‖557  The 
president also made his vision plain to Haldeman in a memo on April 24, where he indicated the 
type of individual he wanted to see in his administration‘s second term. What Nixon wanted was 
a governing structure run directly out of the White House by young loyal men guided by a tight 
inner circle around the president. This inner circle would serve as a de facto cabinet. Nixon 
described the new order in the memorandum: ―For restaffing, we should start on the basis of 
bringing in people with total loyalty. Youth should be emphasized with men in their 30s and 40s, 
and we should look for people with complete selflessness who don‘t need to be babied…The 
point here will be to develop the building of a new establishment.‖558  
 Haldeman agreed with this vision. In his diaries, he made several intimations that it was 
he who was pushing for the changes and a stronger control—a super cabinet concentrated out of 
the Oval Office. ―Pushing again on project of building our establishment in press, business, 
education, etc. Long general talk about ‘72 plans and after. Agrees with my idea that we should 
shoot generally for replacing all key people by mid ‘73 and then really charge ahead to 
accomplish something during first half of second term, our potentially most productive 
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period.‖559 Such a reference is indicative of the degree that Nixon‘s closest men shaped the 
politics around the White House. The transformation‘s collateral damage included an inglorious 
end for long-serving Nixon ally Herb Klein. By June 1973, he was gone, after faithfully serving 
the politician from Yorba Linda for 25 years. As Nixon suggested to Haldeman, ―He just doesn‘t 
have his head screwed on. You know what I mean. He just opens it up and sits there with egg on 
his face. He‘s just not our guy at all, is he?‖560   
 Theodore White referred to the move as ―surgery on the government of the United 
States.‖ It was a streamlining of the Executive Branch, with departments run or controlled by 
White House staff—a ―super-cabinet‖ controlled by the president and a small but intensely loyal 
inner circle. As White had phrased it, the political creature would be a ―White House policy 
center‖ that the president alone would direct.561 Indeed that plan was in many ways a 
continuation of a development that really began in 1969 with Nixon‘s progressive move towards 
the creation of an administrative presidency. Boiled down to its essence, the moves represented 
the naked consolidation of power within the White House. It is clear that in the days immediately 
following the election victory, Nixon and his closest advisers were not worrying about 
Watergate—they were planning for the future, an even more strident second term where the 
White House could reshape the Republican Party, moving ahead with confidence, never giving a 
thought to the unexpected testimony of Alexander Butterfield and the yet to exist Ervin 
Committee. Indeed such stridency would have been surprising if Watergate had ever been seen 
then for what it was to become. But it is clear from the historical record that the president and his 
loyalists were not inordinately concerned about the situation, considering Watergate to be just 
another political problem—a media creation that they could manage or out maneuver as they had 
with other obstacles over the past three years in office. Even Nixonian ―enemies‖ such as the 
Washington Post knew that the scandal had not really touched the president and appeared to have 
little traction. As journalist George Lardner reported from the campaign trail in Florida just a 
month before the election, ―the Watergate Scandal is a ho-hum for most of the people. Politics as 
usual, they say.‖ Reporter Haynes Johnson agreed. ―Indeed, the Watergate case shows just how 
cynically voters view the issue of political corruption. The almost universal attitude is that these 
kinds of things are going to occur in either party, and that no administration is free from 
scandals.‖562  
Many Americans did not seem to care about the scandal, and for Nixon, it was chalked up 
as just another fight in the media, like the controversy concerning the antitrust suit against the 
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) and its questionable contributions to 
the Republican National Convention.
563
 Indeed, Colson and the president had spoken about 
Watergate in just these terms, believing that the break-in could not prevent them from winning 
the election. In June 1972, Colson had suggested to his boss that Watergate should not affect the 
team‘s morale as it was not going to make a difference in the election. The president agreed that 
it would eventually amount to little:   
 
Nixon: Oh sure, and as I said, my goodness . . . 
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Colson: We won‘t let this one bug us. 
Nixon: Dumbest thing. My God, there are going to be all sorts of things in the campaign. We can‘t let this 
(unintelligible) worlds coming to an end. . . This is a development.  Nothing loses an election.  Nothing 
changes it that much . . . Sure . . . It washes away (unintelligible).  And you look at this damn thing now 
and it‘s gonna be forgotten after awhile. 
Colson: This will be forgotten and I hope a lot faster than ITT. 
Nixon: Oh sure, you know who the hell is going to keep it alive?  We‘re gonna have a court case and 
indeed, the difficulty we‘ll have ahead, we have got to have lawyers smart enough to have our people delay 
(unintelligible) avoiding depositions, of course.
 564
 
 
 Unconcerned that Watergate would take him under, Richard Nixon and his inner circle 
planned for some real action. The day after the election in the afternoon, Nixon, Colson, and 
Robert Finch held a powwow in the EOB. On the table was the transformation of the future of 
American politics through the reshaping of the Republican Party. As with other issues of interest 
to the president, Colson was always the goad. That afternoon, the special counsel was stroking 
the president‘s ego, pointing out that Nixon had captured the ―biggest majority of all time.‖ The 
―fantastic numbers,‖ according to Colson meant, ―anyway we slice it, anyway the numbers come 
out, it is the biggest personal victory of any President in American history.‖  The president too 
was fired up that afternoon with Colson in the room. ―First of all, it‘s the biggest majority. And 
it‘s a bigger percentage flip than Johnson‘s percentage flip,‖ Nixon said, his voice excited. ―Do 
you understand? Do you know what I mean?‖ Colson understood, encouraging the president in 
his desire to break the party apart and remake it on their terms.  ―What we‘ve got to really do is 
go over that shit now to the extent possible, I want to know whether it‘s shapeable . . . Chuck, 
I‘ve got to tear that son of a bitch apart. Do you agree or not? Would it get any reception?‖ 
Colson wholeheartedly agreed. ―You should do it right away. Immediately, Mr. President. Your 
great opportunity is to convert an enormous personal triumph into institutional change.‖565  
     To Nixon it was clear that much of this thrust was wrapped up in his long and combative 
political career. ―Well, I want these bastards to know it‘s a personal triumph.‖ Colson, naturally, 
goaded the president on, knowing what he liked to hear: ―The other thing, Mr. President, in the 
middle of the country, what I think you can establish—first of all, what you‘re doing in history, 
really, of the country. And you are part of that history, will be to really throw it into the 
[Northern] Dems that encompasses Middle America, and destroys the old Eastern 
Establishment.‖ Nixon responded with an optimistic musing. ―I wonder—Colson, you’re 
destroying their value system. I wonder if there‘s any way we can really get a new name for the 
Republican Party. I don‘t expect we can do that.‖ The special counsel reminded him of his new 
massive mandate. ―You have a new constituency, a brand new constituency. You have an 
opportunity to do what Roosevelt did with his election in ‘32 and what you‘ll have to do is work 
with the issues. You‘ve got an opportunity to really make a major change.‖  The president liked 
what he heard and was looking for ways to shake up the party apparatus. ―The organization is, 
you know, that‘s exactly the point, isn‘t it? That‘s exactly the point. The thing is, Bob [Finch], in 
your case, Goddamn it! I just, who is going to run it [the Republican Congressional Campaign 
Committee]. No, we‘ll talk about that later. Can I ask you to think about [Bob] Wilson? Can we 
get Wilson now to resign or should we just get him the hell kicked out of that job? I just can‘t 
stand him anymore, can‘t stand it. I know he‘s talking about candidates. I think anyone can pick 
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them, a chimpanzee, anybody.‖566 Finch agreed that the president should strike while he had the 
power. ―Well, your power is so great now, and the Party is so far down, that if it‘s ever going to 
happen . . . this is . . . the time to do it, and whether you change your mind, or, but certainly you 
have to break up this terrible division between the [Republican Party‘s] Senate and the House 
Campaign [Committees]. That‘s what we‘re thinking. That‘s what we‘re doing.‖567 The president 
knew that he had been given a clear mandate, and with the encouragement of men like Haldeman 
and Colson, he was planning to transform this mandate into a new form of government by hitting 
the ground running in the first days of 1973. 
 To some observers, there was much to fear from such a result. As Garry Wills wrote just 
two days before the election, there were those who dreaded the prospect of Nixon winning 
another election as ―the Supreme Court will be castrated, and The New York Times will be a 
single mimeographed page.‖ Sargent Shriver suggested that reelection would ―unleash‖ Nixon. 
As Wills noted, a Nixon victory ―will give him time and clout to stake out permanent ownership 
of the ‗Middle America‘ he has practically invented for electoral purposes.‖568 But therein lay 
the problem for the man from Whittier. Nixon was never able to turn off the internal political 
animal. As Historian Michael A. Genovese has suggested, what Nixon was preparing to do with 
his second term was consistent with his political nature. ―Nixon saw everything as politics—as 
the law of the jungle, as a tough, competitive world where you have to get them before they get 
you.‖ Nixon, wrote the scholar, ―was unable to make the important distinction between politics 
and governance.‖569 
**** 
With the election behind him, Richard Nixon looked ahead to the New Year and his 
second inauguration as president of the United States. First, the president planned to enjoy some 
rest and the holidays with his wife Pat, daughters Tricia and Julie, and Julie‘s husband David 
Eisenhower. Eight thousand miles away, the Air Force, on Nixon‘s orders, had launched a 
second round of ‗Christmas bombing‘ over North Vietnam, bringing the election year of 1972 to 
a fiery conclusion. Other bombs were about to detonate early in the New Year, but these were 
going to fall much closer to home: on the White House, the president, and his loyal inner circle. 
Given Nixon‘s immense victory at the polls, it is difficult to discern exactly what the president 
really expected in the months and years ahead. While Nixon‘s former assistant Monica Crowley 
wrote that the president ―was not an optimist,‖ it is also inaccurate to describe him as a 
pessimist.
570
 The politician from California always appeared to be moved by a complex if 
contradictory inner dialogue. For all of the varied emotions that the president certainly must have 
felt in the immediate wake of his landslide election victory, clarity was not among them. ―I am at 
a loss to explain the melancholy that settled over me on that victorious night,‖ Nixon wrote in his 
memoir concerning the electoral triumph.  ―To some extent the marring effects of Watergate may 
have played a part...and to a greater extent the fact that we had not yet been able to end the war 
in Vietnam. Or perhaps it was because this would be my last campaign. Whatever the reasons, I 
allowed myself only a few minutes to reflect on the past. I was confident that a new era was 
about to begin, and I was eager to begin it.‖571 
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 Under the U.S. Constitution, Nixon‘s victory had earned him four more years in the 
White House and an opportunity to create his ―new era‖ in the nation‘s political story. Indeed at 
that point in time, there was little in American history to challenge the constitutional certainty of 
Richard Nixon‘s second term in office. Only President Andrew Johnson in 1868 had suffered the 
indignity of impeachment by the House of Representatives, a legislative tribulation that did not 
survive subsequent trial in the Senate. In November 1972, following one of the most lopsided 
victories in the nation‘s electoral history, few could have predicted the emergence of a 
constitutional crisis the likes of which had not occurred in 104 years. Outside the unlikely 
prospect of his actual death in office, Richard Milhous Nixon was a sure bet to be at the nation‘s 
helm when it celebrated its bi-centennial just three and a half years away. For some life-long 
politicians, though, there were some fates worse than death. 
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CHAPTER 8 
―A MANDATE FOR REALISM.‖ 
 
We shall answer to God, to history, and to our conscience for the way in which we use these years.
572
 
 
 
n April 18 1975, Richard Nixon walked to the middle of a stage framed in American flags 
and star-spangled bunting. Under a warm mid-day sun, Old Glory danced lightly in the 
gentle southern breeze. The setting was picture perfect; indeed, it was much like the one he had 
dreamt about since first capturing the presidency in 1968. The occasion was the kick-off for the 
official bicentennial events in Boston, and the president arrived on Air Force One that morning 
to light the third lantern at the city’s famous Old North Church, marking America’s third 
century. The following day before a huge crowd, President Nixon delivered one of the strongest 
speeches of his political career to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the Battles of 
Lexington and Concord. In the weeks prior, the president and William Safire had met in the 
mornings in the Lincoln Sitting Room on the second floor of the White House in preparation for 
the address. The speechwriter sat, notepad in his lap, a cigarette perched in the corner of his 
mouth, and listened while the president paced and intertwined his personal story with the 
nation’s history: his sainted Quaker mother, the battles he fought to survive, from Alger Hiss to 
the media that tried but failed to take him down. In the end, the second son of Frank and Hannah 
Nixon had bested his enemies, and the American people had made it all possible. President 
Nixon paused and gazed out the window in the direction of the Washington Monument for a brief 
moment, thinking about his great-grandfather, George Nixon III, who gave his life for his 
country at Gettysburg.   “You know, Bill, ’76 is gonna be a hell of a good year. Pat and the girls 
deserve it,” Nixon said, turning to face his scribe. “Yeah, umm, we’ve all been through shi— 
through the valley, but we fought the good fight and climbed up the other side. Right, Bill, right?  
. . . Bill, where. . . are you—where did you  . . .  Safire?” 
 Sometimes when one wakes the real nightmare begins, a quiet but horrifying lucidity that 
grants no quarter. Even though Richard Nixon had recaptured the presidency with the second 
greatest margin between victors and vanquished in American history, few could have predicted 
that his second term as president of the United States would take its first breaths screaming and 
flailing for purchase. In practical terms, it was stillborn. The Watergate scandal would bring 
Nixon‘s presidency to its knees; the drama surrounding the hearings in Congress that supplanted 
daytime soaps had little to compare with in television history. As the first commander-in-chief 
since the birth of the Republic to be forced from office, Nixon, along with many of his loyal 
aides, was to face history‘s harsh judgment much sooner than anyone could have imagined. As 
the long and painful months of 1973 turned into 1974, many of the men who had fought the 
political battles with Nixon over the years and emerged victorious found themselves descending 
into a swamp teaming with indictments and prosecutors, where all the good presidential lawyers 
themselves needed lawyers. On Nixon‘s last day in elected office, the crowd outside the White 
House gates yelled, ―Jail to the Chief.‖573 With Watergate, careers were ruined, fines and jail 
sentences were meted out, and the 37
th
 president of the United States, not unlike a doomed 
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buccaneer on a ship brimming with pirates, was forced to walk the plank to his helicopter and 
into political obscurity.  
 Richard Nixon‘s massive election victory in 1972, though, was not the result of dark 
political doings. It is a point made well by historian Melvin Small. ―By 1972, even reporters and 
columnists who worked for [the Washington Post and the New York Times] had come to evaluate 
Nixon‘s presidency somewhat favorably. After all, one cannot attribute his landslide victory in 
the 1972 election entirely to dirty tricks, smoke and mirrors, and George McGovern‘s inept 
campaign.‖ As Small suggested, ―Most Americans approved of his foreign policies including 
what then appeared to be a daring opening to China, the normalization of relations with the 
Soviet Union, and bringing most of their boys home from Vietnam with ‗peace at hand.‘‖574 
 But there was much more. Nixon‘s team had built upon these strengths by creating the 
ideal image of the president in the White House while capitalizing upon the weaknesses of his 
opponent, thereby creating the most imperfect one of George McGovern. Following the renewed 
chaos of 1970, the political team projected Nixon as the calm, rational statesman who would 
keep the nation safe and who understood those in the American heartland, while McGovern was 
the leftist, communist, pinko, extremist, who palled around with the Hollywood elitist chic set.  
 Nixon‘s supporters might have not have ‗loved‘ Nixon as John Kennedy‘s followers 
adored him, but they learned to respect what they believed the man from Whittier represented. In 
many important ways, Nixon and his team had learned to meet Americans where they were, 
moving to represent the issues they believed the majority of citizens wanted represented. As the 
famous television personage and symbol of Middle American orthodoxy, Archie Bunker, 
captured, ―I‘ll tell you one thing about Richard Nixon. He keeps Pat home. Which is where 
Roosevelt should have kept Eleanor. Instead he let her run around loose till one day she 
discovered the colored. We never knew they was there. She told them they was gettin‘ the short 
end of the stick and we been havin‘ trouble ever since.‖575 The Nixonian message was always 
more nuanced, couched in anti-busing and states‘ rights rhetoric. But at its core the meaning was 
surprisingly similar. It was a response to a dominant culture that not only loathed but feared the 
prospect of continued turmoil, a populace terrified of the unknown. It was an existential soup 
thickened by a provincial myopia that Nixon and his men were able to capitalize upon by 
fostering the specter of an ‗extremist‘ George McGovern. This proved not to be much of a 
rhetorical stretch, as the South Dakotan‘s own utterances provided the Nixon team with endless 
rounds of attack material, especially given the senator‘s vocal and controversial stands on social 
issues and Vietnam. The president‘s White House loyalists had predicted this would occur and 
thus wished for McGovern as their opponent in the fall over everyone else in the Democratic 
field.  Nixon‘s strategists understood that it would be easy to make voters see the senator as 
someone outside the mainstream of American political thought, and moreover, a ―radical‖ who 
flirted with the dangerous edge of the antiwar movement. On this point, McGovern‘s own words 
had betrayed him with millions of voters.  
 The concussive effects of 1968, ones that appeared to reemerge in 1970 to threaten 
Nixon‘s chance at a second term, had enflamed the fears of an already receptive and conditioned 
public that America was heading for the edge. Nixon and his men understood where the majority 
was, and it was not with the campus protestors, the rock throwers, and the ‗shouters.‘ Nixon‘s 
team portrayed the president as the cultural backstop—a solid resolute leader whose re-
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sculptured image after the mid-term elections clearly resonated with this majority. But this is not 
a well-told tale. As speechwriter Bill Safire predicted, the damage done by the ―Kroghs, Liddys, 
Hunts, and even Colsons,‖ will result in the ―the noncampaign of ‘72 [being] remembered 
chiefly because of what was going on in the way of furious fund-raising, dirty trucks, break-ins 
and bugging—all, hard to believe, at the time matters of little import to the Candidate or most of 
the people in the White House.‖ Safire believed that the plans for the election were really firmed 
up after 1970, when the team, sensing the mood in the nation, turned the ship around by going 
after the president‘s new majority. As Safire recalled, CREEP was little more than a ―mopping-
up operation, largely ignored by the Candidate and most of his men, who were smugly 
concentrating on what they could do with the mandate they would surely receive.‖576  
On this point, Theodore White essentially agreed that the actions of the plumbers meant 
little to voters in 1972. As he suggested at the time, ―the Watergate scandal played only a 
secondary role in the campaign of 1972…[and] was only one of a number of major stories in the 
election of 1972.‖ Not only did the scandal not threaten a Nixon victory, but the presidential 
biographer believed that it was possible that the landslide could have even been greater without 
it. ―Had it not been for Watergate, it is quite possible that Richard Nixon‘s margin would have 
been increased by another three or four million votes,‖ a victory of perhaps 65 percent to 35 
percent ―that might never again be approached in American two-party history.‖  White (much 
like those internal White House memorandums had shown) concluded that the path that George 
McGovern wanted, that of drastic change and the expansion of the federal government, 
―frightened too many Americans; too many had been hurt along that road … [T]he Democratic 
Party, which called itself the party of the future, had become, in their eyes, the party of the past. 
They turned instead to Richard Nixon … For this time, they preferred to live their own lives 
privately—unplagued by moralities, or war, or riots, or violence.‖577 As the late biographer 
suggested, Nixon had used his ―enormous manipulative skill‖ to aid in the victory, ―but the 
break-ins and lying had contributed nothing to it. Nixon had forced issues to popular clarity 
better than any President since Roosevelt; McGovern had sharpened them; and on the issues, 
Nixon won.‖578  
Yet the story of overt (if manipulative) politics over covert operations has received little 
attention in the intervening years, even though the evidence for it has been available in many 
respects since election night. Immediately after the victory, Nixon‘s men tried to figure out for 
themselves how the president managed to capture more than 60 percent of the vote. Staffer Ken 
Khachigian‘s immediate post-election analysis prepared for Pat Buchanan, penned as soon as the 
election results were called is an illuminating and largely accurate summation of what went right 
for Nixon and what went wrong for McGovern before the post-election pundits published a 
single word. The document suggested that McGovern lost because he ―was trying to sell an 
                                                 
576
 Safire, Before the Fall, 313, 652-653. 
577
 White, The Making of the President, 1972, 267-268, 298, 371. 
578
 White, Breach of Faith, 423-424. A Gallup Poll taken two weeks after the election found that 48 percent of 
Americans were unaware of the Watergate break-in. Colson mused to E. Howard Hunt after the election that the 
caper may have worked well as a deliberate attempt to divert the nation‘s attention from the real issues. ―I always 
thought when I write my memoirs…of this campaign—that I‘m gonna say that the Watergate was brilliantly 
conceived as an escapade that would divert the Democrats‘ attention from the real issues, and therefore permit us to 
win a landslide that we probably wouldn‘t have won otherwise.‖ See Lukas, Nightmare, 276. Additionally, as 
Theodore White pointed out, ―the Watergate scandal only played a secondary role in the campaign of 1972. . .; the 
story of Watergate was only one of a number of major stories in the election of 1972.‖ See White, The Making of the 
President, 1972, 267-268. 
  154 
unpopular, unwanted ideology to the American people.‖ To Khachigian, there was no question 
that in a contest ―between drastically differing political philosophies,‖ the country‘s political left 
received ―a good licking in a fair contest.‖ He warned that the ―liberal apologists‖ would try to 
cast the loss as McGovern‘s, and not the core of his ideals. ―They will argue that liberalism is 
still viable.‖ But the election results proved to those in the inner circle‘s brain trust that it really 
was not a sound governing ideology but one that always appeared to reside in ―elitism, close-
mindedness, moral righteousness,‖ which were ―all fundamentals of the liberal-left political 
ideology.‖ While Khachigian did not mention that his team did its best to tie McGovern to those 
―elites‖ and ―radicals,‖ the memorandum made it clear that those who historically supported the 
traditional core of the Democratic Party did not want anything to do with these images and 
turned to Nixon when their party was overtaken ―by the McGovern guerillas.‖579  
 Of course the post-election analyses make it clear that the Democrats in 1972 appeared 
doomed before the campaign left the convention floor. As the Khachigian memorandum recalled, 
McGovern‘s ―leftism was fully exposed on national television,‖ resulting in a ―shock [that] for 
some probably has not yet worn off.‖ There was no soft shoeing around this issue, as the team 
knew how these images played in Middle America. As Khachigian wrote, this constituency 
could not stomach ―the spectacle of the abortion people, the libbers and homosexuals.‖  The 
senator from South Dakota appeared surrounded by radicals and the televised convention images 
for the Nixon White House were golden, especially ―all those damn hippy kids and free love 
adherents.‖  That McGovern‘s politics were associated with the counter culture, according to the 
recap, ―only made his radicalism worse.‖ Much of this was painfully true for some in the 
Democratic Party who had wished to retake the White House in 1972. Khachigian was pleased to 
tell Buchanan that McGovern had ―walked out of that convention a radical.‖ And it never got 
any better as the opinion polls since the summer showed consistently that the public resented 
McGovern ―running down America.‖ As the aide pointed out, ―Not only did the polls show 
McGovern misreading the country‘s mood, they also showed that McGovern misread the 
public‘s perception of the correct position on the issues. [Pollster Lou] Harris found out that in 
the summer the President had the preferable position on 15 out of 16 issues.‖580 
 What helped the president to have a ―preferable position‖ on the issues of the day was 
that his men had put together a strategy that worked. Charles Colson knew that his side of the 
internal White House debate had won the day and it had paid huge dividends. As Colson wrote in 
his memoir, 
 
Through 1971 the White House staff was divided over political strategy. Ehrlichman, Mitchell, speech-
writer Ray Price and others argued for an appeal to traditional Republican suburbanites and to the liberal, 
uncommitted voters. An opposing group—speech-writer Pat Buchanan; Mike Balzano, a talented young 
member of my staff; and I—argued the case for capturing the Middle-America-Wallace vote. The winds of 
social change sweeping across the country were, we felt, changing minds and hearts to our position.
581
 
 
According to Colson, by the summer of 1971, the inner circle knew that the food on the political 
plate would be federal aid for parochial schools, a tougher stand by Nixon against liberalized 
abortion, and a crackdown on drugs. In the South, as the special counsel recalled, ―We rode the 
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issue of busing for all it was worth, stealing the issue which propelled George Wallace to 
smashing victories in the Florida and Michigan primaries.‖ The team was also well aware that 
other issues such as amnesty for draft resisters were an ―anathema‖ to their ―new majority.‖ With 
this view, Colson remembered, ―Slowly we inched up in the polls.‖582 
It is clear that Nixon‘s men had reconstituted the issues they had first raised in 1968, but 
that 1972 offered a greater opportunity. Central to this thrust was the belief that disaffected 
voters would not go for Alabama Governor George Wallace as they had four years earlier. 
Instead, the team felt that this alienated constituency was up for grabs, especially if the 
Democratic Party chose a candidate it could paint as a radical. With the violence and turmoil of 
1970, Colson knew that the ―law-and-order standard which Richard Nixon and his men first 
unfurled in the 1968 campaign was now as American as wearing a flag pin on one‘s lapel, while 
the ‗era of permissiveness‘ became the enemy.‖ It was of course the critical change from 1968 
and Nixon‘s special counsel was accurate in his assessment that the playing field had never been 
in better shape. For the team, George McGovern had made it appear that his party machinery had 
been ―captured by reformers and liberals‖ and were thus ―forced to equivocate over busing, 
compromise on abortion, duck amnesty, and as we charged, go ‗soft‘ on criminals and pot 
smokers.‖ Not only had the Nixon team, in Colson‘s words, stepped in and seized ―the high 
ground, politically speaking,‖ they had actually ―believed in the rightness‖ of their cause ―with a 
religious fervor.‖ While the plan to pander to this constituency was part of a deliberate strategy, 
Nixon‘s former special counsel believed that it was not cynicism but consistent with the 
president‘s ―deeply held convictions.‖ As Colson suggested, ―the President thirsted for a 
restoration of the old-fashioned values, something a restless nation could rely on and believe 
in.‖583   
 Cynical or not, the Buchanan-Colson strategy to hit hard on McGovern‘s ―softness‖ on 
these core issues succeeded with devastating results. As columnist Carroll Kilpatrick noted the 
day after the election, voters were not so much thinking about the president but with ―the parade 
of McGovern supporters at Miami Beach who called for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam, 
who advocated quotas, abortion, gay liberation, youth power and demonstrators.‖ He, like others, 
also gave voice to the strategy that worked very well for the president, and that was to turn 
McGovern into a radical. ―It wasn‘t that McGovern was necessarily a ‗radical‘ or captive of the 
new politics; it was that he was perceived as a radical and ideologist and that too many voters 
distrusted some of his most visible advocates.‖ As Kilpatrick correctly pointed out, all Nixon had 
to do was ―carry out his duties and keep his cool.‖ Nixon‘s men had read the signs after the 1970 
debacle and knew that keeping ―cool‖ was indeed the winning ticket. They had also taken a long 
hard look at the public opinion polling and concluded that they were in step. It was easy. As the 
journalist had correctly pointed out, in 1970, Americans were 86-14 percent against legalizing 
marijuana; 78-22 percent against busing; 91 to 9 percent in favor of more police on the streets; 
and 79-21 percent for withholding aid from colleges failing to expel riotous students. As 
Kilpatrick suggested, Nixon spent the next two years identifying ―himself with the majority 
position‖ against drugs, busing, crime, higher taxes, amnesty, big government, and 
permissiveness, while championing a strong defense, diplomacy with cold war enemies, and 
speaking the work ethic and traditional values of the heartland. In high contrast, Nixon had 
painted the perfect radical image of McGovern. Much as in 1964, when challenger Barry 
Goldwater was depicted as occupying the outer edge of American political discourse, in 1972, 
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―the implication was that the McGovernites were elitists, leaders of a Goldwater-type minority 
within the Democratic Party.‖ Kilpatrick, like others, had noticed that in the wake of the ‘64 
campaign, the president and his team had learned much about how to win big ―by studying how 
Lyndon Johnson waged his 1964 campaign against Goldwater.‖584   
 Other astute observers in the national media had echoed the words of Nixon‘s men in the 
final days of the campaign. The most important factor, according to some was that ―Senator 
McGovern and his supporters completely misread the people‘s discontent.‖ As the Wall Street 
Journal‘s Vermont Royster suggested, the Democrats had made the critical error of listening to 
―the noise of the anti-Vietnam demonstrators, left-wing theorists, rebellious youth, angry blacks 
and the like that the country was ready for a revolution in politics.‖ The party under McGovern‘s 
direction also failed to understand Vietnam, and ―mistook the dissatisfactions about Vietnam for 
a willingness to cut-and-run; his solution was simply to quit and beg Hanoi to be charitable.‖ 
But, as he noted to his readers, it was no different with issues closer to home ―from taxes to 
social legislation‖ and ―real grievances‖ like busing. While Royster suggested that the busing 
issue was ―overblown,‖ what it ―symbolizes is not. People have grown resentful at having the 
long arm of the federal government reach out to dictate to local school boards, zoning 
commissions and city halls.‖585 
 All of this, however, was more than just post-election hindsight. Back in August, some 
commentators in the media sensed not only what Nixon and his boys were up to but that it 
looked like an unbeatable strategy. As the Washington Post‘s Marquis Childes astutely 
suggested, in 1964, the Republicans ―nominated Barry Goldwater on a ticket that spoke to an 
extremist faction, anticipating what was the most disastrous defeat, save one, in American 
political history. The cherished belief of many Republicans here is that the McGovern-Shriver 
ticket similarity represents a small faction of the other party and will likewise go down to 
disaster.‖586  Additionally, three months before the election, political strategist Kevin Phillips 
predicted that the disaffected voters in the heartland, including the alienated Wallace voters, 
would not support the politician who emerged from the Democratic convention. As Phillips put 
it, the Democratic nominee did not seem to understand the mood of the country. ―McGovern has 
got a great issue in alienation, but I wonder if he knows the cause. The people who are alienated 
are the ones who don‘t want pot, who don‘t want abortion, who don‘t want to pay more taxes.‖  
Phillips suggested that if the mood of the country was a sense of frustration with ―the trampling 
of traditional values, and if major chunks of the old Democratic coalition are angry at the cultural 
upheaval represented by George McGovern, then Richard Nixon will come out on top.‖ The 
strategist was quite certain that because of this national mood, the Nixon team had correctly 
begun to consolidate and hold their support from 1968; maximize the Wallace voters; woo 
Catholics, seniors, organized labor, white ethnics, independents, and conservatives into a 
winning coalition.  On November 7, he expected ―Americans to vote for sobriety and stability, 
giving Richard Nixon a decisive reelection majority.‖587  
 A major issue aiding the success of this strategy was that George Wallace was not a 
factor in 1972.  Historian Rick Perlstein suggests that although the president certainly welcomed 
the presence of Wallace in the race as an instrument of division in the Democratic field, he could 
not have predicted that the governor would have run as a Democrat. While hinting that there 
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might have been a secret deal between the president and the late Alabama political icon, he 
points out correctly that Nixon had hoped that ―Wallace would screw the Democrats,‖ but he 
would not ―be in the race long enough to screw him.‖588  As the files in the National Archives 
make clear, Nixon and his men were more than just hopeful about Wallace‘s lack of political 
staying power, but confident that he would not be a factor in 1972 as he had been in 1968. 
Unlike that chaotic year, there were many opportunities for the Nixon administration to attract 
not only Wallace voters but disaffected citizens in general, which comprised much of the 
southern governor‘s core support four year earlier. Moreover, Nixon campaign strategists were 
banking on these voters staying away from McGovern. As historian Stanley Kutler points out, 
the ‘72 campaign ―was to be very different from the calculated divisiveness of 1968,‖ as Nixon 
―assiduously courted Democrats, labor, blacks, Jews, and the young, while expecting (quite 
correctly) that his 1968 constituency would remain with him if only because it had nowhere else 
to go.‖589  
 Early on, however, Nixon and his men did worry that these voters might have had 
somewhere else to go. Given the president‘s low poll numbers after 1970, the rise of a moderate 
Edmund Muskie, who was not sounding like a radical, threatened to capture the constituency that 
Nixon and his men so strongly coveted. But with the senator from Maine unhorsed in the New 
Hampshire snow and the rise of George McGovern, everything had begun to come together for 
the president‘s men in the White House. Nixon staffers like Khachigian believed the result was 
an all but inevitable clash of an extremist radical and a heartland warrior who read the nation‘s 
soul. Like many others in the White House, Khachigian maintained that McGovern had 
committed the political original sin: ―In a nutshell, McGovern was wrong from the start.‖ As a 
result, the American people had repudiated his ―alien ideas. Let‘s not blame it on his political 
amateur standing—after all, he did some quite intelligent politicking at times—let‘s put the 
blame where it belongs: on the elitist, leftward movement in America which was born of 
Kennedy, raised in the Great Society and cut down by the grocer‘s son who saw the excesses and 
called ‗em like he saw ‗em.‖590   
 Pat Buchanan‘s own analysis was more pragmatic and less of the populist wet dream 
described by his assistant. In his immediate post-election memorandum for the president, the 
speechwriter described how the team‘s plan to let others do the fighting was a winning strategy. 
As the chief political strategist suggested in his brief, the team‘s surrogate program ―proved to be 
one of the most effective weapons for keeping McGovern on the defensive.‖ Keeping the 
president sequestered in the White House and enhancing Nixon‘s presidential image had also 
paid dividends as it had ―succeeded in reinforcing the President‘s image of competence, while 
creating doubts about McGovern‘s ability to meet the demands of the Presidency.‖ Additionally, 
the president‘s occasional radio and television appearances ―served to project him into the 
campaign arena just enough‖ to keep their voters interested and their opponent on the defensive.   
This ―front-porch‖ presidential strategy of limited campaign appearances had worked beautifully 
as Buchanan rightly believed, because it was designed to provide the president with ―maximum 
                                                 
588
 Perlstein, Nixonland, 631-632. 
589
 Kutler, The Wars of Watergate, 237. 
590
 Memorandum from Ken Khachigian to Pat Buchanan, November 7, 1972, WHSF, Contested Files, Box 41, 
Nixon Library. 
  158 
use of his office,‖ a plan that left McGovern with ―no target and no opportunity to close the great 
gap in public support.‖591   
 Was this all post-election euphoric blather? It appears not. Some Democrats also believed 
that they had been beaten by a straight up political approach, without the help of smoke and 
mirrors or Segretti-style dirty tricks. As McGovern campaign manager Frank Mankiewicz 
pointed out: 
 
To sum it all up: When we talk about the McGovern campaign, we ought to look at the Nixon campaign, 
which was the model. It spent an inordinate amount of time and money that originally was ticketed for 
television and ended up on the street in one of the best get-out-the-vote operations in terms of direct mail 
and telephones that many of us had ever seen. I have a feeling that the time we spent on election day 
getting out the vote was in part responsible for turning out so large a Nixon vote. I would think the figures 
will show that the Nixon campaign beat us at what we do best—getting out the vote. It‘s probably the first 
time a Republican campaign has ever done that so successfully. It was a remarkable job.
592
 
 
However, both sides in 1972 had some difficulty in encouraging voters to head out to the polls 
on Election Day. The likely reason was a lack of a legitimate contest between the candidates. 
Since the summer, George McGovern‘s numbers in the public opinion polls had flat lined and 
never recovered at any point throughout the fall campaign. The lopsided poll numbers in Nixon‘s 
favor actually caused some consternation in the White House, as the president‘s team worried 
that a low turnout would hurt Republicans more than Democrats. Nixon‘s men believed that 
McGovern‘s young followers would be motivated to cast their votes and worried that 
complacency over the apparent mismatch would keep Republicans at home. Indeed, the 55.21% 
turnout of eligible voters was the lowest since 1948 with some voters from both parties staying 
home on November 7. This less than overwhelming turnout, however, did not change the reality 
that the margin between winner and loser was of historic proportions, only eclipsed once before 
in U.S. history.
593
  
The president himself had revealed that he was well aware of how the nation would 
respond to his campaign‘s message before Americans went to the polls. Two days before the 
election, Nixon agreed to a sit-down interview with Washington Evening Star journalist Garnett 
Horner. The meeting came about in the late afternoon on November 5 at San Clemente, 
California. Sitting in the blue easy chairs in the president‘s office, the two engaged in a far-
reaching conversation concerning both the campaign and how Nixon saw his second term in 
office. Before Americans went to the polls, the president indicated that, unlike George 
McGovern, he understood how the mood in the nation really shaped up.  
 
Well, let me begin by saying that the liberal establishment, during the four years I have been in the office, 
thought that I was out of touch with the country. That is not true. What this election will demonstrate is 
that out across this country, and including, incidentally, up in the Northeast, which is considered to be the 
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playground of the limousine liberal set, you find that a solid majority of the American people do not want 
to go to the far left. What this election will demonstrate is that when a candidate takes basically an extreme 
position on issues, he inevitably splits his party and assures his defeat.
594
 
 
The president even admitted that the press covered this angle ―honestly.‖ Accordingly to Nixon, 
his team won on the issues, including, his stand for a strong national defense, ―peace with honor‖ 
in Vietnam, opposing ―busing for racial balance,‖ and standing up against ―permissiveness‖ and 
―amnesty.‖ Nixon was clear that he placed himself in the middle of the political spectrum, 
suggesting that most Americans believed he was a ―centrist‖ on the issues.  Foretelling works by 
Joan Hoff and Dean Kotlowski, Nixon boldly suggested that his presidency ―will be known as an 
Administration which advocated . . . more significant reform than any Administration since 
Franklin Roosevelt‘s in 1932.‖595   
 The politician that resonated with much of Middle America, however, was not ‗Nixon the 
sweeping reformist,‘ far from it. According to the inner circle, the president was propelled by 
those who were moved by the ―gut‖ and the heart. As Stanley Kutler observed, ―the President‘s 
erstwhile campaign manager [John Mitchell] had no doubts as to the meaning of the 1972 
election.‖ According to Mitchell, Nixon was the ―personification‖ of what voters wanted in the 
White House. Americans may not have appreciated the ―brilliance‖ of Nixon‘s foreign policy or 
the ―nuances of his economic policy,‖ but they understood it was in the best interests of 
themselves and the country.  As Kutler wrote, John Mitchell believed that ―Richard Nixon was 
the one who really had hold of the national pulse.‖596  
  That national pulse, while strong, even hardnosed, was also erratic and skittish. The team 
sensed that Americans out in the heartland wanted a leader to reassure them that everything 
would be okay, that there was someone looking out for their interests who understood their 
concerns. Nixon and his men were not merely cynical propagandists, spinning and serving what 
would sell, as they believed both that they were dead right and that the nation depended on their 
leadership.  They were the partisans and fighters just like the millions they represented. If 
citizens were fearful and narrow in their views, so too were Nixon and his men. This insight 
worked in capturing disaffected white ethnics, labor, and Catholic votes in 1972, voting blocs 
susceptible to arguments against permissiveness, pornography, abortion, but open to calls for a 
strong national defense, peace with honor, safe neighborhoods, and aid to parochial schools.
597
  
The Nixonian postwar stance resonated with his staff. ―He made me feel proud of my country‖ 
speechwriter Bill Safire wrote. ―If you are in your mid-forties, you have been for or against 
Richard Nixon in national elections, with only one exception, ever since you have been able to 
vote. He is part of you: a backboard, a mirror, a stimulant, a palliative, an object of your hate or 
adoration, your grudging respect or mild distaste, but like it or not he is a presence, the presence 
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of the adult postwar generation.‖598 And that generation had ensured that a man like Nixon 
would succeed in the political game.  
 That postwar adult constituency or the ―greatest generation,‖ the incongruous moniker 
coined by television news reader Tom Brokaw, accepted Safire‘s ubiquitous Nixon, the tough 
conservative adult leader who demanded respect if nothing else.
599
 But it also had rewarded and 
stroked the other Nixon, the scrappy, serial communist baiter who fed off the grist of an 
emerging Cold War.  It should not surprise that the ‗confrontational Nixon‘ would appeal to 
Brokaw‘s chosen ones, those who endured the Great Depression, fought and won the Second 
World War, met Communists in the Korean peninsula, were curiously and conspicuously silent 
on civil rights, and who wanted a fighter with whiskey in his blood in Washington. They were 
the ―silent‖ majority of Americans who in 1952 cheered in their homes as Nixon referred to 
Adlai Stevenson as ―Adlai the appeaser…who got a Ph.D. from Dean Acheson‘s College of 
Cowardly Communist Containment,‖ who called Harry Truman a ―traitor,‖ John Kennedy a 
―liar‖ and Lyndon Johnson an ―ignoramus.‖ The grocer‘s son attracted those who were drawn to 
the junkyard dog part of this politician who in their stead bit down on post-war American 
liberalism and refused to let go. Interestingly, Nixon‘s battles in the 1950s to cling to President 
Dwight Eisenhower‘s coattails from the Checkers affair to the Fund crisis had taught him how to 
fight but not how to let go of the proverbial neck once he had won for fear of political ruin.
600
 
 The reality that Richard Nixon appeared to believe his own rhetoric certainly helped to 
provide him with a greater authenticity in the heartland. It should not surprise that the men he 
chose to represent him shared many of his traits. It should also not come as much of a shock that 
the nickname for Nixon‘s new chief of staff in 1969 revealed a characteristic shared by most 
everyone in his inner circle; the daily battles during the 1972 election revealed this in 
Technicolor.  Haldeman was known as the ―SOB,‖ a likening very close to Nixon‘s own 
pedigree—a Frank Nixon gospel that life meant fight.601  It had followed the man from 
California through his political career from his personal style to those he later chose as his team. 
A young Richard Nixon had learned to be a ―SOB‖ from his first campaigns. He had 
maneuvered his way onto Eisenhower‘s vice presidential ticket based largely for his communist 
fighting potential, becoming the commander-in-chief‘s hit man. When Nixon became president 
in 1969, he brought in a type of man he understood: an SOB without par, H.R. Haldeman, who 
subsequently brought in other fighters from his advertising days. They were the ones who in the 
1950s as teenagers and young men stood and cheered when ‗Nixon the fighter‘ had challenged 
the communists near and far and pursued Alger Hiss without a leash. Nixon had attracted a 
faithful following in the 1950s and found a new voice in the reactionary stance that emerged out 
of the chaos of the 1960s, a disturbance that reverberated throughout much of Middle America.   
 The president and his men had also capitalized on another Nixon virtue valued in the 
heartland: his stature as the quintessential self-made man. His upward mobility was a sign for 
others that despite meager beginnings, men like Dick Nixon could rise to capture the highest 
office in the land. It was a mantra shared by those on his team, like Chuck Colson, who were 
proud of his self-starting pedigree, and embraced political warfare as a way of settling political 
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and cultural scores. With men like Haldeman and Colson, the inner circle helped fashion media 
images to fit the nation‘s temperament,602 and chose to represent those whom the ―elites‖ would 
not. As Nixon was proud to say, ―I was anxious to defend the ‗square‘ virtues.‖603  Historian 
Rick Perlstein suggests this feeling went both ways. ―By 1971, more and more Americans were 
professing to love Dick Nixon—not despite the fear and dread that produced the Plumbers, but in 
some sense because of it. They loved him, too, for his squareness.‖604  As journalist Richard 
Rovere observed, Nixon‘s entire demeanor was an easy sell in the heartland. ―His general 
appearance, his dress, his whole style of living and being, commend him to the multitudes who 
share his aspirations for a clear title to a ranch-house, furs for the wife, and pets for the 
children.‖605  
 But as Tom Wicker noted, there might have been also something darker and more primal 
at play. As Nixon had once admitted, ―You‘ve got to be a little evil to understand those people 
out there. You have to have known the dark side of life to understand those people.‖ Wicker, for 
one, believed that it was the realist in Nixon that understood this all too well. ―Perhaps Richard 
Nixon represented a harder and clearer national self–assessment. In the dark of their souls, which 
Nixon seems to have perceived, Americans could have seen in him themselves as they were, not 
as they frequently dreamed of being.‖606 The president understood that all too well. As Nixon 
scholar Margaret MacMillian has written, the career politician dreamed of personal virtue. 
―Nixon did many immoral things in his life but he longed to be good.‖607  
 The connection with Middle Americans also had an unpleasant connotation for people 
such as Nixon, and it is evident in the vocabulary of the ‗common man‘ that was so prevalent in 
the campaign literature prepared by his men. As Theodore White observed, ―The Nixons were 
poor in a way that only the poor could understand. Poverty curdles character as well as 
strengthening it. It crumbles some men. It makes others hard. Poverty soiled Nixon; he grew up 
to be hard—and vulnerable.‖608 But it was just this quality that also made the politician so 
attractive. As Wicker suggested, many Americans ―might even have understood that Nixon, or 
anyone, could believe himself forced on occasion to cheat a little, lie a little, find an edge, get out 
front of more favored competitors any way he could—as they themselves had done, or would 
do—in the unrelenting battles of life.‖609  
 Much of it was also rhetorical gold. These Americans were the ones who baked pies, 
frequented the lodge and legion halls; they bowled on Saturday night and went to church on 
Sunday. They were the ones who believed they sang the national anthem a little louder than the 
Democrats at their party‘s convention, hands held firmly over hearts. ―They were clean, neat 
people,‖ Theodore White wrote, recalling what he saw on the floor of the Republican National 
Convention in Miami. There were no ―long-hairs‖ or beards, no cowboy boots, blue jeans, few 
minorities. As journalist Hugh Sidney suggested, the crowd was representative of the Middle 
American voters Nixon both appealed to and those he knew he needed to reach. They were the 
middle class property owners, the farmers, the ranchers, the miners, the teachers, the small 
business owners, and the middle managers. They were not the ―elite‖ but they also did ―not dig 
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ditches…They run the firms that build industrial plants and houses; they sell refrigerators, play 
pianos, bury the dead and straighten teeth.‖610  
If Nixon was, in the words of Tom Wicker, ―one of us,‖ some observers believed it was 
most likely because many Middle Americans saw in him a man who would fight the battles they 
wanted fought.  It was certainly what had attracted loyalists like Pat Buchanan and Chuck Colson 
to his side. As California Governor Pete Wilson suggested at Nixon‘s 1994 memorial, Nixon 
attracted those who had a thirst for struggle.  While the president possessed other qualities, 
Wilson claimed that he would ―always remember him for another quality. It is the quality that 
great fighters have. They call it heart. Heart is what let Richard Nixon climb back into the ring 
time and again when almost anyone else would have thrown in the towel.‖ Following the same 
theme, long time Nixon loyalist Bob Dole laid it out at his political hero‘s funeral. ―The 
American people love a fighter, and in Dick Nixon they found a gallant one.‖611 Not everyone 
was pleased with the niceties that day. Former Undersecretary of State George Ball was 
disgusted by the memorial speeches, calling the entire episode ―the most obscene orgy of 
revisionism that I‘ve ever seen in this country. Why should they rehabilitate the son of a 
bitch?‖612 Bob Dole‘s gushing and George Ball‘s umbrage notwithstanding, prior to Watergate, 
Nixon‘s fighting heartland hardhat populist language did indeed resonate, not only with the 
Colsons, the Buchanans, and the Haldemans but with Middle Americans, as a majority of the 
adult population were against the same issues that Nixon was against—―acid, amnesty, and 
abortion‖ and for the same tried and true clichés as he was for—―peace with honor‖ and ―law 
and order.‖613  
The letters to the editor in the nation‘s major newspapers spoke to this reality. ―We 
members of the ‗silent majority‘ have at last spoken out in the landslide election of Richard 
Nixon,‖ stated one such letter writer in the New York Times. ―Not because we love him or 
because he is the incumbent President. We voted for Nixon because we are for what he is for.‖614 
Another suggested that ―when Richard Nixon said over and over, ‗Peace with honor,‘ patriotism 
went to the polls.‖615 The vote, perhaps a repudiation of the Sixties as much as a vote for Richard 
Nixon, in many ways represented a calling from the heartland that Nixon‘s men heard and 
responded to after their wake-up call after the violence of 1970 at Kent State and hundreds of 
other campuses across the nation.
616
  As Rick Perlstein has astutely pointed out, ―Nixon acted not 
despite the Silent Majority he described as so pure and decent, but in a sense on their behalf, and 
even at their request.‖617  
 But this ―silent majority‖ was just that—a majority. Indeed, this large middling center 
that Nixon claimed on election night had not been historically party-specific. Democrat, 
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Republican, and Independent voters split somewhat unevenly between the major parties in 1960 
and 1968, and Lyndon Johnson‘s 1964 landslide captured Democrats, Republicans and 
Independent voters for a big tent majority. This majority consisting of rather pragmatic Middle 
American voters was up for grabs in 1972, and was captured by Nixon and his men because they 
had correctly read the electoral tea leaves and McGovern did not.   
Despite what the Sixties appear to be in the rearview mirror, this was not a divided or 
fractured nation.  Just as they had for Lyndon Johnson in 1964, members of both parties voted 
for Nixon in his reelection bid. This not so silent majority was the face of the post-war 
generation. In 1972, Nixon and his men delivered for this Middle American consensus in ways it 
could only have dreamt about in 1968. Whereas the election result of that tumultuous year was 
razor thin with the majority splitting their vote between the two major parties as they had done in 
1960, such was not the case four years later, where Nixon‘s men were appeared to be in step with 
the mood across the nation, bringing home the vote with almost every demographic and in every 
region. While it appears that the president always had a loyal following, including the solid 
supporters that were with him in 1960 and 1968 in tight contests, the difference in 1972 was that 
Nixon not only retained this support but added disaffected Democrats, Independents, 
Wallaceites, Northern industrial workers, organized Labor, white ethnics, Catholics, and even 40 
percent of the Jewish vote. In capturing that large middle spectrum, the president achieved a 
victory of which fellow Republican Barry Goldwater could only have dreamed as he captured 49 
of 50 states. As Vermont Royster pointed out a week following the election in the Wall Street 
Journal, ―not the least interesting thing about President Nixon‘s victory was the evenness of it 
across the country. He did not win by an avalanche here and a trickle there....This suggests that 
however you assess the mood of the country, it is a national mood and not one splintered by 
geography.‖618  
 The mood also suggests why Nixon really won the way that he did. Plagued not by tales 
of Watergate in the Washington Post, it appears that the majority of voting-age Americans 
wanted Nixon, or at the least, what his team sold as a resolute commander-in-chief who shared 
the majority‘s core values. They would not worry as much about being likable, as with the fallout 
from Watergate, but likeminded. As the Wall Street Journal suggested two days following the 
landslide, ―the critics fail to see why the Watergate episode and the like failed to move more 
voters. To the moralistic viewpoint they seemed the perfect embodiment of the choice at hand.‖ 
But voters saw beyond that episode, as they ―were perfectly capable of taking the attitude that 
while Watergate is deplorable and calls for a good housecleaning, its impact on the future of the 
Republic is not of the same order as that of foreign policy and so on.‖ As the Journal 
proclaimed, quite correctly, Nixon‘s landslide was a ―mandate for realism,‖ as it was ―the 
judgment of the American people that the job of politics is to deal with reality, not to beget 
utopia.‖  The voters adopted a ―moral realism,‖ as the world is not supposed to be perfect, it is 
only to work well. In the wake of the clear destruction of McGovern at the polls, the Journal 
suggested that Nixon‘s critics could take a lesson and curb some of their idealism for a ―more 
realistic morality,‖ as ―they will profit and so will the nation.‖619   
 Letters to the editor once again bore this contention out. As one writer observed, ―For 
whatever reasons, a seasoned political veteran who knows the ropes is more comfortable than a 
chance at real movement; security is presently prevailing over growth.‖620 In the wake of the 
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mid-term elections, Nixon‘s men learned that the critical issue was a domestic ‗realism.‘ 
Americans in large numbers wanted a calm and reassuring leader who would steady the ship of 
state. The subsequent strategy to keep the president in the White House acting presidential was a 
clear winner.  
 This is hardly the enduring image of Richard Nixon and his men at the capstone of the 
president‘s career, ushering in the second widest margin of victory in the history of American 
presidential elections. Often Nixon only appears to reflect the darkness; he and his loyal aides 
operating in a bunker, shadowy and disconnected. Additionally, and importantly, is the notion 
that Nixon really did not understand the nation he led. As Theodore White suggested in Breach 
of Faith following the Watergate scandal, Nixon ―had not really learned the way America 
works.‖621  Is this a true reflection of a politician who had been a central player on the national 
political scene for more than two decades? Or is it one of the initial post-Watergate constructions 
that began to view the domestic side of the Nixon presidency through the lens of plumbers with 
flashlights, thereby missing not only the strategy and the overwhelming reception it garnered but 
the connection to the great American heartland? In reality, Nixon scholarship largely followed 
this lead, including otherwise excellent works by Melvin Small, Herbert Parmet, and Stephen 
Ambrose. The domestic political realism of the Nixon team after 1970, however, should not be 
summarily equated with cynicism. The historical view could easily be broader than a story of 
opportunism—a capacious capitalizing on a truck load of McGovern blunders and the bitter fruit 
of a divided or fractured nation. As Haldeman aide and CREEP villain Jeb Magruder wrote, ―the 
1972 Nixon campaign has not, in my opinion, received the attention it deserves, both because of 
Watergate and because the Democratic candidate, Senator McGovern, ran such a poor campaign 
that analysis has tended to focus on the mistakes rather than on our successes.‖622    
Watergate has created a distorting and disorienting hall of mirrors, where even solid 
portraits on Nixon, including that of historian Herbert Parmet, lose some of their meaning when 
applied to the election of 1972. While Nixon is revealed as a representative figure, the ironic 
upshot is that Parmet, like others, conceded that the president was ultimately disconnected and 
isolated from those in the White House, and by implication, the process that brought his message 
to the American people.
623
 While Bob Woodward has written that the president was ―cut off 
from the rest of humanity,‖ it appears that Nixon in reality reflected humanity perhaps all too 
well. 
Scholars such as Stanley Kutler, however, pose a historical absolute, an embedded 
inevitability that limits Nixon‘s ultimate meaning and functionally restricts interpretations to the 
actions of one man. While not merely the isolated loner of Reeves and Woodward, for Kutler, 
Nixon was the lone criminal protagonist: ―In time, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, Colson, 
Dean, Butterfield, Haig, and the other supporting players in the Watergate drama will fade into 
the same well-deserved obscurity as have their counterparts in other historical scandals,‖ Kutler 
wrote. ―Ultimately, we leave behind the spear carriers, what the poet Coleridge called the 
Ancient Mariner‘s ‗strange and ghastly crew.‘ But Nixon himself will remain as the one 
indisputably unforgettable and responsible actor.‖  It should be made clear that Kutler was not 
writing merely about Watergate, but Richard Nixon‘s entire career. As, according to the 
historian, Watergate was not only ―rooted in the lifelong political personality of Richard Nixon,‖ 
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but the man from Whittier ―cannot be separated from Watergate.‖624  The president‘s team then 
risks becoming the detritus: forgettable faceless henchmen with German and Irish names, 
political criminals caught in an office break-in during what otherwise was an unremarkable 
election campaign run by CREEP and a truck load of dirty tricks. Ultimately, they appear 
relegated to straw men who acted merely under the divine will of a single ―responsible‖ 
sovereign, a conclusion that renders them essentially blameless. Such a result fails to consider or 
explain why millions of citizens across the nation supported Nixon from 1948 to 1972, nor does 
it comment on the distinct possibility that Americans knew much of what there was to know 
about Richard Nixon but voted for him anyway.  
A counter argument is that Americans did not know what they were buying in 1972 when 
they went to the polls and only discovered the ―real‖ Richard Nixon as the sordid tales emerged 
during the televised hearings. If historians such as Kutler and Small and others are correct, 
however, that Watergate represented the president‘s entire career, then surely it is safe to assume 
that others recognized those traits well before the dark days of 1974. To Nixon‘s faithful fighters 
and those he wished to speak to in the heartland, however, it seems reasonable to speculate that 
his political approach and attitudes were not a mystery. Nixon had not been an enigma to his 
supporters or disconnected or alienated from the partisans. Arguably, voters knew where the 
politician stood on liberalism, amnesty, pot, elites, and communists. It seems logical to argue that 
this constituency would have inferred that the politician harbored private prejudices against Jews 
or the Hollywood and Hyannis Port jet set, and like them, sided with hard-working hard hats who 
believed in ―traditional conservative American values.‖ Additionally, there can be little question 
that the image of the politician as ‗Tricky Dicky‘ predates by many years the Watergate saga.  
Posters, campaign literature, newspaper and magazine articles, comic books, and radio and 
television programs marked his career as a trickster who would do what was necessary to win in 
the political game.
625
   That Nixon would enter the battle in 1972 using every trick in the book 
could not have been a secret to many adults in the nation. It is equally clear that in 1972 the 
majority of these Americans were willing to vote for him despite the clear history of those 
―transgressions.‖  
If historians Melvin Small, Michael Genovese, Stanley Kutler and Fred Emery, and 
biographers Elizabeth Drew and Richard Reeves are correct that Watergate in some manner 
represents the essence of Nixon‘s political career, then the reality that millions of Americans 
responded to this seemingly divisive and dark character may tell us as much about his supporters 
as it does about the man himself. By 1972, Nixon‘s warts had been visible to citizens for 25 
years, and that had not put him out of public life and the political game but in the best possible 
position to win in November of that year. This awareness was no more evident than among his 
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loyal staff who worked with the Californian politician, some in numerous campaigns, for three 
decades. And when the core of the Nixonian message was packaged and delivered by this team 
with the full measure of its devotion after the midterm elections of 1970, his support was at an 
all-time high.  In some ways, the election of 1972 was the most perfect example of the nation‘s 
support for the post-war ideals—reflected darkly—in the leadership of Richard Nixon. It also 
suggests a clear refutation of the excesses of the 1960s.  
For the man from Yorba Linda, however, that political knife cut both ways. As the 
nastiness of Watergate and the alleged associated high crimes and misdemeanors were played 
out in newspapers and became regular television fare, Nixon‘s poll numbers plummeted as much 
of his following began the process of shunning. One might speculate that this occurred not 
because citizens were unable to believe that Richard Nixon would have been involved in 
underhanded politics, including burglarizing the offices of a political rival. It might be that 
Nixon‘s critical error with the silent majority was not the deed but that he had embarrassed his 
supporters by getting caught. Those who minded their lawns and spread snow-white paint on 
their picket fences might not have appreciated foul language on tapes, sloppy break-ins, and 
slipshod operations that made those they supported appear ignoble and those they loathed appear 
righteous. Americans might like heroes and gunfighters when they run the riffraff out but they 
are not supposed to burn the church to the ground on the way out of town. Watergate wasn‘t so 
much an evil as it was unsightly. As the late Republican hardball strategist Lee Atwater once 
quipped, there are reasons why those behind the scenes never tell the public how they ―make the 
sausage.‖626 
It is unlikely that the historical memory of Richard Nixon will ever transcend his 
contradictions. The president‘s grand diplomatic gestures and his petty Oval Office vendettas are 
odd bookends for what was an intriguing career from a master politician. But his personal 
paradox makes navigation through what was already a very confusing time even more 
challenging. It is too easy to discard his accomplishments in foreign and domestic policy when 
examining the excesses of this partisan politician—the pitcher of beltway hard balls and the 
purveyor of dirty tricks. However, while Richard Nixon was, in the words of speechwriter Bill 
Safire, the ―rock in the snowball,‖ it is clear that the Californian politician could have achieved 
few of his successes in isolation. And the atmosphere in the White House was not a prevailing 
isolating darkness from which no one could escape alive. Even the most hard-knuckled of his 
loyalists understood this reality and proved it with their actions. Instead of dirty tricks, straight-
ahead politics guided the actions of many important figures in the Nixon White House. Pat 
Buchanan, for example, eschewed what he thought were unimportant shenanigans. He believed 
rightly that the actual campaign was separate from these matters, and consequently, wanted 
nothing to do with them. Buchanan recalled how he was offered the job to head up the infamous 
plumbers unit following the release of the Pentagon Papers. ―They had some real cowboys in 
there. And I said to myself, ‗I don‘t want to do this; I‘m not an operations officer.‘ I was very 
close to Richard Nixon, I could simply say, ‗I do not want to do this job. I prefer to do the 
analysis of the opponents for the campaign of 1972. This is what I‘m really good at, you know, 
and I don‘t wanna do that.‘ So they got Bud Krogh....I said no.‖ Buchanan stressed that he would 
not have ―authorized anybody to break in anywhere‖ as he could never ―understand its relevance 
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or purpose‖ to getting reelected and that Ellsberg was already indicted over the removal of 
sensitive files on the Vietnam War from the Pentagon.
627
  
Was this just convenient hindsight? Clearly it was not. As Buchanan wrote in a 
memorandum to Haldeman and Ehrlichman at that time, ―There are some dividends to be 
derived from Project Ellsburg [sic]—but none to justify the magnitude of the investment 
recommended.‖628 Such choices paid huge dividends. After Watergate, Buchanan went home to 
his family and Jeb Magruder went to jail. Far from operating under the power and persuasion of 
a Svengali-like master manipulator or a dark isolating structure that consumed and doomed all it 
touched, Nixon‘s men made choices. As the introspective and thoughtful Magruder put it, ―It is 
not enough to blame the atmosphere he created. No one forced me or the others to break the 
law.‖629  
 Of course all of this reveals why the idea of a ‗Berlin Wall‘ is so erroneous, as such a 
wall would have also limited the perspective of those around the president, preventing them from 
making informed choices. Certainly Haldeman‘s authoritarian role as chief of staff combined 
with the president‘s desire to have his administration run by loyal assets contributed to the 
appearance of isolation. The foiled break-in, however, has elevated this idea unnecessarily. As 
Haldeman wrote in his memoirs, ―Much has been made of the ‗Berlin Wall‘ that I am supposed 
to have constructed around Nixon.‖ The argument that his actions isolated the president, 
prevented ―communication with the outside world‖ and created ―a loner who made all his 
decisions in a complete vacuum‖ is ―completely off the mark.‖ Haldeman argued with good 
reason that he and his assistants controlled access in line with the president‘s wishes and the 
nature in which they wanted to run the affairs of state, especially in terms of the domestic 
political agenda, and the president‘s desire to focus more on his passions for foreign policy. 
Haldeman maintained that controlling Nixon‘s schedule was done in order to provide full 
―access to the advisers he knew would be the most useful.‖630 While Haldeman‘s claim that 
former President Lyndon Johnson was much more hamstrung ―by his accessibility to everyone‖ 
is more than a tad self-serving, his position was that any ―wall‖ he did construct was for the 
purposes of achieving presidential clarity and effectiveness, allowing the president to see whom 
he really wanted to see. On this point Haldeman was more right than even he would have cared 
to admit.
631
  
 What pushed this operation over the edge occurred when ―another character‖ joined the 
White House staff.  Charles Colson, Haldeman admitted, ―encouraged the dark impulses in 
Nixon‘s mind, and acted on those impulses instead of ignoring them and letting them die. By 
1971, Colson was one of the few on the small list of people who saw the President frequently.‖ 
Haldeman recalled how another White House aide had once suggested that, ―Haldeman built a 
wall, but Colson was jumping over the wall.‖ As the chief of staff later declared, ―I must admit 
he was jumping over with my full knowledge and agreement.‖ One should take Haldeman at his 
word on this point, as to argue otherwise would be admitting that the great H.R. Haldeman, 
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keeper, along with Ehrlichman, of the ―German Wall‖ had no real control over what was going 
on with his president.
632
 
 While Haldeman ignored some of the ―orders‖ the president issued while blowing off 
steam, he believed that Colson was different, as the attorney was ―inside the Oval Office 
listening enthusiastically to Nixon‘s outraged pleas for action against various persons or 
organizations and promising, ‗Yes sir, I‘ll do that for you by tomorrow morning.‘‖633 John 
Mitchell, who did not hide his loathing of Colson from White House staff, confided in Haldeman 
that Colson was ―bad news,‖ and that he would ―get the President in trouble.‖ When the first 
news of the Watergate break-in reached Haldeman‘s ears, he instinctively believed it was the 
handiwork of his boss‘s special counsel. ―I tried to visualize the scene: a darkened political 
office, burglars prowling, flashlights wavering. Whose operation did that sound like? This led me 
to my second reaction: ‗Good Lord,‘ I thought, ‗they‘ve caught Chuck Colson.‘‖634  
 Colson of course always denies that he had anything to do with the Watergate break-in, 
and even though there is no ―smoking gun‖ that proves his guilt, one must wonder about his 
claims of innocence, not the least of which was that those who knew him best in the White 
House had feared the worst. John Ehrlichman, for one, believed that Watergate was likely a 
Colson operation.
 635
 Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, Colson claimed to know how 
the president really felt about things. In his exit interview from the White House staff following 
the landslide election on January 12, 1973, Colson made it abundantly clear how things really 
worked in the Nixon administration. ―Well . . . when I started I worked really, I mean Haldeman 
was my direct superior. He is obviously chief of staff, so everyone reports through Haldeman. 
But I, after the first year, had less and less contact with Haldeman on what I was doing and more 
and more directly with the President. I guess in the last two years I had, since 1971 and 1972, 
most of my contact was directly with the President.‖ Colson also laid out how the basic White 
House operation worked, especially in the election of 1972 where he had gained such 
prominence and influence. Although he would ―clear things‖ with Haldeman first, ―once you are 
off and running with something (especially if it was something the President had an interest in), I 
was normally reporting directly back to the President, or the President would call me and ask me 
how it was going.‖ Colson served as that person that Nixon liked to talk to—to bounce issues off 
on domestic, and even on foreign policy, when Haldeman and Kissinger were not there: ―The 
additional things that would probably be of interest, from the standpoint of writing a history, 
would be the advice I gave the President, or counsel he sought from me. . .‖ At specific and 
―limited‖ periods, Colson offered that, ―Apart from the President himself…I‘m probably the only 
guy who really knew what was going on in his mind.‖636  
 In Colson, Nixon had found the ultimate loyalist, one who would do not only anything 
the president asked but anything he believed the president wanted done. Haldeman, perhaps the 
only one capable of stopping it, was too much the true believer to risk being closed out of the 
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loop.
637
 Haldeman claims that Colson and the president were doing things that he paid scant 
attention to and that he failed to heed the warnings of Ehrlichman. ―Yet I preferred running the 
risk of Colson‘s getting out of control to losing his value to me…I felt the benefits outweighed 
the risks—and that I could keep a close enough rein on the risks to avoid any major disasters.‖  
So for the sake of expediency, the White House chief of staff stood by and let the administration 
crumble.
638
 As Theodore White pointed out, ―Haldeman‘s loyalty lay only to Richard Nixon; and 
no man served him worse.‖639 In the end, however, loyalty was a one-way street. In 1974, as the 
walls began to close in on his administration, President Nixon refused to pardon Haldeman 
despite the personal pleas of a man who had stood at his side during the political battles since 
1956. When Nixon learned of Haldeman‘s death in 1993, he chose to remember the good in his 
former chief of staff. ―He was loyal, a hell of a guy,‖ Nixon said to his personal assistant Monica 
Crowley. ―And to think about some of the boobs running around today! They couldn‘t even 
shine his shoes.‖640  
 With Watergate, Nixon‘s loyalists in the heartland abandoned the president like rats 
scurrying off a sinking ship, while others from his once robust inner circle fell back to the earth, 
scattered seemingly without purpose like spent leaves in an autumn wind—some to jail, some 
into personal obscurity, and others to odd forms of political celebrity.
641
 Only then was Richard 
Nixon truly alone and isolated as he fought largely by himself for redemption, struggling for his 
place in history as scholars and others pondered his legacy and picked at his political corpse.  In 
the end, some of Nixon‘s men had mirrored too much of their boss‘s darker impulses, the old 
gunfighter, the communist hunter, the ‗SOB,‘ and allowed the president to act on the worst 
aspects of his complex personality. That White House Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman allowed the 
president to be alone with the likes of Charles Colson must be viewed as a dereliction of duty, as 
this ―special counsel‖ was the likeliest candidate to have led Nixon the last few feet towards the 
edge and into the political abyss. It was a place the man from Yorba Linda had more than flirted 
with for his entire career but one he never fully crossed until he did with the aid and counsel of 
his most fervent loyalist in his last campaign. 
 
**** 
On a damp afternoon in April 1994, Richard Nixon returned to the place from whence he 
came, buried mere feet from the house and the tiny bedroom where he drew his first breath 81 
years earlier. His presidential library sprawls out behind the original modest frame dwelling still 
standing in Yorba Linda as a testament to all the places he traveled, all the hands he shook, 
minds he moved, (and those he didn‘t) and the millions of his fellow citizens he represented who 
instinctively agreed with his vision of America. Those visiting the library and birthplace will 
invariably make their way outside through the building‘s thick glass doors into the First Lady‘s 
rose garden and proceed down a lazy path leading to a small gravesite in the shadow of the 
                                                 
637
 Chuck Colson admitted on tape to the president that while he had nothing to do with Watergate, he ―did a hell of 
a lot of things on the outside . . . and you never read about it. The things that you read about were the things I didn‘t 
do [laughter in room]. Watergate and Segretti. I had nothing to do with it . . .‖ That contention was challenged by 
both the president and Haldeman on the tapes. See WHT Conversation No. 830-6 and 831-6, January 2 and 3, 1973.  
638
 Haldeman, Ends of Power, 319-320. 
639
 White, Breach of Faith, 140. 
640
 Crowley, Nixon in Winter, 341-342.  
641
 Henry Kissinger, who carried on as a peculiar celebrity, commentator and prognosticator on the world of 
diplomacy, was seldom kind to his former boss, once stating that ―He would have been a great man had somebody 
loved him.‖ See MacMillan, Nixon in China, 20. 
  170 
simple country house built by Nixon‘s father in 1912, a year before the future president was 
born. Looking east through a small stand of trees towards the home it is possible for visitors to 
imagine that they are in the middle of a farmyard anywhere in America, and the president was 
just a simple farmer buried out back by the trees in the family plot. As patrons sit on one of the 
two small benches adjacent to the grave late in the afternoon, they may see a small multi-colored 
tabby cat emerge through the brush from the bordering middle-class neighborhood and perch 
atop the dark granite gravestone. Visitors may watch as the animal calmly grooms its coat 
oblivious to those who gesture and muse how the late president would appreciate such a bucolic 
setting—just as they do.  
 For most of the first three decades following the end of WWII, to those in the great 
American heartland, Nixon, perhaps more than any other single leader, reflected their hopes, 
their fears, their creative (and self-destructive) impulses, and their desires to be remembered 
well.  Nixon was not only a risk taker but a winner, one who personified upward mobility. 
Despite his lofty achievements, Nixon, as with countless of his supporters, had remained 
resentful of those of ‗unearned‘ privilege and status—all very American traits. They were also 
characteristics Nixon and his faithful associates marshaled from the countless men and women 
across the nation who followed and supported him throughout—what few could fail to 
conclude—was a controversial career. Nixon‘s legacy could have been an attestation to the 
legitimacy of the American Dream: how paltry origins in a rural orange and lemon grove closed 
with homage and pageantry as the 37
th
 president was laid to rest by a grateful nation. The stirring 
cadence of his state funeral with its nostalgic and poignant blend of inspiration and melancholy, 
however, was marred by the unremarkable intonation of regret.  
In his speech at Nixon‘s memorial that April day, President Bill Clinton indicated his 
hope that history would be favorable to the memory of the late commander-in-chief. Clinton 
suggested, ―…may the day of judging President Nixon on anything less than his entire life and 
career come to a close.‖642 Historian Stanley Kutler among others responds that Nixon cannot be 
judged beyond the crimes of Watergate, as those transgressions were indicative of or ‗rooted‘ in 
his life and career.
643
 Given the immense and long-standing patronage Richard Nixon received 
from the American people, an indictment of his entire public career would constitute an 
indictment of the many millions who faithfully supported his positions, not a pleasant prospect. 
If in fact Watergate represents in totality the character and substance of Nixon‘s long tenure in 
elected office, then history must quarrel not just with the late president but with his benefactors 
who permitted this politician to become a fixture in public discourse for more than a quarter-
century. While Theodore White predicted that Richard Nixon would ―mystify even the 
historians,‖ it is important to remember that Yorba Linda‘s favorite son was never an enigma to 
his millions of loyalists.
644
 
 Behind the ornate presidential desk in the Oval Office, Nixon displayed the bust of his 
hero, Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln‘s sage reminder to his fellow Americans was that in this nation, 
despite the trials and tribulations, citizens must not sever their ―bonds of affection‖ with each 
other. All those who have occupied the office, including Nixon, have struggled in some manner 
with this article of faith, and to honor the sacred oath they swore to uphold when they assumed 
the presidency: That in order to ―serve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States 
                                                 
642
 Clinton‘s comments are taken from a videotaped broadcast of Richard Nixon‘s memorial service, Nixon Library. 
643
 Kutler, The Wars of Watergate, 617. 
644
 See White, Breach of Faith, 79. 
 
  171 
of America‖ it is necessary to defend the rights of friend and foe. Privilege demands an 
enormous and solemn duty. Lincoln‘s appeal to the ―better angels of our nature‖ during his first 
inaugural address in 1861, however, was not reserved for selectmen. No future grants of 
absolution were bestowed upon anyone, including those in Nixon‘s silent majority, who for more 
than a generation on matters of state germane to other Americans, communicated loudly with 
their silence, and when it suited them, spoke up with their vote, reelecting in a landslide the 
knowable and dark Richard Nixon.  
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